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

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NAPOLEON THE THIRD.

FOURTH VOLUME.

THE LIFE

OF

NAPOLEON III.

DERIVED FROM STATE RECORDS,
FROM UNPUBLISHED FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE,
AND FROM PERSONAL TESTIMONY.

BY BLANCHARD JERROLD.

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With FAMILY PORTRAITS in the POSSESSION of the IMPERIAL FAMILY, and
FACSIMILES of LETTERS of NAPOLEON I., NAPOLEON III., QUEEN HORTENSE, &c.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. IV.

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BOOK X.

THE CRIMEAN WAR.

CHAPTER I.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH ALLIANCE.

THE enemies of Napoleon III. are not open to argument, and are not to be moved by facts. Mr. Kinglake, having declared that the Emperor artfully designed and patiently led up to the declaration of war of 1854; that it was part of the policy of personal ambition which he laid down immediately after the *coup d'état*, if not before it; and that, throughout the long negotiations which preceded the rupture of peace, and the appearance of English and French ships and men in alliance against Russia, he was working to isolate England from Austria and Prussia, in order to monopolise her alliance and so give firmness to his throne—is accepted as the true and infallible interpreter of the origin of the Crimean War. Convicted of gross partiality and of reckless assertions, in his endeavour to fasten crime after crime upon the object of his malignant and unreasoning hate; confounded by the testimony of high-minded, impartial statesmen, like the Prince Consort, Lord Palmerston, Baron Stockmar, and others; Mr. Kinglake will not loose his grip nor confess to a single mistake. All the statesmen who approached the French Emperor, or followed the negotiations in which he took part, if they bear testimony to his intellectual power or to his good faith and his zeal for the public good, are his dupes. Mr. Kinglake, having framed his indict-

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ment with extraordinary care, and having defaced and blackened his enemy before putting him upon the stage, and built up a dark plot in which he was to be the arch-villain, could not consent to have the fabric of his dream torn to pieces, and admit that the Eastern Question was growing darkly out of the horizon long before Louis Napoleon was free to return to France, or before the historian's Claremont friends had been driven, with the scorn of all classes of Frenchmen and the contempt of all liberal men in Europe, into exile.

Mr. Kinglake traces all events relating to the war, and every incident of the drifting into it, to some individual interest, or base or treacherous personal interference. His influence on the right understanding of that great chapter of modern history has been most disastrous. The misconceptions in regard to it are innumerable. The careless censors of it are wont to declare that we drifted into it, and to misuse Lord Clarendon's statement in the House of Lord's, in justification of their view.[1] Mr. Kinglake is Austrian, and he

[1] 'My right hon. friend (Mr. Bright) is not to blame; he states that which is the common belief, that Lord Clarendon, in his place as Foreign Minister, did state that we had drifted into the Crimean war, that is to say, were carried into it without our own free will, by causes over which we had no control, with no distinct view or policy to guide our course, as the victims and playthings of mere circumstances. Lord Clarendon never said any such thing. On that occasion Lord Lyndhurst had raised a debate with reference to the policy of the Government. It was on the 14th of February, just before the declaration of war. Lord Clarendon, having fully explained the views and policy of the Government, said, "I have now done with the Blue Book, and I come to the question whether we are at peace or war." For Lord Lyndhurst had wound up his arguments by asking, "Are we at peace or are we at war?" Lord Clarendon answered that negotiations had been brought to a close, and that therefore all questions of policy were over and gone by; that the Government still desired peace, but that the means for securing it had passed away from their hands, and, in short, he said, we are drifting into war. That was to say, not that they had not a policy, but that the moment for negotiations had gone by, and that they had reached

is anti-Gallican. He never appears to be in search of the truth, but only of facts and rumours even of the most doubtful origin, that help to serve the foregone conclusions with which he entered upon his campaign. He condemns the English Government for their lack of energy and decision; and, in the blindness of his hate, arraigns the Emperor Napoleon for displaying those qualities, and adopting that policy, which, according to him, English Ministers should have displayed and adopted. Had English statesmen done that which the Emperor did, they would have been wise and good men in their generation. But the Emperor was a trickster, who laid a trap for England, to drag her into an alliance for his own personal advantage.[1]

The impartial reader of Mr. Kinglake's account of the origin of the Crimean War, will be fascinated by his style, and charmed by his portraiture of the actors in the great drama he unfolds; but, if he has read the pages of other historians, and the political biographies and correspondences bearing upon the subject, which have appeared since 1863, he cannot fail to feel amazed at the audacious partiality of the advocate turned historian. His chapter on the Menschikoff mission, in which the Great Elchi appears as a demigod, before whom we are told the Turkish mind 'used to bend and fall down,' is a literary masterpiece; but it contains no true judgment on the counts with which it deals. At the conclusion of Prince Menschikoff's mission, by which, as Mr. Kinglake admits, the Emperor Nicholas 'had destroyed the whole repute he had earned by wielding the power of Russia for more than a quarter of a cen-

the moment of transition, and he then, with reference exclusively to that state of circumstances, used the expression, "We are drifting into a state of war."'—Mr. Gladstone's Speech on the Affairs of Turkey in the House of Commons, July 31, 1876.

[1] See Appendix I.

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tury with justice and moderation towards foreign States,' all the Powers of Europe were of one mind, and opposed to the Czar.

Had England, acting with France, called the fleet up to Vourla when Napoleon advanced his to Salamis, Nicholas, even in the fury of his diplomatic defeat, would not have passed the Pruth. His sole reliance was on Lord Aberdeen's weakness and the English Peace party. It is at this point of his story that the historian of the Crimean War breaks off to 'glance at the operations of a small host of middle-aged men who were pushing their fortunes in Paris;' in other words, to prove to the world that it must not rely upon him for an impartial history, but must be content to enjoy a series of imaginative chapters about history, by a powerful and brilliant advocate.

He who is in search of a plain account of the origin of the Crimean War, must turn to Lord Palmerston's 'Life and Speeches,' and to the calm and clear judgment on the event by the late Prince Consort. Mr. Kinglake himself calls Palmerston 'the lustiest man of those days;' and certainly he could not object to the serene judgment of Prince Albert on the ground that he was inclined to cover a fault committed by the Emperor. The Prince remarked: 'If, through the line of policy he (Nicholas) has adopted, occasion has been given for Napoleon to prove himself politically honest, then out of this evil good has come.' By September 21 the Prince's good opinion has been strengthened, for on this date he writes to his old correspondent: 'Louis Napoleon wishes for peace, enjoyment, and cheap corn.' This was the opinion of a Prince of statesmanlike views, of calm judgment, and of blameless life, on the part which Louis Napoleon had taken in the tortuous and tangled negotiations that stretched from the resumption

of the dispute between France, as the hereditary protector of the Catholics in the East, and the Emperor of Russia, as the sovereign of the greater number of the followers of the Greek Church, in 1850. Mr. Kinglake has put the question at issue in his own epigrammatic way:—'Stated in bare terms, it was whether, for the purpose of passing through the building into their grotto, the Latin monks should have the key of the chief door of the Church of Bethlehem, and also one of the keys of each of the two doors of the Sacred Manger, and whether they should be at liberty to place in the Sanctuary of the Nativity a silver star adorned with the Arms of France.' At the end of September 1853 the question was whether—to quote the Prince Consort's words—'the extension of the advantages and privileges enjoyed by Christian communities in their capacity as foreigners to the Greeks generally, with the right granted to Russia to intercede for them to this effect, would simply make foreigners of ten millions of the subjects of the Porte, or depose the Sultan as their Sovereign, putting the Emperor of Russia in his place.' The period in the negotiations had been reached, according to the Prince, when the demands of Russia could be conceded 'only with the most dishonourable cowardice on the part of the Powers.' The Prince had been a weighty actor throughout the negotiations which had gone on through three years, and had led to this position, and in which Louis Napoleon had borne a conspicuous part; and he represented him as having been '*ehrlich*' (straightforward) throughout, and, so late as September 1858, as sincerely anxious for peace.[1] Even in January of the following year the Prince writes to his old friend

[1] 'As far as good faith is concerned, he has behaved admirably in this matter,' M. Thiers said to Mr. Senior (February 6, 1854).

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and counsellor: 'In the Eastern question the ball continues to roll downhill. "Things bad begun make strong themselves by ill," says Shakspeare, and the Emperor Nicholas is a case in point. We shall not be able to avoid war, and in this pass we find our neighbour and only ally in anything but a warlike mood.'

The reason was obvious. The war, or impending war, was very unpopular, and the Emperor was greatly embarrassed. His efforts were concentrated upon endeavours to bring the Czar to reason, even at the last moment, after Sinope, and when the fleets had entered the Black Sea.[1] On January 29, 1854, he wrote an autograph letter to Nicholas, in which he sought to demonstrate that the sending of the squadrons of the two Maritime Powers to the Bosphorus, was an inevitable step for the protection of Turkey, after the seizure of her provinces for the fulfilment of a treaty which she had not violated, and the Sinope outrage. This outrage, he declared, was not merely a check to the policy of England and France, but a rebuff to their military honour.[2] And yet he was ready to consent to an armistice, and to the withdrawal of all parties from their hostile positions, while a final effort should be made to settle their differences through their ambassadors.

'Let the Russian troops withdraw from the Principalities,' said Napoleon, 'and our fleets from the Black Sea. Since your Majesty prefers to treat direct with the Sultan, you would appoint an ambassador who would negotiate a convention with the Sultan's plenipotentiary, which would be submitted to the Four Powers. Let your Majesty adopt this plan, on which Queen Victoria and I are in complete agreement, and peace will

[1] January 4, 1854.

[2] See Appendix II.

be restored, and the world will rejoice. There is nothing in this course which can touch your Majesty's dignity, or wound your honour. But if, through some motive which it is difficult to conceive, your Majesty should reply by a refusal, then both France and England would be compelled to leave to the hazard of war that which might be decided to-day by reason and justice.'

Then, in order to guard against any misinterpretation of his personal feelings towards the Czar, Napoleon added: 'Let not your Majesty imagine that there is the least animosity in my heart; it is filled only with those sentiments which your Majesty yourself expressed in your letter of January 17, 1853, when you said: "Our relations should be sincerely amicable, based on identical intentions—the maintenance of order, the love of peace, respect for treaties, and mutual goodwill." This programme was worthy the Sovereign who drew it up; and I do not hesitate to affirm that I have remained faithful to it.'[1] It was at the time when Nicholas wrote to Napoleon the letter here cited, that

[1] The Duc de Broglie said the Emperor's letter had every fault that a composition could have; it was ill conceived and ill expressed. It was *plat et insolent, servile et brutal.* Madame de Circourt called it '*cette lettre affreuse,*' and added, playfully, that Nicholas would have it translated and posted up at the corner of every street. Count Kergolay, at his own dinner-table (February 17, 1854), having expressed his surprise that the English Government approved it, declared that its effect upon the French people had been admirable. 'The workmen,' he said, 'are all devouring it at their *guinguettes.* They are delighted to find *their* Emperor, the man whom *they* made Emperor, bearding Nicholas; and they are glad to read in a short, intelligible form the whole story of the quarrel. It will do much to popularise the war. Louis Napoleon has shown his usual tact in influencing the popular mind. As for the higher classes, the Royalists and the Russians (which is the same thing) are, of course, furious, but even *they* must confess that it is admirably written, that its tone is dignified and imperial, that the narrative is clear and condensed, and the logic irresistible.'

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he was endeavouring, in conversations with Sir Hamilton Seymour (having failed in Vienna), to make a secret arrangement with the English Government, which would have transferred the Christian subjects of the Porte to his paternal care, and eventually have made him master of Constantinople — England receiving Egypt, and, if she pleased, Candia, by way of exchange.[1] In 1853, the Czar Nicholas did not despair of forming a coalition with the German Powers and England against France. When, however, he perceived that his policy was not likely to succeed, he directed his energies to the prevention of the close alliance which, in anger and dismay, he saw springing up between the Emperor of France and the Queen of England. Foiled again, he at length stood at bay, after the reception of Napoleon's letter.

'Whatever your Majesty may decide,' he retorted, 'menaces will not induce me to recede. My confidence is in God, and in my right; and Russia, as I can guarantee, will prove herself in 1854 what she was in 1812.'

This allusion to 1812 was accepted by France as a challenge. When it had gone forth, peace had become impossible, even had the outrageous conditions which Nicholas had sent to Vienna, and to which he haughtily referred the Emperor Napoleon, been admissible.[2]

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[1] *Conversations with the Emperor of All the Russias.* By Sir Hamilton Seymour. 1854.

[2] Russia demanded, among other things, the confirmation of all existing treaties between herself and the Porte, together with a formal recognition of the Protectorate of the Greek Christians as she was pleased to understand it; in other words, the transfer to the Emperor of the allegiance of twelve millions of Turkish subjects. It was the breach of the Treaty of July 31, 1841, signed by the Five Powers, in which the independence of Turkey was collectively guaranteed, that was the origin of the war. At the moment when Nicholas was endeavouring to wheedle Sir Hamilton Seymour at

They were more than Prince Menschikoff had dared to ask, and the Conference of the Powers was not prepared to accept even the Prince's dose, which he had borne with a high hand to Stamboul, in the ship that was destined to be sunk by the Turks at the outset of the strife.

In a letter to King Leopold, July 20, 1854, the Prince Consort tersely expressed the popular feeling at the outset of the war:—'Another mistake which people abroad make, is to ascribe to England a policy based upon material interests and cold calculation. Her policy is one of pure feeling, and, therefore, often illogical. The Government is a popular government: the masses upon whom it rests only feel, and do not think. In the present instance, their feeling is something of this sort: "The Emperor of Russia is a tyrant, the enemy of all liberty on the Continent, the oppressor of Poland. He wanted to coerce the poor Turk. The Turk is a fine fellow; he has braved the rascal; let us rush to his assistance. The Emperor is no gentleman, as he has spoken a lie to our Queen. Down with the Emperor of Russia! Napoleon for ever! He is the nephew of his uncle, whom we defeated at Waterloo. We were afraid of his invading us? Quite the contrary! He has forgotten all that is past, and is ready to fight with us for the glorious cause against the oppressor of liberty."'

When a day of humiliation and prayer for the success of our arms was proposed, the Queen wrote to Lord Aberdeen (April 1, 1854), suggesting that a prayer should be substituted, remarking most justly: 'Moreover, to say (as we probably should) that *the great sinfulness of the nation* has brought about this war,

St. Petersburg, Prince Menschikoff was trying, by threats, at Constantinople, to extort a secret treaty against the Powers from the Porte.

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when it is the selfishness and ambition and want of honesty of *one man* and his servants which has done it, while our conduct throughout has been actuated by unselfishness and honesty, would be too manifestly repulsive to the feelings of any one, and would be a mere bit of hypocrisy.'

Far from suspecting the Emperor Napoleon of having brought about the war, the English Court, and public opinion throughout Europe, agreed in regarding him as the Sovereign who had most reason to avoid it, and who had striven to the utmost to avoid it accordingly. Nor can he be charged with having sought an English alliance at any price, the fact being that England sought his co-operation.[1]

When Mr. Kinglake comes to the Vienna Note, he is forced, by overwhelming facts, patent to all the world, to acknowledge that the Emperor Napoleon appeared in this passage of the tortuous negotiations as a peacemaker. 'And here it ought to be remarked,' he says, 'that at this moment the French Emperor did nothing to thwart the restoration of tranquillity. He perhaps believed that if a Note which had originated in Paris were to become the basis of a settlement, he might found on that circumstance a claim to the glory of having pacified Europe, and in that wholesome way might achieve the conspicuousness which he loved and needed. Perhaps he was only obeying that doubleness of mind which made him always prone to do acts

[1] 'When Russia, in the month of January 1853, first assumed a threatening attitude towards Turkey, by concentrating her troops upon the frontier of the Principalities, no joint action was taken by the Great Powers. When, by the withdrawal of the Russian Mission from Constantinople, and the passage of the Pruth by the Russian army, hostilities were imminent, the English Government first expressed a desire to act in concert with that of France.'—*Quarterly Review*, April 1863. Kinglake's *Crimea*.

clashing with one another. But whatever may have been the cause which led him for a moment to intermit his policy, it is just to acknowledge that he seems to have been faithfully willing to give effect to the means of pacifications which were proposed by the Vienna Note.' CHAP. I.

This admission, made in the most unhandsome manner, with unwarranted hints and reserves, destroys all the foul fabric which the mischievous historian's passion had raised to defame his personal enemy. 'Thus,' says a writer in 'Fraser's Magazine' (July 1863) 'we are given the materials for an irresistible conclusion that the last attempt at reconciliation between Turkey and Russia was devised and enforced by the usurper and his underbred advisers, and frustrated by the Great Elchi 'with the thin disciplined lips.'

At the end of his volume on the origin of the war, given up mainly to a baseless indictment of the Emperor Napoleon as the *fons et origo* of the mighty mischief, Mr. Kinglake, whose passion blinded even his acute intelligence, turns to Palmerston, 'the lustiest man of those days,' and says: 'As he from the first had willed it, so moved the two great nations of the West!' The 'Fraser' reviewer quietly remarks hereupon: 'This is very different to the Queen of England and her people decoyed into war to improve the fortunes of Maupas, and Persigny formerly Fialin, and St. Arnaud formerly Leroy.' It is, however, in harmony with M. Thiers's view. 'He held that Lord Palmerston took advantage of the dispute with Russia about the extradition of Kossuth to engage France in a war with the Power which he abhorred.[1] Baron Stockmar, who

[1] 'The Porte, very imprudently and very inconveniently, left the decision to France and England. Lord Palmerston saw an opportunity of

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was a calmer and more impartial judge, and who cannot certainly be charged with any predilection in favour of the French Emperor or Lord Palmerston, gives the English statesman credit for having been the first person in authority in England to perceive that 'the Russian madness made the Franco-English alliance a political necessity.' 'He certainly had the better of us,' the Baron adds.[1]

engaging France in a war with Russia, and turned it to advantage with his usual wrong-headed cleverness.' —*Conversations with M. Thiers and M. Guizot.* By the late Nassau William Senior. 2 vols. Hurst and Blackett. 1878.

[1] *Memoirs of Baron Stockmar.* Edited by F. Max Müller. 2 vols. Longmans and Co. 1872.

CHAPTER II.

THE CAMP AT BOULOGNE.

CHAP. II.

It was the concerted plan of the enemies of the Emperor to insist that the Empire meant war, and not peace. They would obstinately perceive, even in the Sovereign's domestic measures, his development of the railway system and the mercantile marine, his patronage of any effort for the moral elevation or the material comfort of the nation committed to his care, and his own bold social experiments, only masks hiding preparations for foreign conquest. Model lodging-houses were merely barracks in disguise. If he desired to improve the breed in horses, it was only to strengthen his cavalry. He could not decree the cutting of a broad street through a slum, without hearing that he was making a way for his guns. Such was the interpretation of his act when, on December 10, 1853, he opened the Strasbourg Boulevard. It was the penalty a Napoleon paid for the name by which he had risen to power.

King Leopold, the sagacious, was amongst the most timorous spectators of the rise of the second Empire. After a time he brought himself to believe that the Emperor was of a pacific mind for the moment; and he visited him in 1854, at his Boulogne Camp. But he insisted that Napoleon's peace only meant patience waiting for an opportunity. 'He is trying to amuse the

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commercial and industrial spirit of France,' said the King to Mr. Senior,[1] 'because he has found unexpected obstacles to his plans of gratifying his ambition. This was not his original scheme. I have reason to know that he intended to copy the decrees by which his uncle annexed to France, first Holland, and afterwards the provinces at the mouths of the Weser and the Elbe. I believe that the decree for the annexation of Belgium was actually drawn out.' The King was informed, no doubt, by the exiles of the *coup d'état*, who flocked to his capital, and to whom he gave a hearty welcome. Thiers and Lamoricière were his teachers. It was the deliberate policy of the discomfited Burgraves to represent Louis Napoleon at the courts of Europe as a firebrand; and, for a time, their policy was successful. His early welcome among the European Sovereigns was, as we have seen, more than cold. But the frost melted away, as he gave proof upon proof of his good faith, of his rare ability, and of that fine *savoir faire* which commended him at once to all with whom he came in personal contact. M. Thiers and M. Guizot were at once the most active and dangerous of his enemies. Rivals in ambition become by the blows of fate companions in misfortune, they fell upon the author of their discomfiture with a will. M. Thiers was exasperated because the Prince-President had declined to deliver himself, bound hand and foot, into his keeping. In his conversations with Mr. Senior in London and elsewhere, he presents himself always as the man of the situation, the only safe pilot in the storm. He was quite ready, and so was M. Guizot, to serve Louis Napoleon, had he consented to be a constitutional monarch, of their pattern; but since he declined to commit his

[1] *Conversations with M. Thiers and M. Guizot.*

fortunes and those of the country to the two men who had wrecked the House of Orleans, the sharp-tongued little *bourgeois* went about saying that the Imperial coronation and the marriage would each amuse the people six months, and then some other toys must be found for the diversion of the *vile multitude*. It is remarkable that this unsleeping censor of the new Empire hated it, in the first place, because he was not allowed to direct its fortunes; and, in the second place, because it was based on universal suffrage; on the voice of that 'vile multitude' whom from first to last he despised, being heart and soul a Boulevard *bourgeois*.[1]

M. Thiers watched the progress of the negotiations which led to the war with Russia, hoping to find his opportunity in it. Any conflagration was welcome to him that would roast his eggs *à point*. He showed no concern for the distresses consequent upon the bad harvest of 1853; for the people's bread he never had any care. But he was very busy pondering what the game of diplomacy might bring to him or to his rival Guizot. The latter believed that the Emperor would not live long; that France, being intent on 'nothing but money-making,' would not suffer her ruler to go to war while her prodigious prosperity lasted; and that he would probably die before he reached an opportunity for beginning his career of conquest. 'Then,' said pleasant Mr. Senior, 'of course, the consequence will be

[1] 'You know the story of the fiend that tore his master to pieces as soon as he ceased to find him employment. Such a fiend is France. Do you suppose that the most unquiet, the most restless, the most vain, the most ambitious, the most daring, and the most unscrupulous people that the world has ever feared and wondered at, will be satisfied to stand like a Russian sentinel, with shouldered arms, in silence and darkness, forbidden to move, or to speak, or to hear, or even to see? And this after having enjoyed three hundred years of excitement?'—M. Thiers to Mr. Senior. Senior's *Conversations with Distinguished Persons*.

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Henri V., the re-establishment of the Constitution, and the renewal of the old parliamentary duel between M. Guizot and M. Thiers.' The flattered statesman only answered that both Thiers and Guizot were getting old. Thiers protested that he wanted only to amuse himself for the rest of his life with historical writing. In Paris the Duc de Broglie and his friends met to exchange the most absurd rumours, and to disseminate everything they had heard to the disadvantage of the Emperor, his Ministers, and his Court. The Duke was talking in May 1853 about the possibility of invading England in a few hours. The railway, he said, could take 80,000 men from Paris to Boulogne in seven hours, and in seven hours more they could be en route for Dover. Faucher, who was battening on the sudden prosperity at the Crédit Foncier, had nothing but scandal to report of the Government. Lanjuinais foresaw nothing but the assassination of the Emperor through the secret societies. Mignet, Rémusat, and all the friends whom Thiers had about him, were industriously talking against the Empire, on all kinds of theoretical grounds. Dumon, President of the Lyons Railway, and ex-Minister under Guizot, prated in his splendid cabinet of only ruin and disaster. Victor Cousin went about lamenting the Anglo-French alliance,[1] because, according to him, it introduced Louis Napoleon into the great family of Sovereigns; and the war, because it made the Empire popular. We need not follow all these clever

[1] 'In a letter said to have been written by the Emperor to Mr. F. Campbell, the translator of M. Thiers's *History of the Consulate and Empire*, when returning the proof-sheets of his translation in 1847, he says: "Let us hope the day may yet come when I shall carry out the intentions of my uncle, by uniting the policy and interests of England and France in an indissoluble alliance."'—*Extract from the Queen's Diary—Theodore Martin's Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iii. p. 259.

men in their free speculations on the fate of Louis Napoleon. The pages of Mr. Senior leave them bare to the knife of the future historian of the Empire. Never did so many men, of conspicuous ability and of experience in state affairs, indulge in so many prophecies which a few years, nay, in some cases a few months, showed to be the base creations of passion and of spite. All the enemies of the Empire, from the Duc de Broglie, in the salons of Paris, to M. Ledru-Rollin, in the purlieus of Soho, agreed, however, in representing the Emperor as bent on war, and especially on a war with England. They admitted, when they saw the Anglo-French alliance firmly established, and the fleets and battalions of the two countries engaged in a common contest against the insolent pretensions of Russia, that the descent upon Dover might have been put off by the wily master of the Tuileries, but still they shook their sapient heads, and raised their warning fingers, and told the world to beware. Victor Cousin even said that, before the war was over, the Emperor would seize Belgium and Savoy,[1] and that we should be his slaves ever after.

When it became known, after the declaration of war by England and France against Russia, and while the French Government were making great preparations for the transport of an army to the East, that the King of the Belgians, and afterwards the husband of Queen Victoria, were to be the guests of Napoleon in the Boulogne Camp, the *frondeurs* plied their trade with the vehemence of sudden anger. The war was not popular in France, and they took advantage of this, still to predict disasters, and to measure the short run which the

[1] Senior's *Conversations with Distinguished Persons*, vol. i. pp. 177, 178.

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Empire was to make to its destruction.[1] Napoleon would play the English Court a fine trick. He would soon make Leopold bite the dust. But the illustrious guests came and went away delighted with their host.

The visit of the Consort of the Queen of England to the Emperor, surrounded by his camp, alive with 100,000 soldiers, on the very ground where his uncle had massed an army with the avowed purpose of effecting a landing on British soil, was an event which was brought about after due consideration on both sides. Napoleon, in the first place, asked the British Ambassador in Paris, Lord Cowley, with whom he was on particularly friendly terms, and whose part in maintaining the good relations which existed between England and France throughout the Imperial epoch has never been fairly appreciated, whether he thought an invitation to the Queen's Consort to the Boulogne Camp would be acceptable. Lord Cowley communicated with Lord Clarendon, assuring the Foreign Secretary that the Emperor's desire was to establish cordial personal relations with the British Court, and adding that he believed substantial benefit would accrue from the contact of the Prince's sound understanding with the mind of Louis Napoleon. The reply was prompt,[2] and it drew from the Emperor the following letter of invitation :[3]—

[1] According to the Note exchanged between England and France, they mutually agreed neither to seek nor reap any territorial advantage or aggrandisement from the war.

[2] The visit which the reigning Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha had paid to the Emperor in the spring, and the good effect of it, had inclined the Prince Consort to accept.

[3] 'St.-Cloud, le 3 Juillet 1854.

'Mon Frère, — Votre Altesse Royale sait que, mettant en pratique sa propre idée, et voulant prouver une détermination de soutenir jusqu'au bout la lutte que nous avons commencée ensemble, j'ai décidé la réunion d'une armée entre St.-Omer et Boulogne. Je n'ai pas besoin de dire à votre Altesse quel plaisir j'aurais à la voir et combien je serais

'St. Cloud, July 3, 1854. CHAP. II.

'Brother,—Your Royal Highness knows that, putting in practice your own idea, and wishing to show my determination to carry out to the end the struggle we have begun together, I have decided to form an army between Boulogne and St. Omer. I need not tell your Highness how pleased I should be to receive you, and how happy I should be to show you my soldiers. I am convinced, moreover, that personal ties will contribute to strengthen the union so happily established between two great nations. I beg you to present my respectful homage to the Queen, and to receive the expression of the esteem and of the sincere affection I have conceived for you. With this, Brother, I pray God to have you in His holy keeping.

'NAPOLEON.'

The Prince's reply, written after consultation with Lords Clarendon and Aberdeen, who cordially advised him to call the Emperor '*frère*,' and declared that only good could come out of the proposed visit, was even warmer and more gracious than that of the Emperor.[1] Napoleon was addressed as '*Sire et cher Frère*,' and the Prince, after thanking the Emperor for his 'gracious and amiable letter,' declared that he should accept the invitation with pleasure, as affording him an opportunity of making His Majesty's personal acquaintance, and of expressing to him, *vivâ voce*, the high value the

heureux de lui montrer mes troupes; je suis d'ailleurs persuadé que les liens personnels contribueront encore à cimenter l'union si heureusement établie entre deux grands peuples. Je vous prie de présenter à la Reine mes respectueux hommages et de recevoir l'expression de l'estime et de la sincère affection que je vous ai vouées. Sur ce, mon Frère, je prie Dieu, qu'il vous ait en sa sainte et digne garde.—NAPOLÉON.'

[1] *Life of the Prince Consort.* By Theodore Martin. Vol. iii. p. 88

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Queen and himself attached to the friendship and intimacy which characterised the relations of the Governments of the two countries. 'I shall, moreover,' the Prince continued, 'feel great interest in witnessing the concentration of soldiers of that noble army which is now ranged beside ours for the defence of the rights of Europe, and in seeing these troops commanded by your Majesty in person.' His Royal Highness then thanked the Emperor in the Queen's name for his message to her, and begged to be remembered to the Empress; and signed himself '*le bon frère*' of his host to be.

Nor were these simply civilities. The Queen warmly approved the visit as 'a right and natural thing.' Baron Stockmar anticipated good from it, 'inasmuch as the good or evil destiny of the present time will directly and chiefly depend upon a rational, honourable, and resolute alliance between England and France.'

The Emperor and the Prince met at Boulogne on September 4, 1854, the Prince hastening ashore as soon as the gangway was established from the 'Victoria and Albert,' and giving and receiving a cordial greeting. The Duke of Newcastle, who was in attendance, remarked to Lord Cowley, that the tears stood in the Emperor's eyes, while he expressed to the Prince his pleasure at 'this fresh proof of the cordiality of the alliance which England proffered him.' The Prince, by way of reply, handed to his host an autograph letter from the Queen, couched in terms that delighted him. The two then drove away to a little château behind the railway station, where the Emperor's quarters were established, to begin a friendship that grew from that day forth between the reigning families of England and France, and suffered no abatement after the sun had set on the Second Empire.

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'Writing to the Queen on the eve of the day of his meeting with the Emperor for the first time, the Prince Consort said of his host:[1] 'The Emperor has been very nervous, if we are to believe what is said by those who stood near him, and who know him well. He was kindly and cordial, does not look so old or pale as his portraits make him, and is much gayer than he is generally represented. The visit cannot fail to be a source of great gratification to him. . . . . Drouyn de Lhuys and Maréchal Vaillant are the persons of note who are here, besides General Montebello, whom we saw at the camp in England, and Colonel Fleury; and all the other gentlemen are officers of no distinction.[2]

'I have had two long talks with the Emperor, in which he spoke very sensibly about the war, and the "*question du jour*." People here are far more sanguine about the results of the expedition to the Crimea, very sensitive about the behaviour of Sir Charles Napier, scantily satisfied with Lord Stratford; nevertheless, so far as the Emperor is concerned, determined to consider the war and our alliance as the one thing paramount, to which all other considerations must give place.' Then, on the evening of the same day, before retiring to rest, the gentle and gifted Consort wrote the following in his good-night to his Queen:—'The Em-

[1] Theodore Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort.*

[2] Charles Dickens, in a letter dated April 6, 1854, has described Boulogne during the Prince's visit:—'The town looks like one immense flag, it is so decked out with streamers; and as the royal yacht approached yesterday—the whole range of the cliff tops lined with the troops, and the artillery matches in hand, all ready to fire the great guns the moment she made the harbour; the sailors standing up in the prow of the yacht; the Prince in a blazing uniform, left alone on the deck for everybody to see—a stupendous silence, and then such an infernal blazing and banging as never was heard. It was almost as fine a sight as one could see under a deep blue sky.'—*Letters of Charles Dickens*, vol. i. p. 362.

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peror thaws more and more. This evening, after dinner, I withdrew with him to his sitting-room for half an hour, before rejoining his guests, in order that he might smoke his cigarette, in which occupation, to his amazement, I could not keep him company. He told me one of the deepest impressions ever made upon him was when, after having gone from France to Rio Janeiro, and thence to the United States, and been recalled to Europe by the rumour of his mother's serious illness, he arrived in London shortly after King William's death, and saw you at the age of eighteen going to open Parliament for the first time.' Then, again, on the following evening, after a long review day with the Emperor, the Prince continues the second of his impressions :—

'During the six hours which I passed in the carriage with the Emperor alone, we discussed all the topics of home and foreign policy, material and personal, with the greatest frankness, and I can say but good of what I heard.

'He has explained his relations to Persigny, in exchange for my communication as to ours to Palmerston, and I have made him understand our position with reference to his *coup d'état*. His wish is to see Spain and Portugal united. I have unfolded our reasons for a different view. We have discussed political economy, taxation, and finance, reformatories, prisons, and transportation, constitutional government, liberty and equality, &c., all *secundum artem*, &c. &c. More of this hereafter by word of mouth. He was brought up in the German fashion, at the Gymnasium in Augsburg, where he passed the greater part of his childhood—recollections which have remained dear to him, and a training which has developed a German turn of thought. As to all modern political history, so far as

this is not Napoleonic, he is without information, so that he wants many of the materials for accurate judgment. He has made a thorough study of military matters, and is completely master of them.

'I send you two of the new gold five-franc pieces which the Emperor gave me, one for yourself, and one for the numismatical department of the children's museum.'

While the guest of the Emperor, the Prince Consort expressed to him the Queen's wish to see him in England, and also to make the acquaintance of the Empress. The Emperor replied that he hoped first to have an opportunity of receiving the Queen in Paris, in the following year, 'when the Louvre would be completed for the Exhibition.' And so the matter was left; but when the Prince had returned to Osborne, he wrote to the Emperor, to renew in writing, as he remarked, the expression of his gratitude for the kind reception which had been given to him. 'The remembrance,' he said, 'of the days I have just spent there, as well as of the trustful cordiality with which you have honoured me, shall not be effaced from my memory. I found the Queen and our children well, and she charges me with a thousand kind messages for your Majesty.'

The Prince's impressions of his four days' contact with the Emperor formed the subject of a memorandum[1] which he dictated to General Grey two days after his return to Osborne. 'I cannot sufficiently acknowledge,' he remarks in this formal and candid document, 'the openness and want of reserve with which he broached all the most important topics of the day, and hope I was as open and unreserved in the expression of

[1] *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iii. p. 108.

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my own opinions.' The Prince's sketch of the Emperor's character, as developed before him during his short stay, bears the strong impress of his own. It is not only the truth, but the whole truth, according to the Prince's light.

'He appeared quiet and indolent from constitution, not easily excited, but gay and humorous when at his ease. His French is not without a little German accent, the pronunciation of his German better than that of his English.[1] On the whole I observed a good deal in his turn of mind that is owing to his education at Augsburg, where, as he told me, he was brought up at the Gymnasium. He recited a poem by Schiller on the advantages to man of peace and war, which seemed to have made a deep impression upon him, and appears to me to be not without significance with reference to his life.

'His court and household are strictly kept, and in good order, more English than French. The gentlemen composing his *entourage* are not distinguished by birth, manner, or education. He lives on a very familiar footing with them, although they seemed afraid of him. The tone was rather the *ton de garnison*, with a good deal of smoking; the Emperor smoking cigarettes, and not being able to understand my not joining him in it. He is very chilly, complains of rheumatism, and goes early to bed; takes no pleasure in music, and is proud of his horsemanship—in which, however, I could discern nothing remarkable.'[2]

Having remarked again that the Emperor appeared

[1] The young Prince Imperial, who spoke English with wonderful correctness, often joked his father on his pronunciation of certain English words.

[2] The Prince was himself a very poor horseman.

to be very deficient in modern political history, the Prince added: 'He was remarkably modest, however, in acknowledging these defects, and showed the greatest candour in not pretending to know what he did not. All that refers to the Napoleonic history he seems to have at his fingers' ends; he also appears to have thought much and deeply on politics, yet more like an "amateur politician," mixing many very sound and many very crude notions together. He admires English institutions, and regrets the absence of an aristocracy in France; but might not be willing to allow such an aristocracy to control his own power, whilst he might wish to have the advantage of its control over the pure democracy.'

The Emperor questioned the Prince very closely about the working of the administration of the English Government, and the Queen's relations with her Ministers, her supervision of the whole of the diplomatic correspondence; and then His Majesty described his own administrative machinery and relations with foreign courts. 'He said he did not allow his Ministers to meet or discuss matters together—that they transacted their business solely with him. He rarely told the one what he had settled with the other.'

'He seemed astonished,' the Prince observed, 'when I told him that every Despatch went through the Queen's hands, and was read by her, as he only received extracts made from them, and indeed appeared to have little time or inclination generally to read. When I observed to him, that the Queen would not be content without seeing the whole of the diplomatic correspondence, he replied that he found a full compensation in having persons in his own confidence at the different posts of importance, who reported directly to him. I could not but express my sense of the danger of such

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an arrangement, to which no statesman—in England at least—would consent, and which enabled the Foreign Minister (if he chose to cheat his master) always to plead to foreign countries his ignorance of what might have been done, or to throw the entire blame, in any difficulty that might occur, upon these secret instructions. The Emperor acknowledged all this, but pleaded necessity.'

Having discussed the *coup d'état*, the characters of Lords Palmerston and Aberdeen, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Counts Walewski and Persigny,[1] with perfect candour on both sides, the Emperor and the Prince turned to French public men and French finance. In the course of this discussion the Emperor explained his part in the creation of the *Crédit Mobilier*, and his appeal to the bulk of the people to subscribe the war loan, and its triumphant success.

'We conversed,' the Prince reports, 'on the immorality of public men in France, particularly with regard to money transactions. The Emperor maintained that he could vouch for the integrity of the members of his Government, but not beyond, and this was one of his greatest difficulties. For instance, nothing had done him or his Government more harm than the attempt at the loan on the *Crédit Mobilier*. The transaction had been a very simple and unobjectionable one when proposed to him. The *employés*, however, immediately drove up the 500-franc shares to 3,000, then sold and let the whole thing fall, which brought ruin on numbers of families. He was determined to do them in return, and had, without saying a word to anybody, opened a

[1] The Emperor did ample justice to the good qualities of his old friend, but declared that his marriage had ruined him, and that his unmeasured language had done his Government great harm.

general subscription of the people, through the Prefects, in every village. The effect had been marvellous. The whole loan was subscribed for in a day by the lowest classes, who were as much delighted at the measure as the money-lenders and *agioteurs* were annoyed, and brought their money *seulement pour le donner à Napoléon.* He would have to recur to this again, probably next year.[1] . . . .

'This led to a general discussion on finance and commercial policy—the Emperor leaning to indirect taxation; I condemning indirect taxation as a principle, but acknowledging its necessity as a sacrifice to the weakness of human nature, which cannot bear to see the money go direct from the pocket of the individual to the coffers of the State. I particularly condemned the ever-recurring attempts of the successive French Governments to control the price of bread. He declared this a necessity, as, when bread was dear, the people became ungovernable. The town of Paris had had to sacrifice sixteen millions of francs last year[2] for that object, which he hoped to get back now after a plentiful harvest. I could not but express my doubts whether he would find it practicable to get back a shilling. As to the stability of the Government, nothing appeared to me so dangerous as to establish and acknowledge an immediate connection between it and the price of bread. He admitted this, but repeated that there was no help for it.

'We talked over general principles of government; I maintaining that the destinies of nations were less controlled by armies and rulers than by the philosophers of the day. I attributed the whole difficulty of

[1] The subsequent loans of the Empire were subscribed in the same manner, and with uniform success.

[2] 1853.

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the Government in France to the absurd doctrine of equality as an accompaniment to liberty, which was in fact its negation, and to Rousseau's *Contrat Social*, which represented man as originally free, and surrendering only a portion of his liberty to the State, in return for which he obtained certain advantages. This doctrine made it a continued matter of calculation, whether the advantages were adequate to the sacrifices, and in distress or difficulties of any kind the individual was prone to consider himself freed from his obligations to the State, whilst, in reality, man was originally in the most abject state of dependence, and obtained the condition for acquiring any liberty only through the existence of the State, its laws, and civilisation. Matters would not get better till some great mind arose and made a sounder philosophy popular. The Emperor seemed struck, and agreed with the truth of this; but objected that no writers would for an immense length of time find their way to the people of France. Good writing had no chance at all, for even the worst writing of the Socialists, who worked upon the lowest passions of the crowd, had in fact hardly penetrated the surface of society. He instanced as a proof his own election for the National Assembly at Metz, when the Socialist candidate, who had all the votes pledged to him, saw them given to himself, a stranger just arrived, merely on account of the name of Napoleon. This name was the only thing left which still united the sentiments of the people. How little the people followed even the history of their own times was again illustrated to him on his way with the Empress to Biarritz, when, through a large portion of the south of France, the people cried, "Vive Marie-Louise!" He had also heard on a former journey cries of "*Enfin voilà le vieux revenu!*"

CHAP. II.

Host and guest next turned to military matters, and to the condition in which the outbreak of the war had found the French army. The Emperor acknowledged that France was not ready for the struggle. 'He had to refurnish almost his whole material, but was going on satisfactorily, and would be quite ready next year.' He described how he intended to keep up the camps, to accustom his troops to the field. 'He had placed his whole artillery on a uniform system, twelve-pounders, which he was very proud of, as well as of the new carbine, his own invention, and a rocket of very large calibre, which has carried up to 6,000 mètres, and from which he expects great results. He had likewise had experiments carried on as to the power of resistance of wrought iron, which proved that, at a given angle, a small thickness, like two inches, would resist any shot—the shot splitting. He thought an application of this to floating batteries to be the way of taking Cronstadt without any loss.'

Then, as to the appearance of the Emperor in the field, the Prince remarked: 'In the command of his troops he appeared inexperienced, though calm and self-possessed, and very modest and ingenuous as to what he had yet to learn, but decidedly showing talent for it.' According to the Prince, the Emperor was almost the only person among the officers of the suite and camp who had any hope of the success of the expedition against Sebastopol, and they were astonished to find the English officers who accompanied the Prince so sanguine about it. The Emperor strongly condemned St. Arnaud's march into the Dobrudja, and declared that it had been positively forbidden. Under this section of his paper, the Prince concludes characteristically: 'Before we left Boulogne, accounts arrived from Varna, announcing the decision to go to the

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Crimea, St. Arnaud writing, in true French style, of himself, "*Je suis plein de confiance et plein d'ardeur.*"'

The survey of European politics which the host and guest made in common, on the eve of the Prince's return to England, included a discussion on German politics, in the course of which the Prince saw 'that he had the common dread of all Frenchmen, that Germany would become formidable if too strongly united.' The Emperor declared that he was anxious for the union of Spain and Portugal under one king, to see Lombardy free from the maladministration of Austria, and Poland restored.[1] The Prince said Austria could not give up the line of the Mincio, and he defied the Emperor to trace another tenable boundary on the map. The Emperor answered significantly that if military frontiers were an essential point for the existence of States, France also had claim to one. This the Prince would not admit, pointing to Switzerland and Belgium as the neutral Powers flanking France, and constituting the best possible bulwarks. The Emperor was not convinced, denying that neutrality was a real protection, 'as it was rarely maintained in time of war.'

'Upon the whole,' the Prince remarked, in conclusion, 'the impression which my stay at Boulogne left upon me is, that naturally the Emperor would neither in home nor in foreign politics take any violent steps; but that he appears in distress for means of governing, and obliged to look about for them from day to day. Having deprived the people of any active participation in the government, and having reduced them to mere passive spectators, he is bound to keep up the "spectacle," and, as at fireworks, whenever a pause takes

[1] 'He would have been content with ever so small a nucleus, and perfectly so with the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.'

Painted by Winterhalter

Engraved by H. Adlard

THE PRINCE IMPERIAL. 1864.

place between the different displays, the public immediately grows impatient, and forgets what it has just applauded, and that new preparations require time. Still he appears to be the only man who has any hold on France, relying on the "*nom de Napoléon*," which is the last thing left to a Frenchman's faith. He said to the Duke of Newcastle: "Former Governments tried to reign by the support of perhaps *one* million of the educated classes. I have tried to lay hold of the other twenty-nine." He is decidedly benevolent and anxious for the good of his people, but has, like all rulers before him, a bad opinion of their political capacity. He will be exposed to one danger in his attempt at governing solely by himself, which has befallen almost every absolute monarch, that he will be crushed under the weight of a mass of unimportant details of business, whilst the real direction of affairs may be filched from him by his irresponsible Ministers.'

The value of the Prince's opinion on the Imperial system is lessened, when we consider the undoubted fact that he knew very little of Frenchmen or of France, and that his sympathies lay with Germany and Austria, rather than with the democratic institutions of Napoleon, and the aspirations of Italy and of Poland. Still, his statement is valuable as that of an honest, cultivated, and sagacious mind; of a mind remarkable also for its courageous candour. The opinions of the Prince on the Emperor are exactly what he thought, and all he thought, on the subject. His last words on his visit are very interesting. 'The Emperor's best chance,' he said, 'is the English alliance, which not only gives steadiness to his foreign policy, but, by predisposing in his favour the English press, protects him from the only channel through which public opinion in France, if hostile to him, could find vent. I told him that we should be

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glad to see him in England, and that the Queen would be delighted to make acquaintance with the Empress. He gave no direct answer, but the expression of his hope that we would come in return to Paris for the Exhibition next year, when the Louvre would be finished.'

The Emperor was delighted with his guest, and as he left Boulogne, handed to him a letter for the Queen. 'The presence,' he said in it,[1] 'of your Majesty's estimable Consort in the midst of a French camp, is a fact of the utmost political significance, since it demonstrates the intimate union of the two countries. But to-day I prefer not to dwell on the political aspect of this visit, but to tell you in all sincerity how happy it has made me to be for several days in the society of a Prince so accomplished—a man endowed with qualities so seductive, and with knowledge so profound. He may feel assured that he carries with him my sentiments of high esteem and friendship. But the more I have been enabled to appreciate Prince Albert, the more it behoves me to be touched by the kindness of your Majesty in agreeing on my account to part with him for several days.'

This opinion was repeated by the Emperor shortly afterwards, in a conversation on the Boulogne visit, which he held with Count Walewski. The Emperor reproached him for not having made him better acquainted beforehand with the Prince's high character and the weight which his opinions carried in England.

[1] *The Life of the Prince Consort*, vol iii. pp. 1, 2, 3.

CHAPTER III.

THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.

CHAP. III.

WITHIN a fortnight of the close of the Prince Consort's visit to the Emperor at Boulogne, the Queen received the news at Balmoral[1] that the Allied forces had landed safely at Eupatoria, and had begun to march on Sebastopol.

This successful opening of the Crimean War was hailed in France with an enthusiasm that disheartened the *salons* of the *frondeurs*, who never ceased to support Russia, even against their own country, in the hope of harming the Empire.[2] It came upon a people who

[1] September 21, 1854.

[2] 'We must both of us abstain,' M. Thiers said to Mr. Senior, February 6, 1854, 'from using as our battle-field the foreign relations of the country. In these relations an error is fatal. We may quarrel among ourselves; we must be united against the foreigner.' This, I repeat, we have not yet learned. Our Bourbonists cannot bear to see a Bonaparte strengthened by the alliance of your admirable Queen. They cannot bear to think that his despotism may be consolidated by the prestige of military glory. Their whole influence is exerted for Russia. They would sacrifice Turkey to deprive their enemies of a triumph. They are striving to make *us* distrust *you*, and *you* distrust *us*. They are striving to make the war unpopular; a month hence they will be striving to make it unsuccessful. I believe they are mad enough to wish, and even to hope, for another foreign restoration.' Speaking of the projected fusion, M. Thiers added: 'I think it was inoppertune and insolent. Inopportune, because it was obviously a Russian move, and every move in that direction widens the chasm that is opening throughout Europe between the peoples and the sovereigns. The good sense of the people leads them everywhere to abhor Russia. . . . France always hated the elder branch; now it despises the younger branch. This alliance between the Pretenders has been almost as useful to Louis Napoleon as his own alliance with England.'

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were materially prosperous, and not politically reduced to the position of 'mere spectators,' as the Prince Consort believed. M. Thiers had seen germs of a new political life growing under the Imperial purple, so early as 1853.

'Well, you see what the Corps Législatif are doing,' he said in this year to Mr. Senior; '*ça pousse*. He (Louis Napoleon) thought he had cut down all freedom to the roots. And so he had, but the roots are not killed; the earth is moving above them; you will see the new stalks shoot up. He thought that he had filled his Chamber with mutes and tools. And so he had; but the traditions of representative life have transformed them; the mutes are beginning to murmur, and the tools to turn against him.' Thus, in his old way, the discomfited statesman gave his idea of what the Emperor should do.

'You asked me the other day, my dear Senior, what I would do in his place. I would give free scope to this rising freedom; I would allow them to kick at me as much as they pleased, being sure that if I yielded to the kicks they would not be able to kick me out. This year I would make this decree—"Considering that it is difficult to draw the line between Constitutional and ordinary laws, all laws whatever are within the jurisdiction of the Senate." Next year I would decree—"Considering that the discussions in the Corps Législatif often bring to light new facts and suggest new inferences, the Corps Législatif is empowered to make amendments in the Budget and in the other matters submitted to it." A year after that I would decree—"Considering that the Ministers may receive from the Senate and the Corps Législatif, and impart to them, valuable information, the Ministers shall have places in those bodies." And in 1857 I would decree—"Con-

sidering that free discussion is useful, and is impeded by the subjection of the journals to suppression, no journal shall in future be suppressed. All the liabilities of the press are retained." With these decrees we should have a Constitution; Guizot, and Molé, and Broglie would adhere to him; I would too, after them, not before. They would make an administration which I would support, though I would not enter it; you (the English) would form an alliance with Louis Napoleon; and as for Henri V. and the Comte de Paris, they would neither of them ever cross the frontier. He might die like Louis XVIII. on the throne. Instead of that, he will kick again, and then the end will begin.' Had M. Guizot in 1869 and 1870 acted up to his professions of 1853, he might have saved France from the war and the Commune.

No man in France knew better than the speaker of these words that the ruler to whom they were applied had said of the French people, whom he loved with a devotion that never faltered, even under the stings of their ingratitude, '*Je veux les mener à une liberté sage.*'[1] Nobody knew better than M. Thiers that the Emperor drew up the Constitution under which he assumed Imperial power, with the resolute intention to give back liberty to the people, so soon as he could be assured that it would be used with order; and none of the Emperor's enemies did more than M. Thiers to make the restoration of free Constitutional government dangerous.

Louis Napoleon's relations with the nation at this time were more justly estimated in Belgium, where one of the Vice-Presidents of the Chamber, the Vicomte

[1] These words were spoken by the Emperor to the late Prince Adam Czartoriski, who repeated them to me.—B. J.

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Charles Vilain XIV., said: 'The Emperor of the French has understood with marvellous clearness the force of direct communications between the Government and the people. It is impossible to understand, without having travelled through France, or lived in Paris within the last two years, the moral calm and the tranquillity of mind of this inflammable nation; since all important measures or events of national significance are posted up in plain-speaking placards in every commune. The people read, they understand, they approve or disapprove, and they go away content.' The speaker went on to recommend the Belgian Ministers to explain in the same way the reasons for the high price of bread, from which the Belgian working classes were suffering, and his suggestion was adopted. Constitutional Belgium, in 1854, took a lesson from Imperial France.

The material prosperity of the Empire at the beginning of the Crimean War was, indeed, prodigious. The revenue of 1853 had exceeded the Finance Minister's calculations by forty-four millions and a half of francs. That of 1852 had exceeded his expectations by sixty-six millions and a half. These figures could not be contradicted. They were eloquent answers to the enemies of the Empire. Nor did the Government allow the prophets of evil to use the Eastern Question to their disadvantage. In a Note published in the 'Moniteur' (February 22, 1854) the object of the war was plainly set forth; and the revolutionary parties in Greece and Italy were warned not to cast their nets into the troubled waters of the Bosphorus.[1] The Emperor was

[1] 'Jamais le gouvernement n'aura une politique à double face, et de même que, défendant l'intégrité de l'empire ottoman à Constantinople, il ne pourrait pas souffrir que cette intégrité fût violée par des agres-

not, as the reader has seen, indifferent to the aspirations of the Italians; but he hoped by peaceful means to bring about that liberation of the nation in whose cause he had fought as a boy, to which his brother had sacrificed his life, and which he was destined to achieve on the field of Solferino.

On March 2, the Emperor, in opening the Parliamentary session of 1854, touched on the two dominant questions of the hour, viz. the bad harvest and the war. The natural effect of the bad harvest had been lessened by striking away the old shackles from the trade in corn; by an extraordinary impetus imparted to public works, in order to give employment to the wage classes; and by the bold experiment of equalising the price of bread, which has already been described (vol. iii. p. 449). The Emperor remarked with satisfaction that his subjects, although sorely tried by a bad harvest and a rigorous winter, had not uttered a word against his Government; being convinced that their welfare was his constant study.

A war had followed immediately upon the bad harvest and the severe winter. The Emperor said—and said with a truth to which all with whom he had been in communication during the difficult negotiations that had been carried on in desperate endeavours to avoid an armed conflict could bear witness—he had done everything that honour permitted him to do, in order to keep the peace of Europe unbroken. 'Europe knows,' he remarked, 'that if France draws her sword, it is because she has been compelled; and that she has no idea of conquest. I am glad to proclaim empha-

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sions parties de la Grèce; de même il ne pourrait pas permettre, si les drapeaux de la France et de l'Autriche s'unissaient en Orient, qu'on cherchât à les diviser sur les Alpes.'

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tically that the days of conquest are over, never to return. For it is not by widening the limits of her territory that a nation can become renowned and powerful; but by placing herself at the head of generous ideas, and by helping to spread everywhere the empire of right and justice. Behold the result of a policy void of egoism and *arrière-pensée*. Here is England, our old rival, drawing closer to us day by day, in an intimate alliance, because the principles for which we are contending are also those of the English people. Germany, that had remained mistrustful, bearing still in mind our past wars, and had for forty years leaned deferentially towards the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, has recovered her sense of independence, and is looking freely about to discover the direction in which her interests lie. And Austria, above all, must join our alliance, since she cannot be an indifferent spectator of the events which are in preparation; and thus the morality and justice of the war on which we are entering will be further confirmed.'

The concluding paragraphs of the Emperor's speech created a deep impression.

'We have seen, in the East,' he said, 'in the midst of a profound peace, a Sovereign demand suddenly of his weak neighbours new advantages, and because he could not obtain them, invade two provinces. This act alone should make those whose souls revolt at iniquity grasp their swords; but we had further reasons for coming to the assistance of Turkey. France had equal interest with England, and perhaps greater interest, in preventing the indefinite extension of Russian influence in Constantinople. To reign in Constantinople is to govern over the Mediterranean; and none among you, gentlemen, I believe, will say that England has alone important interests in the sea that bathes three hundred

leagues of French coast. Our policy is not one of yesterday. For centuries every national Government of France has supported it: I shall not abandon it.

'Let people cease to ask us what we are going to do in Constantinople. We are going with England to espouse the cause of the Sultan, and, nevertheless, to protect Christian rights: we are going to defend the liberty of the high seas, and our just influence in the Mediterranean. We are going, with Germany, to help her to maintain her rank, from which there appears to be a desire to lower her, and to secure her frontiers against the preponderance of a too powerful neighbour. We are going, in fine, with the goodwill of all who desire the triumph of right, of justice, and of civilisation.' After appealing confidently to the support of the Chambers, the Emperor concluded with the hope that, by God's help, he might compel such a peace as no man's independent will could disturb.

The response was fervent and unanimous. The Chamber, *en masse*, headed by its President, M. Billault, repaired to the Tuileries to present to the Emperor its vote of 250 millions for the war.

The Emperor replied to M. Billault: 'We are both animated by one sentiment, for are we not both elected representatives of France?'[1] Then he appealed to the nation to subscribe the money; and in a few days the loan was twice covered, and in notable part by the savings of the people.

The lowest sum for which subscription was received was 10 francs. There were more than six thousand subscribers of this minimum sum; but there were more than 60 thousand subscribers of less than

[1] 'Nous avons tous les mêmes sentiments, nous représentons tous les mêmes intérêts, car vous et moi, nous sommes les élus de la France.'

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50 francs. Upwards of 50 millions were offered to the Government, in sums under 50 francs. The sinews of war came out of the pockets of the people; and this fact added immensely to the moral strength of the Government.

The Emperor appealed in vain to Prussia and to Austria. His wish was that the Allied Armies should cross Germany to attack Russia in her most vulnerable place—the Polish provinces. But Prussia held back, albeit she had everything to gain by the reconstitution of a Kingdom of Poland between her and Russia;[1] and she even went the length, after the landing of the Allies in the Crimea, of declaring to Austria that, if she entered the field against Russia, the defensive and offensive treaty between Prussia and Austria would be at an end. The consequence of the conduct of Prussia became so alarming both in France and in England, in the autumn of 1854, that the Prince Consort wrote a solemn letter of warning to the Prince of Prussia (now Emperor of Germany), in which he said:[2] 'The feeling of soreness here and in France against Prussia is upon the increase, people regarding her as the only friend of Russia, and the only reason why an united Europe is unable to put a speedy stop to the war. . . . Already the talk in Paris is of the restitution of Poland, and this finds an echo in England; and in Boulogne the army, as I now hear, was in hopes to have to fight next year with Prussia. The danger of a general European war may probably be averted, if Austria joins our alliance *frankly and fairly*.'

But Austria, by occupying the Principalities, had set free the Russian invading army, and by her subsequent

[1] This was never more apparent than in the relations existing between Germany and Russia during the Russo-Turkish war.

[2] Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iii. p. 137.

obstinately passive attitude, forfeited her claim upon the future good offices of the Western Powers—as she learned to her cost at Sadowa and Solferino. No observer saw the tendency of what was passing with a deeper and truer insight than the Prince Consort. Turning from the Prince of Prussia to his 'dearest uncle,' King Leopold—who still looked with aversion upon the Anglo-French alliance—the Prince besought him to use his influence with the Austrian and Prussian Courts to make them throw in their influence resolutely with England and France to bring Russia to reason. At the opening of the winter, after the country had been profoundly moved, first by the battle of Balaclava and the sacrifice of the Light Brigade at Inkermann, and then by the reports of the privations the troops were enduring, the Prince said to King Leopold: 'To my mind the only practical question is, What will be the character of the war next year? Will it be carried on by United Europe against Russia, or by an Europe divided into two camps, on the Rhine and in Italy?'[1]

Then the Prince, with his customary sagacity, shadowed forth the probable results of the Anglo-French alliance, if Austria and Prussia continued to fail to perform their duties as European Powers. He declined to debate the possibility of France playing England false; and he believed that the Emperor would not listen to enemies who were whispering in his ear doubts about the sincerity of '*perfide Albion*.' 'As men of honour,' said the Prince, 'neither he nor we can entertain such a thought for a moment.' And then he remarked: 'The longer Russia's resistance lasts, and the

[1] Letter to King Leopold, November 6, 1854.—Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iii. p. 142.

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longer the struggle is devolved on France and England alone, the more compact must their alliance become. As, then, France and Napoleon are under all circumstances sure to cherish their national *arrières-pensées* of territorial aggrandisement at their neighbours' expense, the risk, as far as these neighbours are concerned, certainly is, that England may some day have to stand by and see things done, which she herself cannot desire, but must uphold in the interest of her ally. This danger, I repeat, Austria, Prussia, and Germany may avert by acting with us, not in the manipulation of Protocols, which leave everything to the exertions of the Western Powers, and have no other object but to make sure that no harm is done to the enemy. Such a course is dishonourable, immoral, leads to distrust, and ultimately to direct hostility. Already the soreness of feeling here against Prussia is intense, nor can it be less in France.' The Queen enforced the Prince Consort's letters. 'Peace is further distant than ever,' Her Majesty wrote to her uncle in Brussels, 'and I fear the war will be lengthened, and finally a general one. Austria could help its conclusion, if she would but act.'

In both countries the anxiety to persuade Austria to take her part manfully was deep and general. Thiers said: 'With Austria merely neutral it is an awful contest.' An awful contest it became, as the winter developed; and the two armies lay before Sebastopol, enduring all the rigour of a Russian winter, the perils of a siege, and the dire consequences of military maladministration at home. Germany, closely allied with Russia, looked on unmoved; and Austria, whom Russia had helped to overcome the Hungarians, remained at least the passive friend of the Emperor Nicholas. The anger of the English people grew to a storm of in-

dignation, when 'the Pen of the War'[1] divulged the sufferings of the half-starved, ill-clad British army. Lord Russell retreated hastily before it, and the helm of state was given over to the only man in whom all England had confidence—Lord Palmerston. The Emperor, who had met the insulting reply of Nicholas to his memorable letter, by courtesies shown to Russian subjects after the declaration of war, was, as usual, but slowly moved to anger. Since the month of March, when Marshal Saint-Arnaud, appointed commander-in-chief of the French forces, had said in his proclamation, that 'the Eagle of the Empire had taken wing once more, not to menace, but to protect the rights of Europe,' he had remained a calm spectator of the incidents of the struggle by sea and land, and the final necessity of a blow in the Crimea, brought about by the misconduct of the Powers upon which England and France had a right to reckon. In the midst of the war the ruler of France pursued his plans for the embellishment of Paris, and above all for the first International Exhibition of Industry in France, on which he had resolved, while he was receiving the dignitaries of the Prince Consort's Exhibition of 1851 at Saint Cloud. On April 7 the regulations of the Imperial Commissioners, and the classification adopted for the Exhibition of the Industry of all Nations in the palace that was rising apace in the Champs Elysées, appeared in the 'Moniteur.' On the 8th, accompanied by the Empress, the Emperor inaugurated the great lake he had caused to be excavated for the embellishment of the Bois de Boulogne, in the midst of an enthusiastic host of Parisians. Immense drainage works were organised, and vast plantations were established between the Gironde and the

[1] Mr. W. H. Russell, the *Times* correspondent in the Crimea.

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Adour. The Cattle Show, held in Paris in June, demonstrated the excellent results already obtained by the importation of the best breeds, which had been one of the earliest acts of the Emperor's power. The creation of local government in Algeria, in the form of a communal system akin to that of France, and the modification of the Arab bureaux, constituted a first departure from the purely military administration of this colony, which had kept back its material progress. The Emperor was encouraged to hasten these reforms by the increase in the agricultural exports of the colony, and the prospect of turning a heavy charge into a source of national wealth. He wanted to prove that the French people could be good colonists. The reforms given to Algeria were extended to the French Transatlantic colonies in May.

In the same month Napoleon III. re-established the Imperial Guard, and made it a force of 20,000 men and 3,000 horses. The officers were soldiers distinguished by their good conduct, their acquirements, or their brilliant services. The men were soldiers who had completed their seven years' service with credit, and who were willing to re-enlist; retired soldiers of unexceptionable conduct under thirty-five years of age; men wearing the Legion of Honour or the military medal; or non-commissioned officers who were willing to serve in the ranks of the Guard. This *corps d'élite*, if a privileged body, was one composed of men who had earned the advantages which a soldier of the Guard enjoyed. Its ranks were open to every man in the army who, by his services, could establish his right to enter them. The creation of the Guard at the outset of the war was denounced, of course, by the Emperor's enemies, as another proof of his thirst for conquest; but it was merely the completion of the Imperial forces

in harmony with those traditions of his House by which Louis Napoleon was swayed, in all military matters, and which he knew to be popular with the people. He set a high value on the uses of a Guard of trained warriors in critical moments in the field, as well as in the protection of his throne; nor was he insensible to the effect which such a Guard, with its brilliant uniforms, would not fail to have in delighting the loungers of his capital. The disappointed lounger is an active builder of barricades.

The creation of an Imperial Guard was especially distasteful to the De Broglies and other *frondeurs*, whose patriotism was subordinated to their dynastic allegiance. They never ceased to proclaim that the army was Orleanist, albeit the troops everywhere received the Emperor with acclamation; and that most Frenchmen—and Thiers among the number—blamed Generals Changarnier, Lamoricière, and Bedeau, for having refused Napoleon's generous invitation to them to take commands in the war. It should be recorded to the honour of M. Thiers, that, bitterly as he opposed the Government of the Second Empire, his patriotism was stirred by the war, and he could delight with the veriest *gamin* in the glory of his country—even when it was achieved by his political enemy.[1] He said at this time: 'It is wonderful the high position the Emperor has attained in Europe.' So clear was this, that even

[1] Victor Cousin blamed Thiers for the Crimean War. In a conversation with Mr. Senior (February 7, 1854), he said: 'Thiers's conduct in forcing us into a war is inconceivable. He does not see the Emperor; he could not without dishonouring himself; but he inspires him: Vaillant and one or two others are always going backwards and forwards between them.' The two had a sharp encounter on the subject; when Thiers said bravely to Cousin: 'You Royalists have been so accustomed to look to Russia for support that you forget France. You are all *émigrés* like your master. The interests of France and England are identical.'

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cold M. Guizot was heard to admit that old friends were rallying to the new *régime*.

This year, in which war against Russia was declared, and in which the energies of France were strained to cope with the difficulties and dangers which met the Allies in the Crimea, was not barren of minor, as well as of great, domestic reforms. The horrors of the *bagne* were reduced by a system of transportation; the jurisdiction of the *juge de paix*—the cheap and simple judge of the poor—was extended; a new law of copyright was established; and laws extending the telegraphic system, the uses of the post-office, the benefits of scientific sewerage, and regulating University education, were passed by the Legislative Bodies. The arts of peace were not suffered to remain quite silent in the midst of war.

At the same time the Deputies warned the Emperor against the rate at which the Government was authorising local bodies to contract loans for local improvements. 'No doubt,' they said, 'the principal part of these loans will be devoted to the improvement of roads and other means of intercommunication, which return usurious interest; but the pace is a giddy one—and should be moderated.'

It was the giddy pace that frightened friends, and gave a handle to the opposition of foes. M. Guizot, talking to Mr. Senior in the February of 1854—almost on the eve of the declaration of war—said: 'The city of Paris looks like a town that has been bombarded. Whole acres of buildings are cleared away every day. In vain those who are to be ejected protest. They are told to take their indemnity and be silent. Houses that were built not six months ago, according to plans furnished by the Government, have been pulled down because they interfere with some new arrangement.

But if he destroys, like Attila or Genghis Khan, he builds like Aladdin.' Another observer belonging to the opposition—M. Dumon, one of Mr. Senior's friends—remarked: 'Our city will be as fine as ancient Rome, but the *Maison Dieu* will be starved, and our fine city will be undrained.' It is hardly possible to conceive criticism more ridiculous than this. The reconstruction of the Hôtel Dieu was among Napoleon's chief projects; and only that part of Paris on which his hand was laid, is fairly well drained even now.

CHAPTER IV.

THE UNIVERSAL EXHIBITION OF 1855.

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THE winter of 1854–55 had drawn the Allies closer together. The solicitude with which the French military authorities in the Crimea had helped to comfort their English brethren, when they were stricken by disease, and made almost powerless, through the blunders of a chaotic Commissariat, had warmed the hearts of the allied soldiers to each other, as the English proved when they, in their turn, were in a position to minister to the comfort of their French comrades. The popularity of the Emperor in England had borne down the calumnies with which part of the press had been wont to assail him; and all Englishmen who came in contact with him, returned home delighted with their reception. He forgot no friend of his days of exile. Albany Fonblanque, who approached him as the English representative of the International Statistical Congress, which was held in Paris in the autumn of 1854, wrote to his friend, John Forster: 'To-day the Emperor received us all. As the delegate of England, I had to stand at the head of the Congress, composed of about 300 men of all nations. After I had made my bow, the Emperor, instead of passing on, stopped, and said, "M. Fonblanque is an old acquaintance," offered his hand as of old, and entered into familiar conversation about me and mine. It was all very kind, and it made me so completely forget the occasion, that I nearly committed

a breach of etiquette in conversing with him as if he had been a private individual. Considering all that has passed, I was and am pleased; and not the less so because the English members of the Congress were also pleased at the reception of their representative. You will say I am about to turn courtier; I can't help it.'[1] Mr. Fonblanque had been among the furious assailants of Louis Napoleon, in his newspaper, the 'Examiner,' in spite of his personal knowledge of the Prince, and of his friendships among his intimate associates. The author of 'England under Seven Administrations' was a Liberal writer of uncompromising bearing; but he could not resist the simple kindness of the Emperor's greeting. It gave him a new and a most agreeable impression of the Sovereign whom the French people had elected to rule over them; and it explained to his mind the pace at which His Majesty's popularity had grown, and impressed him with the reality of the alliance which Orleanists of the type of the Count de St. Aulaire were still denouncing *sotto voce* as most monstrous,[2] but of which such observers as M. Thiers saw all the force and importance.

This alliance enabled the Emperor to say at Bayonne, on his fête day (August 15, 1854), to the Bishop who congratulated him on the popularity of the anniversary: 'My presence here to-day is a fact of which I think with pleasure. It proves that France, calm and

[1] *The Life and Labours of Albany Fonblanque*, edited by his nephew, Edward Barrington de Fonblanque. Bentley. 1874.

[2] The Count de St. Aulaire, formerly ambassador to England, and author of the *Histoire de la Fronde*, said to Mr. Senior: 'Of all the follies that I have witnessed in my long life, the most monstrous is this offensive alliance of France and England against Russia.' Within a few days M. Thiers remarked: 'There is no alliance which France values so much as that of England, or dreads or detests so much as that of Russia.'

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contented, is no longer troubled with those fears which compel the Chief of the State to remain armed and on the alert in the capital. It proves that France can sustain a distant war, without disturbing the free and regular course of her domestic affairs.' He added: 'Remember those who are fighting, and those who are suffering, for to pray for them is to pray for me.'

The vigilance with which throughout the autumn and winter the Emperor watched every episode of the war, the organisation and life of the army at Boulogne, the conduct of his Generals, and the administration of his War Office, was unsleeping. From Bayonne he wrote to the Minister of War (August 1) to warn him that his generals, in one or two instances, were not careful enough in sparing their troops the unnecessary risks of fatiguing marches under the tropical heat. On August 20 he addressed a proclamation to his army in the East, thanking his soldiers for their discipline and courage under the trials of the disease which had played havoc in their ranks; communicating to them the fall of Bomarsund, and recalling to them the words of the First Consul:—

'The first quality in the soldiers should be courage in bearing fatigue and privations: valour is but the second.' 'This first quality,' the Emperor said, 'you are showing to-day; and no one would dare to doubt your possession of the second.' In the following month the Emperor was once more with the army of Boulogne. And here he put his soldiers on the best terms with himself, by explaining to them broadly, in a proclamation, the plan and objects of the manœuvres he was about to direct. He described the Army of the North as formed in a triangle, of which St. Omer was the summit, and Ambleteuse and Montreuil were the extreme points of the base, and remarked that it could be

within twenty-four hours wholly concentrated upon any point within or on the lines of the triangle. He recalled to them, at the same time, the words of Napoleon I.: 'Any army, the different parts of which cannot be concentrated within twenty-four hours, is an army in a bad position.' The manœuvres at an end, the Emperor took leave of his troops. 'I leave you,' he said, in his farewell address, 'but to return soon to judge of your progress. The creation of the Camp of the North was intended to bring our troops nearer those of England, that they might go swiftly wherever the honour of the two nations might call them. It has been formed, moreover, to show to Europe, that without weakening the garrisons of the interior we can easily assemble an army of 100,000 men between Cherbourg and St. Omer. It has been formed to accustom you to the roughness, the fatigues, and the evolutions of an active camp life; for, believe me, nothing strengthens the soldier so much as this life in the open air, which teaches men to brave the weather and to know one another.

'During the winter, camp life will no doubt be hard to bear, but I rely on the efforts of each soldier to make it profitable to all. The country demands active co-operation from us, one and all. Some are protecting Greece against the baleful influence of Russia; some are guarding the independence of the Pope in Rome; some are consolidating and extending our domination in Africa; and some, it may be, are this very day planting our eagles on the walls of Sebastopol. You, whom these noble examples inspire, and one of whose divisions has just distinguished itself by the taking of Bomarsund, will be the better prepared to take part in the common work by being hardened to the rough work of war.

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'The classic ground under your feet has already formed heroes. This column, raised by our fathers, recalls great memories. The statue which crowns it seems, by a providential chance, to point to the road we are to follow. Look at this statue of the Emperor: it leans to the West and threatens the East. Thence proceeds the danger which threatens modern civilisation; on our side lies the rampart which defends it.

'Soldiers! you will prove yourselves worthy of your noble mission.'

On his return to Saint Cloud from his month in camp, a letter was laid before the Emperor which made a powerful effect upon his imaginative and sympathetic mind. It was from the irreconcilable arch-conspirator Barbès, who had lain long in prison. It was not written to the Chief of the State; it was not a prayer for forgiveness, nor a declaration of repentance. It was simply a letter to a friend—not destined for other eyes than his. Barbès confessed that his heart went with the French army, and that he longed to see them victorious. 'I pity our party,' he added, 'if any among them think otherwise. Alas! we have only to lose all moral sense, in addition to our other losses!'[1] The friend of the prisoner laid these lines before the Sovereign, who replied by an order of release. 'A prisoner,' the Emperor wrote to the Minister of the Interior, 'who, in spite of long sufferings, still retains these patriotic sentiments, cannot, under my reign, remain in prison. Cause him to be put at liberty immediately and unconditionally.'[2]

[1] 'Si tu es affecté du chauvinisme, parce que tu ne fais pas de vœux pour les Russes, je suis encore plus chauvin que toi, car j'ambitionne des victoires pour nos Français. Oui! oui! qu'ils battent bien là-bas les Cosaques, et ce sera autant de gagné pour la cause de la civilisation et du monde!'—*Barbès' Letter.*

[2] Letter from the Emperor to the Minister of the Interior, October 3, 1854.

This act was politic as well as generous. The hostile Orleanist and other *salons*, where hope was centred in the defeat of the Western Powers, and where the intriguers of all kinds, whose machinations had been scattered to the winds by the advent of the Empire, set up an ignoble exchange of scandalous anecdotes, *mots*, and rumours, against the Emperor, his Government, and his Court. There was a general shrugging of shoulders. But the nation was pleased; and was further gratified when, after Inkermann, the hand that had liberated Barbès sent out General Montebello to the Army of the Crimea, charged with the national thanks and gratitude, and with the glittering symbols of both.

Nor was the steady progress of the preparations for the Universal Exhibition of 1855 without its wholesome effect upon the national pride. France, albeit grasping at the throat of the Northern Bear with one hand, could cultivate the arts of peace with the other. Within her borders at least the arts were not silent in the midst of war. She never ceased at the same time to do her utmost to draw Austria to her side. Diplomatic negotiations ran a parallel course with the Allied fleets incessantly passing to the East; England and France submitted a note to the Cabinet of Vienna, containing the bases on which negotiations might be opened with Russia; France signed a treaty with Austria, which bound the latter to go to war at a given moment, which she eventually let pass without fulfilling her engagement; French capitalists took up a great scheme of Austrian railways, in which French capital to the extent of some eight millions sterling became engaged; and still the gloomy winter came and went, while Prussia and Austria looked composedly upon the horrible sufferings of the Allied troops, and moved neither hand nor foot. Still all these Powers answered willingly the chivalrous invi-

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tation of the Emperor to meet in the Champs Elysées in the following May, for a contest in the peaceful arena of industry and the arts. Albeit fully engaged in a mighty struggle, the issue of which was still doubtful, France never held her head in prouder altitude than when her troops lay under the walls of Sebastopol, and her artisans were busy in her Palace of Industry.

The Emperor, having convoked an extraordinary meeting of the Legislative Body in December, to grant further supplies for the war, caught, with his customary dexterity, in his opening address, the spirit of the new epoch of which he was the acclaimed chief. 'Since your last session,' he said, 'great deeds have been accomplished. The appeal which I addressed to the country to cover the cost of the war was answered in a manner that exceeded all my hopes. Our arms have been victorious in the Baltic and in the Black Sea. Two great battles have given glory to our flag. Striking testimony has been borne to our good relations with England. Parliament has voted congratulations to our generals and our troops. A great Empire, rejuvenated by the chivalrous character of its Sovereign, has withdrawn itself from the Power which for forty years has menaced the independence of Europe. The Emperor of Austria has signed a treaty, defensive to-day, but which may become offensive to-morrow, which unites his cause to that of France and England.

'Thus, gentlemen, as the war goes on, our allies increase, and our old alliances are drawn closer. What more solid ties could there be than the names of victories which belong to two armies and recall a common glory, than the same anxieties and hopes agitating the two countries, than identical views and intentions animating the two Governments in every part of the world? Our alliance with England is not the effect

of a passing convenience or of a haphazard policy; it is the union of two powerful nations, banded together for the triumph of a cause, in which, for more than a century past, their greatness, and even the interests of civilisation and the liberty of Europe, have been at stake. Join then with me, on this solemn occasion, in thanking, in the name of France, the Parliament for its warm and cordial demonstration, and the English army as well as its worthy chief for their valiant co-operation.

'Next year, if peace be not re-established, I hope to have to address the same thanks to Austria, and to Germany, whose union and prosperity we desire.' Then the Emperor paid a warm tribute of praise and thanks to his brave army and navy, and added, with emotion—remembering his devoted friend and servant—that the Marshal who had led the troops to the battle-field of the Alma seemed to force death to wait upon victory. 'Let us then declare together,' said the Sovereign, 'that the army and the navy have deserved the thanks of their country.'

The army consisted of 581,000 soldiers, and 113,000 horses; the navy of 62,000 men afloat. A levy of 140,000 men was demanded to fill the gaps made by the expirations of service and the war. The new war loan was set down at 500,000,000 of francs; and, at the same time, the Deputies were assured that the conversion of the Rente had reduced the interest on the national debt by more than 21,000,000, and that there would be a budget without deficit. These financial matters disposed of, the Emperor said in conclusion:—

'The struggle which is going on, kept within bounds by moderation and justice, although it may make men's hearts beat the quicker, disturbs material interests so

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little, that we shall shortly see the products of peace from all corners of the globe assembled here. Foreigners cannot fail to be impressed by the striking spectacle of a country that, relying on the Divine protection, carries on vigorously a war six hundred leagues away from its frontiers, and as vigorously pursues the development of its wealth at home; of a country, in which war does not prevent agriculture and industry from prospering, the arts from flourishing, and in which the genius of the nation continues to manifest itself in all that can add to the glory of France.'

On the morrow, the Deputies unanimously voted all that the Government had asked, and carried their reply to the address to the Emperor, having the Count de Morny for the first time at their head, as their President. Shortly afterwards, when the second war loan was emitted, 179,300 of Napoleon III.'s subjects subscribed for more than two milliards.[1] The year 1854 closed with formal offering of the thanks of the French Parliament to the English forces engaged in the war, through the French Ambassador in London; and the sulky *salons* of the Faubourg passed a sour New Year's Day.

The year of 1855, destined to be the brightest and most glorious of the Second Empire, opened gloomily. The winter was severe, and it was telling with most awful effects upon the Allied armies lying around the walls of Sebastopol. The echoes of the angry excitement which prevailed in London at the unnecessary sufferings of the English army, and the consequent political crisis which ended in the triumphant advent to power of Lord Palmerston as First Lord of the Treasury, travelled across the Channel. The delay in the reduction of

[1] 80,000,000*l.*

Sebastopol chafed the impatient French people. There were murmurs against the war, kept up by the enemies of the Imperial Government, who were never tired of saying that the French were fighting for the benefit of England.

The Emperor, who was as impatient as many of his subjects, followed every episode of the siege with unflagging attention, and was in constant communication with the generals about him who could help him with ideas or plans. By degrees, as he developed, in his slow, methodical way, a plan for the spring campaign, the resolve arose within him to go out, and put himself at the head of his army. The project was full of peril. Already the military reputation of one Bonaparte had been wrecked in the Crimea. The Emperor could not afford to be party to even a repulse. There was danger in his prolonged absence from the seat of his Government. His health was never strong. The reasons against his assuming the command-in-chief were weighty, and those in favour of the project were few and feeble. The opposition which the English Government urged to it probably ended later by overcoming the Emperor's strong desire—assisted as it was by the Queen, who spoke with great judgment and tact to His Majesty when he was at Windsor Castle in the spring. In 1855, not only the two Courts, but the two Governments, were on terms of thorough and cordial confidence. Lord Palmerston knew the Emperor well, and had been his guest at St. Cloud in the previous November, when he had thrashed out all subjects connected with the war with his Imperial host and his Foreign Secretary, Drouyn de Lhuys. 'I have found the Emperor,' he wrote to his brother on his return home, 'and Drouyn de Lhuys in very good opinions on the subject of the war, and acting towards us with perfect fairness, openness, and good

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faith.'[1] The co-operation of the two Governments was without a hitch. When General Canrobert had reported to the Emperor that the British force was dwindling away under the privations which maladministration had brought upon it, he resolved to send large reinforcements at once to the Crimea, and asked our Ambassador in Paris to help him with English ships, as all his own, even to his pleasure yacht, were already engaged in the transport service. The battle of Inkermann made the question of reinforcements paramount. The request was promptly complied with, and before the close of the year the world saw a French army sailing from Toulon on board a British fleet, to meet a common enemy.

On January 9 the Emperor harangued detachments of the Imperial Guard on their departure for the war, bidding them plant his eagles on the walls of Sebastopol. On the 26th of the same month, Sardinia, under the guidance of Count Cavour, entered on the scene—undertaking to send 15,000 men to the Crimea, and to maintain an effective force of this importance—England and France agreeing to guarantee the integrity of the Sardinian States during the war. The spring found a wonderful mixture of races on the heights of the Tauric Chersonese. English, French, Sardinian, Turkish, and Egyptian soldiers formed an army combined to overthrow the barbaric forces of Muscovy that threatened the freedom and civilisation of the West. And yet in London and in Paris the uneasiness as to the result was general, and the peace negotiations through Austria, which were going slowly forward, were watched with intense interest. The four points had been under dis-

[1] *Life of John Henry Temple, Viscount Palmerston*, 1846, 1865, &c. By the Hon. Evelyn Ashley, M.P., vol. ii. p. 68.

cussion for months before the treaty with Austria was signed, on December 2. This treaty, as subsequent events proved, brought only trouble to the Allies, through a series of fruitless and distracting negotiations. At the opening of the year the Emperor Nicholas and his generals were in the highest spirits while they watched the difficult movements of our constitutional and administrative machinery, and especially the party proceedings of Lord John Russell. Count Walewski, in despair, remarked, in reference to the impending Vienna Conferences: 'What influence can a country like England pretend to exercise, which has no army and no government?'

The hopeful fact that stood as a beacon through all the difficulties and dangers, diplomatic, political, and military, of the spring of 1855, was the solid Anglo-French alliance. There was no flaw in that; and the imperious Czar saw before he died, that let the difficulties be what they might, it would prevail over his legions. He watched the renewal of the Anglo-French forces before Sebastopol, the suspicious movements of Austria, the sinister workings of public opinion throughout Europe, and he stood proudly at bay. It is said that he received the news of the defeat of 40,000 of his troops at Eupatoria, by an inferior force of the Turks, whom he despised, under Omar Pasha, on March 1, and that the blow killed him. 'Like a thunderbolt he fell.' If he left behind him a milder Czar in Alexander, he also bequeathed to him the stern resolve to carry on the war.

The Emperor Napoleon had, on February 26, addressed a letter to Lord Palmerston announcing his determination to go to the Crimea, where his presence, he believed, would produce that unity of action which could alone save the expedition from disaster. His

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Ministers, to a man, were opposed to the design. Yet, as we have seen, he held to it for some time with his usual tenacity. He had worked out his military plans with care and patience. In his letter to Lord Palmerston he set forth his views at great length. Leaving a sufficient force at Sebastopol[1] for the purposes of the siege, he expected to be able to take into the field 62,000 French, and the 15,000 Piedmontese. 'With these forces at our disposal,' said His Majesty, 'all the chances will be on our side, for the Russians have only 30,000 men at Sebastopol, and 45,000 écheloned between it and Simpheropol, and very probably they will not receive much in the way of reinforcements before April 1. Strike quickly, and Sebastopol will be ours before May 1. . . . You will tell me, perhaps, that I might entrust some general with this mission. Now, not only would such a general not have the same moral influence, but time would be wasted, as it always has been, in memorandums between Canrobert and Raglan, between Lord Raglan and Omar Pasha. The propitious moment would be lost, the favourable chances let slip, and we should find ourselves with a besieging army unable to take the city, and with an active army not strong enough to beat the army opposed to it.' In this letter the Emperor dwelt on his resolve to stand by England to the end; and to be moved from it by no diplomatic overture or negotiation. As for our army, he said, 'the twenty thousand Englishmen encamped before Sebastopol count, through their courage, for fifty thousand men, in the eyes of the French army.'[2] Lord Clarendon, in the first days of March, went to

[1] *Life of the Prince Consort.* By Theodore Martin, vol. iii. p. 229.

[2] 'Les vingt mille Anglais campés devant Sévastopol comptent par leur bravoure comme cinquante mille hommes aux yeux de l'armée française.'

meet the Emperor in the camp at Boulogne, to talk the matter over.

The British statesman found all the persons who surrounded the Emperor—his aides-de-camp as well as his advisers—opposed to the journey to the Crimea. Colonel Fleury went the length of saying to the English statesman, that the French army adhered to Napoleon as Emperor, 'but did not like to be commanded by any one but a professional man, and they looked upon him as a civilian. The Emperor's plans might be ever so good, but they would not carry with them the confidence of the army.'

Lord Clarendon applied himself to the task of demonstrating to His Majesty the 'checks and disasters' to which he would be liable; and the Prince Consort, in his own careful and methodical way, drew up the account[1] which the English statesman gave to his Sovereign on his return. According to his account, Lord Clarendon was received with the greatest cordiality by the Emperor, 'who was evidently much pleased with his visit.'

'He seemed,' the Prince remarks, 'very much struck with the news of the death of the Emperor of Russia, and speculated on its effects on the political juncture. He believed that it would incline both Austria and Prussia to a more vigorous policy, and that the new Emperor would find it more easy to make peace than his father. Lord Clarendon had to announce his dissent from these views.'

The Emperor then explained his plan of campaign at length, and asked whether the English Government could furnish the necessary transport power. Lord Clarendon admired the Emperor's plan; but he could

[1] Theodore Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iii. p. 238.

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not see his way to its execution. He demonstrated that the utmost which could be accomplished was to carry out 10,000 additional French troops, in addition to the Sardinian contingent, in from six to eight weeks from the time of the order being given. If the Emperor repaired at once to the Crimea, he would be condemned to inactivity at any rate for a month. In any case, he should not go until all was ready for him to give the *dernier coup de main.*

'That is the word,' the Emperor replied, '*le dernier coup de main.*'

Then Lord Clarendon proceeded to show that the Emperor's absence must be of four months' duration at the very least. It was March, and the Universal Exhibition was to be opened in May. The Emperor answered that he would not be away for four months. Then the English statesman painted the risks the Alliance would run. If the Emperor took the supreme command, and gave all the glory to the French, leaving the British to act as carriers or to rot in the trenches, the Alliance would not last a day afterwards. This view struck the Emperor very forcibly, and he replied with energy that he thought it of the highest importance the two flags should be seen waving together, wherever the field of glory lay. He was most anxious Lord Clarendon should tell this to the Queen; and also inform her of his desire to join his ships with ours in the Baltic for an energetic campaign to retrieve the loss of prestige through the nullity of the previous year. Although the Emperor did not at once formally abandon his idea of his journey to the Crimea, the impression created by Lord Clarendon's visit to Boulogne prepared the way for the *coup de grâce* which the Queen gave to it at Windsor.

Lord Clarendon had not returned more than a fortnight from Boulogne, when Lord Cowley, at the request

of the Emperor and Empress, enquired whether their visit to the Queen would be acceptable immediately after Easter. The notice was short, but the Queen cordially desired the visit, and it was finally arranged that the Imperial pair should land in England, as the guests of the Sovereign, on April 16.

The pomp and splendour of that progress from the Tuileries to Windsor, the enthusiasm which it awakened in the hearts of the British public, and the lasting effect its happy and auspicious incidents had on the relations of the two countries, give it the significant importance of an historical event of the first magnitude.

When, passing through a fleet of English war steamers, the Imperial yacht drew up at the Admiralty Pier, the Prince Consort went on board to bid the Emperor and Empress welcome in the name of the Queen. A telegram was put into the Emperor's hand: it announced that the besieging batteries at Sebastopol had opened fire. When the Imperial couple reached London they found a hearty national greeting. Their progress through the Borough and Lambeth to the West End, and through Hyde Park to the Paddington Station, was one bewildering triumph, in which it was calculated a million people took part; the houses swarming to the roofs with cheering hosts, and the open spaces being packed with huzzaing crowds. It was a mighty welcome given by the people of England to their august ally, whose soldiers were fighting side by side with ours. The 'Times' reporter noticed that in passing King Street, St. James's, the Emperor drew the attention of his Consort to the house in which he was living when the events of 1848 summoned him to Paris. The changes which seven years had wrought must have crowded at that moment upon his sensitive imagination. Only seven years ago, he was wont to stroll unnoticed, with his faithful

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dog at his heels, from his little house to the newsvendor's cellar by the Burlington Arcade, to get the latest news from revolutionary France; and now he was the great guest of the English people, on his way, through dense hedges of cheering people, to Windsor Castle, where the Queen of England was waiting in the vestibule to receive him. The Rubens, the Zuccarelli, and the Vandyke chambers were prepared for his coming, and he was to sleep in the room in which Louis Philippe and the Emperor Nicholas had reposed.

'I cannot say,' the Queen tells us in her diary, 'what indescribable emotions filled me—how much all seemed like a wonderful dream. These great meetings of Sovereigns, surrounded by very exciting accompaniments, are always very agitating. I advanced and embraced the Emperor, who received two salutes on either cheek from me, having first kissed my hand. I next embraced the very gentle, graceful, and evidently very nervous Empress. We presented the Princes and our children (Vicky with very alarmed eyes making very low curtsies); the Emperor embraced Bertie; and then he went upstairs, Albert leading the Empress, who, in the most engaging manner, refused to go first, but at length, with graceful reluctance, did so, the Emperor leading me, expressing his great gratification at being here and seeing me, and admiring Windsor.'[1]

The Emperor was soon a favourite in the Castle. At dinner, on the day of his arrival, he charmed the Queen. 'He is,' Her Majesty recorded in her diary, 'so very quiet; his voice is low and soft, and "*il ne fait pas de phrases.*" The Emperor said that he first saw me eighteen years ago, when I went for the first time to prorogue Parliament, and that it made a very

[1] Theodore Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iii. pp. 339.

deep impression upon him, to see "*une jeune personne*" in that position. He also mentioned his having been a special constable on April 10, 1848, and wondered whether I had known it. . . . Nothing can be more civil or amiable, or more well-bred than the Emperor's manner—so full of tact.' When the war was talked about, the Emperor reverted to his idea of going to the Crimea, and the Queen remarked that 'the Empress was as eager as himself that he should go.' 'She sees no greater danger for him there than elsewhere,' Her Majesty remarks, 'in fact, in Paris. . . . She said she was seldom alarmed for him, except when he went out quite alone of a morning. . . . She is full of courage and spirit, and yet so gentle, with such innocence and *enjouement*, that the *ensemble* is most charming. With all her great liveliness, she has the prettiest and most modest manner.'

The Emperor asked the Queen where Queen Marie Amélie was? She had been at the Castle only a few days before His Majesty's arrival, and the Queen had looked sorrowfully after her as she rode away, 'in a plain coach with miserable post-horses,' thinking how unkind fate had been to her. The Emperor's enquiry was addressed to the Queen, only that he might beg Her Majesty to tell Louis Philippe's widow he hoped she would pass through France in any journey she might make to Spain.

The review of the Household troops in Windsor Park, under the command of Lord Cardigan, who rode his famous Balaclava charger, is described by the Queen as 'another triumph' of the visit. 'The crowd in the Long Walk, of people on foot and on horseback, was immense, and the excitement and cheering beyond description. They squeezed round the Emperor when we came to the gates, and rode across the grass to

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where the review was to be, in such a way that I grew very nervous, as he rode on a very fiery, beautiful chestnut, called Phillips, and was so exposed. He rides extremely well, and looks well on horseback, as he sits high.'

Between the review in the morning and the ball in the Waterloo Room in the evening, the Royal hostess and Imperial guest had a frank conversation on the bad news from Vienna. Russia would not consent to the limitation of her fleet in the Black Sea, and Austria had submitted what the sagacious Prince Consort at once called an 'absurd ultimatum.' The Emperor confessed that Russia had been flattering him, and endeavouring to show that the quarrel was none of his, and that he had even been embarrassed by the effect which had been created in France; but he remained staunch, and thoroughly convinced his royal hostess that he was so. And so the ball was opened with spirit in the evening, the Queen making a highly suggestive and interesting entry in her diary. She had danced a quadrille with the Emperor, and noted that he acquitted himself with dignity and spirit.

'How strange,' the Queen remarks, 'to think that I, the granddaughter of George III., should dance with the Emperor Napoleon, nephew of England's greatest enemy, now my nearest and most intimate ally, in the *Waterloo Room*, and this ally only six years ago living in this country an exile, poor and unthought of!' And with these reflections passing through the Queen's mind, and that, certainly, of the Emperor, the Court passed to supper—the Queen remarking of the Empress: 'Her manner is the most perfect thing I have ever seen—so gentle, and graceful, and kind, and the courtesy so charming, and so modest and retiring withal.'

On the morrow of the ball came a great Council of

War in the Emperor's apartments, at which the Emperor, the Prince Consort, Lords Palmerston, Harding, Panmure, Cowley, Sir John Burgoyne, Sir Charles Wood, Count Walewski, and Marshal Vaillant, sat so long debating an agreement between the two Governments as to the conduct of the war, that at the luncheon hour they would not break up, albeit the Queen had knocked at the door, and reminded them there was an investiture of the Garter at four.

At this Council the Emperor again touched upon his project of going to the Crimea to command a vigorous diversion; and again the unanimous advice was against it.

At four o'clock the Queen invested her Imperial guest with the Order of the Garter in the Throne Room. Her Majesty records that after the ceremony, as she was accompanying the Emperor and Empress to their apartments, the Emperor thanked her for the ceremony, as another link which bound them together. He had sworn fidelity to Her Majesty, and he would carefully keep his oath.[1] He added that it was a great event for him, and he hoped to be able to prove his gratitude to the Queen and her country. 'These words,' the Queen notes, 'are valuable from a man like him, who is not profuse in phrases, and who is very steady of purpose.'

Then at dinner the conversation turned on assassination, *à propos* of rumours about the French refugees in London. The Emperor remarked to the Queen that when assassination was loudly and openly advocated, they should not enjoy hospitality: an opinion that was

[1] 'Je remercie bien votre Majesté. C'est un lien de plus; j'ai prêté serment de fidélité à votre Majesté, et je le garderai soigneusement. . . . C'est un grand événement pour moi, et j'espère pouvoir prouver ma reconnaissance à votre Majesté et à son pays.'—Theodore Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort* vol. iii. p. 247.

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to find very ominous expression later, after the Orsini attempt. The Emperor further said that he agreed with his uncle that you could take your precautions against a conspiracy, but that when a fanatic chose to attack you, and to risk his own life, you could do little or nothing to prevent it. With all the precautions, however, which were taken by the police in Paris, Pianori, who was an Italian conspirator, contrived to fire deliberately twice at the Emperor, a few days after his return home from Windsor, as he was riding in the Champs Elysées.[1] The Queen and the Emperor also talked of the want of liberty inseparable from the position; and the Emperor said the Empress called the Tuileries *une belle prison.*

The most graphic and interesting record of the Emperor's visit to England undoubtedly lies in the Queen's diary. The descriptive bits are excellent. For instance, Marshal Vaillant, the Minister of War, is described as tall and very large, 'quite in the style of Lablache, with small features—a charming, amusing, clever, and honest old man, who is an universal favourite.' He urged Her Majesty to speak strongly to the Emperor against his Crimean project.

'J'ai osé faire quelques observations,' said Her Majesty. '*Mon Dieu, oser!*' the blunt soldier retorted. '*Quand on est ensemble, il faut parler nettement.*'

At the close of this well-filled day the Queen entered these remarks on the Emperor in her diary: 'His manners are particularly good, easy, quiet, and dignified—as if he had been born a king's son, and brought up for the place.'

[1] In reply to the address of the Senate congratulating him on his escape, he said: 'Je ne crains rien des tentatives des assassins. Il est des existences qui sont les instruments des décrets de la Providence. Tant que je n'aurai pas accompli ma mission, je ne cours aucun danger.'

On the following day (April 19) the Emperor and Empress went in state to the City; but before leaving the Castle he read his speech to the Queen at the breakfast table, asking Her Majesty and the Prince Consort to favour him with their opinion, and to correct any mispronunciation of English of which he might be guilty. The Queen's record is to the effect that his speech was admirable, 'the result of mature reflection,' and that his pronunciation required but little correction. The reception in the City was one of great civic splendour; but was most memorable for the enthusiasm with which England's august ally and his consort were received along the route.

In his reply to the Lord Mayor, the Emperor said: 'Next to the cordial reception which I have received from the Queen, nothing could touch me more than the sentiments that you have just expressed to the Empress and myself in the name of the City of London; for the City of London represents the material power, for civilisation or for war, of a commerce which embraces the universe. Flattering as your praises are, I accept them because they are addressed much more to France than to myself; they are addressed to the nation whose interests are now everywhere identical with your own; they are addressed to the army and the navy united with yours in an heroic cause full of peril and of glory; they are addressed to the policy of the two Governments, which is based on truth, moderation, and justice.

'As for myself, I have retained on the throne those sentiments of sympathy and esteem for the English people which I professed in exile, when I enjoyed here the hospitality of the Sovereign, and if my conduct has been in conformity with my conviction, it is because the interests of the nation which had elected me, as well as of civilisation generally, made it my duty.

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'Indeed, England and France are naturally agreed on the great political and humanitarian questions which are stirring the world. From the shores of the Atlantic to those of the Mediterranean, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, from the abolition of slavery to the aspirations for the advancement of the countries of Europe, I see, for our two nations, in the moral as well as the political world, only one road to follow, one goal to be reached. Therefore, there are only secondary interests, or petty rivalries, that could separate them. Common sense alone is enough to answer for the future.

'You are right in believing that my presence among you attests my energetic co-operation in the prosecution of the war, if we cannot succeed in securing an honourable peace. In spite of countless difficulties, we may count upon success; for, not only are our soldiers and sailors men of tried valour; not only do our two countries command incomparable resources, but, above all—and here is their immense superiority—they are the representatives of liberal ideas. The eyes of those who are in suffering turn instinctively towards the West. And thus our two nations are ever stronger through the ideas which they represent, than by the battalions and ships which are at their command.

'I am very grateful to the Queen for having afforded me this solemn occasion for expressing to you my sentiments and those of France, whose interpreter I am. In my own name, and in that of the Empress, I thank you for the frank and hearty cordiality with which you have greeted us. We shall carry back to France the deep impression that is made in hearts which can understand it, the important spectacle which England presents, where virtue on the throne directs the destinies of the country, under a liberty that brings no danger to its greatness.'

The great day in the City of London was closed by a state visit to the Opera, the splendour and enthusiasm of which are described by the Queen.[1] 'We literally drove through a sea of human beings, cheering and pressing near the carriage. The streets were beautifully illuminated. There were many devices of N. E. V. A., which the Emperor said, oddly enough, made, "Neva!" This seemed to have impressed him, for he said that he had observed it before at Boulogne.' At the Opera, the Queen led the Emperor forward, the Prince Consort conducting the Empress; amid demonstrations of enthusiasm, which were only surpassed by the tumultuous cheering of the morrow, when Her Majesty accompanied her Imperial guests to the Crystal Palace at Sydenham. Of this visit the Queen remarks: 'Nothing could have succeeded better. Still, I own I felt anxious, as we passed along through the multitude of people, who, after all, were very close to us. I felt, as I walked on the Emperor's arm, that I was possibly a protection for him.'

In the evening, important news of the bombardment of Sebastopol having reached London, a Council was held, to settle a plan for future war operations; and the upshot of it was an agreement, in seven heads, drawn up by the Prince Consort on the organisation of the armies. It was signed, on the morrow (the 21st), by Lord Panmure for England, and Marshal Vaillant for France; and these momentous military discussions were closed by the Prince with the note: 'The Emperor has through-

[1] 'The Emperor told me that after our marriage in 1840, when we went to Covent Garden, he had with great difficulty obtained a box, and afterwards they made him pay 40*l.* for it, "*que je trouvais pourtant beaucoup!*" On this night I hear one person gave 100*l.* for a box.'—The Queen's Diary. Theodore Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iii. p. 251.

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out acted with thorough good faith and good temper.' The Queen also noted that the Council, at which the Emperor, the Prince, Lords Palmerston, Clarendon, and Panmure, and Marshal Vaillant assisted, was one of the most interesting scenes she had ever witnessed. Before parting, the Emperor inscribed his name in the Queen's album; and as he handed it to Her Majesty he said: 'I have endeavoured to express what I feel.' The inscription ran: '*Je porte à votre Majesté les sentiments qu'on éprouve pour une reine et pour une sœur, dévouement respectueux, tendre amitié.*—NAPOLÉON.'

As the Imperial couple took their leave, the Emperor made the Queen promise to return his visit in the autumn, if her public duties would permit her; and remarked that he believed his having passed his birthday with Her Majesty would bring him good fortune.[1]

When the Queen had watched her guests disappear in the distance, 'with the glittering escort,' she made the following notes of her impressions:—

'Thus has this visit, this great event, passed like everything else in the world. It is a dream, a brilliant, successful, pleasant dream, the recollection of which is firmly fixed in my mind. On all it has left a pleasant, satisfactory impression. It went off so well—not a hitch or *contretemps*—fine weather, everything smiling; the nation enthusiastic, and happy in the firm alliance and union of two great countries, whose enmity would be fatal. . . . I am glad to have known this extraordinary man, whom it is certainly impossible not to like when you live with him, and not even to a considerable extent to admire. . . . I believe him to be capable of kindness, affection, friendship, and gratitude. I feel

[1] The Emperor's birthday was the 20th, and the Queen had presented him with a pencil-case, on receiving which he bowed and kissed Her Majesty's hand.

confidence in him as regards the future. I think he is frank, means well towards us, and, as Stockmar (with whom I afterwards talked) says, "that we have ensured his sincerity and good faith towards us for the rest of his life."'

The day on which the Emperor and Empress left England, on their return to Paris, the Russian Government rejected the proposals of the Plenipotentiaries assembled in Vienna for neutralising the Black Sea, and the Conferences came to an end; and Lord John Russell and M. Drouyn de Lhuys returned home, not without having given their approval to a series of insidious terms invented at the last moment by Austria, in order to escape from her engagements undertaken in the Treaty of December 2, 1854. This weak yielding on the part of these Plenipotentiaries compelled their retirement from office, but not before the proposals which they had accepted, and which Lord Palmerston described as 'a mockery,' had entailed considerable embarrassments upon their respective Governments. The conduct of the French Plenipotentiary admits of a fair explanation; but that of Lord John Russell remains as a blemish on his career. M. Drouyn de Lhuys had no love for the English alliance, and would have been glad of the opportunity of weakening it, by drawing closer bonds between Austria and Prussia. Moreover, it would have pleased him to revenge himself upon Russia, by an intimate alliance with Austria.

But, although earnestly pressed by his Minister to fall in with the terms of Austria, which would have amounted to a triumph for Russia, and an ignominious compromise for England, the Emperor, on May 5, communicated to the British Government, through Count Walewski, his final decision not to entertain them, although the Peace party were opposing the fur-

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ther prosecution of the war with vigour. The immediate consequences of this resolve were the resignation of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the appointment of Count Walewski as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the transfer of M. de Persigny, as Ambassador, to London. Its after consequences were that vigorous prosecution of the war, in the teeth of Austrian influences, exerted even in the new French Ministry, and of the action of the Peace party in England, which ended in the fall of Sebastopol. It was the critical juncture in the war, at which the firmness of the Emperor, and his entire loyalty to his alliance with us, triumphed over all kinds of base Bourse and other intrigues, intended to sunder the connection of the two countries. His cordial personal relations with the English Royal Family, and his intimacy with leading English statesmen, like Lords Palmerston[1] and Clarendon, enabled him to place the most implicit reliance in the solidity of his relations with us.

In a memorandum, written by the Queen, a few days after the Emperor's departure from Buckingham Palace, Her Majesty dwelt with rare sagacity on the probable good effects of the visit, in a political sense:—

'The great advantage to be derived for the permanent alliance of England and France, which is of such vital importance to both countries, from the Emperor's recent visit, I take to be this: that with his peculiar character and views, which are very personal, a kind, unaffected, and hearty reception by us personally in our own family will make a lasting impression on his mind. He will see that he can rely upon our friendship and honesty towards him and his country, so long as he

[1] Lord Palmerston wrote to the Emperor on May 28, after the victory of the Government in the House of Commons, declaring that the vigorous prosecution of the war was the only way to peace.

remains faithful to us. Naturally frank, he will see the advantage to be derived from continuing so; and if he reflects upon the downfall of the former dynasty, he will see that it arose chiefly from a breach of pledges and ambiguous conduct towards this country and its Sovereign, and will be sure, if I be not very much mistaken in his character, to avoid such a course.' Her Majesty also relied on the continuance of 'that very open intercourse' which had existed between the Emperor and Lord Cowley for a year and a half; and which continued to exist, to the advantage of the two countries, so long as Lord Cowley represented England at the Court of the Tuileries.

While renewed energy was being infused into the war, the Emperor proudly turned to the triumphs of peace which had been preparing in the Champs Elysées. While the siege was progressing with vigour, and the Allies were advancing steadily upon the Russian stronghold, and the Emperor, from time to time, harangued his battalions on their departure for the Crimea, telling them that the Standard was the soldier's genealogical tree,[1] and that the army was the real nobility of the country, he never ceased to watch the progress of the Universal Exhibition of the arts of peace, the administration of which he had confided to his cousin Prince Jerome Napoleon. In opening the Exhibition on May 15, he said: 'I open with pleasure this temple of peace which invites all nations to a meeting of concord.' Prince Napoleon, in his address to the Emperor, remarked that the Universal Exhibition, while it followed that of 1851 in England, was, in many respects, an improvement on

[1] 'Soldats! l'armée est la véritable noblesse de notre pays; elle conserve intactes d'âge en âge les traditions de gloire et d'honneur national: aussi votre arbre généalogique' (pointing to the flag), 'le voici.'—Address to the Imperial Guard, March 20, 1855.

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it. The Exhibition of 1855 included the Fine Arts, and was arranged on an admirable system of classification; foreign goods were admitted for exhibition at a reduced tariff never exceeding 20 per cent.; the people were admitted on Sundays on payment of 20 centimes; and even the Empire with which France was at war, was invited to compete in the Exhibition lists. 'The Slave communities,' the Prince said in his address at the opening ceremony, 'are not our enemies.' Twenty-five thousand exhibitors had responded to the appeal of the new Empire; and hosts of visitors from every part of the world flocked to Paris in the course of the summer and autumn. While the capital was full of holiday-makers, the anxious eyes of the Government remained fixed on the struggle before Sebastopol, and the sacrifices it entailed. On July 2 the Emperor addressed the members of the Senate and Legislative Body assembled at the Tuileries, a speech in which he briefly described the failure of the Vienna Conference and the vacillating conduct of Austria, in spite of her formal engagements, asking, at the same time, for a further war loan to carry on operations with energy, the calling out of 140,000 men as the contingent for 1856, the imposition of further taxation, and authority to guarantee with England a Turkish war loan of 5,000,000*l.* By the 13th the dutiful State bodies had granted unanimously all the Imperial Government asked—the sole opposing voice having been that of M. de Montalembert, who regretted the failure of the Vienna Conference. The Government asked for a war contribution of 30,000,000*l.*, and the subscriptions amounted to 146,000,000*l.*!

While war events were culminating, and prodigious energy prevailed both in the Baltic and the Black Sea; while the Baltic fleets were playing havoc with the enemy at Sweaborg, at Marionpol and Gheisk, and

shutting up the remnants of the naval power of the enemy in Cronstadt, the Allied armies were drawing close to the enemy at Sebastopol, for the final struggle. It was in the midst of the excitement of this gigantic contest, and while the German Powers still held sulkily aloof from the Allies, that the Emperor Napoleon prepared to receive the visit of the Queen of England and her Consort. It was fixed for August 18; and, like that of the Emperor and Empress to London and Windsor, was a complete success.

The battle of the Tschernaja heralded it. 'The destruction of Sweaborg, the success of Riga, and the defeat of the Russians on the Tschernaja,' the Prince wrote to Baron Stockmar, on the morrow of his arrival at St. Cloud, 'have contributed to put people on all sides in good humour.'

They were in the best humour on June 18, when the Queen of England, her Consort, and the Princess Royal and the Prince of Wales, landed at Boulogne-sur-Mer, under salutes from the batteries and a *feu-de-joie*, kept up for miles along the edge of the cliffs from the port to Ambleteuse. The Emperor, who had taken up his quarters at the Imperial Hotel on the shore, was seen early in the morning at the balcony, watching through a glass for the first appearance of the Royal Squadron. He galloped up the cliffs to the camp, in the hope of getting the earliest possible assurance that his illustrious guests were *en route*: but it was nearly two o'clock before the Queen's yacht was moored to the quay. 'At length,' the Queen writes, 'the bridge was adjusted. The Emperor stepped across, and I met him half way and embraced him twice; after which he led me on shore amidst acclamations, salutes, and every sound of joy and respect.' Under the cloudless summer heavens it was a brave sight. The war-ships in the offing, the

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cliffs glittering with bayonets, the sand-hills breasted with artillery, the crowded harbour gay with the colours of all nations, and triumphal arches of many tints and designs, formed the background of the stately military display which surrounded the Queen on her start for Paris.

The Queen has herself recorded her impressions of her 'first sight of Paris.'

'The approaching twilight,' Her Majesty said, 'rather added to the beauty of the scene; and it was still quite light enough when we passed down the Boulevard de Strasbourg (the Emperor's creation), and along the Boulevards, by the Port St. Denis, the Madeleine, the Place de la Concorde, and the Arc de Triomphe, de l'Etoile.' Through the Champs Elysées and the Bois de Boulogne, the progress to St. Cloud was made in the twilight; but all the way the troops kept the road, bands playing the National Anthem at intervals. The Queen was delighted with the splendour and brilliancy of the scene, and as she approached the Palace remarked the Zouaves as 'splendid troops in splendid dress, the friends of my dear Guards.'

The Empress, who was, as the Prince said to the Baron Stockmar, 'in expectation of an heir and suffering,' met the Queen only at the Palace. 'In all this blaze of light from lamps and torches,' the Queen remarks, 'amidst the roar of cannon, and bands, and drums, and cheers, we reached the Palace. The Empress, with Princess Mathilde and the ladies, received us at the door, and took us up a beautiful staircase, lined with the splendid *Cent-gardes*, who are magnificent men, very like our Life Guards. . . . We went through the rooms at once to our own, which are charming. . . . I felt quite bewildered, but enchanted; . . . everything is so beautiful.' Within the Palace the Queen remarked

that 'everything was magnificent, and all very quiet, and royal.' It delighted Her Majesty to hear from Marshal Magnan and General Löwenstein, that such enthusiasm as had greeted her coming had not been known in Paris, 'not even in the time of the Emperor Napoleon's triumphs.'

Drives in the Park and the Bois de Boulogne, and a quiet dinner, at which General Canrobert, fresh from the trenches of Sebastopol, sat next the Queen, and gave Her Majesty his experiences in a manner that delighted her.' During his visit, Her Majesty gave him the Order of the Bath, and 'with real pleasure.' On the morrow, what the Prince Consort called the Parisian campaign began, with a visit to the Exhibition, through immense crowds of enthusiastic French people. Then, while the Queen was receiving the Diplomatic Body at the Elysée, the Emperor drove the Prince of Wales through Paris in a curricle. Later, the Emperor conducted his guests to the Sainte Chapelle, and other sights of his capital.

'In crossing the Pont au Change,' the Queen has remarked in her diary, 'you see the *Conciergerie*, and the Emperor, pointing to it said, "Voilà où j'étais en prison!" Strange contrast to be driving with us as Emperor through the streets of the city in triumph!' The good impression which the Emperor had created at Windsor was confirmed while he acted as host. 'No one,' says the Queen, 'can be kinder or more agreeable than is the Emperor—and so quiet, which is a comfort on all, but particularly on such occasions.' A day was spent at Versailles, where the Empress joined the party to luncheon; where the Queen sketched, while the band of the Guides played.

'Everywhere everything is ready,' is the Queen's commentary on all the arrangements; 'rooms prepared

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for us, and all just as if one were living there.' In the evenings the Queen delighted to look out from her windows through the clear air, 'free from our baneful coal smoke,' at distant Paris, and thus to rest from the excitement of such scenes as the state visit to the Opera, made in the midst of illuminations and greetings as warm as those of the English people. Returning home from this visit, the Emperor, according to the Queen's diary, was very cheerful, 'and repeated with Albert all sorts of old German songs, and Albert repeated some to him.' Then follows this reflection: 'He (the Emperor) is very fond of Germany, and his old recollections of it, and there is much that is German, and very little—in fact, nothing—markedly French in his character.'

On the fourth day of their dwelling in the Palace of St. Cloud the Queen wrote: 'Another splendid day! Most truly do the heavens favour and smile upon this happy Alliance, for when the Emperor was in England in April, the weather was beautiful.' And then follow words of sadness about the news from the seat of war. 'The Emperor is full of anxiety and regret about the campaign.' He forgot nothing, however, that could charm his guests. After a visit to the Exhibition, he gave the Prince Consort a Sèvres vase, representing the Exhibition of 1851, with the remark that the first International Exhibition was due to him. Then he started the Queen and Prince, *incognito*, in a remise, for a regular bourgeois drive through the busy and less fashionable parts of Paris—the Queen and Princess Victoria putting on 'common bonnets' and veils for the occasion. An opportunity was made for quietly visiting the private apartments in the Tuileries—the Empress's 'splendid cage.' On the day of the State ball at the Hôtel de Ville, we have an account by the Queen of a 'nice quite

vertrauliches (cosy) little dinner with the Emperor at the Tuileries.' 'We talked most cheerfully together,' Her Majesty remarks, 'and he was in high spirits. We laughed much at a fine old-fashioned Imperial *cafetière*, which would not let the coffee out in spite of all the attempts of the page to make it do so. We stood—and I thought at the time how very extraordinary it was, and how much had happened in these very Tuileries—with the Emperor, all three looking out of the window, which opened on the garden, the sound of music, of carriages, and people being heard in the distance, talking of past times.' At another dinner, the conversation fell on the Vienna Conferences, and the strange part M. Drouyn de Lhuys acted at them. The Emperor frankly said that Drouyn de Lhuys had been somewhat against the English Alliance, and that he had warned him that Louis Philippe fell through his alliance with England.

'I answered,' said the Emperor to the Queen, 'Louis Philippe did not fall through his alliance with England, but because he was not sincere in his alliance.'[1]

'I replied,' the Queen remarks, 'that I could not sufficiently express our appreciation of his great *franchise*; that if there was anything to complain of, or which he felt annoyed at, he should only speak out and tell it to us, for that by doing so all misunderstandings and complications would be avoided.'

The Emperor continued the conversation with the remark that he only cared '*pour les grandes choses*;' that he would not tolerate at the different Courts a French anti-English party; and that he had had great trouble in overcoming the old prejudices of the French

[1] 'Je lui ai répondu, Louis-Philippe n'est pas tombé à cause de son alliance avec l'Angleterre, mais parce qu'il n'était pas sincère avec l'Angleterre.'

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against the English—sedulously fostered in those coteries in which Mr. Senior loved to gossip note-book in hand. He expressed his great gratification at the warmth of the reception which the Parisians had given the Queen, as it showed that the popular feeling was strongly in favour of the alliance. Interchanges of cordial congratulations on the alliance were renewed between the sovereigns on the Champ de Mars, after an imposing review of 40,000 troops, and on the way, in the dusk of the evening, to the Tomb of Napoleon at the Invalides. By the light of torches, and surrounded by some of the Old Guard of England's great enemy—with Santini, the Emperor's valet at St. Helena, at their head—Napoleon III. led Queen Victoria into the chapel where the great captain still lay, unentombed, with the sword of Austerlitz upon the coffin.

'There I stood,' the Queen remarks in her Diary, 'at the arm of Napoleon III., his nephew, before the coffin of England's bitterest foe; I, the granddaughter of that King who hated him most, and who more vigorously opposed him, and this very nephew, who bears his name, being my nearest and dearest ally! The organ of the church was playing "God save the Queen" at the time, and this solemn scene took place by torch-light, and during a thunder-storm. Strange and wonderful indeed. It seems as if in this tribute of respect to a departed and dead foe, old enmities and rivalries were wiped out, and the seal of Heaven placed upon that bond of unity, which is now happily established between two great and powerful nations. May Heaven bless and prosper it!'

The illustrious party went back to the Tuileries to another 'nice *vertrauliches* little dinner,' and frank and quiet talk, over the war—and thence to the *Opéra Comique*. The Queen returned to St. Cloud at night,

more delighted than ever with the Emperor's honest candour.

The visit was full of happy incidents. At the hunt in the Forest of St. Germain, 'good old Lablache' was espied by the Queen, and called up for a conversation. The old man cried when the Emperor shook his hand, and told him that the Queen had commended his son to his particular care. After the luncheon, the Queen sketched, and the Emperor danced with the children; and from this quiet domestic scene all repaired to that State ball at Versailles, the Imperial splendour of which was talked about even in Paris, for many years afterwards.

The Empress, whose condition commanded the utmost possible avoidance of fatigue, met the Emperor and Queen at the entrance to the Ball-rooms.

'The Empress,' the Queen has recorded, 'met us at the top of the staircase, looking like a fairy queen or nymph, in a white dress, trimmed with branches of grass and diamonds—a beautiful *tour de corsage* of diamonds round the top of her dress, and all *en rivière*, the same round her waist, and a corresponding coiffure, with her Spanish and Portuguese orders. The Emperor said when she appeared: "*Comme tu es belle!*"'

They passed into the glittering galleries, danced, and supped, and in the midst of the fête a few presentations were made to the Queen—among the persons presented being the Prussian Minister at Frankfort, Count Bismarck, who said, in reply to an observation by Her Majesty, that Paris was even more beautiful than Petersburg.

Delighted with the success of the fête, and, indeed, of the Queen's entire visit, the Emperor said, on their way home to St. Cloud: 'It is dreadful that this is the last night but one.' The Queen was 'equally sorry;'

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and hoped that the Emperor would pay her another visit at Windsor. He promised, and added: 'As we now know one another, we can visit at Windsor and at Fontainebleau without ceremony; is it not so?'

'I replied,' the Queen remarks, 'that it would give me great pleasure, which it certainly would.'

On the morrow—the Prince's birthday—the Emperor, after breakfast, offered him an Imperial gift—the *Meissonnier*, which the Queen declared to be the finest thing in the Exhibition; and then, drawing his guests to a balcony overlooking the courtyard, he said they would hear some music of his own composition in honour of the day. The musicians were 300 drummers. 'Upon our appearing,' the Queen remarks, 'the Emperor gave them the signal: "*Commencez!*" on which they all, as if they were one man, began a splendid roll of drums in a particular manner, which is only given upon the *jour de l'an*. They repeated this twice, and then went away cheering. It was very fine, and very kind of the Emperor. He is particularly fond of it.'

In the course of that day the Emperor drove the Queen through the Park in his phaeton; and in the course of the drive a conversation took place, of which Her Majesty made the following full and admirable note:—

'I said to the Emperor that as he was always so very frank with me, and wished that I should be the same, I was very anxious to tell him something, "*que j'avais bien à cœur, qu'il comprit,*" and this was, that he should understand on what footing I was with the Orleans family; that they were my friends and relations, and that I could not drop them in their adversity, but that they were very discreet, and politics were not touched upon between us. The Emperor replied, that he quite understood this, and felt that I could not

abandon those who were in misfortune. I rejoined, that I felt certain this was the Emperor's feeling; but that other people tried, and Walewski was one, to put a great stress on any communications with the family, and to make me understand that the Emperor would be very much displeased. He replied, "that was just like Walewski." . . . "*Comme nous sommes une fois sur ce sujet*," he continued, he wished to explain the motives which led him to confiscate the property of the Orleans family—an action which had been much attacked. He had no animosity to the family. He had wished to leave all the Orleanist *employés* in their places, to dismiss no one, and to receive every one, but that he had discovered that their agents, encouraged by themselves (though, on my observation, that I was sure they would not conspire, he admitted that), were attempting to upset his authority, and that *then* he felt he could not leave them with such large possessions, which they would have the power to use against the Government. He had, therefore, pursued the course that had been pursued before, of obliging them to sell their property within six months.[1] But he repeated that he had "*aucune animosité*," and he hoped I had told the Queen that it would give him pleasure if she passed through France on her way to Spain. I could not make much further remark, beyond saying that they had felt the confiscation very much, and that they were in consequence much more bitter than they would otherwise have been; at least, they had been at the time, for now the subject was never mentioned between us. I praised the Princes, and the Queen, their discretion, &c. The Emperor said,

[1] It was adopted by the Bourbons, on the overthrow of Napoleon in 1815; and the English Government of the day took advantage of it to buy the palace of a princess of the House of Bonaparte, for the residence of the British Embassy, at less than half its real value.

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in conclusion of his explanation about the confiscation, that their agents were in constant communication with his enemies, even "*avec ceux qui prêchent l'assassinat.*" I said, I could hardly credit this. They were, I was sure, incapable of such conduct. I, however, added, that naturally all exiles were inclined to conspire, which he did not deny, and which, indeed, he had practised himself. . . .'

The Emperor closed the conversation with the renewal of an offer he had made to drive his guests to the chapel on the spot where the Duke of Orleans died. The visit was paid in the afternoon, and the Emperor bought of the woman who kept the *curé's* house two medals, which he presented to the Queen. 'They contained,' Her Majesty remarks, 'the heads of poor Chartres (the late Duke of Orleans) and Paris, with some lines in allusion to the latter being the hope of France, and with a representation of the chapel on the back. Strange that the Emperor should have bought them!'

The last evening at St. Cloud was passed quietly, with a concert of classical music, which much pleased the Prince Consort, but, according to the Queen, 'bored' the Emperor; and on the morrow, in beautiful weather, the Queen and her Consort set forth, amidst tumultuous cheering from the Parisians, and through gaily bedecked streets, on their way to their quiet home in the Isle of Wight, where their younger children were found waiting for them on the shore.

'I am deeply grateful,' the Queen wrote in her Diary, before leaving St. Cloud, 'for these eight very happy days, and for the delight of seeing such beautiful and interesting places and objects, and for the reception which we have met with in Paris, and in France generally. The union of the two nations, and of the two Sovereigns—for there is a great friendship sprung up

between us—is of the greatest importance. May God bless these two countries, and may He specially protect the precious life of the Emperor, and may this happy union ever continue for the benefit of the world!'

The Empress at parting gave the Queen a fan, and a rose, and a heliotrope from the garden, and put a bracelet about the arm of the Princess Royal; and then the Emperor conducted his guests to Boulogne—going out to sea with them before taking his final leave.

These are the Queen's final impressions of her visit to Paris: 'I have since talked frequently with Albert, who is naturally much calmer, and particularly much less taken by people than I am. He quite admits that it is extraordinary, how very much attached one becomes to the Emperor, when one lives with him quite at one's ease and intimately, as we have done during the last ten days, for eight, ten, twelve, and, to-day, even fourteen hours a day. He is so quiet, so simple, *naïf* even, so pleased to be informed about things which he does not know, so gentle, so full of tact, dignity and modesty, so full of respect and kind attention towards us, never saying a word, or doing a thing, which could put me out or embarrass me. I know few people, whom I have felt involuntarily more inclined to confide in and speak unreservedly to—I should not fear saying anything to him. I felt—I do not know how to express it—safe with him. His society is particularly agreeable and pleasant; there is something fascinating, melancholy, and engaging, which draws you to him, in spite of any *prévention* you may have against him, and certainly without the assistance of any outward advantages of appearance, though I like his face. He undoubtedly has a most extraordinary power of attaching people to him! The children are very fond of him; to them also his kindness was very great, but, at the same time, most

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judicious. Then, he is so fond of Albert, appreciates him so thoroughly, and shows him so much confidence. In fine, I shall always look back on this visit to France, not only on account of the delightful and splendid things we saw and enjoyed, but on the time we passed with the Emperor, as one of the pleasantest and most interesting periods of my life! The Empress, too, has a great charm, and we are all very fond of her.'

The Prince wrote to his uncle, King Leopold, that everything, from beginning to end, had gone off 'to a wish.' The Queen, more expansive than her Consort, wrote on the 29th to the Emperor a most affectionate letter of thanks for the ten happy days passed as his guest; and she repeated his '*au revoir*' with all her heart, signing herself with 'tender friendship and affection' his '*bonne et affectionnée sœur et amie.*'

The Emperor's reply (September 1) was characteristic of his sentimental nature. In it he declared that he appreciated fully the advantages of a sincere union between the two Governments; but that he valued, above all other considerations, the intimate and sincere friendship which had been established between the two families. 'For,' he added, 'the satisfaction of the heart will always be with me above that of ambition; and although I felt proud to be for a moment the host of the Queen of so powerful an empire, I am more delighted with the remembrance of the gracious and amiable lady, of the distinguished man, and of the charming children, in whose sweet intimacy I passed days that will never be effaced from my memory.'[1]

[1] 'Car la satisfaction du cœur sera toujours à mes yeux bien au-dessus des satisfactions de l'ambition; et quoique j'ai éprouvé un juste sentiment d'orgueil d'être au moment l'hôte de la Reine d'un si puissant empire, je me plais davantage au souvenir de la femme si aimable et si gracieuse, de l'homme si distingué, des enfants si charmants, avec lesquels j'ai passé des jours d'une douce intimité dont le souvenir ne s'effacera jamais de ma mémoire.'

On September 8 Sebastopol was in the possession of the Allies. With this triumph, and some minor successes in the Sea of Azof and the Black Sea, the war virtually closed; and the diplomatists of the five Powers opened a series of negotiations, which lasted till the spring of 1856.

Meantime, the Emperor turned with renewed energy to home affairs; and struggled hard, even for a moment at the risk of destroying his alliance with England, to hasten a peace that would enable him to repair the financial trouble which the war had brought upon his Empire. The closing of the Universal Exhibition in November, in the presence of an extraordinary assemblage of princes, warriors, statesmen, artists, men of letters, afforded the Chief of the State one of those opportunities which he knew so well how to use, for making his sentiments and wishes known, not only to his subjects, but to all Europe. Having said that he believed the brilliant success of an Industrial Exhibition, held in the midst of war, to be due to the general conviction that the Allies were bent only on chastising a common enemy, for the independence and security of the civilised world, he remarked that the first impression made by the exposition of the wonders around them must be a desire for peace. 'Peace, indeed,' he continued, 'can alone give further development to these products of human intelligence. You must all then hope with me that peace may be prompt and lasting. But, in order to be lasting, it must effectually settle the question for which the war was undertaken. If it is to be prompt, Europe must speak; for, without the pressure of general opinion, the struggles between the great are inclined to be prolonged; while, on the contrary, if Europe hastens to say who is in the right, and who is in the wrong, a great step will be made towards an

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understanding. In these times in which we live, the successes of armies, however brilliant they may be, are only of passing effect; public opinion carries always the ultimate victory.'

Then, turning to the representatives of the various nations ranged in an amphitheatre under their respective flags, and particularly to the Germans, he continued, in a strong and solemn voice that vibrated to the uttermost recesses of the palace: 'You, who believe that the progress of agriculture, industry, and commerce of one nation contributes to that of the rest, and that reciprocal relations grow as national prejudices decline, tell your fellow-countrymen, when you return home, that France has no hatred against any people, that she feels sympathy for all who desire the triumph of right and justice. Tell them that, if they desire peace, they must at least declare openly for or against us; for, in the midst of a grave European conflict, indifference is a bad policy, and silence is an error.'

These words were received with resounding cheers from all sides, save where the German flags appeared. The lesson was addressed especially to Austria. And finally, the Emperor turned to his Allies—the English, the Sardinians, and the Turks, and said: 'As for us, nations allied for the triumph of a great cause, let us continue to forge weapons without slackening our factories, without stopping our looms; let us show ourselves great in the arts of peace as in those of war; let us be strong by our concord, and let us put our faith in God to give us victory over the difficulties of the day, and the hazards of the future.'[1]

[1] 'Vous tous donc qui pensez que les progrès de l'agriculture, de l'industrie, du commerce d'une nation contribuent au bien-être de toutes les autres, et que plus les rapports réciproques se multiplient, plus les préjugés nationaux tendent à s'effacer, dites à vos concitoyens, en re-

From this peaceful arena, the Emperor turned in a few weeks to his Imperial Guard, and the wounded, on their return from Sebastopol. They re-entered Paris, amid tumultuous enthusiasm, on December 29, and the Emperor harangued them, saying: 'I come to meet you, as in the olden time the Roman Senate went forth to the gates of Rome to greet its victorious legions. I come to tell you that you have deserved well of your country. . . . Soldiers of the Guard, and soldiers of the Line, we welcome you. You represent one and all that army of the East, whose valour and endurance have given fresh lustre to our eagles, and reconquered for France the position which is her right. The country, which is watching all that is being accomplished in the East, welcomes you with pride, because she can measure your efforts against the obstinate resistance of the enemy. I have recalled you, although the war is not over, because it is just to replace the regiments which have suffered the most severely. By this means any soldier can go forth and take his share of the common glory; and the country, which supports 800,000 troops, is interested in having in France a strong army inured to war, and ready to be directed in any direction. Preserve, then, with care, your war discipline, fortify yourselves by the experience you have acquired, hold yourselves ready to respond, if necessary, to my call; but to-day forget the

tournant dans votre patrie, que la France n'a de haine contre aucun peuple, qu'elle a de la sympathie pour tous ceux qui veulent comme elle le triomphe du droit et de la justice; dites-leur que, s'ils désirent la paix, il faut qu'ouvertement ils fassent au moins des vœux pour ou contre nous; car, au milieu d'un grave conflit européen, l'indifférence est un mauvais calcul, et le silence une erreur.

'Quant à nous, peuples alliés par le triomphe d'une grande cause, forgeons des armes sans ralentir nos usines, sans arrêter nos métiers; soyons grands par les arts de la paix comme par ceux de la guerre; soyons forts par la concorde, et mettons notre confiance en Dieu, pour nous faire triompher des difficultés du jour et des chances de l'avenir.'

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trials of a soldier's life, thank God for having spared you, and advance proudly amid your companions in arms and your fellow-citizens, whose acclamations await you.'

The Guard and the Line, with their wounded and their tattered colours, passed along the *via sacra* of Paris; and this proud day for France closed, perhaps, the most eventful and brilliant year of Napoleon's reign.

CHAPTER V.

THE TREATY OF PARIS.

LORD PALMERSTON, in a letter to his brother (August 25, 1855) had foreseen that with the fall of Sebastopol, England's danger—'a danger of peace, and not a danger of war'—would begin. 'Austria,' he remarked, 'will try to draw us again into negotiations for an insufficient peace;' and he added: 'I must try to fight the battle of negotiation as well as the battle of war, and fortunately the spirit of the British nation will support us. I wish I could reckon with equal confidence on the steady determination of the French.'

The feeling in favour of peace had been all along much stronger in France than in England. At the end of October (1855), in a letter to Baron Stockmar, the Prince Consort had said: 'Up to this time the peace feeling has been stronger in France than here, and gives us much to do. . . . What is said is: "Si la France doit continuer la guerre à grands sacrifices, il lui faut des objets plus nationaux, plus français: Poland, Italy, the left bank of the Rhine, &c. For this we are prepared, and for these purposes might recall our army from the Black Sea by degrees." Herein lies one of the causes of our inactivity in the Crimea! The position taken up by Austria and Prussia is alone to blame for all, and I tremble for the Nemesis!'

The peace was brought about by the wise, temperate, and conciliatory activity of the Emperor. Critics

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may disagree on the reasons which impelled the French Sovereign. There can be no doubt as to the imprudent impetuosity of the action taken by France when she drew up proposals for peace in conjunction with Austria, and sent them over to Count Walewski, for England's acceptance *pur et simple*. This proceeding was a blunder, the punishment of which followed swiftly on the commission of it. Lord Palmerston was not a Minister to be treated lightly by Count Walewski; nor was England a nation to suffer dictation from France. The only possible explanation of the fiasco was the haste in which the Emperor was to conclude an honourable arrangement with Russia. It cannot be too often repeated, when his motives are brought in question, that the war had been unpopular from the first with his subjects, save during the excitement of its victories; and that it had no sooner been crowned by the fall of Sebastopol, than public opinion called for peace, in tones that could not be heard with indifference.

During the war, in the presence of Prussia and Austria biding their time, the Emperor had cast about for allies on their frontiers. He had concluded a treaty with the King of Sweden, and had sent him the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour by the hands of the popular Crimean commander-in-chief, Canrobert, who had been received both in Copenhagen and in Stockholm with enthusiasm. Napoleon had watched, in short, as in duty bound, every opening that would yield his country an advantage under certain conditions. In the position of uncertainty as to the intentions of the two great central European Powers, he had weighed every chance and sought to fortify himself against any possible contingency. At the same time he had to guard against the traps into which both Austria and Russia endeavoured to lead him, by which he would forfeit the English

alliance. The Emperor was a kindly man, and easy of approach, even by the emissaries of his enemy. He was not inclined to press so hardly on Russia as Lord Palmerston—a man of strong resentments—was. The mildness of his disposition, and at the same time the vehement force of public opinion impelling him to make peace, both inclined him to agree on terms with Austria and Russia, and to press them on England with a haste and in a form which, on reflexion, he acknowledged to be foolish and unbecoming. He meditated the immediate recall of a considerable number of his troops from the Crimea; and his detractors at once whispered abroad that he was contemplating the transfer of the seat of operations from Sebastopol to the banks of the Rhine. He was seeking peace, and only peace; for his people insisted upon it; and if he allowed himself to be persuaded by Count Buol that the Black Sea settlement should be drawn up in a separate treaty between Russia and Turkey, he did so in his haste to comply with public opinion. His frank letter to the Queen, written on hearing the haughty refusals of Lord Palmerston to treat with De Persigny[1] on the Austrian protocol, to which England had not been a party, or to discuss Count Buol's[2] Black Sea

[1] 'Cette manière d'agir dans une affaire tellement grave ne nous convient pas. Nous souhaitons nous conformer aux désirs de l'Empereur, mais il faut que nous soyons en règle vis-à-vis de notre Parlement; et nous ne pouvons pas souscrire à une proposition de paix à être faite en notre nom à la Russie, sans que nous soyons entièrement d'accord et sur la forme et sur la substance d'une telle proposition. . . . . La nation anglaise serait enchantée d'une bonne paix qui assurât les objets de la guerre; mais plutôt que d'être entraînée à signer une paix à des conditions insuffisantes, elle préférerait continuer la guerre sans d'autres alliés que la Turquie, et elle se sent tout à fait en état d'en soutenir le fardeau, et de se tirer ainsi d'affaire.'—Letter of Lord Palmerston to Count de Persigny, November 21, 1855.

[2] 'Buol's statement to you the night before last was what in plain

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proposal, which the English Foreign Minister had described as 'impertinent,' may be put aside by party writers prone to discover base motives for every move of their opponents, as an effort of hypocritical candour; but it was not so regarded by the illustrious lady to whom it was addressed, nor by the Prince Consort, nor by Lords Palmerston and Clarendon, to whose judgment the Queen hastened to submit it.

The letter was dated from the Tuileries on November 22, 1855, and began, 'Madam and dear Sister!'

'We have reached,' the Emperor said, 'one of those critical epochs, when we ought to speak very frankly; and I would therefore ask your Majesty's permission to enter into some detail upon the subject of what is taking place in the political world.

'I begin by repelling everything which could lead to the belief, that the French Government would be constrained to make peace, although the conditions were not good, just as I would not permit myself to think that the English Government would be compelled to continue the war, if the conditions of peace were good. We are both of us free in our actions, we have the same interests, and we wish the same thing—an honourable peace!

'Now, what is our military position? Your Majesty has, I believe, in the East, 50,000 men and 10,000 horses. I have 200,000 men and 34,000 horses. Your Majesty has an immense fleet in the Black Sea as well as the Baltic; I have one that is imposing, though less considerable. Well, notwithstanding this formidable force, it is apparent to all the world, that although we can do Russia serious mischief, we cannot *subdue* her

English we should call impertinent.'—Palmerston to Sir Hamilton Seymour, January 24, 1856.

with our own unaided means. What then is to be done? Three courses are open to us:

'1. To limit ourselves to occupying strategical points, to blockade the Black Sea and the Baltic, and to wait without spending extravagant sums until it pleases Russia to make peace. By confining ourselves to a defensive war, and to holding our ground, Russia will be exhausted in warlike preparations (*s'épuise en armements*), while we, on the other hand, will be diminishing the sacrifices of war.

'2. To make an appeal to all the nationalities, to proclaim boldly the re-establishment of Poland, the independence of Finland, of Hungary, of Italy, of Circassia. This course, I need scarcely say, would be full of danger, and contrary, at this time of day, to justice.

'3. To secure, *if* possible, the alliance of Austria, so that she may carry all Germany along with her, and in this way that Russia may be driven, by our arms on the one hand, and by the public opinion of Europe on the other, to propose equitable conditions of peace.

'It will seem, I doubt not, to your Majesty, as it does to me, that the third course is the best.

'Now, what is going on at this moment?

'Austria says to us, "The proposals of peace which, before Europe, you have proclaimed to be sufficient for your interests and your honour, I accept, nay, I am prepared even to submit them, on the condition, that if Russia shall by any chance entertain them, you give me your assurance, that you will consent to open negotiations for peace on this basis." To such an offer how can we reasonably reply by a refusal, or by equivocations (*chicanes*) which are equivalent to a refusal? This, Madam, is what I cannot understand, for it is not we who make concessions to gain the support of Austria; it is Austria who, of her own accord, hoists our flag.

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'If your Majesty's Government said that the conditions of peace ought to be very different, that our honour and our interests demanded a readjustment of the map of Europe, that Europe would not be free until Poland was re-established, the Crimea given to Turkey, and Finland to Sweden, I could comprehend a policy which would have a certain grandeur, and would put the results arrived at on a level with the sacrifices to be made. But spontaneously to renounce the support of Austria for microscopical advantages, which one could always claim at any time, is what I cannot bring myself to regard as reasonable, and to these questions, so grave as they are, I ask the attention of your Majesty and that of Prince Albert, whose views are always so clear and so exalted.

'My firm desire being to be always at one with your Majesty's Government, I hope we shall come to an understanding.

'I ask pardon for this letter, written in haste, and I beg you to receive favourably the fresh expression of the respectful and tender friendship, with which I am, Madam and Sister, your Majesty's devoted and true brother, NAPOLEON.'

The Queen, in her reply, after thanking the Emperor for his letter as a new proof of his friendship and his 'sincere desire in difficult moments to come to a clear understanding' with his ally, pointed out the advantages and disadvantages of their respective positions as sovereigns: the one acting through Ministers responsible to Parliament, and the other at the free dictate of his personal will. Putting aside any 'wounded feelings of *amour propre*' at the understanding with Austria, and Count Buol's neutralisation proposition, Her Majesty declined to be bound by the letter of the Austrian proposal, to which her Government had not been a party,

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or to assent to Count Buol's plan. Of the three courses submitted by the Emperor, the Queen accepted only the third, remarking that the second would always be rejected with firmness. Her Majesty added:

'I will say nothing here of the plans of military operations, as I consider them to be dependent on the policy agreed upon. This policy having been settled exclusively by the two Governments, the Generals, after a Council,[1] of which I highly approve the idea as suggested by your Majesty, should be entrusted with the consideration of the plans of the campaign to carry out the policy determined upon.

'I am convinced that every difficulty, every divergence of opinion, which may arise on these weighty matters, will be more promptly and more effectually dispelled by a frank exchange of ideas between your Majesty and myself, than by any other mode of communication, and I therefore beg you will continue towards me those unreserved utterances (*épanchements*), to which I hope you will find that my letter responds with a sincere and genuine confidence. . . . Accept, Sire, the expression of sincere friendship and of high esteem, with which I am, Sire and dear Brother, your Majesty's very affectionate sister and friend, VICTORIA.'

The Emperor's admission that Lord Palmerston was justified in peremptorily declining to accept the Austrian Ultimatum, or Count Buol's 'impertinent' proposition, was frank and complete. The Queen remarked, in her letter, on the bad effect produced in Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, by the persons of his *entourage*, who had declared that the financial difficulties of France compelled her to conclude peace. The Em-

[1] This Council of War met in Paris on January 10, 1856, the Emperor presiding, and its sittings lasted till the 20th.

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peror was deeply annoyed—as he proved, by at once making it known far and wide that he would be party to no peace which was not satisfactory to England. Speaking to Lord Cowley on the subject, he said: 'Be assured, whatever I think right, I will do, and I shall not be afraid of making my conduct understood in France.' And he requested that the plain and full truth might be told him, so that he might smooth difficulties for his neighbours and allies as they were ready to smooth away his.

That he remained in this candid frame of mind while the terms of peace were being debated, and was proof against the advances of Russia to deal separately with him, has been placed beyond doubt by the correspondence of the Queen and the Prince Consort.[1]

On February 1, a protocol was signed in Vienna by the plenipotentiaries of the five Powers; and the Congress for the settlement of the terms of peace was appointed to meet in Paris. The Congress met accordingly, and, on March 30, the Treaty of Paris was signed, and a few days later the famous 'benevolent' declaration about maritime war was added.

During the progress of the negotiations the Emperor gave his weight to every conciliatory and liberal suggestion. His enemies said that he was anxious to court the special favour of Russia, and that he inclined too easily to Count Walewski's Russian sympathies. He was represented to be anxious to take advantage of the opportunity of extorting from Alexander the negotiation which Nicholas had haughtily refused him. But there is no evidence to support this malicious interpretation of the Emperor's generous mood. His rank as sovereign was secure; his influence was felt beyond

[1] *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iii.

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that of any other reigning prince throughout Europe; an heir had been born to him while the Congress was sitting. His sincerity and his delicacy in his relations with England were beyond suspicion. Writing to Baron Stockmar on January 16 (1856), the Prince Consort remarked: 'Whether we shall have peace, and what kind of peace, or a continuation of the war, and of what kind, is at this moment hard to say. The elements are not the best; best of all is the good faith and loyalty (*Ehrlichkeit*) of Louis Napoleon towards us, of which he gives daily proofs.' This good faith and loyalty, which left Russia no hope of separating the Allies, made her accept the entire ultimatum defining the preliminaries of peace. Paris was chosen by England as the meeting place of the Congress, although it was infested by Russian agents, because the progress of the negotiations would thus be directly under the observation of the two allied sovereigns, who were resolved to act in concert throughout. This resolution had been come to at the suggestion of the Emperor, who, in a letter to the Queen (January 21), had said: 'Unity of action was as essential at the council-table as in the field;' and had begged that all divergencies of opinion between the two Governments should be adjusted before the meeting of the Congress. In compliance with this request Lord Clarendon went to Paris some days before the assembling of the peacemakers, to confer personally with the Emperor. He was bearer of a letter[1] to His Majesty from his Royal Mistress, in which the Queen said: 'It will afford me deep satisfaction at this critical moment, and I shall esteem it a special proof of your friendship, if you will allow Lord Clarendon to explain my views to you in person, and to

[1] Dated, Buckingham Palace, February 15, 1856.

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learn yours from your own mouth.' Her Majesty having dwelt on the vital importance of a complete accord between the two Governments, in order to obtain terms 'satisfactory to the honour of France and England,' renewed once more her repeated assurances of confidence and friendship. 'You will excuse, Sire,' said the Queen, 'the length of this letter; but it is very pleasant to me to be able to give free utterance to my sentiments, on all these important and difficult questions, to one whom I regard, not merely as a faithful ally, but as a friend on whom I can, under all circumstances, rely,' and who, I am sure, is animated by the same sentiments towards us.'

Lord Clarendon delivered this letter on his arrival in Paris on February 17; and the same evening, at the Tuileries after dinner, he held a long private conversation with the Emperor. His Majesty, Lord Clarendon reported to the Queen, expressed himself most warmly in favour of the alliance, and entirely concurred with Her Majesty that 'upon the perfect understanding between the two Governments, and the conviction on the part of others, that the Alliance was not to be shaken, depended the facility with which negotiations might be conducted and the terms on which peace would be made.' He offered, moreover, to give Baron Brunnow and Count Buol to understand that if they reckoned upon the Alliance being disturbed, they would find themselves grievously mistaken, and that it would be waste of time to endeavour to alter conditions on which the two allied Governments had resolved. Lord Clarendon added: 'The Emperor appeared to be much gratified by your Majesty's letter, for the first thing he said to Lord Clarendon on coming into the room before dinner was, "*Quelle charmante lettre vous m'avez apportée de la Reine!*" and then began upon the extraordinary

clearness with which your Majesty treated all matters of business, and the pleasure he derived from any discussion of them with your Majesty.'

From his resolution the Emperor was never induced, either by the intrigues of the political salons (where Baron Brunnow and his agents were busy) or by the arts of the stock-jobbing politicians, who unfortunately surrounded him, to swerve for one moment. To those who pointed out to him that France was exhausted, and could not continue the war in any case, he replied that, if necessary, he could resume it as easily as he had declared it. This he gave Russia to understand in his speech on opening the session of the Chambers on March 3. When the question of admitting Prussia to the Congress was mooted, and the good offices of King Leopold were engaged in the interests of the Power which had played a base part throughout the war, the Emperor, although he declined to accede to such admission while the terms of peace with Russia remained unsettled, consented to accept Prussian plenipotentiaries to take part in a general treaty, and on March 18 these plenipotentiaries were admitted. On the 25th, in a conversation with Lord Clarendon, the Emperor remarked that he cared nothing about Prussia, and that England had much more interest in pleasing the King of Prussia than France. Lord Clarendon inquired what that interest was. 'The Emperor answered,' Lord Clarendon subsequently reported to the Queen,[1] 'the marriage of the Princess Royal, which must make the Queen anxious to be on good terms with Prussia.' Lord Clarendon said, that the Emperor was greatly mistaken, 'if he thought that the private feelings of your Majesty ever interfered with what your Majesty might think

[1] *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iii. p. 451.

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right for the honour or the interests of England, and that long before the Emperor had made up his mind on the subject, Lord Clarendon knew that your Majesty had determined, and had made no secret of the opinion, that to admit Prussia to take part in the negotiations for peace, after her conduct throughout the war had been condemned by your Majesty's Government, would be degrading to England, and a proof that she viewed political immorality with indifference. The Emperor answered: "*Savez-vous, que c'est bien beau? cela fait plaisir d'entendre. Je suis bien aise que vous me l'ayez dit.*"'

The part taken by the Emperor in the discussion on the manner in which the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were to be dealt with, as recorded by Lord Clarendon, was in accordance with that strong feeling in favour of nationalities as distinguished from dynasties, which never forsook him, and which, if it led him to some of the glories, also landed him in the gravest errors of his reign. His sympathies for Poland were manifested warmly and frequently in the course of the Russian war; and he would have rejoiced indeed had he been able to comfort the venerable Adam Czartorisky with the vision of his country restored to independence.[1] There was bitter disappointment in the Hôtel Lambert when the Peace of Paris was signed; and there were even whispers that the Poles had been betrayed. In the settlement of the future of the Principalities the Emperor spoke his strong conviction in favour of their union under a sovereign of their own election. He remarked that the great fault committed by the Congress of Vienna was that the interests of the sovereigns only

[1] Prince Adam Czartorisky spoke with great bitterness to me, at the time, of the hopes that had been raised in his countrymen, only to be crushed when the Allies no longer wanted them.—B. J.

were consulted, and that from all the information which reached him, he was convinced that nothing would satisfy the people of Wallachia and Moldavia but the union of the Principalities under a foreign Prince, who should nevertheless admit the suzerain power of the Sultan, and that it would be disgraceful to England and France, if they had not the will or the power to establish a state of things in the Principalities that would be in accordance with the wishes of the people, and manifestly be an improvement upon the feeble attempt at reorganisation that had been proposed at Constantinople. His opinion did not prevail; but that which did carry the day left difficulties in the future which even the Treaty of Berlin has not settled.

When, after the signature of peace, the Emperor addressed his congratulations to the entire Congress, he told the assembled diplomates that the signature of peace that day was the fulfilment of what Lord Clarendon had announced in the name of his Government in the House of Lords; and, turning to Lords Cowley and Clarendon, he added, that peace had been rendered possible by the spirit of conciliation they had exhibited.

Illuminations, and a review of 50,000 men, given to the Congress in the Champ de Mars, closed the scene, and left the Emperor, disburdened of a mighty responsibility, to pursue those social improvements and developments of industrial prosperity which were congenial to his heart and mind. The Queen wrote to congratulate him (April 3) on the peace concluded 'under his auspices;' and he replied (April 12), that he was glad of the peace, but especially glad that the Alliance had come out of the Conferences intact, and that it was seen by Europe to be as compact as when it was first concluded.

Lord Palmerston stated with exultation that the

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objects of the war had been gained—'the military audacity of Russia had been repressed, a very severe lesson had been inflicted upon her by the diminution of her reserves; the Danube had been freed, Sebastopol had been destroyed, provision had even been made limiting the force of Russia and of Turkey in the Black Sea.[1] In addition, the whole of Russian treaty rights of interference in Turkey were destroyed. For generations before the Crimean war, the Christians of Turkey had her as a protector. The war abolished her protectorate.' These were the brave words of the peacemakers of 1856. They were recalled in moods of bitter mockery by the active diplomates and statesmen of 1878, when the Emperor lay in a village church in Kent, and Palmerston slept in the Abbey.

[1] Mr. Gladstone's speech in the House of Commons, July 31, 1876. As to the Black Sea provision, he quietly remarked that it 'had now disappeared'!

BOOK XI.

ITALIAN INDEPENDENCE.

CHAPTER I.

BIRTH OF THE PRINCE IMPERIAL.

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EARLY in the morning of March 16, 1856, the guns of the Invalides told the population of Paris that a son had been born to the Emperor. The State Bodies had been sitting *en permanence* for eighteen hours, during the prolonged sufferings of the Empress. At four o'clock on the morning of the 16th a messenger carried the news of the safe delivery of Her Majesty, and the birth of an heir to the throne, to the Senate, the Legislative Body, and to the Municipal authorities at the Hôtel de Ville. Early in the morning the child was named Napoléon Eugène Louis Jean Joseph, the Pope and the Queen of Sweden being godfather and godmother. At one o'clock the Emperor, radiant with joy, received the Diplomatic Body. Paris assumed a holiday aspect; and congratulations were poured into the Tuileries from every part of Europe. The general delight was, however, at first damped by the critical condition of the Imperial mother. On the 18th, Prince Albert, writing to Baron Stockmar, remarked: 'The accounts from Paris are better. We were in some anxiety about the life of the Empress, whose *accouchement* has been a more difficult affair than the public were allowed to be told. She has still a great deal of fever.' Lord Clarendon wrote to the Queen on the same day: 'The Emperor's eyes filled with tears when he described the tortures of the Empress and his own

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sensations.' On the same day, replying to the congratulations of the Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Council of State, the proud father said: 'The Senate has shared my joy on learning that Heaven had given me a son, and you have hailed as a happy event the birth of a Child of France. I use this word designedly. The Emperor Napoleon, my uncle, who had welded into the new system all that was great and elevated of the old, revived this ancient description of the Children of France. And truly, gentlemen, when an heir is born to perpetuate a national system, the child is not only the offspring of a family, but he is also the son of the whole country, and this name indicates to him his duties. If this was true under the old monarchy, which represented more exclusively the privileged classes, how much more is it so now, when the sovereign is the elect of the nation, the first citizen of the country, and the representative of the interests of all?' Then turning to the Count de Morny, who stood as President at the head of the Legislative Body, he added that the unanimous acclamations which had greeted his son's cradle had not prevented him from reflecting on other princes who had been born in the same place and under analogous circumstances. 'If,' said His Majesty, 'I hope that his fate will be a happier one, it is because, relying on Providence, I cannot doubt of its protection, since it has raised again all that was beaten down forty years ago, as though it designed to strengthen, by martyrdom and misfortune, a new dynasty that had issued from the ranks of the people. Then, history has teachings which I shall not forget. It tells me that the favours of fortune should never be abused, that a dynasty has a chance of stability only while it remains faithful to its origin, and has a care for the popular interests for which t has been created. This child, consecrated in

his cradle by the peace we are preparing, by the blessing of the Pope, carried to him by electricity an hour after his birth, and by the acclamations of the French people, whom "the Emperor loved so well"—this child, I say, will be worthy of the destiny which awaits him.'

These hopeful words are inexpressibly pathetic, read by the light of the sad, short life that lay before the Child of France. But with the Crimean war gloriously closed, and congratulations flowing in from every Court of Europe, the horizon had a promise of fair weather all round, and the Emperor had solid reason for his brave hopes. In his gladness he issued a general amnesty to all who would promise to respect the laws, and to accept the order of things established by the will of the people. Generals Randon, Canrobert, and Bosquet were created marshals of France. The Emperor became the godfather, and the Empress the godmother, of all the legitimate children born in France on the Prince's birthday; and took them under their protection. On March 23, a solemn *Te Deum* was performed at Notre Dame before the State Bodies, for the happy deliverance of the Empress; and on June 14, on the Emperor's return from visiting the disastrous inundations of the Saône, the Rhone, and the Loire,[1] the Prince Imperial was baptised with extraordinary pomp, Cardinal Patrizi representing the Pope. When the moment came for the Empress to

[1] On July 19, the Emperor, being at Plombières, addressed a remarkable letter on the prevention of inundations to M. Rouher, then Minister of Public Works; in which he examined the causes of the inundations of rivers, discussed the various methods for their prevention, recommended the appointment of a responsible director of the 'régime des grands fleuves,' who could act with vigour when any disaster threatened, and requested the Minister to make an immediate enquiry into the relative value of the plans in his office. His Majesty pointed out how, after the great inundation of 1846, debates had taken place in the Chambers, and luminous reports had been drawn up, and how in the end nothing had been done.

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hold forth her son and present him to the glittering multitude massed in the cathedral, her emotion and weakness prevented her, and the Emperor took the boy, whom he never ceased to watch from that day to his death with the most passionate love, in his arms, and held him up amid the acclamations of all who thus saw the golden-haired son of France for the first time. A banquet at the Hôtel de Ville, and a ball, closed the costly baptismal festivities—at which the poor were not forgotten.

On her marriage the Empress had transferred the marriage gift voted for a diadem to an Orphan Asylum for Girls; in the same gentle spirit she marked the birth of her son by the creation of an Orphanage for Boys,[1] with the gift fund raised by national subscription. These two charities remained her constant care to the end of her husband's reign. She presided at the committee meetings, attended to the details of management, and made them models of order and efficiency.

On June 19, five days after the baptism of the infant prince, the Pope's Legate, Cardinal Patrizi, gave the Empress, at a solemn service in the Palace Chapel of Saint Cloud, the golden rose which the Pope had sent her. After the ceremony the Cardinal Legate presented to the Emperor, on the part of Pius IX., a fine mosaic of Guido's 'St. John the Baptist in the Desert;' and to the Child of France, a magnificent enamelled and jewelled reliquary, containing a relic of the sacred cradle. These sumptuous gifts and imposing ceremonials were not to the taste of the Emperor. He would have given the cost of the baptismal fêtes to the sufferers by the inundations; and, on his return from

[1] Orphelinat du Prince Impérial. The Emperor distributed 100,000 francs to the Bureaux de Bienfaisance of the localities where the Crown domains were situated.

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the devastated districts of his Empire, had actually endeavoured to stop the preparations for this purpose. But it was too late. He was watching, moreover, with anxiety, and even with anger, the feverish speculation around him, in which the President of the Legislative Body was most deeply implicated, and which had led to a financial crisis. He understood the political value of show in France, and suffered it to be carried on accordingly, while he despised it.

When the baptismal fêtes had been brought to an end, he was glad to get away to the comparative quiet of Plombières,[1] to his study and his dreams. France was at peace once more; his position in Europe was a dominant one; his dynasty appeared to be resting at length on solid foundations. His relations with England were still cordial. In short, when Napoleon retired, for rest and the physical solace of baths, to Plombières, in the summer of 1856, any clouds that lay on his horizon appeared to lie within the bounds of his realm. A bad harvest, wild speculation, excessive expenditure, and extravagant public works, threatened commercial disasters of the most perilous political kind. He saw these in the future, and he would have slackened the pace of the builders, and put a curb upon the De Mornys, Péreires, and others, had he seen his way to apply severer control without raising the opposition of the bourgeois and the work-folk. He had attended the first performance of 'La Bourse' by M. Ponsard, in which the dramatist had severely handled the gamblers on 'Change; and he had written to the dramatist, on receipt of a copy of the piece, a letter of congratulation, in which he said he had been delighted to see how he had branded, with all the authority of his genius, the vice of

[1] Even here the requests for audiences were counted by the hundred daily.

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the day.[1] It was the Emperor's misfortune to have the most daring of the speculators and dabblers in concessions so near to him, and so necessary to him as President of the Legislative Body, that his endeavours to mitigate the evils of the gambling spirit were frustrated. A law reforming societies *en commandite* was passed; but it could do little to counteract the money greed which possessed most of the public men who had access to him. He was lavish in his gifts to all who had served him; he was a prodigal to his kindred; he was a bad economist, because he despised money. He looked on the race for wealth, the hubbub and the scandals of which surrounded and mortified him, with a quiet scorn, that found vent, in his later day, when M. Duruy was of his Government, in the constant exclamation that this Minister was *un honnête homme*. Although he was deceived, and used by dexterous political gamblers throughout his reign, he was slow to believe the least evil in regard to any man who had once won his confidence.

It was reported to him by an unimpeachable authority that the Duke de Morny was in receipt of an annual sum from the Viceroy of Egypt to serve his interests in France. The Emperor refused to believe the story, and appealed to his old playmate, Madame Cornu, who could only confirm the truth of the rumour. But he thrust it aside—and absolutely refused

[1] 'J'ai été vraiment heureux de vous entendre flétrir de toute l'autorité de votre talent, et combattre par l'inspiration des sentiments les plus nobles, le funeste entraînement du jour. Je lirai donc votre pièce avec le même plaisir que je l'ai vu jouer. Persévérez, monsieur, votre nouveau succès vous y engage, dans cette voie de moralité, trop rarement peut-être suivie au théâtre, et si digne pourtant des auteurs appelés, comme vous, à y laisser une belle réputation.'—Letter of Napoleon III. to M. Ponsard, June 15, 1856.

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to be guided by it. 'On another occasion,' said Madame Cornu,[1] 'when I was alone with him in his cabinet at the Tuileries, he referred to certain very base calumnies which had been spread by a certain high official of the Court, and he insisted vehemently that I should tell him the whole truth, as I knew it. I refused at first to obey his command, and referred him to another; but, at length, I consented, premising that the dose was a bitter one. "Tell me everything," he insisted. As I proceeded his face changed; and a tiger-like expression came over it, such as I had never seen before. I, who am not a nervous person, started, and stopped. Then his features resumed their old, kind expression: he begged me to continue, and he listened to me to the end, quietly. He always conquered himself.'

These were the troubles that underlay the splendour of the reign of Napoleon III., even at its brightest. 'He had noble projects,' said his severe critic and friend Madame Cornu, 'and a cosmopolitan mind;' but he had, with few exceptions, incompetent and unworthy agents, and from these, even when they stood convicted, he had not the force to free himself. If in the autumn of 1856, when his heart was oppressed with the scandals that encompassed his throne, and his mind was racked by the diplomatic intrigues which sprang out of the Peace signed in the spring, he had entered upon the liberal course of government which he adopted some years later, he would have spent a happier life, and his end might have been peace with glory. But, encompassed by evil and interested councillors, prone to nurse the dreams of his youth, and inclined to pursue them, he entered with the noblest motives upon a course of political conduct that embittered the re-

[1] Conversation of the author with Madame Cornu, Grand Hôtel, November 12, 1873.

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sentment of his domestic foes, and shook the confidence of his best friends abroad.

In the difficulties that sprang up after the signature of the Treaty of Paris, in consequence of the faithless conduct of Russia in regard to her engagements under the Treaty, France did not show herself so cordial in support of England as she had been during the war. Indeed Russia, in destroying the fortifications of Ismail and Kilia, and the fortress of Kars, and in endeavouring to seize the Isle of Serpents and the town of Bolgrad, and so to command the navigation of the Danube, relied on the secret sanction of France. The sharp diplomatic correspondence that took place hereupon between Lord Palmerston and Count Walewski, and which ended in the triumph of the bold and honest course insisted upon by the English Minister, threw a coldness over the English Alliance.

In the spring the Emperor had written to the Prince Consort, in reply to the royal congratulations on the birth of the Prince Imperial: 'I have been greatly touched to learn that all your family have shared my joy, and all my hope is, that my son may resemble dear little Prince Arthur, and that he may have the rare qualities of your children. The sympathy shown on this last occasion by the English people is another bond between the two countries, and I hope my son will inherit my feelings of sincere friendship for the Royal Family of England, and of affectionate esteem for the great English nation.' In the autumn, on his return from Biarritz, he found himself at serious variance with his ally on the concessions which he had made to the pretensions of Russia on the Danube. In vain he remarked to Lord Cowley[1] that nothing could break up

[1] December 19, 1856.

the alliance, since his feeling for England was one of the heart, while his sentiments for other Powers were those which policy dictated. His enemies had not worked without effect, in representing him as bent on wild schemes, in which Russia was to be his friend, and Austria, if not Germany and England, were to be his enemies. Still the Alliance remained intact, albeit less cordial than it had been at the close of 1855.

On December 21 the Emperor wrote to the Queen: 'Madam and very dear Sister,—Prince Frederick William has handed to me the letter which your Majesty was so kind as to give him for me. The very friendly expressions employed by your Majesty have touched me deeply; and although I was persuaded that the difference of opinion between our Governments could in no way alter your feelings towards myself, I was happy to receive this pleasant confirmation of the fact.

'We liked the Prince of Prussia greatly, and I have no doubt he will make the Princess Royal happy; for he seems to me to have every quality that befits his age and rank. We have endeavoured to make his visit to Paris as pleasant as we could, but I see that his thoughts are always at Osborne or at Windsor.

'I am most anxious that all the discussions relative to the Treaty of Peace should be closed up, for parties in France profit by them in their attempts to weaken the intimacy of the alliance. Nevertheless, I have no doubt that the people's good sense would deal speedy justice to all the falsehoods which have been propagated. Your Majesty, I hope, will never doubt my desire to act in harmony with your Government, and the regret I feel when even for a moment this harmony is interrupted.' The Emperor signed himself, 'Your Majesty's true brother and friend.' Ten days afterwards

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the Queen wrote to His Majesty congratulating him on the entire removal of the difficulties which had arisen about the execution of the Treaty of Paris, and acknowledging his friendly offices with Prussia towards the settlement of the Neuchâtel difficulty, which had arisen by a rough assertion of the King of Prussia's seignorial right by a band of armed men in September.[1]

In attendance on Prince Frederick William as he passed through Paris in December, 1856, bearing a letter from Queen Victoria to the Emperor Napoleon, was Major Baron von Moltke. The Major was a keen observer. Lodged, with his Prince, in the Tuileries, he had opportunities for observing the Imperial couple closely. In his letters[2] he described the Empress as of astonishing beauty, with a slight, elegant figure, and dressing with much taste and richness, but without ostentation. 'She is very talkative and lively,' the Baron added, 'much more so than is usually the case with persons occupying so high a position.' The Baron

[1] In September the royalist party in Neuchâtel, by a *coup de main*, endeavoured to establish the slumbering sovereign rights of the King of Prussia over the canton, in opposition to the democratic party, who had made the principality a Swiss Federal canton in 1848. The King of Prussia requested the Emperor Napoleon to act as mediator, and to obtain the liberation of the royalist fanatics who had been captured and cast into prison by the Federal troops. The Emperor, through his old military master and friend, the Swiss General Dufour, endeavoured to moderate the ardour of the Swiss democratic party, and to bring about a solution that would give Neuchâtel finally over to the Swiss. But the negotiations appeared likely to fall through; and, seeing this, Prussia hastened to arm. It was out of the military enthusiasm evoked through this threat of war, that the new army organisation sprang. Ultimately (in April, 1857) the King of Prussia renounced his sovereign rights over the canton; but haughtily refused to accept the indemnity of one million francs tendered to him in the ultimatum of the mediating Powers.

[2] *Wanderbuch: Handschriftliche Aufzeichnungen aus dem Reisetagebuch von H. Graf Moltke, General-Feldmarschall.* Berlin, Paetel, 1879. The letters were first published in the *Neue Freie Presse* in 1878.

was accustomed to the stiffness of German courts. He found the Emperor shorter than he had expected; and remarked that he looked well on horseback, but not on foot. 'He struck me,' the Baron observed, 'by a sort of immovability of features and the almost extinguished look of his eyes. The predominating characteristic of his face is a friendly and good-natured smile, which has nothing Napoleonic about it. He mostly sits quietly, with his head on one side; and events have shown that this tranquillity, which is very imposing to the restless French nation, is not apathy, but the sign of a superior mind and a strong will.' The Baron's verdict was that Napoleon was an emperor, not a king. But what he meant by this distinction is not clear. Carlyle's Teutonic definition does not serve us. 'King, Könning, which means *Can*-ning, Able-man,' is exactly the definition of the character of Napoleon which Moltke gave when he said that he had a superior mind and a strong will. It exactly represents the being who is set forth in the following further passage from the Baron's letters:—

'Affairs in France are not in a normal condition, but it would be difficult to say how, under present circumstances, they could be improved. The founder of a new dynasty is in a very different position from the descendant of a series of legitimate Sovereigns. The latter may go on in the old grooves, but the former must make new ones, and far more is expected from him. Napoleon III. has nothing of the sombre sternness of his uncle, neither his imperial demeanour nor his deliberate attitude. He is a quite simple and somewhat small man, whose always tranquil countenance gives a strong impression of good-natured amiability. "Il ne se fâche jamais," say the people who are in most frequent intercourse with him. "Il est toujours poli

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et bon envers nous; ce n'est que la bonté de son cœur et sa confiance qui pourront lui devenir dangereux." That at this moment there is only one party in power, and that the Emperor cannot always surround himself with the most important men of that party, is a necessity of the situation. Napoleon cannot make use of men of independent character, who insist on having their own way, as the direction of the affairs of State must be concentrated in his hands. Greater liberty ought to be conceded in a regulated state of affairs; but in the present condition of France there must be a strong and single direction, which, moreover, is also best suited to the French character. Freedom of the press is for the present as impossible here as it would be at the headquarters of an army in the field, if the press wished to discuss the measures taken by the general in command. Napoleon has shown wisdom, firmness, self-confidence, but also moderation and clemency; and, though simple in his dress, he does not forget that the French like to see their Sovereigns surrounded by a brilliant Court.[9]

His Majesty little imagined what kind of man the stern-featured major in the suite of his guest was, who criticised the 15,000 men paraded in the court-yard of the Tuileries, and rode up to the Palace window, 'padded with blue silk,' where the Imperial child was in his nurse's arms, and on whom his father gazed with a face 'radiant with joy.' 'True, the boy seems a strapping little fellow,' Moltke wrote home.

On December 22 the Prince Frederick William left Paris for Germany, attended by the Major; and as they crossed the Vosges Mountains the latter heard the peasants speaking German. He remarked: 'The journey through the Vosges was beautiful; but it was sad to hear them speaking German. And yet

they are good Frenchmen. We have left them in the lurch.'[1]

The impression no doubt remained firmly embedded in the stern soldier's mind. The sadness of hearing French subjects speaking German became a fixed impression. 'We have left them in the lurch,' he remarked in 1856; and he remembered this in 1871, and, through his iron will alone, so far as we yet know, Alsace-Lorraine became German. This was Germany's return for the Emperor Napoleon's hospitality to Prince Frederick William, and his good offices in the Neuchâtel difficulty.

[1] 'Die Fahrt durch die Vogesen war sehr schön, doch es war traurig, die Leute dort Deutsch sprechen zu hören; und dabei sind sie gute Franzosen. Wir haben sie ja im Stiche gelassen.'

CHAPTER II.

RUMOURS OF WAR.

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In the year 1857, France, at peace with all the world, and devoting her energies to the extraordinary developments of her natural riches and of her foreign trade, which it was the constant care of the Emperor to cultivate and promote, was also more powerful as regards her influence in Europe than she had ever been before. Count de Morny's splendid and costly embassy to Russia had laid the foundations of an *entente* between the Emperors Napoleon and Alexander. The gay, astute, and showy Count had, *en passant*, found a wife at Moscow, and had sketched a treaty of commerce intended to draw the two Empires closer together.[1] He had aired, with a somewhat redundant and extravagant parade, the might of the Empire which sent him forth to represent his Sovereign at the coronation of Alexander. But there was a passion for showy ceremonials just then; and it suited the policy of Napoleon to make his overtures of friendliness to his late enemy as marked as possible. Striking embassies were the order of the day, as outward manifestations of the prestige of France. In August, 1856, the Emperor had received a gorgeous Birman embassy, loaded with presents, at Saint Cloud, with much pomp; and in the same month His Majesty had despatched M. de Montigny to Siam to negotiate a

[1] This treaty was signed in June, 1857.

treaty of commerce, that was to extend the outlets for French manufactures to that remote region. The Ministers, at the close of 1856, had presented hopeful reports to their Sovereign. The Minister of the Interior (M. Billault) having described the improved material condition of the population, promoted by a better harvest than that of 1855, and the works in aid of labour and in relief of distress, which the Emperor had promoted throughout his territory, declared that for the ensuing year three millions of francs would be enough to expend on local works, subventions, &c.[1] M. Rouland, the new Minister of Public Works, in his report, had proclaimed that all was working smoothly in his department; and he recommended an annual grant of 5,000 francs to the Société des Gens de Lettres. M. Rouher, representing the Ministry of Public Works, had submitted an admirable account of the development of the railway system which was in progress under his vigorous direction. At the close of the year a deputation of soldiers—officers, men, and *enfants de troupe*—had waited upon the Emperor and Empress at the Tuileries, and had presented to the happy parents the inscription of their son as a soldier of the first regiment of the Grenadiers of the Guard.

Within the Empire, public affairs, then, wore a hopeful aspect. There was peace, the national prosperity was advancing, the reigning family was firmly seated on the throne, and the time was approaching when the Imperial Government might safely secure its hold upon the people, and relax the rigour of those laws

[1] It had amounted to ten millions in 1854, to five millions in 1855, and to ten millions in 1856. Numerous sums were given by the Emperor himself, from his Civil List, in aid of works, tentative social institutions, and of special cases of misfortune. In 1856 the sum thus spent amounted to 6,361,411 francs.

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which had been imposed immediately after the *coup d'état.* When, on February 26 (1857), the Emperor opened the Legislative Session, he could congratulate his Parliament on the final settlement of the Treaty of Paris, the adjustment of the Neuchâtel difficulty, the withdrawal of the English and French troops from the Piræus consequent upon the agreement of the three Protecting Powers; and he could add that his Government and that of Queen Victoria were of one mind in regard to the troubles in the Neapolitan Kingdom. Both Powers, he said, desired to act 'in the interests of humanity and of civilisation.' Thus the time was propitious for domestic legislation of a progressive character.

The speech from the throne was argumentative and comprehensive, developing in a striking manner the ideas of a reflective, elevated, and, above all, of a benevolent mind;[1] and designed to answer the Empire's

[1] 'La civilisation, quoiqu'elle ait pour but l'amélioration morale et le bien-être matériel du grand nombre, marche, il faut le reconnaître, comme une armée. Les victoires ne s'obtiennent pas sans sacrifices et sans victimes: ces voies rapides que facilitent les communications, ouvrent au commerce de nouvelles routes, déplacent les intérêts et rejettent en arrière les contrées qui en sont encore privées; ces machines si utiles qui multiplient le travail de l'homme, le remplacent d'abord et laissent momentanément bien des bras inoccupés; ces mines qui répandent dans le monde une quantité de numéraire inconnue jusqu'ici, cet accroissement de la fortune publique qui décuple la consommation, tendent à faire varier et à élever la valeur de toutes choses; cette source inépuisable de richesse qu'on nomme crédit, enfante des merveilles, et cependant l'exagération de la spéculation entraîne des ruines individuelles. De là, la nécessité, sans arrêter le progrès, de venir en aide à ceux qui ne peuvent suivre sa marche accélérée. Il faut stimuler les uns, modérer les autres, alimenter l'activité de cette société haletante, inquiète, exigeante, qui en France attend tout du gouvernement et à laquelle cependant il doit opposer les bornes du possible et les calculs de la raison. Eclairer et diriger, voilà notre devoir. Le pays prospère, il faut en convenir, car, malgré la guerre et la disette, le mouvement du progrès ne s'est pas ralenti. Le produit des impôts indirects, qui est le signe certain de la

enemies and detractors, who affirmed that France was bent on disturbing the peace of Europe. Her expenditure was to be reduced; her Budget was to show a surplus; her army was to be put on a peace footing; there were to be no more loans. At the same time the pay of the lower grades of the army and of the humbler classes of the civil servants was to be raised, in consequence of the increase of the prices in the necessaries of life. The *landes* of Gascony were to be drained and fertilised. The resources of Algeria were to be further developed.

In taking leave of the deputies who had sat since 1852, the Emperor said: 'Since this Session is your last, allow me to thank you for the vigorous and devoted support you have given me since 1852. You proclaimed the Empire; you are identified with all the measures that have re-established order and prosperity in the country; you have supported me energetically throughout the war; you have shared my grief through the epidemic and the bad harvests; you have shared my joy when Heaven gave me a glorious peace and a well-beloved son; and your loyal co-operation has helped me to establish a *régime* on the popular will and interests. It was a difficult task to fulfil, requiring robust patriotism. To replace licence in the tribune, and the violent struggles which overthrow ministries, by free, but calm and serious debates, was a service done to the country, and even to liberty; for liberty has no

richesse publique, a depassé, en 1856, de plus de 50 millions le chiffre déjà si exceptionnel de 1855. Depuis le rétablissement de l'Empire, ces revenus se sont accrus d'eux-mêmes de 210 millions, abstraction faite des impôts nouveaux. Néanmoins, il y a une grande souffrance dans une partie du peuple, et tant que la Providence ne nous enverra pas une bonne récolte, les millions donnés par la charité privée et par le gouvernement ne seront que de faibles palliatifs. Redoublons d'efforts pour porter remède à des maux au-dessus de la prévoyance humaine.'

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more serious danger than those outbursts of passion, and those violences of speech. Strong in the loyalty of the State Bodies, in the devotion of the army, and, above all, in the support of the people, who know that all my time is given to their interests, I see a future full of hope for our country.

'France, without touching the rights of anybody, has retaken the rank which belongs to her, and may devote herself in security to all the great works of the Genius of Peace. May God continue to protect her; and soon it may be said of our epoch, as a statesman and an illustrious national writer[1] has written of the Consulate: "La satisfaction était partout, et quiconque n'avait pas dans le cœur les mauvaises passions des partis, était heureux du bonheur public."'

The Session produced useful commercial measures. Some customs duties were relaxed, a law was passed reciprocating the privilege granted by Belgium to French companies to sue in Belgian courts, and a law on trade-marks was carried. There were sharp discussions over the subvention of twelve millions of francs demanded for the further embellishment of Paris; but the sum was voted, together with a subvention, not to exceed fourteen millions, for the establishment of three great Transatlantic lines of French steamers that were to develop the trade of France with the Western Continents. The last work of the Chambers was the prolongation and extension of the privileges of the Bank of France. The capital of the Bank was doubled; and it was authorised to raise its rate of discount above 6 per cent. if monetary pressure made this necessary.[2]

The Chamber was dissolved on May 29; and the electoral colleges were summoned to return a new

[1] M. Thiers.

[2] The Bank Act or Charter remains in force to the end of 1897.

Chamber on June 21. The elections of the year 1857 showed that the popularity of the Emperor and of his Government was 'broad-based upon the people's will.' The votes given to Government candidates were 5,471,888, while the Opposition obtained 571,859. But this election did not pass off without exciting scenes and violent language—especially in Paris. In the capital five Opposition candidates were returned, and among them General Cavaignac and M. Emile Olivier. Of these five only two took the oaths and their seat. The work-folk of the industrial faubourgs, inspired by Socialist agents having committees abroad, and supported by the Republicans, Orleanists, and Legitimists, who never cease to be active in the capital, were always a formidable antagonistic body. They gained strength from the severity of the repressive measures intended to scatter and destroy them. Napoleon perceived that the time was coming when the iron hand might be relaxed, and when, indeed, it would be an act of prudence and of safety to relax it. The elections which sent Emile Olivier into the Chamber of Deputies, although they gave the Empire a triumphant majority, gave it a warning also. When the Duke of Morny was called to preside over the new Chamber (January 18, 1858) he struck the key-note of the policy that was to be. 'Let us,' he said, 'remain faithful to the principles which governed the preceding Parliament. Let us not be diverted from that policy which declared that real independence consists neither in blind approbation, nor in rigid opposition.' But this policy was destined to be, for a time, thrust aside, under the influence of events of violence which threatened suddenly to bring upon Europe the horrors of a general war.

While the arts of peace were in full progress, on the morrow of the inauguration of the completed

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Louvre, and while preparations were in progress for the opening of that noble monument of wise charity—the Asylum for Convalescent Working Men—which the Emperor had raised in the pure air and the quiet of the forest of Vincennes; a plot against his life was discovered, thoroughly unmasked, and, as regards its chief agents, judged. Tibaldi, Bartolini, and Grilli—the three miscreants, who had crossed the Channel with instructions to assassinate the French sovereign—were sent to penal servitude; but the organisation of which they were the emissaries survived. The names of Ledru-Rollin, Mazzini, and other revolutionary leaders were coupled with a rumour of a wide-spread organisation for the advancement of the republican banner by the red hand of the regicide. In the midst of his studies and his dreams for the improvement of the nation, of which he was the elected head and chief; while he was laying out Boulevards, examining sanitary schemes, debating the draining of marshes, planning refuges for travellers in the perilous heights of the Alps, and puzzling over the map of Europe, to see how free nations were to be carved out of the territories of masters who held them in bondage, Napoleon found himself the mark of men who sought his life in the name of the very cause he had always had at heart. His Ministers felt themselves bound to cast about him the protection of a rigid surveillance against the machinations of foreign as well as native conspirators; and M. Billault addressed his Prefects, warning them to be vigilant.

The cause of the fierce hostility manifested in the revolutionary centres of Europe against Napoleon III. might be directly traced to the generous and liberal impulses of the Imperial policy, which raised many hopes not destined to be realised, and created an impatience in the breasts of men who had been long hun-

gering for freedom. The French republican exiles in London had their share in the crimes to which Mazzini and his friends were at least privy—if they were not instigators of them; but the life and soul of the plots which were again and again renewed against the sovereign who ardently desired the emancipation of Italy and Poland, and the independence of Hungary, were foreign to France. It must be recorded to the honour of the French people that no attempt was made against the life of the Emperor by a French hand.

That it was sought by men of the nation he was endeavouring to serve at the risk of his fame and of his throne, was a fact which, made suddenly known to him, smote heavily upon his heart. It never touched that cool courage of his which his countrymen could not understand; but it jarred his sensitive nature, and it cast a cloud over his life. He worked, however, not the less ardently at the realisation of those dreams in which he was destined to find, at last, defeat and ruin.

Since the Peace the Emperor's policy had drawn him towards Russia; and, although in the course of the year 1857 he received the King of Bavaria, the Grand Duke of Hesse, the Grand Duchess of Baden, and the Duke of Cambridge at the Tuileries, and himself paid visits to Queen Victoria at Osborne, and to the Emperor of Russia at Stuttgart, he perceived distinctly that he was isolating himself. England, Prussia, Austria, and Belgium looked coldly upon him, as a sovereign who represented nationalities as opposed to dynasties; who was a backbone democrat at the head of the most powerful nation in Europe; and who was the open antagonist of the Treaties of 1815.[1] At the beginning of

[1] 'The danger is, and always has been, that France and Russia should unite to carry into effect some great scheme of mutual am-

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the year he had complained to Queen Victoria[1] that the English attached a hostile significance to his reception of the Grand Duke Constantine in Paris. 'We are gratified here,' he explained, 'by the goodwill and courtesy shown to us by Russia, but this in no way weakens the interests and the feelings by which we are bound to England.' To this the Prince Consort replied, in agreement with Lords Palmerston and Clarendon: 'As to the journey of the Grand Duke Constantine, I thoroughly appreciate what your Majesty says on this subject, and I regret no less than yourself, Sire, the interpretation sought to be put on this visit by our press. Your Majesty does well to cultivate the friendship of all the reigning families in Europe, and of the peoples over whom they rule. The greatest good may result from relations of this kind; and our alliance would be a veritable bondage, if from jealous motives it asked you to renounce for its sake any other friendship. It is a sincere pleasure to the Queen and to myself that your Majesty should be more known and understood. But the impression which this interchange of courtesies with Russia may produce, both upon Russia herself and upon the rest of the European public, is quite another matter, and is well worthy of consideration.' The Prince then reviewed the probable effect of what would appear to the public to be an alliance between France and Russia, and demonstrated with his customary force and clearness, that it must be to convince Europe that this alliance could have for its basis 'nothing but an external and purely political motive.' The Prince then added: 'Immediately all Europe sets to work to reflect,

bition.'—*Letter from Lord Palmerston to Lord Clarendon, September* 29, 1857.

[1] Letter to Queen Victoria on the birth of the Princess Beatrice.—Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iv. p. 28.

and asks itself what this motive is; confidence is shaken; England is naturally the first to take alarm, which is soon shared equally by the rest of the world.' The character of the Russian Grand Duke, 'eminently and exclusively Russian' as the Prince described it, and anti-German as all people knew it to be, gave additional force to the Prince's criticism.[1] The outlook was ominous. The differences of opinion among the Powers as to the future constitution of the Principalities, in which France and England found themselves on opposite sides, coupled with the *rapprochement* of Paris and St. Petersburg, created a general uneasiness. Lord Clarendon told the Prince Consort that it was necessary to 'watch the Emperor closely,' as 'it is plain a number of wild projects are floating in his head, and that he desires to immortalise himself by a redistribution of Europe.' 'He has a long-cherished hatred of Austria (I don't know why), and he proposed to me at Paris that a closer alliance should be formed between France, England, and Russia, from which Austria should be excluded.' Lord Palmerston in his turn complained of what he called the Emperor's 'schemes about Africa.' The Prince Consort, writing to Baron Stockmar, in the summer, said that Russia and France were turning the Indian mutiny to account in resuming their plan for the destruction of the Turkish Empire, with Prussia and Sardinia on their side—and Austria left as England's sole ally. But nothing came of all these fears and forebodings. The Emperor loyally helped the Powers to a solution of the difficulty in regard to the Principalities—and not in the interest of Russia. He offered a pas-

[1] 'The letter ought to open the Emperor's eyes,' Lord Clarendon wrote to the Prince, 'to the consequences of his adulation of Russia, and above all to put him on his guard against that extremely well-veneered gentleman, the Grand Duke Constantine.'

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sage through France to the troops of Queen Victoria hastening to India. He gave up his 'schemes about Africa;' and if Lord Clarendon could not understand his 'long-cherished hatred against Austria,' he must have been the only statesman in Europe to whom it was a mystery. It was against Austria, the oppressor of Italy, that Napoleon's maiden sword had been drawn; and the bitterest day of his life had been that when he followed his brother to his grave at Forli, while the Austrians were marching upon the town.[1]

That the Emperor never ceased to desire a close and real alliance with England, from the day when he assumed Imperial power to that when it fell from his hands, is nowhere more forcibly shown than in the 'Life of the Prince Consort.' We find the Prince constantly expressing doubts of the sincerity of the Queen's ally. His sympathies were Austrian rather than Italian. His concern was for the unification of Germany, and not for the liberation of Italy. His letters of wise and most friendly counsel were addressed to the King of Prussia, and were full of warnings against France. In his correspondence with Baron Stockmar we discover repeated passages of doubt and mistrust, and we are made insensibly aware that the writer is no friend of the French Emperor, but a passionate lover of the Fatherland. When, therefore, Napoleon manifested his sympathies for the Italian cause, and for the oppressed nationalities of Hungary and Poland, the Prince put himself on his guard, and was the first to raise an alarm among English statesmen as to the Emperor's designs. It was easy to lead public opinion to oppose them, by hinting that they included an invasion of England, and, accordingly, the Emperor found himself

[1] See vol. i. p. 172.

suddenly attacked by the English press, even while the English people shared his Italian sympathies. His arrangement of the Neuchâtel affair was put down to his desire to flatter Prussia, in order to secure her before he attacked Austria. Even Prince Napoleon's return visit at Berlin for that of Prince Frederick William was interpreted to the Emperor's disadvantage. 'Have they all,' says the Prince to Stockmar, 'come in Paris to the conclusion that our friendship is indispensable, just as Prussia's is, and that the alliance of these four Powers is the best, with a view to altering the territorial *status quo* at the expense of Austria and the Porte? This is my conviction, and I see a number of small confirmations of this conclusion which are not of a kind to put upon paper. Turn this idea over.'[1]

It was turned over accordingly by many shrewd unfriendly heads; and by degrees a very dangerous state of public feeling was evolved, that spread over Prussia, Austria, and England—to the surprise and sorrow of the Emperor. After a conversation with M. de Persigny, who had crossed the Channel from his London Embassy to explain to his sovereign the attitude of profound suspicion which the English public had assumed towards him, in consequence of his disturbing and adventurous foreign policy, he requested his Ambassador to tell Lord Clarendon that he thought the misapprehensions which had arisen between the two Governments and the two Courts would be best explained at a personal interview with the Queen. This proposal was accepted by the Queen, and it was arranged that the Imperial visit should be made to Osborne at the end of July—at the height of the yachting season, when it 'would appear,' as the Prince

[1] *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iv. p. 52.

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expressed it, 'the least *forcé*.' The idea being fixed in the Prince's mind that the Emperor was meditating a redistribution of Europe, he only feared that His Majesty might be disappointed at the English Court 'not being able to assent to his plans and aspirations.'

It was the morning of August 6, however, before the 'Reine Hortense,' with the Emperor and the Empress on board, was reported to be approaching Osborne. The meeting of the Sovereigns was still cordial; and the visit was turned to the best account, since it brought the heads of the Governments of England and France[1] in contact, and enabled them to settle the question of the Principalities, which was on the point of leading to an open rupture between Russia, Prussia, Sardinia, and France on the one hand, and England, Austria, and the Porte on the other.

The effect of this visit, which lasted three days, both on the Emperor and on the Queen, is described in two letters. Her Majesty, writing to King Leopold on August 12, remarked: 'Our visit was in every way very satisfactory and agreeable. Politically it was, as Lord Clarendon said, "a godsend," for the unhappy difficulties in the Principalities have been *aplanis* and satisfactorily settled.[2] The visit was very quiet and *gemüthlich* (tranquilly pleasant). Good Osborne in no way changed its unpretending privacy and simplicity, and with the exception of a little dance in a tent on Saturday (which was very successful), and additional carriages and ponies, our usual life remained unchanged. Albert truly observed, that the first evening, when the

[1] Lords Clarendon and Palmerston and MM. Walewski and de Persigny were Her Majesty's guests during the Imperial visit.

[2] The agreement come to was that England should make the Porte annul the elections, and that the Emperor should yield up the question of the union of the Principalities.

gentlemen came out of the dining-room, he had to rub his eyes, as one says, to feel quite sure that he was not dreaming, when he saw the Emperor and Empress standing there.

'The Emperor spoke out, as he always does, very openly to Albert, and he to him, which is a great advantage, and Palmerston said to me the last day: "The Prince can say many things which we cannot." Very naturally.

'The Emperor, to whom I gave your message, desired me to say everything kind to you, and said: "*Le Roi n'est pas seulement très-aimable, mais il a tant de bon sens.*"

'Nothing could be more amiable, kind, pleasant, or *ungênant* than both Majesties were. They are most agreeable guests, and, as for her, we are all in love with her, and I wish you knew her. . . . Albert, who is seldom much pleased with ladies or princesses, is very fond of her, and her great ally. . . . Persigny's devotion to the Emperor, and his courage and straightforwardness in all these affairs, are very gratifying.'

The Emperor was not less pleased. 'Madam and very dear Sister,' he wrote (August 15, 1857),—'We left Osborne so touched by the kind reception of your Majesty and of Prince Albert, we are so struck with admiration for the spectacle of all the virtues which is presented by the Royal Family of England, that it is difficult for me to find words adequate to express the sentiments of devotion and regard which we feel towards your Majesty.

'It is so sweet to us to think, that apart from political interests, your Majesty and your Majesty's family entertain some affection for us, that in the very first rank of my settled purposes I place the desire always to be worthy of this august friendship. I believe that

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after passing a few days in your Majesty's society, one becomes better; just as when one has learned to appreciate the various knowledge and the exalted judgment of the Prince, one goes away from him more advanced in one's ideas, and more disposed to do good.

'Deign, Madam, I beseech you, to say to him who so nobly shares your lot, that I entertain for him the highest esteem, and the most unqualified friendship—in saying this, I say how much value I place upon his.

'As for your Majesty's children, they are all endowed with such good and charming qualities, that they are loved as soon as seen, and that it becomes the most natural thing in the world to wish them all the happiness of which they are worthy.

'Adieu, Madam. Heaven grant that two years may not again elapse before we have the pleasure of finding ourselves near you, for the hope of soon seeing you again is the only thing to console us for this painful parting.'

The Queen in her reply said: 'In a position so isolated as ours, we can find no greater consolation, no support more sure, than the sympathy and counsel of him or her who is called to share our lot in life, and the dear Empress, with her generous impulses, is your guardian angel, as the Prince is my true friend.' Lord Cowley reported from Paris that the Emperor had been charmed, and that it would probably have the best results. 'This at all events must be said of the Emperor,' the Ambassador remarked, 'that he is open to conviction, and that good judgment and sound sense make an impression on him. Unfortunately he finds little of the kind in this country.' Lord Clarendon, after reading the Emperor's letter to the Queen, and remarking on it, in a note to Her Majesty, that he had never read a letter better expressed, 'or more affec-

tionate and gentleman-like,' added: 'One cannot overestimate the importance of the recent visit, for *the Emperor is France*, and France, moreover, in her best form, because he is thus capable of generous emotions, and of appreciating the truth, and her alliance with England has consequently been *retrempée* and invigorated at Osborne.' The Prince, in his correspondence with Baron Stockmar, approved the letter as showing 'the warmth and sensibility of the writer's disposition,' and as proving that the fearless and simple statement of home truths did not put him out of humour. The Prince had been candid in his conversation with the Imperial guest; and he has left a record of his candour and of the Emperor's reply to it in the shape of a formal memorandum, dated Osborne, August 6 and 11, 1857. The Emperor described to the Prince the course of events from the Congress of Paris, as they were known to him.

'At the Congress of Paris he had expressed his opinion of the desirableness of the union of the Principalities, possibly under a foreign Prince; and Lord Clarendon seemed not only not to object, but to agree with him. Austria declared herself vehemently against it. Since he had gone home, Lord Clarendon had completely changed his opinion, and was against the union. He (the Emperor) did not object to this, but mentioned it in order to show, that he had not gone forward without previously trying to put himself "*d'accord*" with us. Ever since, as the decision was to be left with the Divans, the partisans of Austria and Turkey had committed the most outrageous acts to force on a decision against the union, contrary to the wishes of the people, who were so anxious for it, that, when the French Commissioner arrived, they carried him in triumph through the streets, dragging his carriage. It was the

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attempt made by the anti-unionists to make it appear, that he (the Emperor) was not sincere in his wish for the union, which had obliged him to put his declaration, of which we had since complained, into the 'Moniteur,' which was, as he termed it, "*un peu sa chambre.*" Thereupon the other party committed still further frauds and violences, and falsified the electoral lists. He had not to complain of the English or Russian Commissioners, who remained entirely neutral. He had thereupon demanded from the Porte the revision of these lists, which the Porte had promised. At the last hour the Porte threw her promise over, because Lord Stratford commanded it. The Ministers of the Sultan acknowledged their wrong, and how sorry they were, but that they could not venture to offend Lord Stratford. There were certain things which a great country like France could not put up with in the face of Europe; he demanded the annulment of the elections, or would break off diplomatic relations; Russia, Sardinia, and Prussia would follow him.'

The Prince replied that the story given to English Ministers was very different, but that it was difficult to get the truth out of 'these places in the East,' as they were 'the head-quarters of intriguers and liars.' The Emperor rejoined that this was unfortunately true; 'but what grieved him most was the ready suspicion, and the accusation that he was false to the English alliance and wanted to break it, whenever he maintained an opinion of his own.' 'Great countries,' he remarked, 'could not renounce the right of having their own opinion.'

The Prince then asked him, giving the doubt as the real cause of the distrust which had arisen, whether he really cared for the continuance of the integrity of the Turkish Empire—remarking that this was a principle

for which England had entered into an alliance with France, and which she was determined to maintain with all the energy she possessed. The Emperor, declaring he would be quite open and honest, said, according to the Prince's memorandum made the day the words were uttered: 'If I asked him as a private individual, he did not care for it, and could not muster up any sympathy for such a sorry set as the Turks.' The Prince caught at this admission; but the Emperor hastened to explain: 'But, if you ask me as *un homme politique*, c'est autre chose. . . . I am, of course, not prepared to abandon the original object of our alliance, for which France also has made great sacrifices.'

The Prince, pushing his point still further, said that as determined as England was to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, so determined was Russia to destroy it. Russia had seen the mistake of leaving France in this struggle on the English side, and, since the Peace, had made immense progress in winning France over to her side. The Russian policy had achieved a triumph at Constantinople.

The Emperor retorted that although 'he did not take for gospel all the Grand Duke Constantine had said, he believed he had told him the truth, when he assured him that Russia did not care for possessing herself of Constantinople.' The Prince believed this, but believed also that Russia desired the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, and its disruption into a number of little States like those of Germany, which would be under her thumb. To this the Emperor replied, explaining herein his support of the union of the Principalities—'that he thought the union, by rendering those countries contented, and particularly if well governed by an European Prince, would form an effectual barrier against Russia, whilst the present dis-

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jointed and unsatisfactory condition of those countries would make them always turn towards Russia. The union was therefore in the interest of Turkey.'

When the Emperor referred to England's sudden alliance with Austria, and the disagreeble impression it had made on himself and France, he was met with the reply that it was only because the two countries agreed in their opposition to the union, just as France agreed with Russia in favour of it.

It was when the Emperor touched on the possible revision of the Treaties of 1815, that he awakened the Prince's keenest opposition. The Emperor said that he had had this revision much at heart when the Conference was assembled in Paris, but he had given it up, 'seeing its difficulties and dangers.' He remained of opinion that those Treaties were bad. He insisted that they had frequently been broken, and he looked upon them as a memorial of the union of Europe against France. The Prince rejoined that these treaties had been and were the basis upon which rested the international law and the legal state of Europe; but this had not prevented readjustments in special cases—Belgium and Neuchâtel, for instance—when they had become necessary. 'The main point in the Treaties,' said the candid Prince to the tolerant Emperor, 'as directed against France, had been the exclusion of the Bonaparte family from the throne. The Emperor's presence here to-day was the strongest proof that there was no practical difficulty in changing special points when such changes had become necessary; but calling the treaties generally into doubt must lead to certain commotion.' The Emperor insisted that France and England might still discuss and come to an understanding on certain points—especially in Africa; and complained that at the least movement, 'up started all

the English Consuls in arms denouncing him.' He complained also of the recent violence of Lord Palmerston, who had written short notes to Count Persigny, so affronting that he had forbidden the Count to forward any more of them. In one the Viscount had asked: '*Si telles et telles sont les opinions de l'Empereur, que va-t-il chercher à Osborne? Pourquoi vient-il?*' The Emperor quietly remarked that this was '*un peu fort.*'

The Prince granted this, but protested that Lord Palmerston was accustomed to write more strongly than he talked, and that, moreover, the notes must have been intended as confidential communications.

To the Emperor's complaint about the duplicity of Austria, the Prince replied that if Austria was insincere (which he granted) Russia was ten times more so. To this the Emperor agreed—adding that it was of the greatest importance to France not to let the Northern alliance be reconstructed, 'which had so long maintained a threatening and hostile combination against her.'

'I fully admitted this,' the Prince continues in his memorandum, 'but begged that on that account he would not give Austria cause for apprehension; for if she saw that her interests required it, she could make her peace with Russia in three days. Russia and France had been enemies from 1815 to 1853 without the interests of either suffering in the least from it. Austria and Russia, on the other hand, had so many points of contact, and of common interest, that it was difficult to keep them long asunder.

'The Emperor answered that he had already seen an instance of what I had said. Austria had offered a reconciliation to Russia, but the Emperor Alexander had replied, that, although he felt no *rancune*, their

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good understanding must not be hostile to France, whom he looked upon as a friend; this was, "*il faut le dire, très-bien de la part de l'Empereur.*" It was very important for France, that she should not get Austria as her neighbour, having Prussia already on her frontier. This was the reason why he had resented so much the move which Austria had made with regard to supplying the garrison of Rastadt, which he now felt sure had originated in the desire for economy on the part of the Grand Duke of Baden.

'I said that, far from being a proof of the ambition of Austria, this move arose with the South German kingdoms, who were afraid of Prussia and France, and of Austria leaving them in the lurch, if attacked on the Rhine, and who therefore wished to have their fortresses garrisoned by Prussia. Austria pretended to the first voice in Germany, but never made the slightest sacrifices for the good of Germany.

'The Emperor told me that he was going to have an interview with the Emperor of Russia in September, and was afraid that this would create a great outcry in England, and the most foolish surmises.

'I said, I thought it quite natural, and had always anticipated that this interview would take place; in fact, it could not be avoided, if the Emperor Alexander wished for it. . . . We then talked at length on the state of France, and on French politics. I asked him whether he had read Tocqueville's book, "L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution." He answered that he had, and praised its style, but complained of the difficulty of doing anything, as the "*esprit de la nation*" was so contrary to self-government, of which he gave me some curious and even ludicrous instances. He added, however, that what made France weak within, viz. "*la centralisation*," made her strong without. He pre-

ferred the state of England, but it could not be imitated in France.

'He returned then to the old topic, and said that he adhered to his conviction, that the peace of Europe could never be lasting until the Treaties of 1815 were revised. However, he had of late seen again, that there were much greater difficulties than he had supposed. He would tell me what had made the strongest impression upon him. He had ordered Count Morny to speak to the Emperor Alexander, and to ascertain, if possible, his views on the subject of an exchange of opinions. The Emperor had answered, however, that he had learned from the experience of his father, who had once had a conversation with Sir Hamilton Seymour. The mischief which its publication had done would seal his lips to any diplomatist.

'I said that this was a most delicate question, and so full of danger, that it required the greatest care how it was touched. As for myself, I could not for the life of me see how it was to be done. No one would run the great risk of re-settling the legal *status* of Europe, without great advantages to himself. Now, if anybody was to get great advantages, where were they to come from? But if some were to seek great advantages to themselves at the expense of the others, these would defend themselves to the last.

'The Emperor replied: "Yes! It is very difficult; *cependant*——" "There was, for instance, the Duke of Brunswick without children; what would become of the Duchy when he died?"

'I answered: "That is all settled by law and treaties. It would belong to Hanover."

'"That is," replied the Emperor, "why I always thought better means '*pour rendre de grands bienfaits*

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au monde' could be found out of Europe than within. There was Africa, for instance. He would not make of the Mediterranean, as Napoleon I. had wished, '*un lac français*,' but '*un lac européen*.' Spain might have Morocco, Sardinia a part of Tripoli, England Egypt, Austria a part of Syria—*et que sais-je?* These were all magnificent countries rendered useless to humanity and civilisation by their abominable governments. France herself wanted an outlet for her turbulent spirits."'

The Prince considered this already a great improvement on the Emperor's 'idea of interfering with the reformation of "*le vieux monde et la vieille société*;"' but he was doubtful about the French nation as colonists, 'because of their inaptitude for self-government'—of which the Emperor himself had complained. But the Emperor would not admit the inaptitude, and remarked that the French were ready to emigrate, and were to be found in large numbers in all the great towns of Europe and America. The truth on this long-vexed question is, that the French people are not, and never have been, overcrowded at home; that their soil is rich and various beyond that of any other nation, and that consequently they have never had the strong incentives to seek new homes far away, which have operated with the Germans and English. Then the conversation turned to the Scandinavian question. The Emperor remarked that he had gone through this question with Lord Palmerston. According to the Emperor the Scandinavian union was desired by the Scandinavians; but he had been afraid that had Denmark been incorporated with Sweden, England would have objected to Holstein being handed over to Prussia, with the splendid harbour of Kiel. Lord Palmerston had replied 'Not at all' to this last point. The Prince then launched into the Schleswig-Holstein question, and

remarked that it appeared to bore the Emperor as '*très-compliquée.*'

On the approaching visit to the Emperor Alexander the two illustrious personages also conversed, the Prince warning the Emperor to be on his guard as to what he might say, since every word of his would be reported to the 'great family of Northern Princes,' who were connected by an alliance of nearly fifty years. The Prince also dwelt on the danger to which the Emperor exposed himself in not taking a Minister with him, and in treating difficult affairs 'quite by himself.'

He answered: 'he felt this, but he could not correspond with so many different Ministers, and he could not take them all with him. He felt the necessity of getting some one to act as his chief Minister. "*Mais où trouver l'homme?*"'[1]

The danger which the Prince pointed out was immediately demonstrated; for, when the Prince described the above conversation to Lord Palmerston, he stated that he had by no means approved a division of Denmark, but, on the contrary, had shown all the difficulties in the question. 'He had merely stated that we were not jealous of Prussia, and of seeing her strengthened.' And yet Lord Palmerston had made quite a different impression on the Emperor's mind. How far this misapprehension helped to complicate the question when Prussia and Austria fell upon Denmark, while England and France looked on, and Prussia obtained Kiel, and laid the foundation of her maritime power, may be easily understood.

The impressions of goodwill which the visit of the Emperor and Empress to Osborne had produced in the

[1] M. Rouher was to be that man.

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mind of the Queen and the Prince Consort, were almost effaced by a flying visit which they made to inspect the forts and breakwater of Cherbourg a few days later.[1] 'It makes me very unhappy to see what is done here,' the Queen wrote in her diary, 'and how well protected the works are.' Her Majesty remarked also that the breakwater was 'treble the size of the Plymouth one.' There were 8,000 men at work. To Baron Stockmar the Prince wrote: 'Cherbourg is a gigantic work, and gives one grave cause for reflection. The works at Alderney by way of counter-defence look childish.' And on their return home the Queen and the Prince could only ponder on the uses to which Cherbourg could be put in the event of a war with France. The result was that throughout the autumn the Prince applied himself to a thorough study of England's means of defence; that Ministers were urged to make full reports on the subject; and that vigorous measures were determined upon, the carrying out of which promoted the public irritation against the Emperor, by bringing his sincerity in doubt.

Meantime Napoleon, having returned to Paris, solemnly opened the completed Louvre,[2] with the following speech: 'I rejoice with you at the completion of the Louvre. I rejoice, above all, at the causes which have made this completion possible. Public order, the re-established stability, and the constantly increasing prosperity of the country, have enabled me to finish this national work. I call it thus, since successive governments have endeavoured to complete the royal residence begun by Francis I., and embellished by Henry II.

'What is the reason of this perseverance and this

[1] The visit of the Queen on board the *Victoria and Albert* lasted from August 19 to 21, during which time the Prince examined the entire works in progress.

[2] August 14, 1857.

popularity in regard to a palace? It is because the character of a people is reflected in their institutions as well as in their manners, in the events which excite their enthusiasm as well as in the monuments which most deeply interest them. Thus France, which, monarchical for so many centuries, recognised always in the central power the representative of her greatness and her nationality, desired that the residence of the Sovereign should be worthy of the country; and the best way of responding to this sentiment was to encompass it with the various masterpieces of the human mind.

'In the Middle Ages the King dwelt in a fortress bristling with weapons of defence. But soon the progress of civilisation replaced battlements and weapons of war by the products of the sciences, letters, and the arts. The history of monuments has its philosophy as well as the history of facts. Just as it is remarkable that under the first revolution the Committee of Public Safety carried on, without knowing it, the work of Louis XI., of Richelieu, and of Louis XIV., in giving the last blow to feudal institutions, and in carrying out the system of unity and of centralisation which was the constant object of the Monarchy; so is there not a great lesson to see, in the Louvre, the idea of Henry IV., of Louis XIII., of Louis XIV., of Louis XV., of Louis XVI., and of Napoleon, adopted by the ephemeral power of 1848?

'One of the first acts of the Provisional Government was to decree the completion of the palace of our kings. So true is it that a nation finds in its antecedents, as the individual derives from his education, ideas which the passions of the moment cannot destroy. When a moral impulse is the consequence of the social state of a country, it prevails through ages and through various forms of government, until it reaches its object.

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Thus the completion of the Louvre, which I thank you for having worked out with so much zeal and skill, is not the caprice of a moment; it is the realisation of a plan conceived for the glory, and sustained by the instinct, of the country during three centuries.'

Turning within a few days from the splendours of the completed Louvre to the camp which he had just established as a great school of war at Châlons, in which the Imperial Guard was assembled, he issued an order of the day to his troops, on assuming the command on August 30. It bore the stamp of his reflective mind.

'Soldiers, I have united you here under my command, because it is useful that the army should undergo together discipline and instruction in the common life of a camp. The Guard, as a picked corps, should be the first to endeavour to maintain the rank which it enjoys by its traditions, and by its recent services on the field of battle.

'The Romans, said Montesquieu, regarded peace as a time for exercises, of which war was the application; and, indeed, the successes which young armies achieve are, in general, but the application of serious exercises undergone in time of peace. I am persuaded that officers and soldiers will apply themselves with zeal to the object I have in view. I recommend paternal severity to the first; and to the soldiers, the obedience which is necessary to all, willingness, and a vigorous attention to a soldierly bearing. For good bearing is respect for the uniform, and the uniform is the emblem of that noble profession of abnegation and devotion, of which you ought to be proud. Let us not forget that every characteristic sign of the army, to begin with the flag, represents a moral idea, and that your duty is to respect it.

'This camp will then not be a vain parade offered to public curiosity, but a serious school, which we shall turn to profit by unceasing labour, and the result of which would become evident if the country were called upon. NAPOLEON.' CHAP. II.

The Camp at Châlons was coupled with the gigantic works of Cherbourg and the prodigious growth of the French armour-plated naval force, in the watchful minds of the English Royal Family and Government; and served to foster that mistrust, which, in spite of their strong personal regard for the French Sovereign and his fascinating Consort, was fastening itself upon the mind of the Queen and Prince, but particularly of the Prince.

Events continually appeared to fortify suspicion, and to put princes, diplomatists, and statesmen on their guard. The meeting of the Emperor Napoleon with the Emperor Alexander at Stuttgart on September 25, and that of Alexander with the Austrian Emperor a few days later, puzzled the minds of the leading men of Europe. 'What these proceedings have resulted in nobody knows, neither will it be very easy to discover,' is the entry in the Prince Consort's diary. But towards England Napoleon continued to show the liveliest sympathy; this could not be disputed. The proposal of the British Government to send troops through Egypt, against the mutineers, reached the Emperor at Stuttgart; and he at once instructed Count Walewski to state to Lord Clarendon, through Baron de Malaret, the French Ambassador in London, that he would cause the Sultan and the Pasha to be informed of the pleasure with which he would hear of facilities being afforded to Her Majesty's troops in passing through Egypt, and that he was quite willing they should pass through

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France, if it would be any convenience, or likely to accelerate their arrival in India. In communicating the Imperial message to the Queen, Lord Clarendon remarked that 'this is certainly a friendly proposal, as the Emperor must know that it would not be very popular in France.' Further, when the news of the capture of Delhi reached Europe on September 30, Napoleon was among the first to congratulate the Queen.[1]

Nor were observers at a distance left long in the dark—in spite of the Prince's surmise, as to the Stuttgart proceedings, or the Emperor's bearing. 'The *parvenu* Emperor,' Sir Theodore Martin remarks, 'thrown for the first time into the midst of the royalties of the 'Almanach de Gotha,' had distinguished himself by great self-possession and dignity, bearing himself, as one of the shrewdest female observers of her time said, "like a thorough gentleman," holding his own, and showing no eagerness to seize at the advances made to him, which might well have turned the steadiest head.' He was found to be impervious to all inducements to a breach of the English Alliance, and the repeated assurances given by Prince Gortschakoff, who accompanied his master, to those around him in the words, '*Nous sommes très-contents*,' were construed, as such assurances were certain to be, in precisely the opposite sense. In fact, the meeting had been productive of no political results. But there were important interchanges of ideas between the two Sovereigns. When, in November, 1859, Lord Palmerston visited Napoleon at Compiègne, His Majesty remarked to him, in the course of one of their conversations, that the Emperor Alex-

[1] Telegram from Compiègne, October 26, 1857:—'*L'Impératrice et moi, nous félicitons cordialement sa Majesté de la prise de Delhi.*'

ander had told him he 'would spend his last rouble and sacrifice his last man to prevent the establishment of a Greek Empire at Constantinople.' This had been said at Stuttgart.

The feeling of uneasiness with which the Emperor's swift and various movements were regarded, and with which his lightest words were whispered from court to court, and from coterie to coterie, is expressed in a letter from Lord Palmerston, written while the Emperor was at Stuttgart (September 29, 1857):[1]—'I am rather surprised that the Emperor should have spoken with so much bitterness about me, for nothing could be personally more friendly than his manner at Osborne. But the fact, no doubt, is that he is much annoyed at finding that we did not give in to his notions about driving the Mahomedans away from the southern shores of the Mediterranean, and about giving an extension to French occupation in Africa. The fact is that, in our alliance with France, we are riding a runaway horse, and must be always on our guard; but a runaway horse is best kept in by a light hand and an easy snaffle. It is fortunate for us that we are thus mounted, instead of being on foot, to be kicked at by this same steed; and as our ally finds the alliance useful to himself, it will probably go on for a good time to come. The danger is, and always has been, that France and Russia should unite to carry into effect some great scheme of mutual ambition. England and Germany would then have to stand against them, and Germany is too much broken up and disjointed to be an efficient ally.' This ungenerous estimate of the ally who had never wavered in his friendship for England, and who was

[1] *The Life of Lord Palmerston*, by the Hon. Evelyn Ashley, M.P., vol. ii. p. 126.

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giving proofs of his steadfastness at the time when the above letter was written, was, unfortunately, general among the governing classes of England; and would probably have led to an European war, had not the more generous feeling of the public kept England clear of an Austro-German alliance against Russia, France, and Sardinia.

The Emperor's order of the day to the troops in the Châlons camp (October 8, 1857) on his return from Stuttgart, was not calculated to disperse the forebodings of his critics.

After congratulating his soldiers on their progress, he let them see that his mind was turned towards Italy.

'When General Bonaparte,' he said, 'had concluded the glorious peace of Campo-Formio, he hastened to send back the conquerors of Italy to company and battalion drill; showing thus how useful he deemed it even for old soldiers to return again and again to the fundamental rules on which theory is based. This lesson has not been lost. You had hardly come back from a glorious campaign when you returned zealously to your drill; and you have inaugurated the Camp of Châlons, which is become the great school of manœuvres for the entire army. The Imperial Guard gives thus, as usual, a good example, in peace as well as in war. Efficient, perfect in discipline, and ready to dare and brave anything for the good of the country, the Guard will be an object of emulation to the Line, from which it emanates, and they will together preserve intact that ancient renown of our immortal legions, which fell only through excess of glory and of triumphs.

'NAPOLEON.'

The allusion to the conquerors of Italy must have

been immediately coupled in the mind of the Prince Consort with a conversation he had held with the Emperor at the Boulogne Camp in 1854, when His Majesty said that he had two strong political wishes, the one to see Lombardy free from the maladministration of Austria, and the other to see Poland restored.

In November, the rumours of war, and the activities of political alarmists, who were the unscrupulous enemies of the Empire, had so acted upon the public mind to the detriment of the national commerce, that the Emperor was impelled to address and publish the following letter to his Minister of Finance:—

'I see, with regret, that without real or apparent cause, public credit is shaken by chimerical fears, and by the propagation of supposed remedies for evils which exist only in the imagination. In previous years, apprehensions, it must be admitted, had some foundation. A succession of bad harvests forced us to export some hundreds of millions of money to buy the corn we wanted; and yet we were able to get over the crisis and to defy the predictions of the alarmists, by a few simple measures of prudence taken for the moment by the Bank of France. How is it people do not understand that to-day the same line of conduct, made easier by the law which permits the raising of the Bank rate of discount, must suffice more than ever to keep in the Bank the gold it requires; since we are in a better condition than last year, the harvest having been abundant, and the returns of the precious metals to the Bank being more considerable?

'I beg you, therefore, to deny emphatically all the absurd projects which are attributed to the Government, the dissemination of which so easily creates alarm. It is not without pride that we are able to state that, in Europe, France is the country whose

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public credit is established on the widest and most solid bases. The remarkable report which you have presented to me proves this. Give heart to those who are frightened without cause; and assure them that I am quite decided not to employ those empirical measures, to which people have recourse only in the happily rare cases, when catastrophes beyond the influence of human prevision befall a country.'

CHAPTER III.

THE COMPACT OF PLOMBIÈRES.

CHAP. III.

ITALY was fortunate in commanding, in the hour of her peril, such worthy sons of the old stock of sturdy Piedmontese nobility as Cavour, Azeglio, Lamarmora, and Balbo. She was fortunate also in such princes as Charles Albert and Victor Emmanuel, and in such a patriot as Garibaldi. She was, moreover, most fortunate in inspiring the life-long devotion of the young patriot who had fleshed his maiden sword against the Austrian at Forli,[1] and who, become the arbiter of the destinies of Europe, remained true to the dream of his youth. It has pleased the mean to declare that the bombs of Orsini drove the Emperor, in fear, to espouse the cause of Italian emancipation; and that his mind was overwhelmed by the letters which Felice Orsini addressed to him from the Conciergerie. His heart was touched no doubt, for it was tender; and his imagination was possibly fired by the passionate appeals even of the man who would have murdered him, since he could perceive in them the outpouring of an honest but misguided mind. But Napoleon's part in the Emancipation of Italy is not to be disposed of in this way. Cavour knew better: Lamarmora knew better: Victor Emmanuel knew better. When Cavour heard on that

[1] Pope Pius IX. used to call Napoleon III. '*le Sectaire de Forli.*'

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January night of 1858 that a cowardly and reckless attempt had been made to kill the Emperor and his Consort, his first fervid ejaculation was: 'Provided only the assassins be not Italians!' When he knew the whole truth, he feared that the progress of the fabric of national freedom which he had been patiently building must be checked for an indefinite period; and that it would tax his energies enough to withstand the angry demands of France for stringent measures against the Italian republican press, and the revolutionary conspirators who had been stumbling-blocks in his path from the beginning.[1]

The Emperor Napoleon and Camillo, Count Cavour, were already friends.

The alliance between France and Sardinia which led up to the liberation of Italy sprang out of the Crimean war. Cavour had laid his plans well. Putting aside the dreams of the revolutionary party, who declared that *L'Italia farà da se*, as those of visionaries, and resolutely declining to believe that his country would ever be freed from the disciplined hosts of Austrians by the wild unskilful valour of Garibaldian volunteers, he deliberately turned to the Sovereign of France, who in his youth had fought for the good cause of Italian freedom, and whose sympathies were almost ostentatiously given to the oppressed nationalities of Europe. Cavour was as fervent a patriot as Mazzini

[1] It was argued by the Emperor's enemies in England that he had no ground for protesting against assassination, since he had sought out the heir of the would-be murderer Cantillon, and paid his uncle's legacy to him. The slander was set at rest in the course of a debate in the House of Commons (February 12, 1858), when Lord Palmerston said in reply to Mr. Stirling: 'The statement that this money was paid under the sanction and by the authority of the present Emperor of the French is absolutely false; there is not the slightest foundation for it. . . . The money was paid by the executors of Napoleon prior to 1826.'

or Garibaldi; and he was something more—he was a statesman of the very highest order. His clear vision comprehended the entire predicament of Italy. He would rather have seen her emancipated by the hands of her own sons. Knowing that this could not be, it is possible that he would have preferred the alliance of England to that of France; but being aware that there was no statesman in England who would have ventured to propose an alliance with Piedmont against Austria, and that the English Court and British statesmen were Austrian rather than Italian, he could never have entertained an idea for a moment of driving the Austrians beyond the Quadrilateral with the assistance of British bayonets.

In Napoleon III. Cavour saw the appointed instrument of his country's deliverance; and he had no sooner approached him than he felt that he was on the high road to freedom. What valiant Piedmont could not do alone against the 300,000 troops and the fortresses of the Austrians, she might easily accomplish with the help of the armed hosts of France. To obtain these arms on the easiest and safest terms became the absorbing object of Cavour's life. He pursued it with unfaltering energy; encountering many obstacles by the way, submitting to many rebuffs and some humiliations, but keeping the goal full in sight. The Crimean war, that threw Sardinian troops into the camp with those of France and England; the visit of Victor Emmanuel to Paris; the marriage of the King's daughter with a Prince of the Emperor Napoleon's House, were planned stepping-stones to the emancipation of Italy.

At length—in 1858 at Plombières—Cavour obtained from the Emperor his promise to support Italy by force. The bargain was struck; and it was a generous one on the part of the Emperor, albeit it included, under cer-

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tain conditions to be hereafter described, the cession of Southern Savoy and Nice to France.

The Compact of Plombières has been severely criticised by the enemies of Napoleon and of Cavour. But it was, so far as we have been permitted to know it, an equitable arrangement. At any rate, the only question is, whether France obtained an equivalent for her sacrifices. That Italy made a good bargain is now beyond dispute. She leapt by two or three bounds into a new and free national life. All she has obtained was not promised in the treaty; far from it. A united Italy was not in the Plombières agreement; nor did Cavour contemplate it. He hoped for a free Northern Kingdom to begin with, that would absorb the Italian nation in the word 'from the Alps to the Adriatic.' But the impulse which his genius and patriotism gave to his countrymen's destinies, in conjunction with the forces that Napoleon set in motion 'for an idea' which he had all his life deemed a noble one, carried the seat of the Italian Government swiftly from Turin to Florence, and from Florence to Rome.

The bitter words which have been written and spoken over the cession of Savoy and Nice to France will surprise the future historian of the emancipation of Italy. The time has not yet come for an impartial judgment. Party passion still smoulders in many breasts, and the archives on which such a history must rest, lie scattered under lock and key in many chanceries and foreign offices. But the part taken by the Emperor Napoleon in this memorable event may be known, by the light which a remarkable succession of events, and a curious series of revelations, have cast upon it.[1] His

[1] Lamarmora, in his *Un po' più de Luce*,* in which he has described the hidden negotiations connected with the Prusso-Italian alliance of

* Published in 1873.

enemies have obstinately striven to reduce him to a schemer for territory, or to the position of a political poltroon, acting under the threats of the Carbonari and the lesson of Orsini. A simple narrative will dispose of both accusations, levelled against the sovereign who as a boy risked his life for the cause which eventually led him to the field of Solferino, and, we may add, to the disaster of Sedan: for the passions which the war of 1859 engendered in Germany were never allayed until the Franco-German campaign had been fought, and German battalions had aired themselves in the Champs Elysées.

While the Marquis d'Azeglio, in London, failed to obtain from Lord Palmerston any promise of support from England towards Italian independence, M. de Villamarina, in Paris, was succeeding under the adroit direction of Cavour in obtaining from Napoleon half-promises which the Italian statesman knew how to interpret. The Turin Cabinet had, at Napoleon's secret request, addressed to the Sardinian ambassador at Compiègne the solution of the Bolgrad difficulty—which England had accepted, and with which Russia had been satisfied. It was a service rendered to the French Emperor, for which he expressed his cordial thanks, through his Foreign Minister, Walewski—adding that Sardinia's service would not be forgotten, and would not be in vain. M. de Villamarina wrote to Cavour that Napoleon only wanted time to carry out the projects he had conceived for the emancipation of Italy.[1]

1866, and which he published in 1873, in his fear lest his country should bind itself hand and foot by another treaty with a treacherous Prussia—in this exposure of German perfidy he demonstrates the sincerity and generosity of the Emperor Napoleon's sympathy for Italy, from the beginning to the end of his relations with her, and shows that her statesmen had entire confidence in his honour and his goodwill.

[1] *Le Comte de Cavour.* Par Charles de Mazade. Paris, 1877.

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Cavour watched every sign, listened to every whisper, marked the most trivial movement, that indicated in Paris the various drifts of opinion which began to appear for and against the Italian cause directly after the signature of the Treaty of Paris. The Emperor had to count with the old parliamentarians, with the clergy, with the Legitimist *salons*; and these were all opposed to a free Italy. Cavour knew how to read Imperial hesitations and changes of front by the light of the clashing hostile influences which surrounded the throne. He was aware of the value Napoleon put upon the English alliance; and of the German and Austrian influences dominant in England, especially at Court, and among the upper classes of society. His sovereign had nothing to expect from the enemies of the democratic principle; for these were the foes, open or occult, of the principle of nationalities, of which the Emperor Napoleon had proclaimed himself the champion, having startled courts and chanceries by declaring that his object in the Crimean war was the independence of Poland and Italy.[1] Poland had slipped through his fingers, but Italy remained. The dexterity, the suppleness, the patience with which Cavour approached men of all degrees and of every shade of opinion, keeping his object ever in view; retreating quietly when repulsed, advancing boldly in response to an encouraging movement; and the steadiness with which he made his progress good, led the venerable Prince Metternich, who watched him, to say 'there was only one diplomatist left in Europe, and he is against us; it is M. de Cavour.'[2] Cavour boasted laughingly that he deceived

[1] The Emperor said to Lord Clarendon at Compiègne, in November (1858): 'The object of our Eastern policy was twofold—Poland and Italy! Poland must be given up, as we wish to be friends with Russia—so Italy alone is left!'

[2] De Mazade.

the diplomates by telling them the truth. He bore the brunt of the fierce, and for a time the powerful opposition of the reactionary and the revolutionary elements in Turin, that threatened, by turns, to destroy the work of his life. He called it the Black Crisis of 1857; and he resolved that it should be vanquished as the Red Crisis of 1849 had been. He rested his cause on the patriotism of a constitutional Sardinia, appealing to her Italian neighbours to form a free Italy.

If he ever had a moment of doubt, almost amounting to despair, it was when, as we have already remarked, the news reached Turin, in January 1858, that a most dastardly attempt had been made on the life of the Emperor and Empress at the entrance to the Opera, in Paris.

The assassins were of Italian blood. The chief of them, Felix Orsini, was an exile from the Roman revolution, who had escaped from an Austrian dungeon. Cavour had reason to dread the effect of such a crime committed by Italians. Austria promptly took advantage of it to enquire whether the time had not come at length for France and Austria to take common action against Piedmont, for the suppression of the plots and criminal machinations which she fostered against her neighbours. The Pope's Nuncio in Paris warned Napoleon that the Orsini attempt was the first of the revolutionary passions which the Count de Cavour had fomented.

The year had opened quietly and serenely enough; but, as the Emperor remarked in his New Year letter to Queen Victoria, more disagreeably than usual: 'for it began on a Friday, and with a fog that might be envied on the Thames.' The year begun on a Friday soon brought ill-luck in its train. The Reds of France had been warned to expect something before the middle of

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the month. Piétri had received warnings, and had even advised the Emperor not to go to the theatre; but the Empress had overruled the advice. On the 14th, as the Emperor and Empress approached the Opera House in the Rue Lepelletier, to hear 'Le Bal de Gustave,' which culminates in the assassination of Gustavus III. of Sweden, Felix Orsini and his accomplices cast hand grenades at the carriage, with disastrous consequences, but not with that effect which their guilty minds had designed. The Emperor received a slight wound on the nose, and the Empress a blow on the eye; but they were able to enter the Opera House, calm and self-possessed, to receive the tumultuous congratulations of the audience.[1] But, after their return again in the Tuileries, and when all the Palace was hushed for the night, the Imperial pair went to the room in which the infant prince was sleeping, and at the sight of him burst into tears. The father knelt by the cot and wept bitterly.[2]

The indignation which spread over France on the

[1] The Prince Consort's brother was awaiting the arrival of the Emperor, in his box; and on the following day he gave the Queen the following details, which are in the Royal diary, in these words: 'He (the Prince's brother) rushed down. The noise and cries were dreadful; and the rush of the crowd, many bleeding, who quite surrounded the Emperor and Empress, was fearful. The Emperor's nose had been grazed; the Empress's dress was spotted with blood from the wounded around her. The Empress wonderfully composed and courageous, even more than he. They remained all through the performance.'

[2] According to the Prince Imperial's English nurse, she was awoke on the night of the Orsini attempt by some one opening the door of the nursery, in which she slept with her charge. Perceiving that it was the Prince's father, she lay still, and saw the Emperor go and kneel for a few seconds at the child's cot, and then quietly depart.* 'He (Mérimée) confirms what I hear from everybody, that the Emperor's conduct for the first two or three days after the attack was calm and courageous. He drove the Empress along the Boulevards on the 15th with only one attendant.' — Mr. W. Senior's *Conversations*, vol. ii. p. 164.

* Dr. Alfred Gatty had this from a friend of the nurse. See *Notes and Queries*, July 5, 1879.

morrow was difficult to control; and many hasty, angry, and dangerous things were said and done. Three days after the event, the Emperor, replying to Queen Victoria's cordial congratulations on his escape, said:[1] 'In the first moment of excitement the French are bent on finding accomplices in the crime everywhere, and I find it hard to resist all the extreme measures which people call on me to take. But this event will not make me deviate from my habitual calm, and, while seeking to strengthen the hands of the Government, I will not be guilty of any injustice. I am very sorry to intrude a subject so serious and engrossing upon your Majesty at a moment when I would fain speak only of the happiness I feel in the thought that your mother's heart will soon be satisfied. I would also venture to beg your Majesty to present to the Princess Royal all my congratulations on her marriage. Our warmest wishes will be with her and with you upon the 25th.'

The 'habitual calm' of the Emperor was not shared by his subjects, nor maintained by himself. He hastily appointed a Council of Regency. Orsini and his accomplices had killed ten, and wounded one hundred and fifty-six people. MM. Troplong and de Morny in the Chambers, and military correspondents, whose letters were imprudently admitted to the official columns of the 'Moniteur,' indulged in violent language against the countries that harboured conspirators and assassins—and especially against England. The effect of this abroad was aggravated by the Emperor's recall of General Changarnier; and at home, by the General's refusal to return. Lord Clarendon, in returning the Emperor's letter to the Queen, after having been permitted by Her Majesty to read it, remarked to the Sovereign that it was not to be expected that foreigners,

[1] Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iv. p. 155.

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who saw assassins free to come and go in England, and that conspiracies might be hatched there with impunity, should think our laws friendly to other countries, or appreciate the extreme difficulty of making any change in them.[1] The Imperial Government were far from thinking our laws friendly; through the agency of Count Walewski, they rated us as protectors of the enemies of the Emperor, who were compassing his life. By the intemperate language of the French Foreign Minister, and the hectoring airs in which French officers were permitted to indulge, the Emperor completely turned public opinion in England against him; and the public anger so reacted on the House of Commons, that the Conspiracy Bill, which had passed its first reading by a majority of 200, was thrown out, and its authors with it, twelve days afterwards. M. Billault was replaced at the Ministry of the Interior by General Espinasse, a soldier of violent character, intended to strike terror through the Prefectures of France. The language of expostulation was adopted towards England; but that of menace was addressed to the small Powers—to Switzerland, Sardinia, and Belgium. It must be confessed that the provocation had been great; for in all these countries were secret agencies, ready to use assassination as a political weapon, and apparently directing their energies chiefly against the Emperor

[1] This difficulty caused the overthrow of the Government, of which the writer was a member, within a month. On February 8, Lord Palmerston introduced a measure to make conspiracy to murder punishable as a felony, instead of a misdemeanour; and the first reading of it was carried by 299 to 99. Between the first and the second reading, the violent and menacing language of the French press and of French officers and officials towards England had roused public indignation, and an intemperate despatch from Napoleon's unpopular Foreign Minister, Count Walewski, had been published. On February 19, a vote of censure, skilfully prepared by Mr. Milner Gibson, was carried against Ministers by a majority of 19 in a division of 459 members. Lord Palmerston at once resigned.

Napoleon. It was at this crisis that the weakness of Napoleon's advisers was made manifest. There was not one strong enough to direct the storm, and to calm it; but each man appeared anxious to cry louder than his neighbour. That the Emperor should, in the midst of rash advisers, lose some of his 'habitual calm,' in spite of his resolution to maintain it, was natural. His nature was easily wounded; and the things which were said about him, in the excitement of the fall of Lord Palmerston's Government, moved him strongly. For a moment he despaired of the English alliance, and saw himself forced into the arms of the Power he hated.

The Prince de Latour d'Auvergne was charged by Count Walewski, in the excitement which immediately followed the Orsini crime, to require the suppression of Mazzini's organ, the 'Italia del Popolo,' a severe press law, the banishment of the revolutionary agents, and other reactionary measures. The Emperor, speaking to the General della Rocca, whom King Victor Emmanuel had sent to congratulate him on his escape, said: 'Don't think that I want to put pressure upon your Government. In the vicissitudes of my life, I have had occasion to learn to respect dignity shown by small countries in the face of the threats of powerful States; but the concessions I ask are easy, and may be granted by an ally, even by a government that was careless as to the justice of the case. Suppose that England should not comply with my legitimate demands, the relations between the Cabinets of Paris and London will soon cool; and from coolness to war there is but one step. If that were to happen, let us look at the position in which Sardinia would find herself. There are two hypotheses. She would be for me or against me. You can have no illusions on this subject. The

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realisation of your hopes, your future, depend on the French alliance, which alone can afford you an efficacious support. Well, if you are to be with me, it is indispensable that you should do what I ask. If you refuse, you put yourselves in antagonism to me—you will be with England. What will you gain by that? What help to you will a few ships of war at Spezzia or Genoa be, if England pretends to keep the Treaties of 1815 intact? In this case, in spite of myself, I should find myself compelled to rely on Austria; and once engaged in that direction, I should be obliged to renounce the dearest dream of my life, the strongest desire of my heart—I mean the independence of Italy.'[1]

But, if the Emperor lost his 'habitual calm' under the influence of rash advisers, and permitted them to take violent action, in the provinces, to which many merely suspected persons fell victims, he soon recovered his serenity, and with it his accustomed docility to the language of reason and of justice. He reproved his hectoring colonels who had written outrageous things about England, and he quieted the irritated *amour-propre* of Cavour, by assuring him that he would ask of Sardinia only that which the most sensitive national honour could concede, in the way of precautions. But he could not quiet the malignant tongues in the *salons*, which Mr. Senior affected, and in which he picked up a rare collection of anecdotes referring to the crime, the trial, and the execution of Orsini. Collectively these disclose that unsettled state of society in which all kinds of absurd stories are welcomed. The Emperor's enemies declared that his prestige was gone; that his courage had forsaken him;

[1] De Mazade's *Life of Cavour*.

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and that his time was occupied in devising precautions for his own safety. He was said to wear a cuirass under his coats; to have had wires fixed over the chimneys of the Tuileries, so that explosive substances should not reach him at his hearth; to have bought the houses opposite the Tuileries, lest grenades should be dropped from their windows into his carriage; and that twenty spies mingled with the guests at Lady Cowley's ball, to protect him. The Emperor's old relations with Orsini's father, who had fought by his side in the insurrection of 1831, were canvassed to his disadvantage; albeit they only demonstrated the steadfastness of purpose of the young soldier of liberty who had closed his brother's eyes at Forli. The trial, conducted with unusual fairness and moderation in a crowded court, maintained the popular excitement at an extraordinary height, especially on the day of Jules Favre's defence of Orsini; in the course of which he said he gave up his client's head in the cause of Italy, and at the same time he described him as an old fellow-conspirator with the Emperor in Italy.

It was the strong desire both of the Emperor and the Empress to pardon Orsini. They were impressed with the courage of the criminal, and with the strong patriotism expressed in his letters, written from his cell, to the Sovereign in whose hands his life lay. But it could not be. The effect of the crime—the sacrifice of life—had been too heavy; and, although the man whose life had been sought was ready to forgive, the Sovereign, yielding to the advice of his Ministers, signed the death warrant. 'Short of pardon,' Mr. Senior remarks, 'which was impossible, Orsini had everything that he could wish.'[1] His letters to the Emperor,

[1] Senior's *Conversations with Thiers and Guizot*, &c. vol. ii. p. 186.

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calling upon him to free his country, were sent by Napoleon to Cavour for publication in the 'Gazetta Piemontese;' and they produced exactly the sensation they were intended to create.[1] Their publication was the Emperor's endorsement of them; and they gave fresh hope and courage to the Italians. Thiers described

[1] Kossuth, in his *Memoirs of my Exile*, gives the story of the Emperor's relations with Orsini, as they were given to him by Senator Piétri, on their way to meet the Emperor at Valeggio, during the Italian war. 'On our way thither he spoke much of Orsini, with whom, in consequence of his official duties, he had come into contact during the latter's imprisonment. He spoke of him with sympathetic pity. He used all his influence to induce the Emperor to spare his life. As so many human lives fell victims to the attempt, the Emperor did not think he could assume the whole responsibility of a pardon, but intimated that if the Council of State, at which also archbishops were to assist, would pronounce favourably for the prisoner, he would not withhold his sanction, and he also authorised Piétri to endeavour to get his (Piétri's) view accepted by the majority. Piétri canvassed each member of the Council personally. He received encouraging assurances, and went to the Council, hoping for success; but when abandoned there, and left in the minority, even by the teachers of charity, he was so much grieved that he resigned his office as Chief of the Police. I was told by Piétri that Orsini was not a ruffian. He was a fanatic, who carried patriotism to the verge of passion for martyrdom. He held the mistaken idea that the Emperor Napoleon stood in the way of the liberty of Italy. There he was quite wrong. The Emperor was always a true friend to it. Piétri explained to Orsini, in his cell, that if the murderous attempt had succeeded, he would have killed the one man, amongst all the crowned heads of the world, from whom the Italians could expect support and help. I heard this from Piétri himself. This explanation was not without influence on Orsini. On February 21 he wrote a letter to the Emperor from the prison of Mazas. "Do not repulse, sire," he writes, "the words of a patriot, who stands on the verge of the grave. Free Italy, and the benediction of twenty-five millions of people will accompany your name to posterity." The newspapers were permitted to publish this letter. Orsini understood this to mean that the voice he had raised from the verge of his grave, had found its way to the Emperor's heart, and on March 11, this time from the prison of La Roquette, he wrote a second letter, in which he openly condemned political murder, and called upon the youth of Italy "to prepare itself for fighting out the liberty of their country, by practising the virtues of citizens, which alone could free Italy, and make it independent and worthy of its past greatness."'

them as 'affronts to England, almost menaces;' but they irritated only the Austrian party in England. Cavour had warned the Emperor that they would be regarded as a direct attack on Austria, not only by Piedmont, but by France; and the Emperor had answered: 'Have them published.'

The differences between England and France, consequent upon the Orsini attempt, were adjusted immediately after the fall of Lord Palmerston's Government. Lord Cowley, in conference with the Emperor and Count Walewski, arranged an explanation of the French Minister's despatch of January 20. Count de Persigny was instructed (March 11) to assure the English Principal Secretary of State that the French Government had never intended to do more than call attention to the conspirators against the Emperor's life in London, leaving the nation to determine upon the remedy; and to remark that the Emperor would 'abstain from continuing a discussion, which, if prolonged, might injuriously affect the dignity and good understanding of the two countries.' Imperial France would place her reliance purely and simply on the loyalty of the English people. The adjustment was honourable to both countries, and satisfied both. It was followed by the immediate resignation by Count de Persigny of his position as Ambassador at the English Court; and this retirement of so warm a partisan of the alliance would have created a bad effect, had the Emperor not appointed General Pélissier, Duke of Malakoff, to the post.[1] By this appointment, he intended to give the

[1] Count de Persigny retired in a huff. He had not been consulted by his rival, Walewski, on the step which he was suddenly called upon to take. He had said again and again, that if the Conspiracy Bill were abandoned, a rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries would immediately follow.

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English people proof of the value he continued to place on the alliance. Writing to Lord Malmesbury on March 22, Lord Cowley remarks: 'There could not be a greater reparation for the offence given by the addresses, than by sending the greatest man in the army to maintain friendly relations.'[1] The Emperor understood England better than any of his advisers, and he was more liberal than any of them. When Dr. Simon Bernard, Orsini's accomplice, was acquitted, in April, amid the cheers of an irrational mob, the French people became very angry again; but the Emperor remained unmoved. He concurred with his Ambassador, who remarked to the Prince Consort: '*Il faut rester impassible pour ces sortes de choses, et laisser couler l'eau sous le pont.*' As Napoleon dealt with a great Power, so he dealt with Sardinia. Walewski had, in the excitement of the Orsini crime, demanded the suppression of Mazzini's 'Italia del Popolo,' and other summary measures against the Emperor's enemies; and he had provoked the intrepid Victor Emmanuel to write direct to the master of the destinies of Italy that he would retire and defend his crown upon the Alps, rather than forfeit the honour of his country by unworthy concessions.

The Emperor, putting his compromising Foreign Minister aside, wrote to the King to 'do the best he could, but not to feel uneasy.'[2]

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[1] 'With France matters have once more been put on a good footing. Her ruler, however, requires the lesson. The loss of Persigny is a great loss for us; still Pélissier will certainly do all in his power to uphold the alliance conscientiously. . . . His appointment is a deadly blow to Walewski, who had tripped up poor Persigny's heels, but with the view of appointing a creature of his own in his place. The Emperor, however, wishes to have a *personal* representative here.'—*Letter from Prince Consort to Baron Stockmar*, March 27, 1858. Martin's *Life*.

[2] *Le Comte de Cavour.* Par Charles de Mazade. Paris, 1877.

But uneasiness was the prevailing feeling of the time. It had produced commercial stagnation in France; and it kept the attention of monarch, statesmen, and diplomatists on the stretch. At any moment, it was felt, a trivial incident might break the peace of Europe. The quarrel between Naples and Sardinia, caused by the illegal seizure of the Sardinian mail-steamer 'Cagliari,' by Neapolitan cruisers, in June, 1857, and its complication by the imprisonment of two English engineers, had ripened into a very dangerous complication. England and Germany looked upon it as the match which Sardinia might use, with the connivance of France, to fire the train which was to deliver Italy. They knew how the Emperor chafed at the misgovernment of the Pope, and the countenance which the presence of his troops in Rome appeared to give to it; and how the Italian patriots kept up Napoleon's irritation and apprehension. 'I fear he' (the Emperor), the Prince Consort wrote to Baron Stockmar,[1] 'is at this moment meditating some Italian development, which is to serve as a lightning conductor, and ever since Orsini's letter he has been all for Italian independence; only the Pope and the compact with the Church, which is useful to him at home, stand in the way. A conflict between Sardinia and Naples might, however, look as though he had nothing to do with it, even though it should set all Italy in a blaze. The materials for the conflagration are ready in abundance, and would even suffice to spread the flames as far as Germany.' But in June Mr. Disraeli was in a position to announce to Parliament the surrender of the two English engineers; and with the restoration of the 'Cagliari' and her crew to Sardinia, this excuse for a war was removed.

[1] Theodore Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iv. p. 216.

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About this time, however, Dr. Conneau, the Emperor's old friend and physician, was setting out for Turin, bearing to Count Cavour a message, which meant that, in his master's opinion, the day of Italy's independence had dawned. Napoleon desired to speak with 'the obscure citizen of Piedmont.'[1]

On the whole, Louis Kossuth's account of this still mysterious conference is the most authentic and satisfactory one which has been given to the world. He writes: 'The meeting at Plombières (in July, 1858) was the prologue to the drama enacted in 1859. All the details are not yet known. The chroniclers of Italian diplomacy still speak of it with reserve. They think, however, that they can go so far as to state that Napoleon made a decided offer to give Piedmont armed assistance, in order to wrest the whole of Italy from the hands of Austria. But the question of fixing the time for commencing the war the Emperor reserved to himself. Meanwhile Piedmont was to prepare and to foster political agitation in Italy; was to prevent all revolutionary outbreaks; make no advances to Austria, yet refrain from provoking her "too much." But she was to endeavour to make friends with Russia. *A united Italy was not mentioned.* It was settled that the temporal power of the Holy See should be preserved, but within very narrow limits. Both parties spoke with the utmost caution as regarded Tuscany and Naples; *but it was agreed, that for the House of Savoy a kingdom of twelve million inhabitants, in the north of Italy, should be formed.* As compensation for the promised military help, *Savoy was to be ceded to France.* It was decided that the question with regard to Nice

[1] Cavour's description of himself. His countrymen, who twitted him with his English tastes, called him 'Milord Camille.'

should be settled later, when the war was over. Nothing passed in writing. An offensive and defensive treaty was signed after a lapse of six months only.

'From what I heard later through Piétri, Cavour, and still higher authorities, I feel justified in asserting that this account is authentic in its essential features.'

CHAPTER IV.

FREE ITALY.

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In November, 1858, Vincenzo Salvagnuoli presented a memorial to the Emperor at Compiègne, in which the expulsion of Austria from Italy, with the assistance of France, was assumed as a question already agreed upon, and in which the redistribution of the soil of Italy was discussed. The Emperor listened to the proposals without speaking a word. It matters not now to determine in whose name Vincenzo Salvagnuoli went to Compiègne to propose four Italies—Central Italy falling to the lot of Prince Jerome Napoleon. The Emperor was not seeking a crown for his cousin; nor was he the dupe of any of the plotters and schemers who were watching the coming of Italy's supreme struggle for independence in order to profit by it. M. Kossuth asserts, and truly, that 'in the course of all the gigantic activity displayed in originating the war of 1859, the question of Italian unity was not so much as mentioned by one word.'[1] The Emperor put forward no general plan for the reconstitution of Italy; and he committed himself to none. His understanding with Victor Emmanuel and Cavour, which, in December, took the settled form of an alliance, to be signed by Prince Napoleon on the eve of his nuptials with the Princess Clotilde, was, accord-

[1] 'By whose authority is not known.'—Kossuth, *Memoirs of my Exile.*

ing to Bianchi,[1] to the effect that Sardinia should receive Lombardy and Venice, Modena, Parma, Romagna, and the Papal Legations, and become Upper Italy; that the temporalities of the Pope should be restricted to 'Rome and a garden,' as the official pamphleteer, Edmond About, had pithily said; and that Savoy should be annexed to France—leaving Nice and Naples out of the question. The Emperor undertook to throw 200,000 troops into Italy, and to command them in person—and this in the following summer. Cavour gives these as the heads of agreement in a letter to Villamarina (December 24, 1858). Such an agreement was equivalent to a declaration of war; and the course adopted by the Tory English Government, and by Austria, precipitated the catastrophe.[2] The Emperor promised England not to make common cause with Sardinia if she was the first to break the peace; a promise that was of little value, since a rupture was inevitable, and the readiness of Austria to strike on the first provocation might be inferred from the haughty tone of Count Buol-Schauenstein's reply to the remonstrances of Lord Malmesbury. Austria would stand by her dynastic rights; she would continue her armed interventions in Italy as she might judge them necessary, and she would advise no Italian despot to reform his realm. She was so confident of victory that she invited a struggle. She had dreams of a march to Paris, and of a power that would make her mistress at

[1] Bianchi's *History of Diplomatic Negotiations.*

[2] Count Buol-Schauenstein replied to the protest of England against Austria's armed intervention in Italy, and her refusal of reforms: 'We will not advise any Government to introduce reforms. France plays the part of protectress of nationalities—we are, and will remain, protectors of dynastic right.'

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Constantinople, as well as throughout Italy. A military despotism of an eminently aggressive and ambitious character, she had forfeited every claim to the sympathy and respect of civilised communities, and by her haughty pretensions had estranged every old ally save the English Government; and this Government could not openly assist her in the face of the generous English people, who were looking eagerly forward to the emancipation of the Italian nation from her desolating and debasing grasp. Austria stood alone, hateful and hated in the sight of the world, on that day when the Emperor Napoleon, addressing her Ambassador at the Tuileries, warned her that the champion of Italian independence was ready to measure swords with her.

'I am told,' the Emperor said to Lord Cowley towards the close of 1858, 'that my policy is tortuous, but I am not understood. I am blamed for coquetting with Austria one day and with Russia the next, and it is inferred, therefore, that I am not to be depended upon. But my policy is very simple. When I came to my present position I saw that France wanted peace, and I determined to maintain peace, and to uphold the treaties of 1815, so long as France was respected, and held her own in the councils of Europe. But I was equally resolved, if I was forced into war, not to make peace until a better equilibrium was secured to Europe. I have no ambitious views like the first Emperor, but if other countries gain anything, France must gain something also. Well! when driven into war with Russia, I thought that no peace would be satisfactory which did not resuscitate Poland, and I humoured Austria in the hope she would assist me in this great work. She failed me, and after peace was made, I looked to the amelioration of Italy, and therefore drew more closely to Russia. This is the whole secret of my

policy.'[1] This was spoken frankly to the representative of the Court which the Emperor had good reason to believe cherished an Austrian alliance,[2] and with which his Government had recently had some angry correspondence in reference to the seizure of a French vessel by the Portuguese Government.[3]

Lord Malmesbury had addressed the most pressing remonstrances to the Emperor, begging him to reflect on the possible issues of the conflict to which his Italian policy appeared to be tending. The Queen wrote to the Foreign Secretary (December 9): 'Whatever can be done to turn the Emperor's mind from such a project (as a war with Austria) ought to be done. He will not reflect, but sees only what he wishes. If he make war in Italy, it must in all probability lead to war with

[1] Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iv. p. 315.

[2] 'The idea that Uncle Leopold is at work upon an alliance between England, Prussia, and Austria against him, has for a long time taken entire possession of Louis Napoleon's mind, and originates, no doubt, in the feeling that if he prosecutes an alliance with Russia, this dreaded combination would be formed, from an instinct of self-defence, and might more than counterpoise the Russian alliance. We are, in fact, on a more friendly footing with Austria than we have been for a long time, simply from the fact, that the latter, in the consciousness of her own weakness, shut up as she is between the hostile Powers of France and Russia, feels the necessity for attaching herself to England, and for sacrificing to that object some harmless prejudices.'—Letter from the Prince Consort to Baron Stockmar, October 18, 1858.

[3] The high-handed proceedings of the Imperial Government in this case provoked very angry feeling in England. The Emperor acknowledged that his Government had been led into a scrape; and he made an *amende* in the shape of a letter to Prince Napoleon, then Minister of Algeria and the Colonies, forbidding the continuance of the practice of importing black labourers from the African coast—a traffic which had provoked the *Charles and Georges* affair. In this letter he remarked: 'If, in truth, labourers recruited on the African coast are not allowed the exercise of their free will, and if this enrolment is only the slave-trade in disguise, I will have it on no terms; for it is not I who will anywhere protect enterprises contrary to progress, to humanity, and to civilisation.'

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Germany, and, if with Germany, will embrace Belgium, and if so must, according to our guarantees, draw us into the quarrel, and France may thus have the whole of Europe against her, as in 1814 and 1815.'

The Emperor saw farther and clearer than the Courts of London, Berlin, and Brussels. If these were against his resolve to help Italy to her freedom, the public opinion of Europe was with him; and with public opinion Courts and Governments could not choose but reckon, as Lord Derby was taught in the summer.[1]

His relations with the English Court remained, however, almost on their old cordial footing. On the last day of the year the Queen wrote her customary letter of congratulations, taking the opportunity to express a hope that the new year might 'assure the tranquillity and the peace of the world,' and that the two Governments, 'cherishing their cordial understanding on all points,' might 'continue to contribute to its happiness and its prosperity.' The Emperor's New Year's letter avoided reference to the probability of war, but he said: 'I hope the coming year will be prolific in happy results for the alliance of the two countries; this much at least is certain, that my efforts will always be directed to maintaining a sincere alliance between our two Governments. In this view I feel bound again to thank your Majesty for having come to Cherbourg, for your presence there, and that of the Prince, have silenced the absurd rumours which people took pleasure in spreading.'[2] At the same time the Emperor announced

[1] At the general election in 1859, which happened while the Emperor's legions were pouring into Italy, the suspected Austrian leanings of the Government turned the scale against them, and transferred power to Lords Palmerston and Russell, the warm friends of Italian independence.

[2] 'Je ne veux pas laisser com-

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to the Queen the approaching marriage of Prince Napoleon with the daughter of King Victor Emmanuel, the Princess Clotilde. His Majesty hoped that this union would give the Empress an agreeable companion; both the Queen and the Prince saw in it the sealing of a compact which meant war in the spring.

This was made clear enough on the morrow of the letter's date. On New Year's morning (1859), when the Emperor was receiving the customary congratulations of the Diplomatic Body at the Tuileries, he said to the Austrian Ambassador, M. Hübner, in the hearing of his colleagues: 'I regret that the relations between our two Governments are not more satisfactory; but I beg you to assure the Emperor that they in no respect influence my feelings of friendship towards himself.' These simple words, flashed about the world by the telegraphic wires, created a profound sensation. They fell upon Europe like shocks of earthquake. They were the certain first mutterings of a storm, which diplomatists had regarded as inevitable for some time past; but for which the outside world was not prepared, anxiously as the vast warlike preparations of France and Austria, and the recent military activities of Prussia, had been watched. They heralded to Italy's master mind at Turin the coming of his country's deliverance; and he said quietly: '*Il paraît que l'Empereur veut aller en avant.*' The shock created in Paris, the disastrous fall in the funds, the immediate

mencer une nouvelle année sans exprimer à votre Majesté tous les vœux que je forme pour son bonheur. J'espère que la nouvelle année sera féconde en heureux résultats pour l'alliance des deux pays; ce qu'il y a de sûr, c'est que je ferai toujours mes efforts pour maintenir entre nos deux gouvernements une union sincère. A ce propos je dois encore remercier votre Majesté d'être venue à Cherbourg, car sa présence et celle du Prince ont fait cesser tous ces bruits absurdes qu'on s'était plu à répandre.'

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stop put to trade, the swift interchanges of diplomatic notes, the refusal of England and Prussia to promise neutrality, and the wild hopes which found expression among the Italian patriots, so startled the Emperor, that he hastened to protest that his meaning had been exaggerated. The 'Moniteur' declared that the alarm was irrational. M. Hübner became the object of particular attentions. But the fears which had been conjured up would not be laid. They were stirred anon by a responsive speech from Victor Emmanuel: they were kept alive by Prince Napoleon's marriage a few weeks later. The bride's *corbeille* included a treaty offensive and defensive between her father and the august cousin of her bridegroom, which assured freedom to Italy in the summer.[1] Albeit this and the previous December understanding were supposed to be state secrets, the diplomatic world understood pretty well how matters stood between Napoleon, Victor Emmanuel, and Cavour. Austria replied to the New Year's address to her Ambassador by pushing forward her armaments, and by covering the plains of Lombardy with her white-coats. They believed they were on the road to Turin, and to Paris. The Emperor, firm in his resolve to accomplish the liberation of the Italians,[2] was disconcerted by the precipitate

[1] M. Gallenga, in *The Pope and the King: the War between Church and State in Italy*, talks about the sacrifice of Princess Clotilde, 'the Savoy Iphigenia, to a Bonaparte Hades;' but the truth is, that there was no sacrifice; and that this 'mariage de raison' was as happy a one as such marriages usually are —while the conduct of the husband remained fairly good.

[2] 'Generally, the matter stood thus: while adept historians, writing even after Napoleon had lost his throne and was an exile, and when, therefore, their judgment could not have been influenced either by fear or by hope, stated that the fundamental trait of Napoleon's Italian policy was his sympathy for the Italians, produced neither by Cavour nor by anybody else, but of spontaneous growth.'—*Memoirs of my Exile*, by Louis Kossuth, 1880.

march of events. He was not ready. His words, intended to give warning, and possibly to avert a war, appeared likely to force him, unprepared, into the field. Lord Cowley, writing to Lord Malmesbury on January 12, described him as 'very much out of humour at what is taking place in France,' and 'cast down.' He was troubled by the commercial panic. One of the Pereires had told him that his words to M. Hübner would cost France a *milliard*. The French people were by no means bent on making heavy sacrifices for the deliverance of Italy. The Ministers and the *salons* were opposed to the war, and M. Thiers was talking everywhere against it.[1]

At the opening of the Parliamentary session (February 7), the Emperor, addressing the assembled Senators and Deputies at the Tuileries, said :—

'France, as you know, has during the last six years seen the national wealth increase, her intestine dissensions diminish, and her prestige developed; and yet, from time to time, in the midst of this general calm and prosperity, vague uneasiness and agitation, without any defined cause, have arisen and shaken public confidence. I deplore these periodical depressions, without being surprised at them. In a society which, like ours, has been upset by so many revolutions, time alone can settle men's convictions, and strengthen the public faith and character.

[1] The general excitement was kept up by the appearance (February 1) of a pamphlet, called *Napoléon et l'Italie*, written by M. de la Guéronnière, and revised by the Emperor; in which the reasons for a war in support of Italian independence were fully stated.

M. Mérimée said to Mr. Senior (May 3): 'One of the strongest opponents of the war was Thiers. At last I begged him to write his objections to it. He did so, and with great freedom and force. The Emperor read the paper, and said that some of it was true, but that on the whole it was "bourgeois."'

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'The emotion which has been felt recently, without the appearance of imminent danger, may readily surprise us, for it betrays too much mistrust and fear. There appears to have been, on the one hand, doubt of the moderation of which I have given so many proofs; and, on the other, of the real power of France. Happily, the masses of the people are far from sharing these impressions.

'It is my duty to-day to submit to you once more that which appears to have been forgotten. What has been the constant object of my policy? To reassure Europe, to give back to France her proper rank, to cement closely our alliance with England, and to regulate the degree of my intimacy with the Continental Powers of Europe, in accordance with our views, and with their conduct towards France. It was thus that I was led, on the eve of my third election, to make this declaration at Bordeaux, "*L'Empire, c'est la paix;*" wishing to prove by it that if the heir of the Emperor Napoleon mounted the throne, he would not re-open an era of conquests, but would inaugurate a system of peace which could not be troubled, save in the defence of great national interests. As for the English alliance, I have exerted my utmost perseverance to consolidate it; and I have found on the other side of the Channel a fortunate reciprocity of sentiments on the part of the Queen of Great Britain, as well as on the part of statesmen of every shade of opinion. To reach this end, so useful to the peace of the world, I have trodden underfoot the irritating memories of the past, the attacks of calumny, and even the national prejudices of my country. This alliance has borne fruit. Not only have we won lasting glory together in the East; but again, at the farthest extremity of the world, we have just

opened a vast Empire to the progress of civilisation, and of the Christian religion.

'Since the conclusion of peace, my relations with the Emperor of Russia have assumed a frank and cordial character, because we have been of one opinion on all questions. I have also to congratulate myself on my relations with Prussia, which have been marked throughout by mutual friendliness. The Cabinet of Vienna and mine, on the contrary, I remark with regret, have been in frequent collision on important questions; and a resolute spirit of conciliation has been necessary to solve them. For example, the reconstitution of the Danubian Principalities was accomplished only after innumerable difficulties, which prevented the full satisfaction of their most legitimate interests. If I were asked what interest France had in these distant lands watered by the Danube, I should answer that the interests of France are everywhere where the cause of justice and of civilisation has to be maintained.

'Under these circumstances it was not extraordinary that France should draw closer to Piedmont, who had been so devoted during the war, and so faithful to our policy during peace. The happy union of our well-beloved cousin, the Prince Napoleon, with the daughter of King Victor Emmanuel, is not one of those strange facts for which some hidden cause must be sought, but the natural consequence of the community of interests of the two countries, and of the friendship of the two Sovereigns.

'For some time past the abnormal state of Italy, where order can be maintained only with the assistance of foreign troops, has disquieted the diplomatic world. This is not, nevertheless, a sufficient reason for believing in war. Let some cry for it without fair reason; let others, in their unreasoning fears, describe to France

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the perils of a new coalition ; I shall remain unassailable in the path of right, of justice, of national honour ; and my Government will neither be driven nor intimidated, because my policy will never be either provocative or pusillanimous.

'Let us cast away these false alarms, these unjust suspicions, these interested fears. Peace, I hope, will not be disturbed. Return then, in peace, to the customary course of your labours. I have frankly explained to you the state of our foreign relations ; and this statement, which is in accordance with those I have endeavoured to spread at home and abroad during the last two months, will prove to you, I hope, that my policy has never ceased for a moment to be firm, but conciliatory.

'Therefore, I continue to rely with confidence on your support, as well as upon that of the nation, which has confided its destinies to my keeping, and which knows that my actions will never be governed by personal interest, nor by a mean ambition. When, supported by the popular will and sentiment, a man mounts the steps of a throne, he is raised, by the most solemn of responsibilities, above the mean level where low interests are fought for, and he has for his guides as well as his final judges—God, his conscience, and posterity.'[1]

When these words were spoken, the hopes of peace were strongest.[2] Between the day of its delivery and the end of April, when Austria's haughty summons to

[1] 'Lorsque, soutenu par le vœu et le sentiment populaires, on monte les degrés d'un trône, on s'élève, par la plus grave des responsabilités, au-dessus de la région infime où se débattent les intérêts vulgaires, et l'on a pour premiers mobiles comme pour derniers juges : Dieu, sa conscience et la postérité.'

[2] The Emperor wrote a long and friendly letter of frank explanations to Queen Victoria on February 14. —See Appendix IV.

Piedmont to disarm put an end to all chances of an amicable arrangement, the resources of English and of Russian diplomacy were exhausted in endeavours, first to prevent the outbreak of a war, or if that should fail, then to localise it. The Emperor, in the anxious course of these negotiations, was at a disadvantage. Between him and his Foreign Minister, Walewski, there was little sympathy, and there were few communications. The vice in the Imperial system of government, which the Prince Consort had pointed out to the Emperor at Osborne, being the isolation of the Sovereign from his advisers, and the consequent clashings of their proceedings and policy with his, continued. While, at the beginning of the year, the Tory Government in England were displaying a feverish activity at St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and even Rome and Naples, their object being to prevent the ousting of the Austrians from Italy, Walewski's sympathies were not merely antagonistic to those of his Sovereign. He actually thwarted the Emperor's policy. The French Ministers were opposed to Italian independence throughout, and disliked Cavour: Walewski even hated him. The Italian statesmen and soldiers, who have published their testimony within the last ten years, agree in giving all the credit of the liberation of their country to the Emperor Napoleon, backed with the sympathetic aid of his cousin, Prince Napoleon, and to Thouvenel, who replaced Walewski at the Foreign Office.[1] They

[1] 'It is an important fact, and one that the historian of our times must always bear in mind, that the Emperor Napoleon's policy often differed from, and sometimes was opposed to, that pursued by his Ministers. They were often not even initiated into their master's policy, nor employed in carrying it out. We Hungarians also were only in communication with the Emperor, with Prince Jerome Napoleon (who, on important occasions, was employed as mediator and executor), and with trusted instruments of the Emperor, who had no political rank.

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have no acknowledgments to offer to any other French statesmen. The hesitation to take an irrevocable step, and the readiness with which the French Sovereign listened to schemes of peaceful solutions; the anxiety he exhibited to spare his country the sacrifices of a struggle; the hope again and again renewed that diplomacy would achieve those ends on which he had resolved at Plombières with Cavour, and make him deliverer of Italy, and the head of an Empire that should still mean peace: these perplexities, aspirations, hopes, and resolves tumbled together, and for ever astir during the four first months of 1859, wore away the spirits, and enfeebled the health, but never mastered the patience, nor gave one instant's weakness to the purpose of Napoleon. The whispered threats of a coalition fell as idle wind upon the ear of the student, who had slowly settled down into the belief that the principle of nationalities was the rock upon which the future Europe was to be built; and who could perceive in the blind, uneasy movements of the Poles, the Hungarians, the Slavs, the Italians, the Greeks, and the great German nation, peoples who would not form the patient legions of dynasties fighting for the pact of 1815. The Italians, the Poles, and the Hungarians were looking to him to help them to their deliverance; and the English people were the long-tried friends of

We had nothing to do with his Ministers—I, at least, had never anything to do with them. They were not initiated into our relations—at least not in 1859. . . . No French Minister had any knowledge of what passed at the meeting of Plombières, or of the conditions of the offensive and defensive alliance concluded in December, 1858. . . . The Emperor's Ministers did not at all show a friendly feeling towards Piedmont. In fact, at times, they evinced sentiments quite of an opposite kind; notably Walewski, who never stood on a cordial footing with Cavour. There was a certain coolness and stiffness between the two, perhaps it would not even be an exaggeration to say hatred.'—Kossuth's *Memoirs of my Exile*, pp. 64–5.

the Poles, the admirers and protectors of the Hungarian patriots, and the ardent well-wishers of Sardinia in her fight for a free constitutional Italy. This no Tory Government could hide, in aid of their Austrian sympathies; and so the hostility of the British aristocracy expressed at foreign Courts, and the brisk family correspondence between the Courts of London, Berlin, and Brussels against him, and in favour of Germany, were of little weight indeed in the balance. In the end such measures as Lord Cowley's mission to Vienna served the Italian cause, by keeping Austria back until it was too late to strike a decisive blow at Sardinia before the arrival of the French.[1]

The Emperor's hope that war might still be averted lay in the assembling of a Congress, and not in the activities of princes and diplomates. He induced his ally, the Emperor of Russia, to take the initiative; Russia being careful to make it known that the Emperor Napoleon was the prime mover. Baron Brunnow wrote to Lord Malmesbury on March 10, 'Déférant au

[1] M. Thiers, who was on the side of the Austrians, said to Mr. Senior (May 1, 1859): 'All your parties seem to combine against Austria; all your intervention has been disastrous to her. It has prevented her from being at the foot of the passes of the Alps on April 1. If she had been there, as she ought to have been, this war would now have been over.'

M. Duvergier said to the same gentleman (May 10): 'Lord Derby has done still worse than that; he has given to Louis Napoleon the support of the French people; he has made the war, which was most unpopular, national. The people are told, on Lord Derby's authority, that Austria is not only an aggressor, but a criminal. These words have run through France like wildfire.' M. Lanjuinais had said: 'The silly, hopeless interference of Lord Derby caused Austria to lose three weeks; the mismanagement of Francis Joseph, or of the "imbéciles" to whom Francis Joseph has trusted the fate of his army, perhaps of the Empire, has turned the loss of those three weeks into the loss of the campaign.' Apparently these gentlemen would have preferred to see the Austrians in Paris to the triumph of the Italian cause through Napoleon!

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désir de la France, le Cabinet Impérial a cru devoir prendre l'initiative de cette réunion diplomatique;' and when Lord Malmesbury gave instructions on the subject to Lord Cowley, he also took care to fix the responsibility of the Congress on France. But France had reason to be proud of the paternity. As proposed by Napoleon, the Congress was a humane and rational proposal; as it appeared afterwards, defaced and misconstrued by the British Government, who had received it in the beginning in the most hostile spirit, and had accepted it only when they had utterly changed its meaning and its object, it was doomed. Napoleon intended to have justice done to Italy by an Areopagos instead of a battle-field; whereas England, Russia, Prussia and Austria, and even his own Foreign Minister, designed a tribunal with the liberty of Italy erased from the list of its causes.

Austria would take part in the Congress, provided no changes in the territorial arrangement of Italy should be discussed, and that Sardinia was refused admission. Nor would she have the rights of the Italian princes brought in question. Inspired by her, Ferdinand II. of Naples told Russia that his internal affairs must not be discussed. Cardinal Antonelli, on behalf of the Pope, and the Princes of Parma, Tuscany, and Modena on their own behalf, would brook no discussion of their rights and methods of government; but would probably have something to say about the punishment of Cavour and his 'facinorosi'[1] when they got to Paris in the wake of Austria's victorious legions. Cavour was alarmed, not by the hostility of Austria to the Congress, nor by the willingness of the British

[1] The epithet applied by the Duke of Modena to Cavour's friends and supporters.

Government to see Sardinia excluded from it, for he had accurately gauged the depth of English popular feeling for his country; but by the news that reached him from the French Minister at Turin. He wrote to the Marquis of Villamarina, Sardinian Minister in Paris, that Walewski had made a communication to the French Minister at Turin, which might make desperate measures inevitable. Villamarina sought out Walewski, and they had an angry explanation, in the course of which the French Foreign Minister said: 'What do you want? The Emperor surely will not, must not, carry on a war for no other purpose than that of satisfying the ambition of Sardinia! The matter must be settled peaceably at a congress, and Sardinia has not an atom of right to participate in such a congress.' Villamarina replied that Sardinia would not submit to such an affront; that she would attack her enemies alone; and that, if need were, she would set fire to the four quarters of Europe. The position of the Emperor was painful. On the one hand, he was working—with very little hope it is true—for, peace through his Ministers, his diplomatists, and the Congress; and on the other he was holding ready, should the Congress fall through, to meet Austria in the field.

A few days after the stormy meeting between the Sardinian Minister and Walewski, Cavour reached Paris (March 25) at the summons of Napoleon. The condition of affairs was very grave; for the Emperor had good reason to believe that the coming war might ultimately be fought out on the banks of the Rhine. He was aware of the strong German sympathies of the English and Belgian Courts; he knew that the Prince Consort had advised his 'dear cousin,' the Prince Regent of Prussia, to be ready to meet the French on the Rhine; he had had cause to complain of the family

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correspondence with King Leopold against him;[1] he was aware of the latent hostility of Baron Stockmar, the Duke of Coburg, and other German personages, albeit he had received assurance that there was no settled plot against him. When he considered this latent animosity in conjunction with Austria's position in the German Confederation, and his belief that the Diet might declare war against France, even without Prussia, a war on the Rhine looked almost like a certainty.

Later—on the eve of the invasion of Piedmont—when the Archduke Albrecht, Governor of Hungary, was despatched on a mission to Berlin, to propose that Austria should send a contingent of 200,000 to co-operate with the forces of the Confederation on the Rhine, yielding the command to the Prussian Regent, and offering to alternate with Prussia in the Presidency of the Diet, Napoleon could not fail to see that he had only Prussia's jealousy of Austria between him and an European armed coalition. The reply of the House of Hohenzollern to the House of Hapsburg was happily dictated by this jealousy. Prussia elected to remain neutral, that she might not give her rival an opportunity of becoming supreme in the Confederation. She was not yet ready for the struggle she was meditating, but she was preparing apace.[2]

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[1] The Prince Consort had forwarded extracts from the Emperor's letter explaining his policy to his uncle Leopold, and the King had forwarded the Emperor's letter to himself to the Prince.

[2] The Emperor had caused articles to be inserted in the *Moniteur*, disclaiming all hostile feeling towards the Germans, but at the same time telling them that he did not fear their threats; and that these would not influence his Italian policy. On April 10 the *Moniteur* said: 'The policy of France cannot have two weights and two measures. What she seeks to make respected in Italy, she will know herself how to respect in Germany.' A few days later, in a conversation with Kos-

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When Cavour returned to Turin from his final conference with the Emperor, he announced that the war would begin in two months. On his arrival in Paris, he had been inclined, after his interview with Walewski, at which the French Foreign Minister informed him that the Emperor had resolved to interfere in Italian affairs only by peaceful means, to depart without seeing Napoleon. He talked of his own resignation, of the King's abdication, and of his determination to retire to America, where he would publish the documents in his possession, which would prove that the Emperor had promised to assist Sardinia by force of arms against Austria.[1]

The Emperor had never denied this promise, nor threatened to break it, even when driven into false and dangerous positions by the impetuosity of Cavour. He only persisted in regarding war as the last resource; and with his habitual patience he tried every means by which the Italian cause might be won without drawing the sword. Two days before Cavour's arrival in Paris, the Emperor gave audience to Lord Cowley, at which the English Ambassador endeavoured to persuade him to require Sardinia to disarm. 'His Majesty admitted,' Lord Cowley reported to Lord Malmesbury, 'that it ought to be done, but he said that his accounts from Turin were of that nature that he was convinced the King would abdicate, and Cavour resign, if the disarmament were forced upon him, or else in a fit of despair they would throw themselves upon the Austrians. . . . Finally he said he would see what he could

suth, Napoleon said: 'Two Germanies I would not mind, but one Germany—*ça ne me va pas.*'

[1] These details are given by Sir Theodore Martin, in his *Life of the Prince Consort*, on the authority of information supplied to the Prince in 1860, 'from a quarter which placed their accuracy beyond suspicion.'

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do with Cavour, and that he would see me again in a couple of days.'

That the Emperor did his utmost to moderate the ardour of Cavour, and to turn him to a less vehement course, the tenor of the subsequent negotiations demonstrates. The Italian Minister saw how the French Sovereign was surrounded with difficulties and dangers; and that the great Powers were one and all against him. The only point on which Cavour remained firm was in his refusal to disarm. Therefore the Emperor could not, when next he gave audience to the English Ambassador, promise to support England in demanding a step that would probably lead to the annihilation of Sardinia, and the further advance of Austria into Italy. Rather than lay down his arms, Victor Emmanuel and his Minister declared that they would die defeated, but not dishonoured. Austria proposed that a simultaneous disarmament of the great Powers should be laid down as a matter to be settled at the Congress. This proposal led to the assent of the Emperor on the basis that Sardinia and the other Italian States should be heard at the Congress, and that Sardinia should concur in the general disarmament. Cavour consented. To England's request that Sardinia should disarm he was prepared with a refusal; but to the demand of Europe he could defer with honour. The basis of the Congress was, then, agreed upon by England, France, Russia, and Prussia; but Austria, in whose interest all these intricate, protracted, and harassing negotiations had been carried on, now required that disarmament should be not a subject for the Congress, but a measure to precede it. 'I can remember no period of equal confusion and danger,' the Prince Consort wrote of this period. 'The ill-starred telegraph speaks incessantly from all quarters of the globe, and from every quarter

a different language (I mean to a different purport). Suspicion, hatred, pride, cunning, intrigue, covetousness, dissimulation, dictate the despatches, and in this state of things we cast about to find a basis on which peace may be secured.'

It was now apparent that Austria was resolved on war—and immediate war; so that she might be able to strike a blow at Sardinia before the French could take the field against her.

On April 23, a haughty ultimatum was carried from Vienna to Turin by Baron Ernest Kellersberg, summoning the subjects of Victor Emmanuel to disarm, and demanding the disbanding of his volunteers. Three days were allowed for a reply. A refusal was to be tantamount to a declaration of war. That refusal was written by Cavour with joy; for while it put Austria in the wrong as the aggressor, and left Napoleon free to act, it was confidently welcomed by the great Italian statesman as the beginning of the realisation of his dearest hopes. He replied on April 25: 'May the responsibility rest upon those who were the first to arm, and who substituted threats for fair proposals for a peaceful settlement.' From words he passed swiftly to deeds. He telegraphed the note of war to the Tuileries, he laid the Lomellina under water, and left the rest to the valour of Victor Emmanuel's Piedmontese, and to the legions of Napoleon. The action of Austria, taken in the hope of finding France unready, and Italy an easy prey for her splendid army, turned public opinion, as the Prince Consort had predicted, against her 'at a stroke,' and transferred the sympathies of the nations of Europe to Sardinia. On the day of Cavour's haughty reply to the Austrian Envoy (April 25), Lord Derby said at the Mansion House: 'There was nothing, in his judgment, to justify the hasty, the precipitate, and, be-

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cause involving the horrors of war, the criminal step which had been taken by Austria.'

On April 26, Count Walewski explained at great length to the Legislative Body the French policy in Italy; adding that the invasion of Sardinian territory by Austria would be regarded by France as a declaration of war. Three days afterwards that invasion began by the crossing of the Ticino. The war of independence was entered upon; and 40,000 French troops, under Canrobert and Baraguay d'Hilliers, were, in spite of the negligent administration of Marshal Vaillant, within the Sardinian territory.

Still, the condition in which the Emperor found the administration of his army, when the moment for action had come, threatened to bring disasters upon it.

In a moment of irritation he peremptorily dismissed the Marshal without warning, in a note which he sent to him by an aide-de-camp. Vaillant received it while he was in consultation with several officers. 'J'ai toléré votre négligence pendant la paix,' said the Emperor; 'je ne dois pas la tolérer en guerre. J'ai nommé le maréchal Randon votre successeur.' Vaillant hurried to Saint Cloud, and protested that he was disgraced by such a dismissal. But he was soothed with the appointment of Major-General of the Army of Italy.

The war, which had been unpopular in France when first bruited, became so popular when once it was entered upon, that the French people watched all movements of the troops with eager enthusiasm, and crowded to the *mairies* to subscribe to the loan.

In the course of the debate on the war loan of twenty millions on May 1, M. Baroche described the war as defensive, and affirmed that France had de-

clared it because Austria had attacked her in the person of Piedmont. Jules Favre denied this, and maintained that the war was the Emperor's. 'He had resolved to have it; he prepared it in profound peace more than a year ago; its whole responsibility falls on him, and I honour him for it. Its object must be the independence of Italy; for no other purpose will France fight. Still I have a painful remembrance of 1849, when, under the same guidance and after similar professions, we sent an expedition to Rome; and we know what followed. I am anxious, therefore, to learn whether I am wrong on either of these points. I ask M. Baroche to tell me whether this is not a war "provoquée par l'Empereur pour libérer l'Italie." His answer or his silence may decide my vote. He is silent. Then I vote for raising the money, reserving to myself to demand an account, after victory, of the use to which the victors will put it.'

The loan was eagerly taken up, and by the poorer classes, who assembled in crowds at the subscription places, and were passed in a score at a time to subscribe. Three times the amount was applied for. M. Duchâtel (May 8) described the operation to Mr. Senior,[1] as an opponent of the Government, with more fairness than his friends generally showed to the Empire. 'The three per cents are at 91·50. The loan, considering that it is to be paid by instalments running over eighteen months, and that interest runs on the whole from Christmas, is really given out at 57·50—that is to say, at five per cent below its value. The Government might have got twenty-one millions for the price which it pays for twenty millions. I am delighted to see that it is taken by Frenchmen, and by the lower classes.

[1] *Conversations with M. Thiers and M. Guizot*, vol. ii. p. 264.

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A large public debt held by hundreds of thousands will not easily be repudiated, and will interest those hundreds of thousands in the restoration of peace.'

The Empress told M. Mérimée (May 2) that, the war declared, she was happier than she had been for months. 'Our cause is good, our army is excellent, and *he* is full of confidence and energy. The suspense of the last three months affected his health and spirits; now he is as happy as I am.'

'When, after the insurrection in which his brother died, Louis Napoleon was carried to the Roman frontier, and then pardoned and driven out,' he said, according to Mérimée, that 'he would pay another visit to the Cardinals.'

He was now on his way.

The Emperor, before leaving Paris for the war, addressed to his subjects the following proclamation, dated from the Tuileries on May 3:—

'Frenchmen!—Austria, in causing her army to enter the territory of the King of Sardinia, our ally, declares war against us. She thus violates treaties and justice, and menaces our frontiers. All the great Powers have protested against this aggression. Piedmont having accepted the conditions which would have ensured peace, one asks what can be the motive of this abrupt invasion? It is because Austria has brought matters to this extremity, that either her dominion must be extended to the Alps, or Italy must be free to the Adriatic, for in that country every corner of land which remains independent is a danger for her power.

'Hitherto moderation has been the rule of my conduct; now energy becomes my first duty.

'Let France arm, and say resolutely to Europe: I desire no conquest, but I resolve firmly to maintain my national and traditional policy. I observe treaties on

the condition that no one shall violate them to my disadvantage. I respect the territory and rights of neutral Powers, but I boldly avow my sympathy for a people whose history is mingled with our own, and who groan under foreign oppression.

'France has shown her hatred of anarchy. She has been pleased to confer upon me the power to reduce to helplessness the abettors of disorder, and the incorrigible members of those factions whom we perpetually find plotting with our enemies; but she has not therefore abdicated her function as a civilising Power. Her natural allies have always been those who desire the improvement of the human race, and when she draws the sword it is with the purpose, not of dominating, but of liberating.

'The object of this war, then, is to restore Italy to herself, not to make her change masters. We shall have on our frontiers a friendly people, who will owe to us their independence.

'We are entering Italy, not to foment disorder, nor to shake the power of the Holy Father, whom we have replaced upon his throne, but to free him from that foreign pressure which weighs upon the whole peninsula, and to help to establish order there upon the satisfaction of legitimate interests.

'We are going, in short, to seek upon that classic ground, memorable by so many victories, the footsteps of our fathers. God grant that we may be worthy of them!

'I am about to place myself at the head of the army. I leave in France the Empress and my son. Aided by the experience and the enlightenment of the last surviving brother of the Emperor, the Empress will understand how to show herself equal to the grandeur of her mission.

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'I confide them to the valour of the army which remains in France to watch over our frontiers, and to protect our homes: I confide them to the loyalty of the National Guard: and entrust them, in a word, to the entire nation, who will encircle them with that affection and devotion, of which I receive daily so many proofs.

'Courage, then, and union! Our country once more will show the world that she has not degenerated. Providence will bless our efforts, for the cause which is based on justice, humanity, love of country, and of independence, is holy in the sight of God.'

Sir Theodore Martin tells us[1] that, in a letter to Lord Malmesbury (June 8), Lord Cowley mentions, on the authority of a person who learned the fact from Count Walewski, that when this proclamation was under consideration, Count Walewski had passed many hours in endeavouring to persuade the Emperor to omit all reference to the Adriatic, observing that the expression would alarm all Europe, and moreover render it exceedingly difficult for the Emperor to conclude a peace which should fall short of his own words. 'The Emperor,' we are told, 'demurred to Count Walewski's interpretation of the passage, which, he said, was simply the expression of an opinion, but did not bind him in any way to maintain that opinion by the sword.' The Emperor's interpretation is clearly the right and obvious one. It is true that on his return from Italy, after the Peace of Villafranca, he said in his address to his Ministers that he felt great reluctance in withdrawing from his programme 'the territory from the Mincio to the Adriatic,' and 'to see noble illusions and patriotic hopes vanish from honest hearts;' but this

[1] *The Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iv.

declaration is in strict accordance with His Majesty's original interpretation of his phrase. He believed that Italy must become free to the Adriatic, and she did eventually become free to this limit, through his act, after Sadowa; nay, he hoped, when he set out, to see his eagles on the Adriatic shore before he returned; but he gave no pledge.[1]

The Emperor aspired to assist in the liberation of Hungary. To this end he had interviews with Louis Kossuth, and entered into an arrangement with him for a Hungarian Legion in Italy, and the support of a Hungarian rising, at a given moment, by a French army. But he gave no unconditional promise. Kossuth undertook to upset Lord Derby's Government, and to replace it by the Whigs—these having given pledges of England's neutrality as a condition of their advent to power. There is no more startling page of contemporary history than that in which the Hungarian patriot describes how he accomplished his mission,[2] and carried proofs of his success to the Emperor's head-quarters in Italy. But Napoleon made only a conditional promise.

'I accept this basis,' he said in the interview he gave Kossuth at the Tuileries; 'either I will send an army to Hungary, or I will not require Hungary to rise. But I will send her an army, if within the range of possibility; only I must first carry out certain further military operations here. Should, however, Europe force

[1] On April 25, Count Walewski had written to the French Ambassador in London a despatch in which he strongly invited the cordial co-operation of England in protecting Sardinia. Two days after the Emperor's proclamation, Lord Malmesbury coldly replied, in an elaborate despatch, throwing all the blame of the war on Sardinia, and intimating that England would remain neutral. Early in the year, in the discussion on the Address, Lord Derby had spoken of the grievances endured by the Italian subjects of Austria as 'sentimental.'

[2] See Appendix V.

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me by an armed mediation to make peace, the Hungarian expedition must be foregone; but in no other case.'

The agreement was loyally carried out on both sides; and after Villafranca, Napoleon insisted upon the free return of the soldiers of the Hungarian Legion to their homes, with exemption from military service.

CHAPTER V.

THE WAR.

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THE war was short and sharp.[1] The French vanguard reached Turin on April 30, and the Treaty of Villafranca was signed on July 11. When he disembarked at Genoa the Emperor remarked to Cavour: 'You ought to be satisfied: your design is in course of realisation;' when, within three months, the Emperor, passing through Turin on his return to France, received the great Italian at his palace, the disconsolate Minister believed that his design had been shattered, and that he had been betrayed. His feeling was shared by his countrymen, who almost sullenly watched the heroes of Magenta and Solferino marching homewards. 'If,' said the good and temperate Massimo d'Azeglio, 'the problem had been set forth six months ago—to enter Italy with 200,000 troops, to spend millions, to win four battles, to emancipate one of the finest Italian provinces, and then to turn

[1] On May 8, 1859, Madame Cornu said, in a conversation with Mr. Senior: 'On December 24, 1848, a fortnight after he had been elected President, I waited on him, at the request of the Italians in Paris, to ask what he intended to do for Italy. "Tell them," he said, "that my name is Bonaparte, and that I feel the responsibilities which that name implies. Italy is dear to me, as dear almost as France, but my duties to France *passent avant tout*. I must watch for an opportunity. For the present I am controlled by the Assembly, which will not give me money and men for a war of sentiment, in which France has no direct immediate interest. But tell them that my feelings are now what they were in 1830, and repeat to them that my name is Bonaparte."'—*Conversations with M. Thiers, M. Guizot, &c.* By Nassau William Senior, 1878. Vol. ii. p. 262.

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homewards with the curses of the people for whom all this had been done—it would have been declared insoluble. Well then,' he said, 'it is not; and facts have proved it.' The wondrous march of victory by Montebello, Palestro, Magenta, Melegnano, to the Mincio, and the great field of Solferino, where the Sovereign of France had risked his throne in his zeal for a cause in which he had fought as a boy, and in which his brother had laid down his life, left the countrymen of Cavour almost indifferent as the legions of France passed northwards. The Emperor had well-nigh provoked an European coalition against him; he had alienated the powerful Court and aristocratic allies of Austria in England, and he had chilled his friendly relations with the English Royal Family, while he had stirred the Germans to arm against him and to threaten his eastern frontiers. He had lost 16,000 men. And yet his victorious legions passed homewards under the downcast eyes of disappointed Italians, who, it should be resolutely recorded, remained ungrateful, when events had proved the truth of the prevision that lurked in his parting words to Victor Emmanuel on the Mincio, 'Now we shall see what the Italians can do unaided,' and in the preliminaries of the Peace.[1]

On May 12 the Emperor made his entry into Genoa, under triumphal arches, and through streets of white marble palaces adorned with rich draperies and flowers. At Alessandria he found an enthusiastic welcome. The frieze of the gate of Porta Marengo was emblazoned in tricoloured letters with this motto: 'To the descendant of the conqueror of Marengo.' On his table at the royal palace he found, as an offering to him, the map on

[1] 'The Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena shall return to their States'—but with this stipulation, that the populations should first be consulted.

which his uncle had followed the movements of his army before the battle of Marengo.

On the 20th was fought the brilliant action of Montebello, in which less than 6,000 of the allies and six squadrons of Sardinian horse routed 20,000 Austrians under Field-Marshal Stadion. This victory was immediately followed by a complete and most skilful change of front on the part of the French army. 'This strategic movement,' Count Charles Arrivabene remarks, 'one of the most skilful recorded by military historians, was commenced on the morning of May 28. The strictest secresy was preserved, and there were but few of the French staff officers who knew the real intentions of the Emperor. The last and most important orders, however, were despatched only during the night of the 29th, and the greatest care was taken at the Imperial head-quarters that no suspicion of the contemplated design should reach the Austrian general-in-chief. In less than three days, this remarkable movement was made, with astounding order and precision, almost under the very eyes of the enemy.' This powerful army was thus swiftly extended in a line parallel with the Sesia, and the Austrians were compelled to retreat on the left bank. Under the direction of the Emperor as commander-in-chief, the Sardinians crossed the river, and after a tough fight, in which they were led by their gallant King, drove the Austrians from their strong position at Palestro.

On June 2 and 3, Gyulai, seeing himself outmanœuvred and beaten, recrossed the Ticino, burning the bridges behind him, and established his head-quarters at Abbiate Grasso, his right wing thrown on Magenta, while his left was massed at Abbiate Grasso. He had 60,000 men. His plan was to cut off the French army from the bridges of San Martino and

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Buffalora, and so to sunder the allied troops who had crossed the river from the main body. But he had to deal with commanders who would not be outwitted, and with soldiers flushed with victory. Count Arrivabene says: 'The strategy of the French was of the highest order.' The battle of Magenta, on June 4, was in all respects a glorious one to France.[1] The brilliant march of MacMahon from Turbigo on Buffalora and Magenta, and the prodigies of valour performed by his soldiers; the deeds of Regnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angely with the grenadiers of the Guard on the Bridge of Buffalora; the splendid fight at the Ponte Vecchio; the bayonet charges under General Wimpffen; and, above all, the hand-to-hand struggle in the streets of Magenta—were achievements of infinite military skill as well as of unsurpassed valour. The Emperor took up his position by the Bridge of Buffalora. 'This,' says Count Arrivabene, 'was the central position of the forthcoming operations; and the Emperor chose it because he instinctively saw that it was the most important one.' He adds: 'I will not attempt to go into all the details of that glorious battle, in which the Imperial Guard was engaged for so many hours at the Bridge of Buffalora, at the Ponte Vecchio of Magenta, and in various other spots. The right, the left, and the centre of that important position were equally engaged in a bloody hand-to-hand struggle with the rifle and bayonet. Many times the aides-de-camp of General Regnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angely, brought to the Emperor news that the commander of the Imperial Guard could no longer hold the ground. "He must hold it," was the answer of Louis Napoleon; and the Guard, with a heroism never surpassed, continued to resist.'

[1] Count Arrivabene was an eye-witness of the chief events of the day.

The Austrians left 6,000 dead and wounded on the battle-field; 4,000 were taken prisoners, and four guns fell into the hands of the French. The victors had lost in dead and wounded almost as many as the enemy. Their reward was that they had driven the hated Austrian once and for all out of Piedmont. The Emperor, on the field, made Generals MacMahon and Regnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angely Marshals of France, and created the former Duke of Magenta.[1]

After the battle of Magenta (on the night of which the Emperor slept at San Martino), he and Victor Emmanuel entered Milan together in the early morning; and the former was conducted to the Villa Buonaparte. 'How many recollections,' remarks Count Charles Arrivabene,[2] 'must have rushed to the mind of Louis Napoleon while occupying that palace! The villa had been restored by the illustrious chief of his dynasty. His uncle Eugène Beauharnais and Napoleon I. himself had inhabited it when at Milan. His mother, when Queen of Holland, had passed within those very walls many happy days, when the present ruler of France was a child. It is reported that, on entering the Villa Buonaparte, Louis Napoleon pointed out to his aide-de-camp the very room in which he slept in 1813, and that he asked if the fine, tall porter of those days was still alive.'

A few hours after his arrival he rode out through the streets, with his aide-de-camp, and was recognised

[1] It is said that on the morrow of Magenta, MacMahon wrote to his old companion in arms, Changarnier: 'On m'avait dit d'aller à gauche; j'ai été à droite, et j'ai sauvé la France.' But MacMahon never intended that his words should bear the malevolent meaning which the memoirs of the enemy have given them. He used a discretion left to every commander.

[2] *Italy under Victor Emmanuel: a Personal Narrative.* By Count Charles Arrivabene. 1862, vol. i. p. 82.

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only as he was returning. 'Those who have not lived in Italy,' says Count Charles Arrivabene, 'and are unacquainted with the ardent, excitable, and almost feverish nature of the people, cannot form a just idea of the height of enthusiasm to which my countrymen can rise when any powerful emotion has roused their imaginations. Gratitude or hatred will turn them into angels or demons; for with them the feeling of the moment knows no bounds. The Emperor had crossed the Alps with a powerful and valorous army; he had helped the King of their predilection; he had freed them from the tyrannical yoke of Austria, and from the *cieffo* of Gyulai. What could a mortal do more to rouse the utmost passions of their souls? The transition had been so sudden, so like a beautiful but evanescent dream, that the people well-nigh lost their reason. All the demonstrations of affection and reverence which could spring from the excited minds of men were poured forth upon Louis Napoleon on that great occasion. The Milanese had never before seen a liberator within the walls of their city. Charles Albert had passed through the capital of Lombardy only after the rising hopes of Italy had been crushed on the field of Custozza. But now they beheld before them the chief of the generous French army; they could shake hands with him, bless him, stop his horse, throw flowers under his feet, and cast themselves in all the ecstasy of thanksgiving before the hero who had come from far away to save them. They did not anticipate—how could they in all that tumult of success and national resurrection?—that within the short period of thirty-four days Villafranca would follow on Magenta.

'It is very certain that Louis Napoleon was deeply affected by the tribute of gratitude thus paid to him; for he was heard to say to Count Roguet, the aide-de-

Italiens !

La fortune de la guerre me conduit aujourd'hui dans la capitale de la Lombardie ; je viens vous répéter pourquoi j'y suis et ce que je veux y faire ~~pourquoi j'ai pris en mon~~ ~~votre cause~~ et ~~quelles sont mes intentions~~

Lorsque l'autriche attaqua injustement le Piémont, je résolus de soutenir mon allié le roi de Sardaigne ; hommes ~~[illegible]~~ la capitale de la France ~~ne soutenant parce que la cause qu'il défendait~~ qu'en toujours on donne ~~avait toutes mes sympathies~~ ; ~~mais aussi~~ parceque l'intérêt ~~français exige que le Piémont~~ soit toujours ~~indépendant~~ Vos ennemis, qui sont les miens, ont tenté de diminuer la sympathie universelle qu'il y avait en Europe pour vous, en faisant croire que je ne faisais la guerre que par ambition personnelle ou pour agrandir le territoire de la France. Il y a des hommes qui ne comprennent pas leur époque ; je ne suis pas du nombre ; dans l'état éclairé de l'opinion publique on est plus grand aujourd'hui par l'influence morale qu'on exerce que par des conquêtes stériles ; et cette influence morale, je la recherche avec orgueil en contribuant à rendre libre une des plus belles parties de l'Europe. ~~Je suis donc votre ami le plus~~ Votre accueil m'a déjà prouvé que vous me serez compris.

Facsimile of the Emperor Napoleons address from Milan to the Italian People.

~~sincère et le plus désintéressé~~ : Je ne viens pas ici pour déposséder les souverains ni pour vous imposer ma volonté ; mon armée ne s'occupera que de deux choses : combattre vos ennemis, et maintenir l'ordre intérieur, ~~mais~~ elle ne mettra aucun obstacle ~~n'empêchera en aucune manière~~ la ~~libre~~ (manifestation de vos) (légitimes désirs) ~~légitimement~~ ~~librement~~ Le prodigieux ~~[illegible]~~ quelquefois fera des peuples comme ~~exprimés par le peuple~~ ~~Ces sentiments~~ ~~que individu~~ à l'occasion de grands tout-à-coup ~~[illegible]~~ ~~me donnent donc le droit de vous~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~donner un conseil salutaire~~ ~~et ne laissez~~ ~~[illegible]~~ Profitez donc de la fortune ~~pas échapper~~ l'~~occasion heureuse~~ qui ~~[illegible]~~ ~~se présente de recouvrer votre~~ votre indépendance ~~et de la maintenir~~, ~~car si vous la laissiez~~ ~~échapper~~, des ~~siècles s'écouleraient~~ ~~peut être encore sans que vous puissiez la~~ retrouver, et ~~la seule manière de conquérir~~ ~~votre indépendance, c'est de faire cause~~ ~~commune contre ceux qui vous oppriment~~, ~~de vous organiser militairement partout~~, ~~ne traitez comme traîtres à la patrie tous~~

ne pensez qu'à

ceux qui veulent créer des dissentions, et ~~chercher à~~ ne pas vouloir trancher aujourd'hui les questions politiques que l'avenir seul peut ~~résoudre~~. ~~Unissez donc toutes~~ rôlez sur les drapeaux ~~vos troupes~~ à ~~celles~~ du roi Victor Emmanuel qui vous a déjà si noblement montré la voie de l'honneur ; souvenez-vous que sans discipline, il n'y a pas d'armée, et animés du feu sacré de la patrie, ne soyez aujourd'hui que soldats.

Demain vous serez citoyens libres d'un grand pays.

camp who accompanied him: "How this people must have suffered!" But the enthusiasm of the Milanese was beyond all expression when they read the famous proclamation in which Louis Napoleon wound up with the words: "Remember, that without discipline there is no army. Animated by the sacred fire of patriotism, be soldiers to-day, that to-morrow you may become the free citizens of a great country!"[1]

The stay of the Emperor in Milan was one unbroken fête. The three heroes of the hour were Louis Napoleon, Victor Emmanuel, and Cavour. By day the Milanese filled the streets, laughing, singing, and cheering; at night their lovely city was illuminated, and processions, bearing lamps, moved like swarms of fireflies to the Villa Buonaparte. Montebello, Frassinetto, Palestro, and Magenta were everywhere displayed—woven in flowers. Men even went mad with joy.[2] The Lombard nobility—the Visconti, the Gonfalonieri, the Casati, the Arese (the Emperor's old and staunch friends)—joined with the people in doing honour to him; the multitude bore his fantassins into their cafés and restaurants and feasted them. While these rejoicings were going on, the faint echoes of the guns of Melegnano—announcing a bloody victory—reached the city on the evening breeze. MacMahon, Baraguay d'Hilliers, Bazaine, Forey, Ladmirault, had been at work! The allies had marched with unbroken fortunes from victory to victory.

The Emperor left Milan on June 12, and fixed his head-quarters at Gorgonzola, with the Imperial Guards,

[1] See the facsimile of the original in the Emperor's hand, which was left behind with the curé of San Martino. The corrections are many.

[2] 'An old officer of the Napoleonic wars, showing the rag of an old tricolour flag, fell on his knees, raving, and died a few days afterwards.'—*Arrivabene.*

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thus acting as the reserve of the allied armies. At Brescia, where the Emperor was the guest of Count Fenaroli, he slept in the room which his uncle had occupied, and wrote his despatches upon the table which the First Consul had used. From Brescia the Imperial head-quarters were removed to Castenedolo.

Revolution had kept pace with the swift progress of the war. On June 9, the Duchess of Parma quitted her dominions. On the 11th, Francis V., in the rear of the retreating Austrians, deserted the duchy of Modena. In less than a week the Pope lost the Legations. Yet Garibaldi and his Cacciatori delle Alpi looked surlily at the victorious Emperor and his legions, even when victory and freedom waited on their steps; and they persisted in suspecting the liberator of his country.

In the evening of June 24 a general order had been issued from the Imperial head-quarters, directing the forward movement of the allied forces, which was to begin at two o'clock on the morrow.

It was at five o'clock in the morning, at the Church of Montechiaro (the head-quarters of the Emperor), that on the day of Solferino (June 24), His Majesty received messages from Marshals MacMahon and Baraguay d'Hilliers, informing him that the allies were already engaged. He was paying the last honours to General Colste, one of his aides-de-camp, who had died of apoplexy. He at once set off for Castiglione, saying: 'The fate of Italy is perhaps to be decided to-day.' The Austrian army, now consisting of 140,000 fresh troops, with their young Emperor at their head, and General Hess commanding them, occupied, on the morning of the battle which gave independence to Italy, a hilly range twelve miles in length by nine in width, between Lonato, Peschiera, Volta, and Castiglione delle Stiviere; the key of the position being the elevated

village of Solferino.[1] On the previous day the lines of the allied armies reached from the shores of the Lake of Garda, at Desenzano, bending back towards Carpenedolo, to Chiese. The two armies were imperfectly informed as to the disposition—even with the exact whereabouts—of the forces they had to meet. They felt their way into the fight; but so effectually that early in the morning the whole of the French army had been engaged. CHAP. V.

To describe the details of the great battle in which the hosts of France and Italy engaged and finally overthrew the legions of the Kaiser, would be to travel beyond the scope of this work. It was, perhaps, the most momentous, involved, and hard-fought battle which had occurred since Waterloo. The fortunes of Napoleon and of Victor Emmanuel were at stake on that day; and the French troops swept down on the Austrians to the right and left, carrying and losing, but finally carrying, point after point, after many hours of exhaustive marching, to the cry of '*Vive l'Empereur!*' The fight was already serious on the right and in the centre when the commander-in-chief of the allies arrived at Castiglione. He ascended the steeple of Saint Peter's Church, whence he commanded the far-spreading panorama, and could direct the struggle, the varying fortunes of which were here distinctly perceptible to him and his staff. As he was surveying the ground, the smoke of the guns enabled him to form an exact idea of the different combinations of the battle which was then being fought.[2] Of the success with which he directed the fortunes of the day, seconded by such generals as MacMahon, Canrobert, Baraguay d'Hilliers,

[1] From the ancient town of Solferino, a view extending from the Alps to the Apennines is commanded.

[2] Count Charles Arrivabene.

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Forey, Niel, Vinoy, and Regnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angely, it will suffice to say that it was earned by his courage under more than a commander's responsibilities, the pains and knowledge which he gave to the plan of battle. When party passion shall be spent, when personal spite shall have been silenced, and when the history of the Franco-Italian war shall be judged with the impartiality of a competent historian, the qualities of Napoleon III. as a soldier and a captain will be treated with respect. It is enough now to put on record in this place such testimony as that of Count Charles Arrivabene, who smelt the gunpowder and saw the blood of Solferino; and who knew how his grudging countrymen under arms, as well as Napoleon's own fantassins, spake of him in the field, in the camp, and in the café.

'High military capacity,' says this impartial writer, 'has been generally denied to Louis Napoleon, and it is not my intention to pass any inconsiderate eulogium on his qualifications as a commander. The man who has shown himself a great politician may not be a general of the first order. Yet the directions he sent to his marshals as soon as he descended from the steeple of the church of Castiglione, certainly evinced the penetration of an experienced captain. He at once perceived that the object of the Austrians was to divert the attack on Solferino—the key of their position—by outflanking the right of the French army, filling up the space between the second and fourth corps, and thus cutting the enemy's forces in two. The Emperor therefore commanded the cavalry of the Imperial Guard, under General Morris, to join MacMahon, to whom he sent orders to dislodge the enemy from Morino's farm; he also directed General Regnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angely to march with the Imperial Guard behind the

heights on which the first corps was fighting. . . . It was soon after the taking of Morino's farm that Louis Napoleon joined MacMahon to communicate his plan to him. In a few words he told the Duke to watch the movements of the enemy on his right wing, and to maintain himself on the plain which separated him from the fourth corps. He was also to prevent the Austrians dividing his forces from the first corps, and was not to miss any opportunity of bending towards Cavriana as soon as the attack of Baraguay d'Hilliers on Solferino succeeded, and Niel's corps had made its appearance. To keep open the communication of his corps with that which Niel commanded, the cavalry of the Imperial Guard was to take up a position on his right.

'Judging from these instructions, the plan of the Emperor appears to have been clear and precise. His design was to carry Solferino at any cost, and then, by a flank movement, to beat the enemy out of his position at Cavriana.'

Let us follow the Emperor :—

'Death was ravaging the gallant divisions of Baraguay d'Hilliers, fighting on the heights which face Solferino. From the plain the Emperor saw the clouds of smoke which enveloped the masses of his army, and he felt that his place was there. He set spurs to his horse, and in a few moments reached the top of Monte Fenile, whence the artillery of Forey was shelling the ranks of the enemy, which were concentrated in a narrow valley below the heights on the right of Solferino. General Dien's brigade had already reached the foot of the Cypress mamelon ; that of D'Alton was massed on the road from Castiglione to Solferino, edging the foot of the hill from which the Emperor was witnessing the tremendous drama then being acted out.'

Suddenly a formidable body of Austrians appeared,

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who had been sent by Stadion to cut the line of the French. It was then that the most stubborn struggle of the day ensued. The French were threatened to be crushed by the overwhelming numbers of the foe. 'The moment was critical,' says Arrivabene; 'there was not a minute to be lost. From the heights of Monte Fenile, Louis Napoleon had perceived the danger, and saw that the moment had come to engage his reserve. He perhaps remembered at that juncture the magic words so often repeated by his great kinsman, "*A moi la Garde!*" and he sent orders to General Manèque to advance at once against the Austrian columns, and support D'Alton's troops, seriously menaced in their rear. This movement was executed with that rapidity which is one of the finest qualities of the French army; the Austrians were beaten back beyond Casal del Monte, till they reached Monte Sacro, which was strongly held by two brigades of Croats.'

The enemy's projectiles rained on Monte Fenile. Many of the Cent Gardes near the Emperor were wounded or killed. Baron Larrey's horse was slain under him. The battle raged long around the tower and hill of Solferino: but at last the French won it—Forey storming it to the shouts of '*Vive l'Empereur!*' The rush of Voltigeurs of the Guard, the Chasseurs, and the Line was tremendous, and irresistible. When Solferino was crowned with the victorious French legions, albeit there was tough fighting far and wide even to the close of day, victory was with the eagles of France. The Emperor kept steady watch on all sides. When Manèque and Lebœuf were on the point of retiring before overwhelming numbers of the enemy, he sent two regiments of Grenadiers of the Guard, under Mellinet, who turned the tide of war. After the storming of Solferino, the Emperor had ridden from Monte Fenile

towards Monte Fontana. Here he received a message from MacMahon asking for troops to support the attack on his left wing. Then, on hearing of the advance of Niel, MacMahon advanced and swept the plain as far as San Cassiano. A heavy thunderstorm covered the mighty struggle towards its decline; before sunset the Austrian Emperor had ridden swiftly away with his staff from the scene of ruin to his fortunes; and by nightfall Casa Pastore, Francis Joseph's head-quarters, gave shelter to another Emperor.

Let it not be forgotten that on this, the most glorious day of Napoleon III.'s life, Victor Emmanuel, at San Martino, bore his part nobly in the great struggle for his country's freedom.

General Niel, to whose valour so much of the glory of the day was owing, was created Marshal of France on the field; and the Emperor addressed an order of the day to his troops, in which he thanked them in the name of their country. 'The blood that had been shed,' he added, 'has not been shed in vain for the glory of France and the happiness of nations.' [1]

Arrivabene gives us a glimpse of the life of the Emperor, at his head-quarters at Valeggio, after Solferino :—

'The camp life of Louis Napoleon was exceedingly simple. Except the regulations necessary to avoid con-

[1] 'Soldats! l'ennemi, qui avait cru nous rejeter au-delà de la Chièse, a repassé le Mincio; vous avez su, comme toujours, défendre dignement l'honneur de la France. Solférino surpasse les éclatants souvenirs de Lonato et de Castiglione. Pendant douze heures, vous avez repoussé les efforts de 150,000 hommes; votre élan n'a été arrêté ni par la nombreuse artillerie de l'ennemi, ni par les positions formidables s'étendant sur un rayon de trois lieues. La patrie, qui vous remercie de votre bravoure et de votre persévérance, déplore le sort de ceux de ses enfants qui sont tombés . . . . Le sang versé ne l'aura pas été inutilement pour la gloire de la France et le bonheur des peuples.'

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fusion, and certain precautions mysteriously carried out, there were no vexatious formalities to be gone through before getting admittance to the villa. More than once, whilst strolling about the garden, to which my *permis* gave me access, I saw the Emperor in his shirt-sleeves, writing at his desk, sometimes smoking a cigar, but always at work; for it is only doing him justice to say that he saw almost everything himself, and did not spare either fatigue or trouble during the campaign. The simplicity of his manners contrasted very powerfully with the haughty and reserved countenance which the people of Valeggio had been accustomed to notice in the Kaiser. This striking difference secured to the French Emperor a great amount of popularity, which was still further increased by his liberality to the poor of the place. The Imperial table, however, was by no means an epicurean one. Four dishes, one quality of wine, and plenty of fruit, formed the unvarying fare of the French head-quarters. At three o'clock in the morning the Emperor got up, and all the officers of the staff were to be ready by that hour. During the day, he either rode to the front, or remained in his cabinet, working with Marshal Vaillant, or with one of the *maîtres des requêtes*. When riding out, he generally passed through the allied camp, followed by a few of his officers, and a small escort of the Cent Gardes.'

The victory had brought the victor only a change of cares. The first of these was a quarrel among his generals as to the indecision of Canrobert, in not marching on Robecco. It has been said that had Canrobert cut off the retreat of the Austrians, as it was contended he might, perhaps the Treaty of Villafranca would never have taken place, and Napoleon would at a blow have freed the whole of Italy. The speculation is not now worth pursuing. Nor is it worth while to

speculate on the consequences which might possibly have followed, had the decision to propose an armistice been delayed for thirty-six hours. It is asserted that a courier was on his way from Berlin to the Marquis Pepoli at the Italian head-quarters,[1] with overtures of a German alliance with the conqueror of Solferino, when he was stopped by the news of the cessation of hostilities.

[1] 'Shortly afterwards, however, the publications of Lassalle, that attributed to Bismarck (*Preussen und die Italienische Frage*, for which he was transferred from Frankfort to St. Petersburg), and several others, made it clear that the real interests of Germany were in the struggle which Italy and France had entered into with Austria; and the first military events in the plains of Lombardy ended in overcoming the hesitations of the Prussian Government. A courier was then despatched from Berlin to the Italian head-quarters with a private message for the Marquis Pepoli, in which he was made acquainted with the new set of ideas to which Prussia gave her willing adhesion, but it was already too late. The announcement of the Peace of Villafranca arrived at Berlin before Pepoli received the despatch of Prince Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, and the courier was stopped by telegraph when he had got three parts of the way. It is natural to ask oneself here what would have been the course of political events in Europe, if the conclusion of peace had been delayed twenty-four hours or thirty-six hours.'—'A Diplomatic Mission,' by . . . . *Minerva*, a Monthly Review, Rome, December 9, 1880.

CHAPTER VI.

THE PEACE OF VILLAFRANCA.

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It was in the early evening of July 6, when the English Government had declined to ask for an armistice on terms submitted by Count Persigny to Lord John Russell, that General Fleury left Valeggio, with the Emperor's letter to Francis Joseph, making direct proposals for an armistice;[1] and by ten o'clock he had placed it in the Kaiser's hands at Verona. On the following morning, by eleven o'clock, the French general was back at Valeggio with the answer.

It fell upon the Italians like a thunderbolt. It was a surprise to the French commanders, whose imposing forces were drawn out in line of battle. Canrobert at Venturelli, MacMahon at Santa Lucia, Niel at Oliosi, Baraguay d'Hilliers at Castel Nuovo, with the Imperial Guard as a powerful reserve behind the line, were eager to resume the fight. It was rumoured that the Emperor had resolved to make common cause with the Italians. Kossuth and distinguished officers of the Hungarian emigration had been in the French camp. A French corps was to be thrown on the coasts of Dalmatia, and then the Quadrilateral was to be taken

[1] The Emperor saw that by pushing his successes he would bring the States of the Confederation to the rescue of Austria, and on the previous day Schouvaloff had told him that he must not reckon upon the support of Russia.

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with ease. In short, the air was rife with the spirit of war and victory on the morning of July 7, when Marshal Magnan issued from the Emperor's cabinet, and called briskly to two or three officers of the staff. Half an hour later officers were seen galloping away in various directions from the Villa Maffei. It became known that an armistice of a month had been concluded, and profound disappointment, and anger with difficulty suppressed, spread throughout the Sardinian camp.

It was inexplicable. Two days after the great battle, Count Cavour, with Commendatore Costantino Nigra, had had a long interview with Napoleon. 'They had found Louis Napoleon exceedingly disgusted with the quarrels of his generals, deeply impressed by the horrible scenes of war he had just witnessed for the first time in his life, but, above all, proud and delighted that the military glory of France and the superiority of her army over the Austrians had been once more splendidly asserted.'[1] Arrivabene goes on to assert that it was generally reported at the Sardinian headquarters after the interview that the Emperor, 'far from intimating that it was his intention to make proposals of peace, hinted to Cavour that, to ensure the total defeat of the enemy, he had made up his mind to help the Hungarians.'

When Cavour left the Villa Maffei, he was in high spirits. Count Arrivabene breakfasted with him on the day of his return to Milan, and he was full of 'frolic and gaiety,' and bade the Count be prepared to rejoin his family at Mantua by August 1. His frolicsome mood was of short duration. Not a single Power in Europe was ready to help the cause of Italian freedom

[1] Count Charles Arrivabene.

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if the further successes of the French brought Germany (her forces being already mobilised) into the field. The Prussians were clamouring for a war, and shouting for Alsace and Lorraine, with a vast army of observation on the French frontier; Russia had massed 200,000 men on the Austrian frontier, who would not have been on the side of France if she had helped the Magyars to begin a war of independence; Switzerland had 100,000 men under arms; and even Denmark had raised her forces to 70,000; while England promised, at most, neutrality, and would not even risk the proposition of an armistice.

The Emperors met on the 11th at Villafranca, in a house in Contrada Cappucini. The interview lasted less than an hour. In the course of the conversation, Louis Napoleon plucked some of the flowers from a vase upon the table, and mechanically scattered the petals about the floor. When they went forth together the Austrian was pale and embarrassed, the Frenchman gay and at his ease. Nothing was committed to paper at the meeting, but on his return to Valeggio, the Emperor despatched his cousin, Prince Napoleon, to Verona to settle the preliminaries of that peace which was finally adjusted, after many delays, contentions, difficulties, and the making of much bad blood, at Zürich. On the departure of the Prince, the Emperor remarked to his disappointed ally, Victor Emmanuel, that if the preliminaries, of which his cousin was bearer, were accepted, peace would be signed. Victor Emmanuel replied gravely and coldly: 'Whatever may be the decision of your Majesty, I shall feel an eternal gratitude for what you have done for the independence of Italy; and I beg you to believe that, under all circumstances, you may reckon on my complete fidelity.'[1]

[1] Count Charles Arrivabene, *Italy under Victor Emmanuel*, vol. i. p. 268.

Where was that fidelity in 1870?

Cavour heard at Desenzano, on the road to the head-quarters of Victor Emmánuel, that the Emperor was on his way to Verona to see the Kaiser. Entering a café of the Piazza, while waiting for horses, he found the company rating the Emperor soundly. One denounced him as a traitor; another pointed out that Mazzini had predicted such an end of the war; a third cursed the liberator of his country. Cavour listened; and knew not only that the news was true, but that this was the spirit in which it would be received by the mass of his countrymen.

The interview with his sovereign was a stormy one, in the course of which he advised His Majesty to reject the terms of peace, and withdraw his army from Lombardy, leaving the Emperor to his own devices. It is believed that he even suggested an abdication. It has even been said that Cavour forgot, in his rage, the respect due to his master, and that he was summarily dismissed from the royal presence. It is certain that he hastily retreated from the Villa Melchiori, learning that the Emperor and Prince Napoleon were coming to dinner. As the carriage was leaving, Nigra whispered to Count Charles Arrivabene: 'You may write to England that the Count is no longer the adviser of the Crown, and that Rattazzi will be asked to form a new Ministry.'

On the evening of July 12, the Emperor left for Milan, on his return to France. His entry into Paris, amid the tumultuous plaudits of tens of thousands of his subjects, who lined the broad Boulevards from the Bastille to the Rue de la Paix, and pelted him and his victorious legions with flowers, was the supreme triumph of his reign; that triumph of which he had dreamed as a boy, and for which he had toiled through innumer-

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able dangers as a ruler of men. Of this triumph, Meissonier, who accompanied his sovereign, has left an imperishable record in his noble picture of the crowning battle of the campaign.

The peace preliminaries of Villafranca were ratified in September by the Treaty of Zürich. The annexation of Lombardy had been already sanctioned by the two Emperors. It is true that by the terms of the Treaty the provinces of Italy which had been held, with the aid of Austrian bayonets, under the tyrannical sway of Bourbon princes, who had fled when the French entered Italy, were restored to their tyrants, but on a condition that made the restoration a mockery. The tyrants must return with the concurrence of their subjects. The doctrine of non-intervention was set up at Zürich; and it meant that Italy was to be left the mistress of her own destinies. *Italia farà da se* was her boast. She might now, secure against Austrian battalions, work out her own emancipation. Farini had been elected Dictator of Modena and Parma by the unanimous vote of the State Chambers; in the Legations Lionetto Cipriani was master; and stern Baron Ricasoli represented the will of the Tuscans. How were the Bourbon dukes and duchesses to make their way back to their petty palaces, in the face of a hostile people, ranged under competent and regularly elected popular leaders? The doctrine of non-intervention solemnly laid down at Zürich—part of that principle of nationalities which was the keystone of the Emperor's foreign policy throughout his reign—barred the return of the petty oppressors, and left the Italians free to achieve the unity of Italy under the constitutional sway of Victor Emmanuel.

Count Cavour, from his retirement at Neri, directed Rattazzi and Lamarmora, and the rulers of Central

Italy, through the difficulties of the situation made for his country on the withdrawal of the armies of Napoleon. The patriotism of the nation, guided by the remarkable group of Italian statesmen and men of action who held sway and mastery in this crisis of Italy's fortunes, completed the edifice of Italian unity, the foundations of which were laid by Napoleon III., and cemented with the blood of his intrepid battalions. The enemies of the Emperor have striven, not without success, to lessen his just share in the glory of Italy's emancipation. He has been represented as having made a Jew's bargain. Savoy and Nice are said to wipe out the conception of war for an idea. But the proofs that there was no idea of barter in Louis Napoleon's breast when he resolved to strike for Italian freedom, stretch straight through his life—even to the death-bed of his brother at Forli.

Cavour returned to office in January 1860, and the effect of his vigorous hand became at once apparent. The Sardinian Constitution was boldly proclaimed in the Duchies and the Romagna, with the explanation to the Powers that the step had become inevitable. It was impossible to restore the old dynasties; there was no hope of a congress, and government of some settled kind was an immediate necessity in Central Italy. The Italian Minister relied once more on the good faith and the staunch friendship of the Emperor. True to his principles, Napoleon acquiesced in the annexation of Tuscany and the Emilia, provided these States consented, by universal suffrage, to the transfer. An immense majority having accepted annexation, Central Italy was formally joined to Sardinia. In two months Cavour made a free, strong Italy a fact.

Thus an end was put to the bitter feuds as to the fate of the Italian Duchies, which lasted through the

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peace negotiations, and with which the Rattazzi Ministry had endeavoured in vain to cope. The Treaty had restored the Dukes, but the Duchies would none of them. 'If,' Mr. Dicey remarks,[1] 'the French regiments, after Solferino, had been marched southwards, instead of northwards; if, with French troops stationed in the insurgent provinces, and with the prospect of a restoration of the deposed princes hanging over the country, a proposal had been made for the establishment of a Central Italian State under a French prince, the States would have consented readily, if not gladly; and the otherwise inevitable annexation of the Duchies and the Romagna to Sardinia might have been avoided, without any actual employment of force.' The Emperor did not adopt this course, but left the Duchies to vote themselves into an Italian kingdom.

It was hereupon that the cession of Savoy and Nice was claimed. There was a loud outcry, particularly in England, about this cession; but we had no right to complain. The friends of Austria and of Prussia denounced our ally as aiming at conquest, and as having been disloyal to the English alliance. But he had doughty defenders.

'If,' said a writer of authority,[2] 'the French Emperor seems to disregard England's policy and England's opinion, he surely can find his justification in the cold and scarcely civil refusal with which Lord Malmesbury met his earnest appeal for even the moral support of England. It is not for us to blame him for retiring from an attack upon the Quadrilateral lest he might involve himself in a German war, when our Foreign Secretary announced to Europe that the English

[1] *Cavour.* A Memoir by Edward Dicey. Macmillan & Co., 1861.

[2] *The Italian Cause. Its History and its Hopes. Italy's Appeal to a Free Nation.* London, Chapman & Hall, 1859.

Minister would not take upon himself the responsibility of dissuading the German princes from any course they might think fit to adopt, as he could not offer them even a moral guarantee as to the ultimate objects of the war. A Roman Catholic sovereign can scarcely be blamed for showing some little deference to the Papal power, when, of the two great Protestant nations of Europe, one actually menaced, the other was undisguisedly hostile to the attempt "to free Italy from the Adriatic to the Alps!"

'Lord Derby did not consider it inconsistent with his station, as first Minister of the Queen, to denounce the Italian war as one "undertaken under false pretences," and reprobate the conduct of Sardinia, as proving that a small State, with free institutions, might be just as dangerous to the peace of a neighbour as a great military despotism.

'Those who were ready to applaud and repeat this language are now the loudest in condemning Louis Napoleon for not continuing the war until he had achieved the complete emancipation of Italy. If there be shortcomings in the terms upon which peace is proposed, the language and the conduct of English Ministers preclude Englishmen from fastening the blame upon the Emperor of the French. It is manifest that some of the objects which he sought he has consented to abandon. He did so as the result of a careful review of his position at the gates of Verona. Whatever may be thought of the reasons which influenced him, it is in his power to point to one which, unhappily, Europe can appreciate, and to say that England had deserted the cause of European freedom.'

In reply to the assertion that England could not trust the Emperor, Lord Palmerston remarked in his

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'Memorandum on the Affairs of Italy' (January 5, 1860):—

'It is said we cannot trust the Emperor Napoleon, and when we had entered into this triple alliance (of England, France, and Sardinia) he would throw us over and make some arrangement of his own without consulting us. It is no doubt true that such was the course pursued by Austria during the war which ended in 1815. Austria took our subsidies, bound herself by treaty not to make peace without our concurrence, sustained signal defeat in battle, and precipitately made peace without our concurrence. But on what occasion has the Emperor Napoleon so acted? On none. He differed with us about certain conditions and the interpretation of certain conditions of the treaty of peace with Russia, but the points in dispute were settled substantially in conformity with our views. There is no ground for imputing to him bad faith in his conduct towards us as allies. But it is said that he has no steadiness of purpose, and the agreement of Villafranca is a proof of this. That agreement was certainly much short of the declarations of intentions with which he began the war, but he had great difficulties of many kinds to contend with in further carrying on the war; and though we, as lookers-on, may think, and perhaps rightly, that if he had persevered those difficulties would have faded away, yet there can be no doubt that he thought them at the time real; and he is not the only instance of a sovereign or a general who has at the end of a war or a campaign accepted conditions of peace less full and complete than what he expected or demanded when hostilities began.

'But there is no ground for imputing to Napoleon unsteadiness of purpose in regard to his views about Italy. I have, during the last four or five years, had at

different times opportunities of conversation with him upon many subjects, and, among others, upon the affairs of Italy, and I always found him strongly entertaining the same views and opinions which have filled his mind since January of last year, in regard to forcing Italy from Austrian domination and curtailing the temporal sovereignty of the Pope. There seems, therefore, no reason to apprehend that if we came to an understanding with France and Sardinia, for the purpose of maintaining the principle that no force should be employed to coerce the free will of the Italians, the Emperor Napoleon should turn round and leave us in the lurch. There is every reason, on the contrary, to be confident that, by such an agreement with France and Sardinia, we should without war complete a settlement of Italy highly honourable to the Powers who brought it about, and full of advantage, not to Italy alone, but to Europe in general.'

In his address to the Legislative Body and the Council of State at Saint Cloud, after his return to Paris from Italy, the Emperor plainly described his reasons for the Treaty of Villafranca, and his hopes for the future of a free Italy:—

'Arrived beneath the walls of Verona, the struggle was inevitably about to change its nature, as well in a military as in a political aspect. Obliged to attack the enemy in front, who was entrenched behind great fortresses and protected on his flanks by the neutrality of the surrounding territory, and about to begin a long and barren war, I found myself in face of Europe in arms, ready either to dispute our successes or to aggravate our reverses.

'Nevertheless the difficulty of the enterprise would not have shaken my resolution if the means had not been out of proportion to the results to be expected.

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It was necessary to crush boldly the obstacles opposed by neutral territories, and then to accept a conflict on the Rhine as well as the Adige. It was necessary to fortify ourselves openly with the concurrence of revolution. It was necessary to go on shedding precious blood, and at last risk that which a sovereign should only stake for the independence of his country.

'If I have stopped it was neither through weakness nor exhaustion, nor through abandoning the noble cause which I desired to serve, but for the interests of France. I felt great reluctance to put reins upon the ardour of our soldiers, to retrench from my programme the territory from the Mincio to the Adriatic, and to see vanish from honest hearts noble illusions and patriotic hopes. In order to serve the independence of Italy, I made war against the mind of Europe, and as soon as the destinies of my country appeared to be endangered, I concluded peace.

'Our efforts and our sacrifices, have they been merely losses? No; we have a right to be proud of this campaign. We have vanquished an army, numerous, brave, and well organised. Piedmont has been delivered from invasion; her frontiers have been extended to the Mincio. The idea of Italian nationality has now been admitted by those who combated it most. All the Sovereigns of the Peninsula comprehend the imperious want of salutary reforms.

'Thus, after having given a fresh proof of the military power of France, the peace we have concluded will be prolific in happy results. Each day the future will disclose additional proofs of the happiness of Italy, the influence of France, and the tranquillity of Europe.'

To say that the Emperor made peace after merely liberating Lombardy is to do him wrong. He left Italy free to work out her own emancipation. He said as

much to Victor Emmanuel when they parted; he proclaimed it to his Parliament; and he laboured for it through difficulties innumerable afterwards, of which England did not create the least provoking. He watched the insurrections of Modena, Parma, and Tuscany; he marked the movements towards liberty from Papal misgovernment of Umbria and the Romagna; and, albeit he was constrained to protest, and although events were not working themselves out after his own design of an Italian Confederation, he left Cavour free to act. His opposition was rather feigned than serious; for had he been resolute to stay the progress of Italian liberty, Russia, Austria, and the whole conservative and monarchical forces of Europe would have combined on his side. These would have delighted to put an end to the expeditions of Garibaldi and the intrigues of Mazzini, and to have closed the revolutionary epoch which appeared to be threatening Europe, when Victor Emmanuel was seen hobnobbing in the streets of Naples with Garibaldi's red-shirts.

The conduct of Napoleon throughout was in favour of Italian freedom and unity. The Congress which he had favoured fell through, when, after the appearance of the famous pamphlet 'The Pope and the Congress,' in which Rome and a garden were marked as the limits of the Pontiff's future temporal sovereignty, His Majesty wrote to the Holy Father suggesting that he should cede the Romagna to Piedmont. This, and the substitution of M. Thouvenel for Count Walewski at the French Foreign Office, estranged the Pope from 'the eldest son of the Church.' 'Non possumus,' said His Holiness; and that famous dictum stood in force thenceforth. Lamoricière, in support of this refusal, organised an army of Roman Catholic volunteers, to protect the Papal territories. If the Emperor did not encourage,

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he did not oppose the assembling of this force. To have opposed it openly, would have been to offend the entire body of the Catholic Church. It was a risk, not to be taken by the sovereign of a Catholic nation. But the sympathies of Napoleon were with the Italian people; and when Cavour ordered General Cialdini to attack the Papal volunteers, His Majesty, while recalling his Ambassador from Turin, is said to have remarked to the Italian captain: '*Frappez vite et frappez fort.*'

The Papal volunteers were routed again and again at Castelfidardo, at Perugia, and at Ancona, and finally disbanded, and thus the greater part of the States of the Church were, by the votes of their inhabitants, added to free Italy under Victor Emmanuel. The Kingdom of Italy was created; and the subalpine Parliament proclaimed that Rome was its capital. But the Eternal City was not to be the capital of an Italy free and united from the Alps to the Adriatic, until the fortunes of her liberator had suffered shipwreck.

The subsequent relations of the Emperor Napoleon with the Vatican may be briefly stated. In 1864, in the September Convention it was agreed that the French troops should be withdrawn from the Papal territory; that Italy should undertake to protect the temporalities of the Holy Father, and adopt Florence as the capital of the kingdom. The Pope applied his famous 'Non possumus' to this agreement; but it stood nevertheless. The Italians transferred the seat of government to Florence; but they openly avowed that they looked upon it as only a half-way resting-place between Turin and Rome. The Antibes Legion was formed, in which there was a large French element. The best friend of Italy was still thought to be the dutiful first son of the Church. In 1866, after the war between Austria and Prussia, he handed over Venetia to the

crown of Italy. His reward was the Garibaldian rising, which drew French battalions back to Italian soil for the protection of the Pope, and was ended by De Failly's chassepots. The return of the French to Rome was unfortunate alike for France and for the Church.

BOOK XII.

HOME POLICY.

CHAPTER I.

THE COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH ENGLAND.

THE Emperor Napoleon understood better than any monarch of his time that Peace has her victories not less renowned than War. It was in pursuit of dreams for the progress and perfection of civilisation; for the enfranchisement of nationalities; for the dispersion of barbarism, and the establishment of settled forms of civilised government in the East and West; and for the glorious part which France should take in these high enterprises, that he sent his eagles far and wide. They travelled to Senegal, to Cochin-China, and to the heart of the Celestial Empire. The close of the Italian war found allied French and English armies fighting at Palikao, and presently masters of Pekin. In 1857 Kabylia had been subjugated. In 1860 French battalions went to the rescue of the Maronites, threatened with extermination by the Druses, in Syria. In 1862 the Treaty with the Emperor of Annam gave the French Empire a magnificent colony in the far East. New Caledonia had been French territory since 1853. These were successes and glories of the Imperial régime which carried the popularity of the Sovereign to an extravagant height in the middle of his reign. He valued them undoubtedly as helping to consolidate his dynasty, and to fix the crown upon the head of the child he so passionately loved; but also, and chiefly, as helping to make his Empire the first and most powerful

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on the face of the earth. The zeal with which, immediately after his return from the field of Solferino, he gave his attention to the reform of Algerian institutions, and the patience with which he went and studied the subject under the torrid skies of that unmanageable colony, displayed the strength and the ample range of his mind. He was still in the full vigour of his life; and he laboured diligently over the details of that reconstruction of the Government of Algeria, which remains one of the striking proofs of his aptitude for the broad lines of organisation. On December 10, 1860, the new Algerian Government was put in force; and under the vigorous impulse of it the colony—and especially the natives in it—took fresh life. Arab schools were established, the natives were encouraged to settle upon the land, towns and villages sprang up. 'Let us endeavour,' said the Emperor later, in a letter[1] to Marshal MacMahon, whom he had appointed Governor-General, 'by all available means to conciliate this proud and warlike, but intelligent agricultural population. . . . Algeria is not strictly a colony, but an Arab kingdom. The natives have an equal right with the colonists to my protection. I am the Emperor of the Arabs as well as Emperor of the French.'

[1] This letter, dated February 7, 1863, describes how the land is to be first distributed to the tribes in *douars*, that it may ultimately fall in parcels into the hands of individuals, and so make the wandering Arab a settled citizen.

Mérimée wrote to Panizzi (June 23, 1865) that the Emperor had returned from Algeria, delighted with his reception. 'His Majesty went into the Great Desert with a score of Frenchmen as escort, and remained for forty-eight hours surrounded with between fifteen and twenty thousand Saharians, who fired their rifles in his ears (their manner of saluting) and cleaned his boots with their beards. Not one showed the least sign of revenge. They gave him oxen roasted whole, they made him eat ostriches and other impossible animals; but everywhere he was received as a beloved sovereign. He is very proud and very pleased.'

But the most memorable event of the year 1860, in which the Italian question was finally settled, and Savoy and Nice were added to French territory, even at the risk of a rupture of the Anglo-French alliance,[1] was the signature of the Commercial Treaty between England and France which had been in course of active negotiation throughout the previous autumn, and on which, indeed, there had been correspondence at intervals between the two Governments since 1852.

The negotiations which ended in the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty have been traced back by M. Rouher to M. de Vergennes in 1786. They had broken down again and again.

In 1831, Sir John Bowring and Mr. George Villiers (afterwards Lord Clarendon) were engaged as Commissioners for the negotiation of a Commercial Treaty with France. They failed miserably. The French Commissioners were not ill-affected, according to Sir John Bowring;[2] but 'the King himself was a deceiver throughout. He was a large forest proprietor, and could not reconcile himself to the losses he anticipated,

[1] May 10, 1860.

'Savoy, as I foresaw, poisons everything abroad and at home. There is no longer any confidence in peace continuing a month longer, and we may be fighting France single-handed, or (what I really believe would be worse) with a coalition of effete and corrupt Continental States. The present Ministers are supposed to have been outwitted by Louis Napoleon, and to have disabled themselves for any resistance to his aggressive plans by swallowing the bait of his commercial treaty'—*Life of John, Lord Campbell, &c., consisting of a Selection from his Autobiography, &c.* Edited by his daughter, the Hon. Mrs. Hardcastle. Vol. ii. chapter xxxiv. Murray.

On May 19 M. Thiers said to Mr. Senior, of the cession of Savoy: 'The worst humiliation of 1815 has been wiped out, and a portion at least of our natural frontier has been restored to us. Even I, who am among those who most disapprove his general conduct, feel grateful.'

[2] *Autobiographical Recollections of Sir John Bowring.* With a brief Memoir. By Lewis B. Bowring. Henry S. King & Co., 1877.

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should the importation of English iron lessen the value of the timber employed in the manufactures of the French. Then, in the House of Peers and Chamber of Deputies, there were the most potent possessors of those privileges which excluded foreign articles from fair competition with the national productions. They maintained that the markets of France belonged by right to Frenchmen, and that foreigners were but intruders there. Independently of the resistance we met with in the highest quarters, almost all the subordinate functionaries were bitter enemies of commercial liberty, and the remembrance of the old quarrels with Great Britain made the introduction of our goods particularly obnoxious to French policy.' The Lyons Chamber of Commerce, led by Arlès-Dufour and the great wine-growers of the Gironde, was the one exception.

When, at the beginning of 1849, Lord Palmerston made application to France through M. Drouyn de Lhuys to ascertain the disposition of the French Republic to enter upon a policy of reciprocal trade, he was told that the people of France were not prepared for it.[1] The Legislative Body, in 1856, rejected the Government project. French public opinion was so little prepared for it, even ten years later, that when the leading economists of France had found in the Sovereign a prince enlightened enough to perceive the immense advantages which France must reap from such a Commercial Treaty as British free-traders were prepared to give, they were compelled to negotiate in secret, to do the good they contemplated by stealth.

According to Mr. W. S. Lindsay, the Anglo-French Treaty of 1860 was broached in the Crystal Palace of 1851,[2] when Richard Cobden and Michel Chevalier

[1] Letter from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, dated January 3, 1849.

[2] 'In that marvellous structure, two great and good men for the

first met there, and resolved 'to secure a more free interchange of those articles each country produced more cheaply and more abundantly than the other.'

This led to a correspondence between the two, and to tentative conversations between Count Persigny and Lord Palmerston. 'Cobden and I,' M. Chevalier said to Mr. Senior, in May 1860, after the great work had been completed, 'had long been in correspondence as to the means of improving the commercial relations of our countries. I always told them that it could be effected only by a treaty, as the legislature is ultra-Protectionist. He met me at the railway terminus when I reached London last October to attend the Bradford meeting; told me that this was the time to make the attempt; that the long annuities had just fallen in; and that he had seen Gladstone, who said that he was resolved that the money thereby saved should not fall into the gulf of a constantly increasing expenditure. He introduced me to Bright and to Gladstone, both of whom I found earnest in the cause.

'On my return to Paris I consulted Rouher, Fould, and Baroche. I found them ready to co-operate with me. Cobden came to Paris, and it was agreed that on October 24 I should see the Emperor at eleven o'clock, and open the matter to him, and that Cobden should see him at three the same day.

'I related to the Emperor the subject of my con-

first time met—Richard Cobden of England and Michel Chevalier of France. Men of such great intelligence could not fail to see how numerous were the articles exhibited which were required by the people of both countries where they could not be economically produced, but which were heavily taxed, merely for the special benefit of the few who produced them, to the great loss of whole communities, and that, consequently, productions and manufactures were limited by a system of protection, alike iniquitous and unnecessary for the purposes of revenue.'—*History of Merchant Shipping and Ancient Commerce.* By W. S. Lindsay. 1876.

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versation with Gladstone. I said that I had no previous communication on the subject with any of the Ministers; that mine was a totally unauthorised proceeding, and would fall to the ground without inconvenience if His Majesty disapproved it.

'The Emperor received the proposal favourably, and it was determined that, on this side of the water, no one should be admitted to the secret except the Emperor, Rouher, Fould, Baroche, myself, Cobden, and Lord Cowley. Walewski was specially excluded from it. When we had settled the articles of the Treaty, of course it became necessary to tell Walewski, but it was then too late for him to interfere.'

M. Chevalier declared that it was 'utterly false' that the Emperor proposed the Treaty in the hope of reconciling England to the annexation of Savoy. Yet Lord Campbell, then Lord Chancellor, was talking at this time (May 1860) of the Treaty having been thrown to England as a bait.

'The Emperor,' M. Chevalier continued, 'never entertained the subject until Cobden and I suggested it to him. Perhaps he may have adopted our suggestion more readily because he thought that it would please England. But I am sure that he also thinks that it will be useful to France. Not having studied the subject, he is naturally a free-trader, for free-trade is the obvious common-sense doctrine—protection is artificial.'

Mr. Cobden, in his account of his first interview with the Emperor, described him as much irritated by the persistent attacks of the English press. He remarked that the ten years during which he had held power, he had constantly endeavoured to act in accord with England.[1] Mr. Cobden pointed out that the mys-

[1] *Richard Cobden: Notes sur ses Voyages, Correspondance et Souvenirs.* Par madame Salis Schwabe. Paris, Guillaumin et Cie, 1879.

teries which had veiled his designs before and during the Italian war had irritated the minds of Englishmen, and created a feeling of insecurity; but that nothing could be suggested better calculated to disperse the clouds and bring fair weather to the two countries, than a commercial treaty, which would increase their business relations. The Emperor assented. Then Mr. Cobden sketched rapidly the skeleton of a treaty—the abolition of the English import duty on *articles de Paris*, the reduction of French duties on wrought iron and coal—and ended by promising to draw up a list of the French manufactures on which England would reduce or abolish the import duty. The Emperor dwelt again and again on the opposition of the French ironmasters and other protectionists; so that when Mr. Cobden' left him, he doubted whether he would have the courage to brave the storm which a free-trade treaty might raise, but he was convinced that the Emperor himself was a free-trader. His Majesty had said that he should be proud to reap such glory as Sir Robert Peel had reaped in England.

Immediately after this conversation the secret negotiations were begun in earnest with the Ministers Rouher, Fould, and Michel Chevalier (who was a Councillor of State), and they were carried forward steadily, while England rang with denunciations of the Emperor, as one who was preparing to carry fire and sword through the land; while the volunteer movement was at its height, and Lord Palmerston was spending millions on fortifications. The meetings were at Mr. Cobden's lodgings in the Rue de Berri. So carefully was the secret kept that M. Rouher had to make various excuses to his clerks in the Ministry of Commerce for the many documents he required. M. Rouher would call on the English negotiator in the

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evening, and announce himself as 'a gentleman who desired to see Mr. Cobden.' While the negotiations were in progress there was a change of Ministry. M. Fould was transferred from the Finances to the Ministry of State, and M. Magne—a staunch Protectionist—was appointed to the vacant place. M. Magne got scent of the work that was being carried forward in the Rue de Berri, and in his agitation communicated his fears to friends, who told them to M. Thiers. The historian of the Empire was so impressed with the dangers which, to his mind, free trade must bring upon his country, that he wrote a letter to the Emperor, in which he implored him to pause before he sold France to the English; and he even offered to go to the Tuileries and demonstrate to His Majesty that the proposed treaty would ruin the country.[1]

The Emperor sent for M. Rouher, and laid the letter before him. The chief conspirator of the Rue de Berri read it, and then said: 'Sire, pray listen to him. I agree to the interview on one condition, that you allow me to be present, and to answer M. Thiers. I have no hesitation in signing the Treaty; for I know it is for the great good of my country.'

The Emperor decided to decline the interview.

The negotiations proceeded slowly; for Mr. Cobden spoke French with difficulty, at first; and M. Rouher knew no English. Michel Chevalier was the interpreter. Mr. Cobden and M. Rouher became excellent friends. Of Cobden M. Rouher said: 'He was a calm, clear-headed, simple-minded man; full of kindness, and, occasionally, even of humour. Sometimes he would fall asleep during the four hours' discussions. He had no

[1] M. Thiers said of the Treaty to Mr. Senior (May 19, 1860): 'No event in modern times has done you (England) so much harm—not even your opposition to the Suez Canal.'

care or mind for details; and when the small items of the tariff were under discussion, he would pass them easily and airily—his invariable phrase being: "No trade!"'[1]

The convention that was signed by Lord Cowley on the part of England and by M. Baroche on the part of France on January 23, 1860, laid down the bases of the Treaty; but the Treaty itself was the public work of the Superior Council, aided by the most distinguished representatives of all branches of trade and manufactures, who sat for eight months. It was fiercely denounced by the Protectionists; but, as M. Rouher skilfully reminded the Chamber of Deputies in the debate on the renewal of the Treaty in 1880, the Opposition (the famous Opposition of Five) supported it. M. Emile Olivier said in the Legislative Chamber (May 1, 1860), in reply to the objectors to the secret manner in which the Treaty had been prepared, that it was undoubtedly to be regretted that it had not been submitted to the representatives of the country; but he taunted the Protectionists with having provoked the form adopted, by their opposition to the efforts of the Government to put aside prohibitive duties, and he advised them to accept the *fait accompli*, and to identify their interests with those of their work-folk, who would be greatly benefited by these advances towards free trade. A few weeks later (July 12) M. Olivier said: 'Since last session the Government have realised three great acts which I approve; they have decreed an amnesty, they have made a considerable step towards free trade, and they have enforced in Italy the principle of non-intervention. On all the laws that have been, or that may be, the consequence of these three acts, I and my friends

[1] Conversation between M. Rouher and B. J., June 18, 1878.

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have given them, and we shall continue to give them, a loyal support.'[1]

Not only Mr. Cobden bore repeated witness to the courage, the patience, and the intelligence with which the Emperor helped forward the famous Treaty. Mr. Bright had also been in Paris during the negotiations, and at the ceremony of unveiling the statue of his illustrious friend, in the Exchange Rooms at Bradford (July 25, 1877), he said of the Treaty and its authors:—

'If you want to trace his (Cobden's) great life and his works, you will come to the question of the French Treaty—that work which Mr. Cobden performed as it were of his own hand. He went to France, communicated with his friend M. Michel Chevalier, the eminent French economist, and 'put' himself into communication with the Emperor, who was most honest and intelligent upon this question. M. Rouher, the French Minister, was enabled to commence negotiations, which for many months went on, interfered with by many obstacles, but by no obstacles in France so great, I believe, as some of the obstacles which came from this country. Finally, the Treaty was signed, and the triumph achieved. I venture to say there is no act of any statesman left that can be looked back to with more unalloyed pleasure by him who did it, or by his friends who stood by him and commended him, than that great act of the Commercial Treaty with our neighbouring country—France. There are persons who think that much did not come out of it. There are persons who want the world to get on a great deal faster than it appears that Providence has enabled it to get on. I saw the other day, in that little book of Mr.

[1] *Le 19 Janvier.* Par Emile Olivier. Paris, Librairie Internationale, 1869.

Ashworth's, that he says that no less than twenty-seven commercial treaties between different countries in Europe followed the Treaty between England and France, and if it were the time or the opportunity now to give you the figures connected with it, you would see that the traffic between England and France in fifteen years had increased threefold, and that the commerce between half a dozen of the principal nations of Europe had also increased to an enormous extent. . . . Take the countries of France and England, is there anyone who doubts that from the passing of the French Treaty the state of feeling between France and England has been entirely changed, and changed in a most wholesome direction? We all know that when the Emperor agreed to that Treaty he agreed to it with the honest intention that the two countries should be united by commercial relations. During an interview I had with him along with Mr. Cobden, just after the conclusion of the Treaty, putting his hands together, he said: "What I want is that the two countries should be so bound together by their commercial interests, that it should not be in the power of any Government, or Sovereign, or statesman, to bring them into a state of war." The moment that Treaty passed the unfriendly feeling that previously existed in England—and which I believe some statesmen dishonestly fostered—was changed, and a very different state of feeling was produced.'

The broad lines of the Commercial Treaty may be briefly stated. France undertook to reduce all duties on English manufactures thirty per cent. as a maximum; and on English coal and coke to fifteen centimes the 100 kilogrammes. England, more liberal, abolished duties on French manufactures, as arms, wrought iron, silk and woollen fabrics; and reduced the duty on wines to one shilling the gallon, rising to two in pro-

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portion to the alcoholic strength. French spirits were to be admitted on payment of the equivalent of the home excise duty. The most favoured nation clause gave to each country the benefit of any reduction or remission of duty either might grant to a third Power. As regards trade-marks, industrial designs, &c., the subjects of each Power were placed on an equality with those of the other. The Treaty was signed for ten years; and within those ten years the value of the imports from France to England were more than doubled.[1]

Speaking of the work in which he had borne the foremost part, Mr. Cobden remarked:—[2]

'It has been truly said that France has been hitherto as a nation attached to those principles of commercial restriction which we in England have but lately released ourselves from, but which have cost us thirty years of pretty continuous labour, and the services of three or four most eminent statesmen, in order to bring us to our present state of comparative freedom of commerce. The French, on the contrary, have hardly taken a single step in this direction; and it was left for the present Emperor—and he alone had the power—to accomplish that object, and to his Minister of Commerce (M. Rouher), who for the last eighteen months has scarcely given himself twenty-four hours of leisure—it was left for them to accomplish in France, in the course of a couple of years, what has taken us in England at least thirty years to effect. I mention this, because I wish—and I have a reason for it, which I will state in a moment—I wish it to be borne in mind what has been the magnitude of the task which the French

[1] In 1859 the value was 16,870,859*l.*, and in 1869 it was 33,527,377*l.*

[2] Speech to his constituents at Rochdale, June 26, 1861. *Speeches by Richard Cobden.* Macmillan & Co.

Government has had to accomplish on this occasion. They had to confront powerful influences which were at the moment entirely unbroken, and they had to attack the whole body of monopoly in France.'[1]

The best testimony in support of the wisdom of the Treaty of 1860 lies in the statistics of the exports and imports of the two contracting parties for the last twenty years. The metal trade of France, the chiefs of which were the free-trade Emperor's most violent opponents, has increased 89 per cent. The deposits in the French savings banks now amount to forty millions sterling. In 1857 the French import of raw materials was to the value of about thirty millions sterling: it is now ninety millions sterling. In his speech to the Chamber of Deputies in 1880, M. Rouher showed how the public fortune had increased by 240 millions sterling since 1852. He told the deputies that in a period of eight years of comparative free trade, France had exported 680 millions sterling of manufactures, and had imported only to the value of 160 millions. Mr. Cobden's old fellow-worker stood bravely, 'defeated but undismayed,' before a hostile Republican Chamber, to demonstrate the good which had flowed from the commercial policy of the Empire. He spoke for four hours to an audience whose attention his authority as an economist and his eloquence as a debater commanded;

[1] The death of Cobden (April, 1865) was deeply regretted by the Emperor. He ordered that a bust of him should be placed in the museum at Versailles. He wrote to Mr. Charles Cobden, the great free-trader's brother: 'I feel deeply the misfortune which has befallen your family, for Mr. Cobden had always shown great sympathy with this country, and his influence over his countrymen could not but help to strengthen the bonds which unite England and France. I beg you to express to his widow my real regret, and to receive the assurance of my high esteem.—NAPOLEON.'

At the time of his death Mr. Cobden was acting as a member of the Imperial Commission for the Exhibition of 1867.

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and he thoroughly vindicated the claim of his Sovereign to the gratitude of France for the act of courage and enlightenment by which, in 1860, he threw open his ports to his neighbours—even while they were reviling him, and hastily arming against him.

CHAPTER II.

THE REPEAL OF THE FRENCH NAVIGATION LAWS.

THE immediate effect of the Treaty of 1860 was to direct the minds of Frenchmen and Englishmen to the French Navigation Laws. These were in a deplorable state; and Mr. W. L. Lindsay, after having carried a motion in the House of Commons (March 29, 1860) for an address to the Queen to enter into negotiations with the Emperor, with the view of making a treaty 'for the reciprocal abrogation of all discriminating duties levied upon the vessels and their cargoes of either of the two nations in the ports of the other,' was, nine months after the passing of the treaty, sent to Paris by Lord Russell to urge the French Government to pass such measures in relation to her mercantile marine 'as would be most conducive to the interests of her own people, irrespective of other nations.' The question was one so charged with technical details that Lord Cowley confessed his utter inability to deal with it, and was delighted to leave it in Mr. Lindsay's hands. Mr. Lindsay has given a very interesting, and, so far as he is concerned, a very modest account of his mission.

'The advantages I possessed,' he remarks, 'were a practical knowledge of the subject in all its bearings and details; a slight personal knowledge of the Emperor, which I had gained when I had an interview

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with him about his transport service during the Crimean war; and, more especially, the friendship of Michel Chevalier, through whom I became acquainted with M. Rouher, the then Minister of Commerce.

'Having consulted with MM. Rouher and Chevalier as to the most advisable course to pursue, and seeing with them the difficulties which had to be overcome, I had resolved with their entire consent—indeed, on their suggestion—to seek an audience with the Emperor himself, a course which so thoroughly met the approval of Lord Cowley, that he, at once, undertook to obtain it, and, himself, to accompany me to the Tuileries. I had learned from the "tossing of the horses' heads" what an apt scholar I was about to meet, and that any imperfect arguments or inconclusive facts would be at once detected. Consequently, I had carefully rehearsed in my mind every point necessary to bring under his notice, and had taken all my figures from the *French Official Returns*. At first the subject, necessarily a dry one, did not seem to interest the Emperor; but, when I called his attention to the fact that, while the sailing-ships of Great Britain had been increased during the previous twenty years by 2,800,000 tons, and her steamers by 400,000 tons, those of France had only in that time been increased by 370,000 tons and 50,000 tons respectively, though her general commerce, in any other branch, increased nearly as rapidly as our own, he asked me to repeat the figures, and explain why it was that there was such an enormous difference. The task was an easy one; but, perhaps, the facts that struck him most were, that, though the shipowners of France were carefully protected at a loss to the community, as more than one-half of the whole of her over-sea carrying trade was conducted by foreign vessels, owing to the differential duties, her people were

really paying greatly enhanced prices for everything they required from abroad, without adding one sixpence to his revenue.

'The interview, which, altogether, lasted for nearly two hours, must, however, have made a considerable impression on the Emperor, for, on parting, he requested me to put in writing, and in a letter addressed to himself, the leading facts and figures I had brought under his notice, and to let him have it that evening if convenient. I made it convenient, and by 6 P.M. of that day he received the letter.

'On the following morning I received a note from his private secretary, M. Mocquard, saying that the Emperor wished to see me that forenoon alone. After communicating with Lord Cowley, I waited upon His Majesty, and his first expression was: "I have read your letter more than once, and I wish you to explain more fully the effect of the Navigation Laws." That I might convey to his mind, effectually, the operation of all such laws, I asked for the use of a Mercator chart on a large scale, which was soon obtained, and, spreading it on the floor, I drew upon it, with a pencil, lines to explain, for instance, the usual course of commerce with India, by way of Egypt as well as by the Cape of Good Hope. I then showed him that, though our steamers and sailing-ships were constantly passing his chief ports of Havre and Marseilles laden with produce, of which his people might be in the greatest want, the differential duties imposed by his laws prevented us from landing these goods; and then, turning to his own official returns, I repeated the fact that not one franc of revenue was derived from these dues; so that, while his people were heavy losers on one hand, his exchequer was not benefited on the other. To obtain the sugar, coffee, indigo, and other articles with which,

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for instance, a Peninsula and Oriental steamer passing his port of Marseilles was laden, it was necessary that they should be carried through the Straits of Gibraltar (still tracing the lines on the chart), cross the Bay of Biscay, pass his other great port of Havre, and so carried on to Southampton, to be there landed, and most likely sent by railway to London, where they were bonded, and thence shipped again in either French or English vessels for Calais or Boulogne, and then conveyed across France to wherever they might be required by his people, possibly even to Marseilles or Havre.

'"Now, Sire," I said, still kneeling on the chart and looking earnestly at the Emperor, "if your people prefer to have what Indian produce they need conveyed to them in that very roundabout and expensive manner, instead of importing it direct in whatever vessels may be ready to carry the produce to them on the most favourable terms, it is a process to which I, as an Englishman, have no objection to offer, for we carry in our ships not merely the great bulk of the Indian produce, but have also much extra profit from it in the shape of landing, bonding, railway carriage, transshipment, commissions, and so forth; I do not, however, see how your manufacturers can compete successfully with those of other nations, if they are compelled by your Navigation Laws to import the raw material they require by such antiquated and expensive modes as these."

'As the room in which we were was small and the light not very good, the Emperor had followed my example, and, that he might see the lines and ports more distinctly, had himself, before I concluded, knelt down also on the chart.

'In the palaces of France are to be found many

grand pictures descriptive of the wars of the Emperor, but its artists may now add to the decoration of these walls a far grander and nobler scene, and represent their last Emperor performing a duty to his people of much greater importance as regards their future welfare and happiness, and far more worthy of record than the blood-stained fields of Magenta and Solferino.'

In consequence of Mr. Lindsay's discussion with the Emperor, the Minister of Commerce, M. Rouher, drew up a report to His Majesty relative to the state of the French Mercantile Marine, which was published in the 'Moniteur' in May, 1862; and two months later the Superior Council of Commerce opened a minute enquiry, which lasted a considerable time, and was eventually embodied in three bulky volumes. The conclusions were in favour of radical liberal changes; but these were not sanctioned by the Chambers, after many prolonged discussions, until May, 1866, and the wisdom that had triumphed in England in 1849 had taken seventeen years to cross the Channel.

The new law was violently opposed by French shipowners—a Protectionist class, as Mr. Lindsay remarks—and in June, 1867, their influence was strong enough to obtain another decree that nullified in many respects the law of the previous year—for their benefit, but to the disadvantage of the nation. The law of 1866 suffered later under the Protectionist influence of M. Thiers, who had inspired the Assembly with his old-fashioned delusive theories, and persuaded it to revise the Treaty of 1860 in a Protectionist sense, and in 1872 to reverse much of the law of 1866. Under a threat of resignation he reimposed upon a still distracted country the *surtaxes de pavillon*—thus favouring a small class at the expense of the community—and, in short, swept away, as Mr. Lindsay tells us, 'the chief

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provisions of the wise and liberal Merchant Shipping Act of Napoleon III.'

M. Thiers's triumph was, however, of short duration. He resigned the Chief Magistracy of the Republic on May 24, 1873; and two months afterwards the Assembly retraced the steps which had led M. Thiers into error, and for the second time abolished the *surtaxes de pavillon*. And thus foreign vessels [1] are replaced, in French ports, upon the same footing as those of France, as the Emperor left them.

[1] Except in the coasting trade.

CHAPTER III.

THE YEAR 1860.

CHAP. III.

THE year 1860 was at once the most active and the most glorious year of the reign of Napoleon III. In this year, as we have seen, the Commercial Treaty with England was signed; the march of Italy towards freedom and unity slowly proceeded, in spite of diplomatic and ecclesiastical difficulties, and the animosities of the English and German peoples, stimulated by the suspicions of their Governments. The Prince Consort, and Lords Palmerston and John Russell, persisted in regarding the Emperor as bent upon the remodelling of the map of Europe to the advantage of France; and they did not discourage the idea that his increase of his navy, and the attention which he was paying to the efficiency of his army, were preparations for a descent upon England. There is not the smallest item of evidence to support the charge, then freely made, that the Emperor ever even meditated this act of treachery towards his best ally. He chafed under the suspicion. He protested against it as unhandsome and utterly groundless in his conversations with Lord Cowley and Lord Clarendon. In April Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord Cowley: 'The Emperor's mind seems as full of schemes as a warren is full of rabbits.' It was busy enough; but not with the elaboration of desperate adventures in any corner of Europe, as it pleased the English Premier and Foreign Secretary to represent it.

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The Emperor had more than enough of domestic affairs on his hands. He was meditating and preparing his 'Life of Cæsar;' and was becoming so engrossed with this literary work, which was his delight, that his Ministers began to complain of the difficulty of obtaining his full attention to questions of State. The financial condition of the country was unsatisfactory. On all sides indications of a rising opposition to personal or absolute government were appearing. The clergy had been angered by the Emperor's acquiescence in the aggressive revolutionary policy of the Sardinian Government, which had reduced the temporalities of the Pope; and were fomenting throughout the country a spirit hostile to his Government.[1]

The Emperor was perplexed by the irritation and the warlike preparations of England and Germany; and he was deeply grieved by the violent invectives of the press of the two countries against his person and Government; but he uttered no words of resentment, even when he saw that England was working towards a German and Austrian alliance against him.

The Prince Consort, in a letter to the Prince Regent of Prussia (January 25, 1860), described the Emperor Napoleon as in a cleft stick between his promises to the Italian revolution and those he had made to the Pope. And the Prince was not dissatisfied to see His Majesty in this unpleasant predicament. He anticipated dissatisfaction in England at the Commercial Treaty; so

[1] The *Univers*, the *Bretagne*, and *L'Ami de la Religion*, three Ultramontane organs, were suppressed in the spring, on reports of M. Billault, Minister of the Interior. M. Thouvenel, Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed a letter to the French Ambassador in Rome, protesting against the Pope's Encyclical Letter to the French bishops. The Minister of the Interior, in a circular letter to the Prefects, directed them to put an end to the violent harangues that were being delivered from provincial pulpits.

that even this enlightened act would not tell in the Emperor's favour. As for the cession of Savoy and Nice, it had his heartiest condemnation; albeit it was made possible by the four points of Lord John Russell's proposal for the final adjustment of the Italian question, one of which left Central Italy free to act for herself. This was the real starting point of the great Italian kingdom, the establishment of which justified the Emperor in demanding the frontier of the Maritime Alps, with the assent of the populations, in accordance with the intention, which, as Cavour admitted, he had never disguised.[1]

Although the cession of the two Italian provinces was candidly and reasonably explained by M. Thouvenel to Lord Cowley, as giving no fresh strength to France, but merely placing in her hands the passes by which she might be invaded when Italy had become a great kingdom, it was made the groundwork of a fierce wordy war in France and Germany against the Emperor and the Empire, led by English Ministers in thorough accord with the Court, and in sympathy with the German Powers. The democratic leanings of the Emperor were the unacknowledged cause of the bitter-

[1] 'It is due to the Emperor to bear in mind that he had all along made us aware, that, if the war should result in establishing a great Italian kingdom in the hands of Victor Emmanuel, he should stipulate for the surrender of these provinces to France.'—Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. v. p. 25.

'Previously to Prince Napoleon's marriage, the possibility of war with Austria had been discussed between the French and Sardinian Governments, and, among other arrangements depending on it, it was stipulated on the part of France that, if the events of the war were to give the kingdom of Sardinia a population of ten or twelve million souls, France would put forward a claim to Savoy. These arrangements remained in the form of a project, and, when the war actually took place, he asked Cavour to convert it into a treaty, which Cavour declined, saying that it was not necessary.'—The Emperor in conversation with Lord Cowley, February 9, 1860.

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ness with which his work of Italian liberation was regarded. On January 12 the Prince Regent, in opening the Prussian Chambers, announced the increase of the military forces of the kingdom, and that development and reorganisation of the Prussian army, which made it equal to its mighty work in 1870.

The Emperor complained to Lord Cowley (February 9, 1860) that credit was not given to him for the sincerity of his intentions. 'What,' he asked the British Ambassador, 'could be more natural than that, if Northern and Central Italy were to be fused into one kingdom, he should desire to have a frontier a little better protected on that side than it now is? It was unfair to call the annexation of a small mountainous district to France by the name of conquest or aggrandisement. It would be nothing but a measure of legitimate defence.' [1]

When the House of Commons had by a large majority carried an address to the Queen expressing its satisfaction with the Commercial Treaty, the Emperor seized the opportunity, while thanking Mr. Gladstone for a copy of his great Budget speech, of reiterating the expression of his hope that the Treaty might restore to their normal state the political relations of the two countries. 'Despite the difficulties which surround me,' His Majesty wrote to Lord Cowley, 'despite the prejudices which still exist in France, as they do in England, I shall always continue to do everything in my power to cement more and more closely the alliance of the two nations, for it is my profound conviction

[1] The Treaty of cession of Savoy and Nice to France was signed on March 24, 1860. According to a letter from Sir James Hudson to Lord John Russell (May 1, 1860), Cavour signed it only on a threat that if he refused the French troops would occupy Bologna and Florence. The Sardinian Chambers approved the cession by 229 votes against 33.

that their harmonious action is indispensable for the good of civilisation, and that their antagonism would be a calamity to all. While saying this, I would ask you, my dear Lord Cowley, to pardon me, if occasionally I give too warm expression to the pain I feel at seeing the animosities and the prejudices of another age springing up afresh in England, like those weeds which will spring up fresh and fresh, let ploughshare and harrow do what they will. Let us hope that the science of politics will make as much progress as agriculture and industry, and that man's intelligence will bring his evil passions under subjection, as it has already shown itself able to dominate matter.'

These were not the words of an enemy of England, but rather those of 'the crowned philosopher' of kindly heart and generous dreams, who had learned to love and admire the land of his long exile, and whose deepest desire was to live on terms of cordial friendship with its Government and Sovereign. They were frankly addressed by a Sovereign to an Ambassador at his Court, in explanation of some hasty words that had escaped him under the smart of the recent debate in the House of Commons, in which he had been roughly handled.[1] They were spoken at a State concert at the Tuileries, in the hearing of the Russian Ambassador. Lord Cowley had expostulated; and the Emperor had seen his mis-

[1] In the course of this debate (March 3) Mr. Bright said of the noisy opposition to the cession of Savoy: 'The opposition, if you give it, must be futile; you cannot prevent the transference of Savoy, but you may, if you like, embroil Europe and bring England into collision with France. I say, perish Savoy!—though Savoy, I believe, will not perish and will not suffer—rather than we, the representatives of the people of England, should involve the Government of this country with the people and the Government of France on a matter in which we have really no interest whatever.'

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take, and unreservedly admitted it. This admission should have been generously acknowledged; but Lord John Russell was never generous in his relations with the Emperor, nor, indeed, with France. He hastened to thank Lord Cowley in a secret despatch for his firm conduct; and the Queen, to whom the incident was communicated, remarked of it: 'The circumstance is useful, as proving that the Emperor, if met with firmness, is more likely to retract than if cajoled, and that the statesmen of Europe have much to answer for, for having spoiled him in the last ten years by submission and cajolery.' In these lines, which exactly express the opinion of the Prince Consort, we find the keynote of the remainder of the harassing contentions, suspicions, and difficulties that accompanied the completion of Italian unity and freedom. The weight of England was never heartily thrown into the balance in favour of Italy, but was given in diplomatic notes and royal letters to the cause of legitimacy as opposed to popular sovereignty and natural frontiers. It was at the direct instigation of the Prince Consort that the Prince Regent of Prussia protested against the cession.[1] When it was acknowledged that the Italian States, which had *de facto* emancipated themselves, might choose their own future ruler, the Prince Consort wrote to the Prince Regent of Prussia: 'We do not make a stand upon the principle of popular sovereignty, according to which a nation might vote itself over from one ruler to another (this would be illustrated in the case of Savoy, against which we protested), neither do we recognise universal suffrage.' In short, the opposition of the Prince to the Emperor was an opposition to all the fundamental principles of

[1] 'At your request we have given our opinion to the same effect.'—Letter from the Prince Regent of Prussia to the Prince Consort, dated March 4, 1860. Martin's *Life of Prince Consort*, vol. v. p. 46.

his political existence; and the final acquiescence of Russia, Austria, and Prussia in the cession of the two Italian provinces to France, he described in a letter to Baron Stockmar as 'the worse than stupidity of the other Powers.' In March, the feeling against the Emperor ran so high in English official circles, and in the mind of the Prince Consort, that the Queen wrote to Lord John Russell that she feared it might not be long before the union of Europe for safety against a common enemy might become a painful necessity.

The English panic of 1860, which had not been completely allayed two years later, must now appear to all students of recent history as extraordinary and as baseless as it then seemed to Mr. Cobden and his friends. In his 'Three Panics,' Mr. Cobden boldly and effectually attacked Lord Palmerston's panic expenditure on fortifications, and showed that the increase of the French navy was far behind that of England. The French naval force of 1860 was actually less than that of 1847. We had 456 steamers afloat and France only 244; and, on May 1, the First Lord of the Admiralty stated that more men were then employed in English dockyards than at any previous time, not even excepting the period of the great war with France which terminated in 1815. Lord Palmerston left no doubt in the minds of the people as to the quarter from which England was to expect invasion. On July 23, in asking for 9,000,000*l.* for defences, he said: 'It is difficult to say where the storm may burst; but the horizon is charged with clouds which betoken the possibility of a tempest. *The Committee of course knows that, in the main, I am speaking of our immediate neighbours across the Channel, and there is no use in disguising it.*'

'To appreciate fully the scope and bearing of these

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words,[1] it is necessary,' Mr. Cobden remarked, 'to refer to the precise circumstances under which they were spoken. . . . At that moment, the negotiation of the details of the Commercial Treaty with France, upon the liberal arrangement of which depended the whole success of the measure, was at its most critical and important stage. The public mind was under considerable misapprehension respecting the progress of the measure, owing to the systematic misrepresentations which were promulgated in certain political circles, and by a portion of the press. The British Ministry alone knew that, up to that time, the French Government had manifested a disposition to carry out the details of the Treaty with even unexpected liberality, and they could not have been unaware how important it was, at such a juncture, to preserve a conciliatory tone towards the Government. It was at this critical moment that the speech burst upon the negotiators in Paris. Had its object been to place the British Commissioners at the greatest possible disadvantage, it could not have more effectually accomplished the purpose. It cut the ground from under their feet, in so far as the French Government had been actuated by the political motive (apart from politico-economical considerations) of seeking to strengthen the friendly relations of the two countries as represented by their Governments. This plea of high state policy, with which the Emperor's Government had met the complaints of the powerful interests which believed themselves compromised by the Treaty, was in a moment silenced and turned against itself. The offensive passages in the speech were instantly transferred to the pages of the Protectionist organs, accompanied with loud expostulations addressed to their own Govern-

[1] *The Three Panics: an Historical Episode.* By Richard Cobden. 1862.

ment. "You are sacrificing us," they said, "in the hope of conciliating the political alliance of our ancient rival; and now behold the reward you are receiving at the hands of the Prime Minister of England!" These taunts resounded in the *salons* of the enlightened Minister of Commerce, and murmurs were heard even in the palace itself. A profound sensation was produced among all classes by this speech, and no other words could adequately express the emotions experienced by the French negotiators but astonishment and indignation. Had the Emperor seized the occasion for instantly suspending the negotiations, he would undoubtedly have performed a most popular part; but on this, as on other occasions, his habitual calmness and self-mastery prevailed, and to these qualities must be mainly attributed the successful issue of the Treaty.

'It is impossible to construct any theory of motives to account for this speech, consistent with a wise or serious statesmanship.'

Mr. Bernal Osborne attacked it with his customary point and force. 'At the commencement of the session,' he said, 'I gave my humble support to a Commercial Treaty with France, under the idea that I was promoting good and substantial relations with the country. The noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) has told us that we should not speak of this Treaty with levity; but his actions are inconsistent with his words, for the resolution before us is the oddest sequel imaginable to a Commercial Treaty. After taking off all the duties on French manufactures, we are asked to vote nominally 9,000,000*l.*, though I believe it will be ultimately nearer 20,000,000*l.*, for the construction of defences to keep out our friends and customers. Why, sir, if this was not an expensive amusement, it would be the most ludicrous proceeding ever proposed to a deliberative

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assembly.' Nevertheless, under the influence of a 'humiliating and groundless' panic, the millions were freely voted.[1]

In presence of the feverish military activity of Prussia, the defensive preparations, the increase of the navy, and the creation of the Volunteer force of England —even of a European coalition against the French Empire—all idea of lightening the burdens of France by the reduction of her military budget appeared to be vanishing in thin air. The Emperor protested in vain that he had no dreams of conquest, and that he had no intention of marching on the Rhine, as his enemies in the Orleanist saloons of Paris alleged, and as their allies in the upper classes of England, with Mr. Kinglake for noisiest mouthpiece, pertinaciously repeated. The Prince Consort, in a letter from Osborne to the Foreign Secretary (March 18, 1860), sketched the proper course of Prussia, and the support which England should give to her to make her the supreme, unified German Power, with a perfect Federal army—the object being to counteract the alleged ambitious designs of the Emperor Napoleon.[2] On the 26th of the

[1] In a memorandum to the Prime Minister, written in 1862, immediately after the single combat between the two American ironclads, the *Monitor* and the *Merrimac*, when an attempt was made to create an American panic in England, Mr. Cobden pointed out that since it was demonstrated that wooden ships of the line would be nothing more than human slaughter-houses in any future naval war, England and France might agree to withdraw their hundred wooden ships of the line, in proportion to their relative strength. England possessing sixty-five and France thirty-five, the former would withdraw thirteen for every seven withdrawn by France.

[2] Writing to Panizzi, on the breaking out of the war, Mérimée said: 'The fury of the *Franzosenfresser* is great. The Government is more reasonable, but may be drawn in. A Russian, M. de Tourgueneff, whom I presented to you last year, has arrived from Moscow. He says that the Germans want to make a mouthful of France and Russia at one time. They claim Alsace from France, and from the Russians Courland and Livonia.

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same month, Lord John Russell delivered a strong anti-Gallican speech in the House of Commons, in the course of which he described the annexation of Savoy as an aggression (which it was not) that would lead a nation so warlike as the French 'to call upon its Government from time to time to commit other acts of aggression;' and declared that the policy of England should be to seek fresh alliances. The Queen wrote on the morrow to the speaker to communicate to him the pleasure with which she had read his remarks; feeling certain that the country felt the danger 'which a supposed intimate and exclusive alliance with France had for the interests of Europe and of England.' Her Majesty, we may presume to believe, under the guidance of the Prince, further remarked: 'As the English press and general public were favourable to the Italian revolution, and the loss of the Italian provinces by Austria, and are supposed to be so with regard to the separation of Hungary from Austria, and of Poland from Russia, the Emperor Napoleon has the more chance of keeping up the distrust of the Continental Powers in England.'

The German and Austrian sympathies of the Prince and his desire to draw England away from France, were natural in the faithful son of the Fatherland; but their influence was detrimental to the best interests of his adopted country, and they might have brought about immediate disasters, had the Emperor not been thorough in his friendship for the English people. Count Persigny, the French Ambassador in London, and the Emperor's friend, Count Flahault, warned the Government that Lord John Russell's speech, openly

He is uneasy, also, about Prince Albert. It seems that Prince Albert is terribly Austrian. Do you think that it can affect the opinion of the English in any degree?'

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and severely hostile as it was to the Government of the Emperor, might precipitate a war, by aggravating the irritation in the two countries. The danger was averted on April 2, when Lord John was induced to say, in laying before Parliament some further papers on the Italian question, including the Treaty between France and Sardinia for the cession of Savoy and Nice, that as the Emperor had undertaken to consult the European Powers on the neutralised portions of Savoy, this question might be satisfactorily settled. But for the dangerous irritation Lord Palmerston's Government was mainly responsible; albeit the Premier had written in January, 1860: 'There is no ground for imputing to Napoleon unsteadiness of purpose in regard to his views about Italy.' The idea had become fixed in the English Premier's mind that the Emperor was working his way to an opportunity for avenging Waterloo; and he acted thenceforward under this idea—for which no foundation ever existed.[1]

[1] In a letter to the Duke of Somerset, in 1860, he wrote: 'I have watched the Emperor narrowly, and have studied his character and conduct. You may rely upon it that at the bottom of his heart there rankles a deep and inextinguishable desire to humble and punish England, and to avenge, if he can, the many humiliations, political, naval, and military, which, since the beginning of this century, England has, by herself and her allies, inflicted upon France.'—*The Life and Correspondence of Viscount Palmerston.* By the Hon. Evelyn Ashley, M.P. Vol. ii. p. 391. Bentley, 1879.

Writing to Mr. Gladstone two years later (April 29, 1862), he said: 'We have on the other side of the Channel a people who, say what they may, hate us as a nation from the bottom of their hearts, and would make any sacrifice to inflict a deep humiliation upon England. It is natural that this should be. They are eminently vain, and their passion is glory in war. They cannot forget or forgive Aboukir, Trafalgar, the Peninsula, Waterloo, and St. Helena. Increased commercial intercourse may add to the links of mutual interest between us and them; but commercial interest is a link that snaps under the pressure of national passions. Witness the bitter enmity to England lately freely vented, and now with difficulty suppressed, by those Northern States of America with whom we have had a most extensive commercial intercourse.

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By June, 1860, the English Government had effected an agreement with Prussia and Austria by which they severally agreed to exchange all communications or overtures of an international character that they might receive from the French Government; in other words, to betray to one another the confidential communications of the Emperor, his Ambassadors, and M. Thouvenel, his Foreign Minister. This secret *entente* was the response to the Emperor's manifesto in the 'Moniteur' (June 1), which preceded his journey to Baden to meet the German Sovereigns. They were already banded with England to watch him. In his manifesto he said, and truly, that he was making every effort to restore confidence in Europe; and that all he desired was to live in peace with his allies—giving his undivided energies to the development of the resources of France.

The meeting of the Emperor with the Prince Regent of Prussia, and with the other German Sovereigns then in Baden, took place on June 16, 1860. The conversation between the Emperor and the Regent was duly recorded by the latter and forwarded to Prince Albert, for the information of the English Government. 'From this it appeared,'[1] according to the Prince's memo-

Well, then, at the head of this neighbouring nation, who would like nothing so well as a retaliatory blow upon England, we see an able, active, wary, counsel-keeping, but ever-planning Sovereign; and we see this Sovereign organising an army which, including his reserve, is more than six times greater in amount than the whole of our regular forces in our two islands, and at the same time labouring hard to create a navy equal, if not superior, to ours. Give him a cause of quarrel, which any foreign Power may at any time invent or create, if so minded; give him the command of the Channel, which permanent or accidental naval superiority might afford him, and then calculate if you can—for it would pass my reckoning power to do so—the disastrous consequences to the British nation which a landing of an army of from one to two hundred thousand men would bring with it.'

[1] *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. v. p. 124.

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randum, 'that the Emperor of the French had adopted the only course which the tactics of the Prince Regent had left open to him,[1] by at once explaining that his object in seeking the interview had been to give an earnest of his pacific intentions, and to put a stop to the excitement to which a belief in his designs upon a portion of their country had given rise among the Germans. What had happened as to Nice and Savoy, he said, was quite exceptional, and due to the special circumstances of the case. When he first promised his assistance to King Victor Emmanuel, he had told him that this annexation must follow upon any material addition to the Piedmontese territory resulting from the war.

'The assurance of peaceful intentions was of course accepted by the Prince Regent as most satisfactory. He quite admitted the state of feeling in Germany to which the Emperor referred, but at the same time he reminded him, that the world and himself were now for the first time made aware of the compact with Victor Emmanuel, having had nothing before them up to this time but the Milan manifesto, and the declaration that France desired no increase of territory of any kind. What had occurred since was quite sufficient to justify apprehension on the part of Germany. The Emperor, too, had now appeared in the field as a general and commander-in-chief, a circumstance not calculated to allay the uneasiness of the country.

'Nothing, the Emperor rejoined, could be further from his thoughts, than to dissever any territory from Germany and incorporate it with France. So clamorous,

[1] It is alleged, but on no proof yet laid before the world, that Napoleon had recently proposed to Russia a peaceful European territorial revision, by a series of mutual concessions, at the expense of European Turkey.

however, was the outcry of the German press, that something must be done to convince Germany of his sincerity. What should this be? Nothing, was the reply, could be easier. Most of the German sovereigns were in Baden. Let the Emperor tell them what he had told the Prince Regent, and the news of his desire to leave Germany undisturbed would speedily be known throughout the country.

'The Emperor went on to speak of the press, which had become a power in Europe. For himself he had very little control over it. Would it not be well to guard against its being allowed to govern the country as it did in England? The panic it had helped to create there about a French invasion was childish, because invasion was impossible, even with the best steam fleet. To land, and to hold your ground after landing, were two very different things—the latter simply impossible. What stronger proof, moreover, could be given of his desire to be at peace with England, than the recent Commercial Treaty?—a treaty more advantageous perhaps, he said, to England than to France, for it had been vehemently attacked by the manufacturers and artisans of France. The fears which were current, too, he went on to say, about a French invasion of Belgium were equally incomprehensible and absurd. But were they not, he was reminded, in a great measure due to the language of the French press? This he would not admit.

'The conversation was turned by the Emperor to a pamphlet which had recently appeared in Paris, entitled "L'Empereur et la Prusse," in which the Rhine, as the only secure frontier for France, was contended for, while Prussia's true policy was maintained to be the surrender of the Rhenish Provinces, while absorbing as compensation all the minor States of Germany. That

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this pamphlet, if not directly countenanced by the Emperor himself, was issued with the connivance of his Government, who had ordered its title to be altered, was very well known. But the Emperor disclaimed the views which it upheld, and said that he regretted its appearance. This he might well do, whether privy to its publication or not, as he must by this time have felt that the promulgation of these doctrines at the present moment had been singularly inopportune. He complained of what he called "a thundering article" which had just appeared in the "Allgemeine Zeitung," denouncing his purpose in coming to Baden as one of deliberate falsehood and treachery. The Prince Regent's answer was, that he had never seen either the pamphlet or the article; but the effectual way to neutralise both was to publish the disclaimer of any aggressive intention given by the Emperor to the present meeting.'

The Prince Consort wrote to the Princess Royal of Prussia that he hoped the result of the meeting would be to heighten mutual confidence between the German Sovereigns, 'and thereby to contribute towards the unity of Germany.'

While the guest of the Grand Duke at Baden, the Emperor saw the King of Würtemberg, the King of Bavaria, the King of Saxony, the King of Hanover, the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt, the Duke of Nassau, the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar, the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, and Prince Hohenzollern. In one day His Majesty met these German Sovereigns at breakfast and at dinner at the Grand Ducal château, and at tea in the *salons* of the Princess Marie of Baden, Duchess of Hamilton; and the 'Moniteur' declared that all these meetings were more than formal courtesies. On the 19th, the Emperor was back in Paris, and the official journal announced that his spontaneous mission of

peace and good-will would tend to consolidate the peace of Europe.

The death of King Jerome, the last surviving brother of the Great Captain, took place at this time. On July 3, M. X. Doudan[1] wrote to his friend M. Piscatory: 'We are here, as in the days of the obsequies of Germanicus in Rome, consequent upon the death of King Jerome. One hears only the roll of muffled drums and the sound of the cannon of the Invalides. Crowds of sightseers have come from the provinces to witness this great military pomp. About the last witness of the great sun of Messidor is gone. These obscure bearers of illustrious names make a singular figure. Those persons who saw him in his *chapelle ardente* say that he looked like the dead Emperor at St. Helena, according to Calamatta's engraving. This family seal stamped upon creatures so different in themselves, is strange.'

This death of Jerome, which broke the last link with the First Empire, may be taken as the starting point of that peaceful epoch of the Second, in which Napoleon III. gave his attention to the development of the internal political and commercial consolidation of France. After making a triumphant progress through Savoy and Nice in the autumn, and paying a visit to the cradle of his race in Corsica; he 'withdrew into his shell,' as he remarked to Lord Cowley; turned a deaf ear to the continued attacks of which he was the object for years afterwards, both in England and Germany; and worked at the constitutional reform by which, as he had always said, liberty was to crown the edifice of the Empire. His leisure he gave to the great work on which he had now set his heart—the 'Life of Cæsar.'

The brilliant year closed sadly. In September (17th)

[1] *Lettres de X. Doudan.* Avec une Introduction par M. le comte d'Haussonville. Vol. iii. p. 185. Paris: Calman-Lévy, 1879.

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the Empress lost a beloved sister, the Duchess of Alba; and in the winter Her Majesty was forced to journey, for her health, as far as Scotland. She visited the Queen (December 4), who records in her diary: 'She looked thin and pale. . . . and she was as kind and amiable and natural as she had always been.' 'What a contrast,' the Queen adds, 'to her visit in 1855! Then all state and excitement. Thousands on thousands out, and the brightest sunshine. Now all in private, and a dismal, foggy, wet December day!'

CHAPTER IV.

THE HOME IN THE TUILERIES.

THE Emperor selected for his private rooms in the palace of the Tuileries a few low chambers on the ground floor, between the Pavillon de l'Horloge, or central pavilion, and the Pavillon de Flore, or that abutting on the Seine embankment. A dark corridor, lighted day and night by a lamp, connected the rooms. From one of the windows of the Emperor's study, wooden steps led down to the gardens and to the asphaltum path which was prepared for his morning walk.

The room in which the Emperor passed the greater part of his time when he was in Paris, in which he worked with his secretaries, laboured at his 'Life of Cæsar,' received the little Prince Louis every morning at nine o'clock, and paused in the transaction of affairs of State with his hand ever caressing the bright child's head while he listened to his prattle; and where he sat with the Empress in that domestic intimacy which never lost its charm for him—this room was a veritable workshop.

It was a low, gilded chamber, the walls of which were covered with miniatures of the Imperial family, and with arms of every description. The furniture was of the First Empire. It was littered with papers, models, drawings, maps, and even with historical documents of inestimable value.[1]

[1] The Queen in her diary has described the Emperor's private rooms at the Tuileries:—'In his bedroom are busts of his father and uncle, and

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A spiral staircase led from the Emperor's cabinet to the library of the Empress above. Frequently in the course of each day the Empress would tap the gong placed at the top of the staircase, and the Emperor would go to her. Or she would descend to the Emperor. The Imperial couple lived thus in a perpetual intimacy. At hand were the rooms of M. Mocquard and M. Conti, and later of M. Franceschini Piétri, chef and secretaries of the *Cabinet de l'Empereur*; and beyond these was the Council Chamber—the green cloth perpetually spread—ready for a meeting of Ministers. Here, locked up in a cabinet, were the colours of the Imperial Guard, in the keeping of the Sovereign. At hand, in their respective quarters, were Monsieur Thélin, promoted to the rank of Privy Purse; the faithful Léon, wearing the brown livery of his rank; and the valets-de-chambre, Goutellard and Müller.[1] These, with Félix, composed the intimate *entourage* of the Emperor in his private rooms. Félix had charge of a perfect museum of models, inventions and curiosities from all parts of the world, that were sent to, or accumulated by, his Imperial master, and were packed in a great room called 'la Chambre de Félix.'

The Emperor was fond of turning, and it was the expertness of the valet Goutellard in this art which first commended him to the particular regard of his Sovereign. Goutellard was left to finish off His Majesty's heavier work—as the chairs he turned, and that were

an old glass case which he had with him in England, containing relics of all sorts, that are peculiarly valuable to him. In some of the other rooms are portraits of Napoleon, Josephine, his own mother with his elder brother, and one of her with his brother and himself as little children. These were in the room in which we lunched, which is used as a sitting-room. There is also here the cabinet on which Louis Philippe signed that fatal abdication.'

[1] These two faithful servants were with the Emperor at his death.

to be seen formerly at St. Cloud. At the lathe the Emperor would spend quiet hours, taking gentle exercise, and ruminating over the questions he had in hand, the cares of State, the schemes in social science to which his mind was constantly addicted, his literary studies, or his artillery experiments.

He loved the quiet hours in his snuggery, amid the tumbled masses of papers, books, and models; where he could indulge in waking dreams, or gossip intimately with some scholar, inventor, or man of science, on archæology, the latest invention, or a new discovery. His Ministers were often perplexed at their labours by the Sovereign's proneness to the solitary habits of the student, and the absorbing delights of the experimentalist.

The Emperor was an early riser. By eight o'clock he had shaved himself, and was dressed with English care and neatness, and was joined by the Empress for the early tea and talk. At nine he and the Empress welcomed the little Prince Imperial, who was led to the windows of the private apartments by his tutor, M. Augustin Filon. Then the Emperor received M. Mocquard—while this faithful and accomplished friend remained to him—and the correspondence of the day was gone through. Answers were arranged; intimate visits of friends, or savants, or distinguished foreigners were regulated; and then audiences were given to Ministers and the great officers of the Household, as Cambacérès and Fleury. Then the Emperor, passing through the Council Chamber, where his hats (of the d'Orsay pattern, which he never could be persuaded to put aside) and gloves were always arranged in a corner with the familiar gold-headed eagle-cane, ready for his use, went for his morning walk down the wooden steps from his windows to the long walk under them, or to

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that skirting the quays, where the young Prince played. When a Ministerial Council was held, which happened generally twice a week, the walk was curtailed if the deliberations lasted till the breakfast hour. But the Emperor never failed to take a few minutes' fresh air in fine weather before he joined the Empress at the lunch table at half-past eleven.

Leaning on the arm of his aide-de-camp—Fleury, Beville, Favé,[1] Frossard, or an officer whom he had selected on account of some distinguished service he had rendered, or on some highly favourable report as to his capacity—the Sovereign paced slowly under the palace windows, seldom speaking. His companion soon learned that His Majesty was not inclined to talk in his walks. When General Frossard first gave his arm to his Sovereign for these mild constitutional exercises, he ventured to launch into a subject; but he found that the mind of the Emperor was generally far away from it, and he understood that he must remain silent. Nor did any of the Emperor's companions chafe under his reserve. A kindly word at meeting and parting established between the Emperor and his aides-de-camp that strong bond of sympathy which contact with his kindly and gracious nature always inspired.[2]

A simple luncheon with a little wine prepared the Emperor for the more active duties of the day. At lunch he received Count Bacciocchi, who attended to know the Imperial pleasure for the evening, and who informed their Majesties as to the theatres and other amusements. After lunch the formal receptions of dis-

[1] General Favé was a particularly sympathetic companion to the Emperor. He made topographical observations for the *Life of Cæsar*, and was placed by the Emperor at the head of the Ecole Polytechnique.

[2] In a letter to King Leopold (1859) the Queen remarked: 'I was sure you would be pleased with the Emperor Napoleon. No one has the power which he has of pleasing and fascinating others.'

tinguished strangers and others took place through the Duke of Bassano. The number of applicants was extraordinary in the heyday of the Empire. People from all parts of the world pressed upon the Duke their claim to make their bow to the Sovereign of romantic origin, who appeared to hold in his hands the destinies of Europe. All came away from these audiences charmed with the Emperor's kindly greeting and by the quiet dignity of his bearing. 'His manners are exceedingly good, simple and kind, yet dignified,' even M. Guizot—a grudging panegyrist—said to Mr. Senior at Val Richer.[1]

About four o'clock the Emperor and Empress went for their afternoon drive, in the Bois generally, but sometimes to other less fashionable quarters in the suburbs of Paris. Or the Emperor would ride out with his aide-de-camp, and appear unannounced and unexpected in the most populous quarters—to the great alarm of the police, who were responsible for the safety of his person. Sometimes he would sally forth, even in the early morning, and ride over the ground which the Baron Haussmann was covering with new Boulevards, and mark the progress and the effect of the mighty building operations that were gradually transforming old Paris into a city of broadways flanked with palaces. Among the personages who visited him in his private cabinet was the great Baron who for so many years held sway as the Prefect of the Seine, and from his superb quarters at the Hôtel de Ville designed, with his Sovereign, the most marvellous transformation of a great city ever accomplished within the space of a single reign. In this the Emperor not only took a real delight; he worked at the outlines of it. He was an intelligent seeker after the health as well as the beauty

[1] 'M. Guizot at Val Richer,' *Fortnightly Review*, January, 1878.

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of Paris. He was an ardent sanitary reformer, as the monumental sewers of the capital testify. The salubrity of the dwellings of the work-folk was constantly in his mind; and he was always accessible to any inventor or theorist who had something to contribute to the subject. One day, in company with the Empress and one of the Péreires, he made a tour of the new squares which, in obedience to his orders, had been planted with flowers, and left unprotected to the people. M. Péreire had endeavoured to dissuade the Emperor from his plan, telling him that every flower would disappear in a day. When the carriage reached the Square Montholon—in the midst of a crowded, unfashionable quarter—and the parterres appeared untouched in the midst of the blouses who were enjoying the garden, the Emperor's face beamed with triumph.

'You see,' he said, 'they haven't touched a flower!'

Sometimes the ride or the drive would be to Vincennes. When the Commandant Minié was *chef du tir* there, the Emperor would visit him in his smithy, and delight in a talk, with experiments. Then the Commandant was invited to the Tuileries; and Sovereign and soldier would go deep into gun and projectile speculations and experiments, in the course of which they riddled the gilded walls of the Imperial cabinet with some spiral bullets which Minié had invented, and which could be projected by the breath through tubes with great force.[1]

The fixed dinner-hour at the Tuileries was seven o'clock, before which time the invited guests assembled in the first *salon* adjoining the dining-room. As the Emperor approached, with the Empress on his arm, and in the latter days, on great occasions, with the boy

[1] These details were given to me by Commandant Minié, in 1857, in the course of a conversation on his once celebrated rifle.—B. J.

Prince at his side, the doors were thrown open, and an usher announced severally the three members of the Imperial family, the company rising. According to the Palace code of etiquette, the company present were bound to rise whenever the Emperor stood; but he was impatient of such rules, and put this aside.

The Emperor sat in the middle seat of his table, with the Empress on his left, and the Prince Imperial on his right; the ladies and gentlemen in waiting being seated on either side; while immediately opposite the Emperor the Adjutant-General of the Palace invariably took his place. This officer, and M. Augustin Filon, in the last years of the reign, were the only persons who dined with the Emperor all the year round. The dining-room was known as the Salon Louis XIV.; and in it was a great ceremonial picture of Louis XIV.

The Imperial dinner-party, on ordinary days, varied in number from twelve to eighteen. It was a pleasant, intimate circle, and the Emperor was the gayest of the diners, when his health was fairly good; talking easily and cheerily round the table of the news of the day —but never of people. This was the rule in the dining-room as well as the drawing-room. A quiet, humorous observer, as well as a *fin* talker when in the vein, nothing of a scene escaped him. He had the happy art of saying something to please every guest; of being one of a party and remaining the Emperor always. His easy manner and lively remarks, and the delight he took in humorous stories, or strokes of wit from the old intimate of the family circle, Mérimée, or, at Fontainebleau, from Octave Feuillet[1] (an exquisite

[1] Octave Feuillet was the delight of the Court at Fontainebleau, where he held the appointment of Librarian. He wrote verses that charmed the ladies; and the sparkle and fineness of his wit commended his conversation to the gentlemen.

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causeur), or Sainte-Clair Deville, farceur, philosopher, and man of science—a man after the Emperor's own heart—never led the most vivacious guest to forget for a moment that the hearty host was the Emperor. The genial terms on which the Emperor lived with his household and his personal friends, and the ease with which he suffered all men to approach him, might lead casual observers to conclude that he was led hither and thither by his entourage. But this was not the case. His reserve, and his perpetual thoughtful moods, had a mystery in them, which compelled respect. That a man so self-contained should have been so abounding in human sympathies, will always strike the close observer of his character with wonder.

One evening, at dinner, the Emperor remarked that the servants were looking at one of the windows, and whispering. He asked what was to be seen. An owl had pressed itself against the glass, and remained motionless there. The ladies were in a flutter, vowing that it was a bird of evil omen, and that it meant a misfortune. M. Filon, to whom the Emperor laughingly appealed, declared that it was the bird of wisdom, and was to be welcomed accordingly. But the incident disturbed the minds of the ladies, who would not be comforted by the badinage of the Emperor, nor by the assurances of the young professor.

On the following day, at dinner, the servants stared more than ever at the window where the owl had appeared. There was now a whole family of owls, where one had been. The consternation was general; and the Emperor remained grave. After dinner, when the Imperial party went to the *salon*, they found the entire family of owls, stuffed, and ranged upon a table. The Emperor had ordered them in the morning from the Zoological Museum. He turned the dismal

augurs into hearty laughers, and enjoyed his joke with the youngest of them. On another occasion, to amuse the children,[1] with whom he delighted to have sport, it being April 1, he caused the dinner to consist of turbot, which was gravely served again and again, as entrées, relevés, and rôts, to the guests. His young friends were in ecstasies.[2]

After dinner the Emperor and Empress led the way back to the drawing-room, where coffee was served while the company chatted—the Emperor giving himself up completely to the light after-dinner talk. Then he retired to his cabinet downstairs for his cigarette, and very often for some hours of State or literary work. He would sometimes reappear later, at the tea-table, and listen to, rather than engage in, the conversation which the Empress directed to some interesting question of the time. The discussions, in which Her Majesty took a large share, were generally of a very serious character, and on the subject on which the chief guest of the evening was an authority. The Emperor would sit, his hand passing lovingly over his son's head the while, listening and enjoying the brilliant

[1] The Prince Imperial, the Empress's two nieces, and young Conneau.

[2] Mérimée (October 13, 1865) gives an amusing practical joke, in which both the Emperor and Empress took part.

'Madame de L., as a German, greatly admired M. de Bismarck, and we used to joke her about the risk she was running in encouraging the attentions of the great man. A few days ago I carved and painted a striking head of M. de Bismarck, and their Majesties and I went to Madame de L.'s chamber, where I arranged it in the bed, making the form of a person asleep under the clothes with pillows, the Empress tying a handkerchief over the head like a night-cap. In the half light the illusion was complete. Then their Majesties retired to the farther end of the corridor, and we all pretended to withdraw to our respective rooms. Presently Madame de L. entered her room, and was seen to rush out of it. She knocked at the door of Madame de X., calling out: "There's a man in my bed!" The laughter of the Empress spoiled the rest.'

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questioning and searching enquiries of his Consort; but joining in the controversy very seldom. He was the most patient of listeners. A card-table stood ready for him, with packs of very small cards upon it, and here sometimes he would sit apart playing patience. Or he would engage the children in a round game, and keep a merry circle about him for an hour or two. New silver was brought for counters; and the Emperor would keep the bank. The young Conneau was very eager at the game, and the Emperor would lead him on into heavy losses, observing the young gambler's face the while, and reading him a little lesson at the end. His reproofs or sermons were, however, of the mildest kind. When he was begged to give the young Prince a severe reprimand for some juvenile escapade, the utmost he could be induced to say was: 'Voyons, Louis, ne fais donc pas des bêtises!'

As a rule the Emperor retired very early, even before his malady had fastened itself upon him. It was not long after ten when he was on his way to his bedroom. He lay down much, not to sleep, but to think and dream at his ease. It had always been his habit. When any great news was expected—the result of a plébiscite, for instance—he would quietly go to bed as usual, while his family and friends remained anxiously on the tiptoe of expectation. It was his uncle's philosophy.[1]

On Sunday mornings the Emperor was seen dressed betimes in red trousers, ready for attendance at High Mass with his household, and for the interviews which he gave to officers of the army afterwards.

[1] 'Among the private instructions which Bonaparte gave me, one was very curious. "During the night," said he, "enter my chamber as seldom as possible. Do not awake me when you have any good news to communicate; with that there is no hurry. But when you bring bad news, rouse me instantly; for then there is not a moment to be lost."'—*De Bourrienne.*

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On Sunday Prince Louis breakfasted with his parents, and afterwards the Imperial family repaired to the Grand Salon, where they took leave of the gentlemen and ladies in waiting whose week of attendance was at an end, and received their successors; and then the entire Court repaired in state through the Hall of Marshals—the Emperor in the uniform of a General of Division—to the Chapel. This progress to and from Mass was one of the great parades of Imperial splendour that every visitor to Paris, who had access to his Ambassador, resolved to see.

As the Emperor returned from the Chapel back to his rooms, he passed through lines of soldiers of all grades ranged in one of the long corridors, who had obtained permission to salute him. He had a kindly, *à propos*, flattering word for each; and the effect of these weekly military receptions was, no doubt, to strengthen the Emperor's popularity with all arms of his military forces.

Such was the ordinary home life of the Tuileries under the Second Empire. It was enlivened by State balls and concerts (which Auber conducted), and by the Empress's small dances and receptions, the entrée to which was hedged about with strict formalities, and at which the most rigid decorum was maintained. All that was written about them by the political enemies of the Empire, who spared neither the honour of women nor the good character of public men, may be confidently set down as the malignant invention of professional lampooners.[1]

There were Court scandals, and many, in the course

[1] Perhaps the most striking instance of the absurd and scandalous excesses to which writers against the Second Empire have gone is that in M. Hippolyte Magen's History (*Histoire du Second Empire*. Paris, 1878. Maurice Dreyfous), when he describes the charming picture by Winterhalter of the Empress surrounded by her ladies as a *cadre scabreux*, nicknamed *Le rendez-vous des grisettes*.

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of the twenty years of the reign of Napoleon III.; but the home life of the Court was simple and honest. The gallantries, in which illustrious names were mixed up only too frequently, were kept away, and far away, from the domestic circle of the Tuileries, St. Cloud, Fontainebleau, Compiègne, and Biarritz.

CHAPTER V.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS.

CHAP. V.

In the autumn of 1860 the Emperor communicated to M. Rouher his resolution to liberalise the Parliamentary groundwork of the Empire. The manner in which the Opposition of 'The Five'[1] in the Legislative Body had continued to agitate the public mind, assisted by such rising journalists as M. Prévost-Paradol, and the many unmistakeable signs which the people had given of a desire to have the iron bands of personal rule loosened and a freer vent given to the direct expression of public opinion in the Chambers and the press, were candidly accepted by the Emperor as just and honourable aspirations towards that free constitutional government to which he had always hoped to lead the Empire. '*Je veux les mener à une liberté sage*,' he had said one day of his subjects to Prince Adam Czartoriski.[2] Encouraged by the settlement of Italian independence, and by the immense popularity which his recent progresses through his Empire told him he enjoyed, and

[1] The Opposition known as *Les Cinq* was constituted at the opening of the session of 1859, after the return of MM. Jules Favre and Ernest Picard to the Assembly. It remained intact throughout five sessions. Its most gifted and conspicuous member was M. Emile Olivier, who had defended and obtained the acquittal of M. Rogeard, the author of the *Propos de Labiénus*, and had been afterwards spurned by his client for having taken the oath of allegiance as a deputy. Its acknowledged chief was M. Jules Favre. MM. Darimon and Hénon completed the party.

[2] Repeated by the Prince to B. J. in the course of a conversation on Polish affairs, at the Hôtel Lambert, after the Crimean war.

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resolved on peace and the development of that epoch of material prosperity which, with his Minister of Commerce, he anticipated from the liberal Commercial Treaties already in progress; the time had come, at the close of 1860, to complete the glory of a successful war of independence, waged for a neighbour, with a wide step towards liberty at home. One member at least of 'The Five' shared the opinion of his Sovereign, that the people would accept a thoroughly liberal Empire.[1]

Already the Emperor had extended an amnesty (August 15, 1859) to all Frenchmen who had been condemned or exiled for political offences. This clemency had been regarded by many of his advisers as an act of temerity; but he had persevered. The more important step, by which he intended to institute debates on the Address and to make a considerable step towards a free constitutional government, met with stubborn resistance on the part of the adviser in whom he had the fullest trust. M. Rouher believed that public opinion neither expected nor desired constitutional reform; and that the Sovereign, in endeavouring to disarm the opposition of a few irreconcilables, was running the risk of reducing that strength which the Imperial Government undoubtedly possessed, with the consent of the immense majority of the country. The Em-

[1] 'A certains moments les peuples, comme les individus, surexcités par la passion, s'affranchissent de toute dissimulation et mettent leur cœur à nu! Dans cette journée je lus jusqu'au fond du cœur du peuple de Paris. Je le retrouvai tel qu'aux élections pour la Législative, lorsqu'il réunit dans un même vote les noms de Murat et de Ledru-Rollin; tel qu'au 2 décembre, lorsqu'il se contenta de rire de l'emprisonnement du burgraviat législatif: c'était toujours ce peuple inébranlable dans sa fidélité au souvenir de la Révolution, sur tout le reste mobile et ayant une attache secrète au nom de Bonaparte. Il criait: "Vive l'Italie! vive la liberté!" mais en tendant les mains vers l'auteur du 2 décembre. Si je ne l'avais vu de mes yeux, je n'y croirais pas. Cela me parut une seconde absolution pour l'Empire, et pour moi un encouragement à persévérer dans ma voie.'—*Le 19 Janvier*. Par Emile Olivier. Paris, 1869.

peror insisted that the moment had arrived to give the Senate and the Legislative Body liberty to reply frankly, after a free debate, to the speech of the Sovereign at the opening of the session; and he resolved to leave the duty of replying to two Ministers who would be the exponents of the Government policy, viz. to M. Baroche in the Senate, and M. Rouher in the Lower Chamber. M. Rouher respectfully and repeatedly declined the share of the task allotted to him,[1] and it was transferred to M. Billault, M. Rouher remaining at his Ministry of Commerce to carry forward the Commercial Treaties.

M. Thiers had been (through M. Walewski) privy to the reform, which was at length made known in a decree dated November 24, 1860. It was accepted even by the Orleanist coteries as a concession that might be useful to them. M. X. Doudan wrote to his friend M. Paul de Broglie 'that these débris of liberty might be used as dykes or as ramparts.' It was the probability that M. Thiers and his friends, or that MM. Olivier, Favre, and their friends might turn them to this kind of account against his master, that led M. Rouher to seek an audience of the Emperor, even at the last moment, when the decrees had gone to the 'Moniteur' offices, and to conjure him not to part with power which was necessary to him for the good of his country.

'Wishing,' said the Emperor in his decree, 'to give to the great Bodies of the State a more direct participation in the general policy of my Government, and a striking testimony of my confidence, I have decreed as follows.' Then followed the authorisation of the Senate and Legislative Body to vote addresses in reply to the

[1] At the same time the Emperor offered a house to his faithful Minister of the value of 40,000*l.*, which he declined, declaring that he was ready to remain in his service at twenty sous a day!

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Speech from the Throne; the grant of the right of moving amendments to Bills, except in cases of urgency or of local or private Bills; and the publication of the Parliamentary debates in the daily papers. By the same decree the Ministries of the Imperial Household and of Algeria were suppressed. Marshal Pélissier was appointed Governor-General of Algéria; Admiral Hamelin was raised to the dignity of Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honour; and the two Ministers without portfolio who were to be the exponents of the opinion of the Imperial Government in the Parliamentary debates, received the full dignity of Ministers with portfolios.

The position which was given to M. Billault as chief spokesman for the Government in both Chambers, was filled by him during the sessions of 1861 and the two succeeding sessions with consummate tact and force. His successes as an orator, particularly in support of the Papal policy of the Government, wrung applause even from the Opposition and from the *salons*. He was more than a match for Prince Napoleon. M. Thiers could not afford to disdain him as an antagonist.[1] M. Magne, as a financial authority, was a distinct and important addition to the debating power of the Government. The Government, in short, was strong when the new epoch was opened. M. de Persigny had left London to replace M. Billault at the Ministry of the Interior; M. de Forcade la Roquette succeeded M. Magne at the Ministry of Finance; M. Thouvenel remained Foreign Minister, and M. Baroche President of the Council of State; M. Walewski became Minister of State, and, as

[1] 'For the last month (March, 1862) we have had the most brilliant word tournaments, as you may judge by the papers. M. Billault has had the greatest success; and, indeed, he has made great progress as an orator.' —X. Doudan's *Letters*, vol. iii. p. 252.

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we have seen, M. Rouher continued to hold the portfolio of Agriculture and Commerce. Then M. de Morny had been the skilful and accomplished President of the Legislative Body since 1854, when he had succeeded M. Billault. The new order of things had met with his approbation. He was inclined to Parliamentary government by education; and, spendthrift and speculator as he was, his mind, as M. Emile Olivier has boldly recorded, was open to liberal ideas. The splendour in which he lived at the Palais Bourbon, and the sumptuous feasts he gave, moved the wrath of the Republican party, who were always primed with stories of his scandalous speculations and his bitter jests; but his courtly manners, his impartiality as President, and his intrepid spirit, made him a favourite among hosts of men who were neither Imperialists nor Orleanists. His commanding intellectual resources would have secured him lasting renown as a servant of his country, had his public services not been tarnished by his private vices. But these were so notorious that they more than counterbalanced his labours as a firm and impartial President of the Legislative Body in the early years of its Liberal life. The evil he wrought was greater than the good, and the Empire which he served at the Palais Bourbon he helped to destroy on the Bourse.

The first session of the Chambers under the new Parliamentary *régime* was opened by the Emperor on February 4, 1861, with a speech in which he described the object he had in view in submitting the policy and acts of his Government to the free discussion of the Senators and Deputies; contrasted the existing Constitution with that of the Government of July; described the measures which his Government had adopted for developing the agricultural and commercial prosperity of the country; the reforms in the administration of Algeria; the esta-

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blishment of the doctrine of non-intervention in foreign affairs; and proclaimed anew and emphatically that France was seeking no ambitious ends beyond her frontiers, and desired to live at peace with the world, finding glory in the development of the germs of prosperity which Providence had placed in her hands.

The Chambers were not slow in using the new powers given to them. In the Senate a vigorous debate, in which M. Larochejacquelein attacked Victor Emmanuel, and Prince Napoleon assailed the Papacy and the French occupation,[1] was closed by M. Billault on the part of the Government; and the Address was conveyed to the Emperor on March 7, who received it with the remark that the debate would serve to enlighten the public.

In the Legislative Body the Address in reply to the Speech was not drawn up and ready for discussion by the committee appointed for the purpose before March 11—more than a month after the opening of the session. The debate (which lasted eleven days) turned chiefly on Italian affairs and the occupation of Rome. MM. Jules Favre, Emile Olivier, and Ernest Picard were the spokesmen of the Opposition of Five; the first declaring himself to be of the revolutionary party, the second—a wiser man—accepting the decree of November 24 as a courageous, a generous, and a beneficent act. The Address was not carried to the Emperor before March 23. It conveyed the thanks of the Legislative Body for the new prerogatives extended to them by the spontaneous act of the Sovereign, and exhorted him to persist in a policy at once prudent and resolute, liberal and firm, which shielded enduring liberties under

[1] 'I cannot repeat it too often, that, spite of appearances the other way, what the Emperor has most at heart is the evacuation of Rome.'—Lord Cowley to Lord J. Russell, March 1, 1861.

a strong rule, and the sole object of which was the honour and renown of the French name.' CHAP. V.

The Emperor had been painfully impressed by the uncompromising tone of the Opposition speeches; but in his reply he said that, notwithstanding the sharpness (*vivacité*) of the debates, he did not regret to see the Chambers discussing openly the difficult problems involved in a foreign policy. Such debates would inform the country without disquieting it. 'To be of our time,' the Emperor added, 'to preserve all that was good in the past, to prepare the future by freeing the movements of civilisation from the prejudices which hinder or the Utopian dreams that compromise them, is the way to prepare calm and prosperous days for our children.'

The session of 1861 was marked by the violence of the active Parliamentary Opposition which the new prerogatives called into existence. M. Jules Favre attacked the whole fabric of the Constitution of 1852; and M. Emile Olivier alone appeared as a reformer who was ready to accept a Liberal Empire. During this session imprisonment for debt was abolished, but no other notable legislation accompanied the passionate and sterile attacks upon the army and other estimates by the Opposition. M. Billault replied to M. Favre and his colleagues by telling them that the Government did not intend to tolerate, in the citadel which France had confided to them, either open enemies or foes in disguise. Freedom of debate had not been given to them as a weapon of destruction.

Disappointed, but with a resolution to persevere in a liberal course, the Emperor continued to set his home affairs in order. Among other reforms of this year, he accepted on November 12 a plan which had been developed by M. Fould before the Privy Council,

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for a thorough and severe financial reform, including the suppression of the system of supplementary credits and free entrance to the Bourse.[1] The difficulties cast in Napoleon's way came not only from enemies like M. Victor de Laprade, whose intemperate language against his Government he was induced by the Minister of Public Instruction to punish with dismissal from his professorship of French Literature at Lyons, but from his own kindred. Prince Napoleon, in the course of his violent speech on the Address, had said hard things against the Bourbon and Orleans families. This assault provoked a severe retort in the shape of a pamphlet by the Duke of Aumale, which created a wild sensation in France. It was a severe review of the Bonapartes. At a meeting of the Council called together to consider whether any steps should be taken in regard to it, the Ministers described it as a tissue of falsehoods and exaggeration.

'No, gentlemen,' said the Emperor firmly, 'it is not so. Nobody knows the truth so well as I do, and there is but one calumny in the letter, and that is the accusation against me—that while my mother was asking protection of Louis Philippe, I was conspiring against him with some of the chiefs of the Republican party. In fact, I was ill in bed with a bad sore throat. Louis Philippe's reception of my mother was that of a father receiving his child. He folded his arms round her, and promised to do all he could for her and hers; and when she returned to my bedside, her face was still wet with the tears which she had shed.'[2] The only result

[1] The Paris *agents de change* begged to be permitted to erect a statue of the Emperor, as an act of gratitude, in the quadrangle of the Bourse; but he declined, begging them rather to accept his portrait for their meeting room, as a mark of his gratitude for their loyal sentiments.

[2] See vol. i. book ii. chapter viii.

of the Council was a short note drawn up by M. Mocquard, in which the Duke's accusation against the Emperor was explicitly denied. There was not, indeed, the least excuse for it.

The effect of Prince Napoleon's harangue in the Senate was to give a new direction to the suspicions of Foreign Courts. The Prince Consort besought the Germans to hold together, seeing that the way was being paved for revolutions in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and Spain. In giving Constitutional Government to his people, the Emperor was but turning from dreams of conquest to visions of nationalities rehabilitated by revolutions.

At the opening of the session of 1862, on January 27, the Emperor expressed some of his disappointment at the manner in which his acts were misinterpreted.

'I am not unaware,' he said, 'that it is the fate of those who hold power to see their purest motives misconstrued, and their most praiseworthy acts outraged by the spirit of party. But clamour is powerless when one possesses the confidence of the nation, and when one neglects nothing to deserve it. This sentiment, which prevails under all circumstances, is my most precious reward. When unforeseen events happen—as a rise in the price of food, or a failure of work—the people suffer, but they are just, and do not make me responsible for their sufferings, because they know that all my thoughts, efforts, and actions are directed to the bettering of their condition, and to the promotion of the prosperity of France.'

In the course of the debate on the Address in the Senate, Prince Napoleon renewed his attacks of the previous year on the French occupation of Rome; although he knew that the Emperor, his cousin, was as anxious as he to withdraw his troops, and that the

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Government were doing their utmost to complete the independence of Italy.[1] M. Billault replied to him in this sense. In the Legislative Body the debate on the Address was not begun before March 6. It was preceded by an 'incident' which gave the Opposition inside and outside the Chamber an opportunity for a demonstration against the Government. A Bill was laid before the Deputies for conferring a pension of 50,000 francs on the commander of the Chinese Expedition, the General Cousin-Montauban, whom the Emperor had created Count of Palikao. It served as a peg to the Orleanists and Legitimists, and was so roughly handled that the Count insisted upon having it withdrawn. The rebuff was a mortification to the Emperor, and a flagrant act of injustice to a general; but it served to give the Opposition a little triumph, and the *salons* a subject for many well-turned sarcasms. It was a feather that helped to show the direction of the wind.

The debate on the Address in the Legislative Body lasted fourteen days, the burden of the Opposition speeches being against great military establishments, and the laws restricting the liberty of the press, official candidatures, and the laws of public safety. The 'Five' claimed, in their amendment, free elective municipalities. These were the demands of the regular Opposition, which were renewed year after year, but always rejected by large majorities, for the seven years during which the debate on the Address was maintained. In 1860, M. Emile Olivier said in the Chamber: 'Since the last session the Government has realised three great acts which I approve: an amnesty has been decreed, a wide step has been made towards commercial

[1] The Emperor addressed a severe remonstrance to his refractory cousin in the spring of 1863. See Appendix VI.

liberty, and the doctrine of non-intervention has been vindicated in Italy. In all the laws which have been or may be the consequence of these three acts, I and my friends have given the Government, and will continue to give it, a loyal support.' So far as the speaker was concerned, this promise was kept. But the Opposition was not a loyal one; and its attitude in 1862, and at the general election of 1863, gave force to M. de Persigny's remark to his Prefects, when urging them to do all in their power to support the Government candidates, that their opponents were not, as in England, loyal party men, but factious remnants of former *régimes*, that sought to overturn the foundations of the State. The Minister of the Interior was a headstrong, rash, and dangerous adviser of the master whom he had served faithfully for many years; and in this general election, when political passion ran high, and the enemies of the reigning dynasty obtained several signal victories—among others the return of M. Thiers to public life as a Paris deputy—he manifested his absolutist sympathies and Papal antipathies in an unbecoming manner which shocked the Emperor and his more enlightened advisers. But M. de Persigny's vision was true and clear in many respects. He was not mistaken as to the real character and the danger of the new elements which were being imported into the governing forces of the Empire; albeit he was rash in giving offence to friends who had conscientiously opposed the Italian policy of the Government. He fell, at the close of the elections, never to rise again as a public servant, but to sink lower from year to year, under his ducal coronet, given to him as a parting gift, and to die miserably.

M. Emile Olivier had disdainfully tossed the groups of dynastic opponents of the Government aside as 'phantoms,' and the Emperor had believed that they

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would vanish before the light of liberty he was turning upon them. His policy was one of conciliation, and this was in harmony with the generosity of his nature. Prince Napoleon—a man of essentially illiberal sympathies, but of the most audacious ultra-liberal professions—attacked M. Billault in the Senate, charging him with having voted for General Cavaignac at the Presidential election which first gave power to the Emperor. The Minister replied with dignity that it was quite true; 'but,' he added, 'having seen the Prince President at work during ten years, I serve him with fidelity and honour.' The Emperor wrote at once to M. Billault to thank him for his candour, and to assure him of his sincere friendship—two qualities His Majesty never found in the cousin he continued to load with favours.

While M. de Persigny's rash exclusion of friendly candidates from the official lists, on the ground that they were 'clericals,' raised a small body of powerful antagonists to the Government, Paris returned ten Opposition deputies, and Marseilles, Lyons, Havre, and some departments fourteen; and thus the 'Five' of the preceding Parliament were swollen to twenty-four. Among these were the famous Legitimist lawyer, Berryer, and Marie, the Republican. The bulk, however, were Liberals of Orleanist sympathies. None, save M. Emile Olivier, could be said to be well disposed even to a Liberal Empire, although they took the oath of fidelity to the Emperor prescribed by the Constitution. In presence of an Opposition, formidable by the remarkable men it included, if insignificant still in numbers, the Emperor resolved to strengthen the hands of M. Billault by creating a Minister of State who should be, in reality, first Minister, in whom the policy of the Government should be centralised, who should be responsible for all

the departments of the administration to the Emperor, and be able to speak with full authority for the Sovereign and the Government before the Senate and the Legislative Body. At the same time M. Rouher was invested with the functions of President of the Council of State. These changes were intended to give the statesmen charged with the duty of speaking for the Government in the Chambers a closer knowledge of all the departments of the Executive, without altering, as the Emperor explained in the 'Moniteur' the fundamental pact of 1852.[1] For, in effect, it was the beginning of a system of Ministers responsible to the Chambers. It was in the remodelling of the administration consequent upon the above changes, that M. Duruy became Minister of Public Instruction. His advent to power marked the opening of a new epoch in the educational history of his country.

The lines of opposition which Emile Olivier had taken up from 1859 to 1863 were the legitimate objec-

[1] 'Le plébiscite sur lequel se base la Constitution de 1852, en établissant que les Ministres étaient responsables envers l'Empereur seul, a voulu mettre un terme à la compétition d'ambitions parlementaires, causes continuelles d'agitation et de faiblesse pour les gouvernements passés. Sans altérer en rien la force et la liberté d'action nécessaires au pouvoir, l'Empereur, par le décret du 24 novembre, a voulu donner aux grands Corps d'Etat une participation plus directe dans la politique générale de son gouvernement; mais ce décret n'a pas modifié les principes fondamentaux du plébiscite de 1852, qu'un nouveau plébiscite seul pourrait changer. La discussion plus large et plus complète des affaires publiques devant le Sénat et le Corps Législatif avait motivé la création des Ministres sans portefeuille, c'est-à-dire des Ministres n'ayant dans les faits à débattre aucune part personnelle. L'Empereur, par le décret de ce jour, leur substitue le Ministre chargé des rapports du Gouvernement avec les plus grands Corps d'Etat, dans le but d'organiser plus solidement la représentation de la pensée gouvernementale devant les Chambres, sans s'écarter de l'esprit de la Constitution. Le Ministre d'Etat, dégagé de toutes attributions administratives, et le Ministre présidant le Conseil d'Etat, avec le concours des membres de ce Conseil, sont désormais chargés d'expliquer et de défendre les questions portées devant le Sénat et le Corps Législatif.'

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tions of a loyal subject to illiberal laws. He asked for freedom of the press, municipal liberties, responsible Ministers, peace, order in the national finances, and morality in the conduct of public affairs; in short, as he said, 'liberty without disorder, but order without despotism'—in a word, 'the crown upon the edifice' which the Emperor had promised! He attacked several of the shameless jobs which were frequently scandalising the public, not only of France, but of Europe, and which a Sovereign made of sterner stuff than the Emperor would have severely punished. The Emperor fretted under the faults of his old friends, and he despised the lust of gain which absorbed them; but he allowed M. de Morny and others to flourish to the end of their days, to his own great disadvantage.

M. Billault did not live to enter upon the new and important functions which the Emperor had confided to him. The Senate and Legislative Body had been convoked for November 5. On October 13 the 'Moniteur' announced the sudden death of the Minister on whom the responsibility of the new advance to constitutional government was to rest. All the friends and some of the more moderate enemies of the Government regretted the death of this most authoritative and conciliatory orator of the Government. 'This morning,' M. Doudan wrote (October 17, 1863), 'the cannon announced the obsequies of M. Billault. The army was astir, the eagles of the Empire were craped! The Government is not wrong in regretting M. Billault's death. He was one of the glories of the Empire. I myself, for other reasons, I suppose, heard of his death with regret. I am afraid lest, this orator removed, the Government draw back from the risks of debates to which it was becoming seasoned.' But the Emperor remained firm; and in the place of M. Billault put M. Rouher, who from this

time became His Majesty's most powerful subject and supporter.

The Emperor opened the session on November 5. In his speech he spoke with confidence of the material progress of the country, of the great works in progress, of peace, of the abundant harvest, and of an approaching European Congress to settle the questions which had kept the public mind in perpetual ferment for some years.[1]

But the Congress never met. It was opposed, to begin with, by Lord Palmerston's Government. 'Our answer to the Emperor's proposal has been,' Lord Palmerston wrote to the King of the Belgians (November 15, 1863), 'in substance, that we do not admit that the Treaties of Vienna have ceased to be in force, inasmuch as, on the contrary, they are still the basis of the existing arrangements of Europe; that with regard to the proposed Congress, before we can come to any decision about it, we should like to know what subjects it is to discuss, and what power it is to possess to give effect to its decisions. My own impression is that the

[1] 'L'insurrection polonaise, à laquelle sa durée imprimait un caractère national, réveilla partout des sympathies, et le but de la diplomatie fut d'attirer à cette cause le plus d'adhérents possible, afin de peser sur la Russie de tout le poids de l'opinion de l'Europe. Ce concours de vœux presque unanime nous semblait le moyen le plus propre à opérer la persuasion sur le Cabinet de Saint-Pétersbourg. Malheureusement nos conseils désintéressés ont été interprétés comme une intimidation, et les démarches de l'Angleterre, de l'Autriche et de la France, au lieu d'arrêter la lutte, n'ont fait que l'envénimer. . . . Sans courir aux armes comme sans nous taire, un moyen nous reste: c'est de soumettre la cause polonaise à un tribunal européen. . . . Les traités de 1815 ont cessé d'exister. La force des choses les a renversés, ou tend à les renverser presque partout. Ils ont été brisés en Grèce, en Belgique, en France, en Italie comme sur le Danube. L'Allemagne s'agite pour les changer, l'Angleterre les a généreusement modifiés par la cession des Iles ioniennes, et la Russie les foule aux pieds à Varsovie. . . . Quoi donc de plus légitime et de plus sensé que de convier les Puissances de l'Europe à un Congrès?' &c.

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Congress will never meet, and that the Emperor has no expectation that it should meet.' The English Government had resolved that it should not meet; and, in fact, prevented its meeting; Lord Palmerston dismissing the subject with the hope that the Emperor had mended his position at home by his proposal.

The English statesman was of opinion that, as to the question between Germany and Denmark, 'a smaller machinery' would be sufficient to solve it. Events quickly proved how fallacious that opinion was.

The new Chamber, which included in the Opposition ranks some of the leading orators of the country—as Berryer, Thiers, Emile Olivier, Jules Favre, Marie, and Jules Simon—gave the Government an immediate taste of its hostile temper. Violent discussions were raised on the Address, and amendments were proposed, demanding the liberty of the press, the right of meeting and of association—in short, the reforms which the 'Five' had advocated in the previous Parliament. These amendments were rejected by large majorities; but three months had been spent before the Address of the Legislative Body was presented to the Emperor (January 29, 1864). The tone of many of the Opposition speakers was not that of reformers, but of revolutionists. M. Olivier protested against this interpretation of his opposition, and with reason; but he could not persuade impartial minds that reform and not destruction of the Imperial *régime* was the object of the majority of his party—albeit they had sworn allegiance to the Emperor.

In the opening Speech of the session of 1865 (February 15), the Emperor referred to the revolutionary harangues in the Legislative Body, and the agitation outside, by which his advances had been met. He exhorted the Senators and Deputies to oppose the supporters of

changes suggested with the sole object of sapping the foundations of the edifice.[1] The Senate replied chiefly on the Roman and Italian questions; but the Legislative Body discussed their Address from March 27 to April 15. In these debates MM. Emile Olivier and Thiers were the important speakers. The first was, as we have seen, a loyal reformer; the second was a masked enemy. It was on the eve of these assaults upon the Government of the Emperor that M. de Morny died. The Empire was losing its stoutest friends apace, and this when most it had need of all the Parliamentary strength it could put forth.

'After the elections of 1863,' M. Emile Olivier tells us,[2] 'M. de Morny said to me: "We will talk presently about the political liberties you claim. From this moment I agree with you as to the necessity of giving a wide extension to civil liberty. I have been of this opinion for a long time. Everything is ruled in this country; it is a misfortune. What is the most urgent reform to be carried, to satisfy the working classes?" I answered, the law right of meeting, of combining, and of forming associations. "Don't let us try too much at once," he replied. "Let us begin with the right of combination."' And so thoroughly did M. de Morny go with M. Olivier that a law satisfactory to the wage classes was carried, on the plan laid down by a Commission, of which MM. Jules Simon, Buffet, and Olivier were members. The manner in which this reform, that gave the working classes the right to combine for their

[1] 'Opposons-nous aux tendances exagérées de ceux qui provoquent des changements dans le seul but de saper ce que *nous* avons fondé. L'utopie est au bien ce que l'illusion est à la vérité, et le progrès n'est point la réalisation d'une théorie plus ou moins ingénieuse, mais l'application des résultats de l'expérience consacrés par le temps et acceptés par l'opinion publique.'

[2] *Le 19 Janvier.* Par Emile Olivier. Paris, 1869.

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common interests, was received by his political associates, and chiefly by M. Jules Favre, proved to him that they were a revolutionary faction, full of personal rancour, and not a loyal political party.[1] The zeal which M. de Morny displayed in promoting it, and the ardour with which he had ranged himself on the Liberal side for other advances towards parliamentary government, made his loss one to be deeply regretted. Had he lived, not only might he have redeemed his reputation by honest service in the cause of liberty, but he might have guided the Empire safely through the perils of the changes on which the Emperor was bent.

On the eve of M. de Morny's death, His Majesty with the Empress had visited him, and remained part of the night by his bedside. The Duke and the Sovereign had been estranged several times through the imprudences and audacities of the speculator who could not keep his hands clear of stock-jobbing and of dangerous and immoral transactions, even when ennobled and entrusted with one of the highest offices in the State. From his palace on the banks of the Seine, where he was surrounded with a court only second in brilliancy to that of the Tuileries, he had turned again and again to the Bourse; and, at his death, a charge lay upon him of having drawn the Emperor into the Mexican expedition that he might carry out an ignoble bargain. But the Emperor forgot all these wrongs at his friend's death-bed, and there were tears in his eyes as he passed silently out of the Palais Bourbon, remembering only the dying man's brilliant gifts, his courageous and his loyal heart.

[1] The loyalty of M. Olivier to the Emperor drew off his friends from him, even while he was doing his utmost for the liberal cause. They and the press opposition denounced his liberal law on coalitions as an act of treason!

The Duke de Morny was made indeed 'splendid in ashes and pompous in the grave.' More imposing obsequies were never given by a Sovereign to an illustrious subject. The army of Paris, led by a Marshal of France,[1] opened the procession, which stretched for miles along the Boulevards.

In the Chamber, from which the authoritative, and at the same time courteous and conciliatory President had disappeared, M. Olivier, apostrophising M. de Morny's empty chair, declared that he was expressing the opinions common to M. de Morny and himself, when he said that the Emperor would find the rejuvenescence of the Empire in larger measures of liberty. He exhorted the Government to move resolutely forward on the path of freedom, saying that what they had done was too much or too little.[2] M. de Morny dead, he had had pourparlers with M. Rouher, who had become without dispute the foremost orator and support of the Empire; but between the two there was no sympathy, and they drew apart into opposite camps. This separation was a misfortune for the Empire.

M. Olivier, in a powerful speech (March 27, 1865), exhorted the Government, now that it was firmly established, to grant the people political liberty as well as civil liberty. 'While,' he said, 'it was foolish to yield to clamour, it was dangerous to put off concessions until popular anger had been aroused. Now it is neither too

[1] Marshal Magnan, who died two months afterwards.

[2] On the morrow of the famous decree of November 24—a decree at which both M. de Morny and M. Walewski had cordially worked, on the initiative of the Emperor—the President of the Legislative Body, meeting M. Olivier, said: 'Well, I hope you are content?' 'Yes,' M. Olivier answered, 'you are now established or lost: established if this is a beginning, lost if it is the beginning and end.' Afterwards the two statesmen agreed that the plan was to efface or complete, as they respectively put it, the *coup d'état* by a *coup d'éclat libéral*. As a preparation M. Olivier reconciled M. de Morny with Prince Napoleon.

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soon nor too late: it was the right moment.' He ended by remarking that, for the first time, he should vote for the Address with the majority.

M. Olivier was followed by M. Thiers (March 28), who in one of his most elaborate orations described the liberties that were necessary to a real government. He required individual liberty, electoral liberty, free speech and a free press: these constituted his 'missionaries of liberty.'

The phrases were caught up and bandied about the press and the *salons* for a long time afterwards. The 'necessary liberties' and the 'minimum of liberty' of M. Thiers were tossed about with the 'liberty without epithets' of M. Olivier. M. Thiers, in claiming his 'necessary liberties,' inferred that France possessed none—a falsity for which he was severely reprimanded, first by M. Thuillier, and then, with more authority, by the spokesman of the Government, M. Rouher, who reviewed the veteran statesman's career as one that had been opposed to every progress of his time, to railways and to free trade. M. Thiers had pursued only his own political advancement, through the troubles of his country, and he remained true to his old tactics.

Indeed, the time for the attack was ill chosen; for at the moment when it was made the press teemed with assaults upon the Government; hostile pamphleteers were abroad; and so complete was the freedom of the working classes to combine, that Paris was without cabs, owing to a strike of the cabmen.[1] France had

[1] This strike took place during the tour in Algiers which the Emperor made in 1865. The Empress, who was Regent, sent for M. Olivier, as one of the Commission on the Coalition laws, and enquired minutely into the working of the new law, under which the cabmen had struck, and into the principles of co-operative societies, in which she was interested. Her Majesty was implored to interfere, to compel the cabmen to resume work; but she resolutely declined to interfere 'd'urgence' with the liberty which had been just granted.

not all the liberty she might reasonably expect; but to say that she had no liberties was to make an untruthful and factious statement. The covert design of the new Opposition was tersely described by M. Pelletan, when he said that their work was like that of animals whose underground destruction of the basis of a building is known only when it falls. This work of destruction, according to M. Rouher and his friends, was helped forward when the Emperor, on his return from Algeria (where he had been received with enthusiasm by his troops and by the Arabs), acceded to M. Emile Olivier's request, made at their first interview (June 27, 1865), that no further refusals should be given to the demands of working men to hold meetings.

The session of 1866 was opened on January 22—M. Walewski, who had been appointed successor to M. de Morny, presiding.[1] In this session a first and powerful Opposition group was formed, in which the Orleanists predominated. They mustered forty-five deputies. In the separate amendment to the Address, presented by them, they said: 'France, firmly attached to the dynasty which guarantees order, is not less so to liberty, which she considers necessary to the accomplishment of her destinies.' They exhorted the Emperor to carry forward at once the liberal reforms which, they maintained, were the natural consequences of his 'great act of 1860,' and which the experience of the last five years had proved to be proper and necessary. This progress on the part of the Sovereign would make the nation contemplate the future with entire confidence. M. Buffet and M. Thiers were the chief spokesmen of the group; and they asked nothing which should not have been granted, and which the

[1] M. Walewski proved unequal to the duties of President, and retired in the second session of his presidency.

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Emperor was not even eager to grant to loyal men. But the past five years, and this sixth session of debates on the Address, had developed, not a reform, but a masked revolutionary party, whose ends could be discerned by the close observer of their movements. M. Jérôme David boldly answered M. Buffet, telling him that his groups of Legitimists, Orleanists, and Republicans were united only by a common hate; and that they were seeking, not a Liberal Empire, but powers by which they might destroy it. M. Olivier alone was conscientious when he said that liberty would set up the Imperial dynasty upon a rock.

M. Rouher in his reply on the debate denied that a complete return to parliamentary government, with Ministers responsible to the Chamber, was compatible with the Imperial Constitution as established by the plebiscite of 1852.[1] M. Emile Olivier had said that the decree of November 20, 1860, had struck at its foundations; but this could not be. Only the direct vote of the people could put aside that which their direct vote had willed; and this vote had defined the powers of the Legislative Body, and had confided to the Sovereign the administration of the Government, as the representative of the national sovereignty. M. Rouher skilfully recalled the debates under the Government of July, in which MM. Guizot and Thiers had themselves rejected universal suffrage as incompatible with parliamentary government. The national sovereignty was embodied in the Emperor by nine millions of votes. If universal suffrage was to remain this sovereignty must be intact.

[1] Writing to Prince Napoleon about this time, and returning him some letters of Proudhon which the Prince had lent him for his Life of the revolutionary philosopher, Sainte-Beuve said: 'Le Gouvernement a tort de voir par la société des salons. Le blanc domine; il n'y a de rouge que celui des cardinaux.'

The attribute of the elected Sovereign was authority; the functions of the elective bodies were to control and advise. The memorable debate was closed by the triumph of the Conservatives, who rejected the amendment of the forty-five by 269 votes against 63.

The Emperor, in his reply to the Address, betrayed his disappointment, when he said: 'We are in quest of that liberty which enlightens, controls, and discusses the conduct of the Government, and not that which becomes an arm to undermine and destroy it.' Then he went on to say: 'Fifteen years ago, the nominal Chief of the State, but without power or support in the Chamber, I dared to declare, backed by my conscience and the suffrages that had been given to me, that France should not perish in my hands. I have kept my word. For fifteen years France has grown and has developed her resources. Her high destinies are in course of their accomplishment. Our sons will continue our work after us. As guarantees I have the co-operation of the great Bodies of the State, the devotion of the army, the patriotism of all good citizens, and, that which our country has never lacked, the protection of Divine Providence.'

CHAPTER VI.

TWO GERMAN WARS.

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THE invasion of Denmark by Prussia and Austria was the opening scene of the long-protracted drama that closed with the proclamation of King William of Prussia as Emperor of Germany, in the gilded saloons of Louis XIV. at Versailles. That great wrong which England, France, and Russia permitted to be wrought upon a weak but gallant nation, brought in its train mighty evils upon some of those who forbore to help, and one at least of the wrongdoers. 'The conduct of Austria and Prussia is discreditably bad,' Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord Russell (February 13, 1864), 'and one or both of them will suffer for it before these matters are settled.'

The complications of the Sleswig-Holstein question are almost as perplexing to the student of modern history as those of the Eastern question. We may pass them over very briefly; for they affected the fortunes of the French Empire only after Field-Marshal Wrangel invaded Holstein at the head of 80,000 German troops, on February 1, 1864. The difficulties between Germany and Denmark about the two provinces arose when, in 1848, the revolutionary party in Denmark appealed to Germany to help them in establishing the union of Sleswig and Holstein. Germany, nothing loth, interfered in behalf of the revolutionists; and from the moment when she was permitted to have a hand in the

regulation of the destinies of the Duchies, began Prussia's scheme of self-aggrandisement, the first triumph of which was her possession of the harbour of Kiel, and the last of which was the abolition of Paragraph 5 of the Treaty of Prague, in 1878.[1] It is a long story of falsehood, craft, and cunning, absolved by success.

The part taken by France and England in the negotiations which preceded and followed the invasion of Denmark by the Austrians and Prussians was to the credit of neither. Public indignation was fierce in both countries at the brutal conduct of the two German Powers, and it was suggested that England and France should offer mediation on the basis of the treaty engagements of 1852. A refusal on the part of the Germans was to be met by a British squadron at Copenhagen, and a French *corps d'armée* on the Rhenish frontier. To this proposal both France and Russia declined to agree. The Emperor Napoleon was in no mood to fall in with suggestions from Lords Palmerston and Russell, especially in an expedition against the two Powers with which England had been lately negotiating, in order to isolate him in Europe. He had full in his mind the defeat of the Congress he had proposed; and this defeat was in the main the work of the British Cabinet. He met the suspicion of England with cold reserve when she turned to him suddenly to co-operate with her. In April an armistice was arranged, that a conference might be held in London, to settle the dispute between the belligerents. But the victorious Germans would listen to no fair terms,

[1] By the insertion of Paragraph 5 in the Treaty of Prague, Denmark acquired a moral right at least to have the question of North Sleswig settled by a plebiscite; and at different times appeals were addressed by the Danish Government to the different Powers—France, England, and Russia—but in vain.

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the conference broke up, and the war was resumed. On June 24 the British Government applied to the Emperor a second time to co-operate actively in defence of the heroic Danes. The Emperor declined again on the terms offered by England, but tendered his moral support. He played the part which England had performed in the Italian struggle for independence; while England gave only sympathy and regrets, left the Danes to be crushed, and saw her forced to sign a peace at Vienna, by which she gave up to her immoral and shameless foes the Duchies of Sleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg.[1] M. de Bismarck remained at Biarritz during the negotiations.

The share of France in these transactions must be attributed in part to the state of the Emperor's health, as well as to the condition of perplexity and mistrust in which the failure of the Congress had left him,[2] and

[1] 'It was an unworthy abuse of power by Austria and Prussia, to take advantage of their superior enlightenment and strength to crush an antagonist incapable of successful resistance; and the events of this Danish war do not form a page in German history which any honourable or generous German hereafter will look back upon without a blush. I wish that France and Russia had consented to join with us in giving a different direction to those affairs; and I am convinced that words from three such Powers would have been sufficient without recourse to blows. One consequence is clear and certain, namely, that if our good friend and neighbour at Paris were to take it into his head to deprive Prussia of her Rhenish provinces, not a finger in England would be stirred, not a voice raised, nor a man nor a shilling voted to resist such retribution upon the Prussian monarch; and when France and Italy shall be prepared to deliver Venetia from the Austrian yoke, the joy with which the success of such an undertaking will be hailed throughout England will be doubled by the recollection of Holstein, Lauenburg, Sleswig, and Jutland.'—Letter of Lord Palmerston to the King of the Belgians, August 28, 1864.

[2] 'Il semble hors de doute que la Sainte Alliance, que la France avait réussi à rompre par la guerre de Crimée, est, pour le moment, plus ou moins un fait accompli, vis-à-vis duquel l'Empereur, abandonné de l'Angleterre, ou du moins sans pouvoir compter sur cet Etat, s'est décidé à observer une position encore plus réservée qu'auparavant.'—The Danish Minister in Paris to the

to the German influences in England which fettered Lord Palmerston's Government. When, in June, Lord Cowley pressed His Majesty to go to war, in alliance with England, the Emperor was suffering acutely from that disease which his physicians appear to have misunderstood from the first. He hesitated to commit the fortunes of his country and his House to the issues of a great war; and the English Government took advantage of his indecision to declare in the House of Lords (June 17) that since France would not fight for the treaty of 1852, England must decline to go single-handed into the fray, particularly as the treaty included no positive guarantee of the integrity of the kingdom of Denmark.

This statement was not an ingenuous one. The negotiations between the two Governments had been carried on between Lord Cowley, the Prince da la Tour d'Auvergne, French Ambassador in London, and MM. Rouher and Drouyn de Lhuys, on the part of the Emperor. According to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, England never offered more than her fleet as her share of the forces which were to drive off Prussia and Austria,[1] leaving France to bear alone the shock of the combined German armies; and it was for this reason he and M. Rouher persuaded the Emperor to hold back. Had England offered an offensive and defensive alliance 'on reasonable terms,' France would have once more taken the field with her old ally; but even with the prospect of a Rhine frontier, to which England is said to have consented in June, a war by France alone against the united armies of Germany was not to be thought of.

Minister of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen, July 7, 1864. *Les Coulisses de la Diplomatie*, p. 26.

[1] *Les Coulisses de la Diplomatie*, p. 14.

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On May 31, while the Conference was sitting, the Emperor gave audience to the Count Moltke, the Danish Minister, at his Court. The Minister found Napoleon with the map of Sleswig before him, and thoroughly master of the frontier questions then under debate in London. He told the Count candidly that Denmark must content herself with the Flensborg-Tœnder line, as the utmost the Conference could obtain. 'If she continues the war,' said the Emperor, 'Denmark will lose Sleswig. England will do nothing for Denmark. I personally, as well as the entire French people, cherish the deepest sympathy for the Danish nation; but I must look after the interests of my own country before those of Denmark, and I cannot take upon myself the responsibility of waging war alone to help you.'

Lords Russell and Palmerston were not satisfied with the line of conduct into which the course of events, the manufacturers' peace party, and German sympathisers had forced them.[1] They suffered a vote of censure in the House of Lords, and barely escaped one in the House of Commons. The two statesmen exchanged opinions on the question when it was at an end. The Premier wrote to his Foreign Secretary (September 11, 1864): 'You say that with less timidity around us we might probably have kept Austria quiet in the Danish affair. Perhaps we might; but then we had no equal pull upon Prussia, and she would have rallied all the smaller German Powers round her, and we should equally have failed in saving Denmark.' The 'timidity around them' prevented them from offering France more than a naval co-operation, and decided them to take advantage of the Emperor's

[1] *Les Coulisses de la Diplomatie*, p. 22.

hesitation to justify them in leaving Denmark to her fate.

The Danish negotiations settled, much to his dissatisfaction, the Emperor left Paris for Vichy in July, to take the waters; and he remained a month under treatment. It was while he was here, at rest from the cares of State, that he wrote a characteristic letter to Marshal Vaillant, Minister of the Imperial household, on two great building operations in Paris:—

'Vichy, July 3, 1864.

'My dear Marshal,—I wish to communicate to you a reflection I have made during the rest I am enjoying here. Two great establishments, for very different objects, viz. the Opera and the Hôtel Dieu, are to be rebuilt in Paris. The first is already in progress; the second is not yet begun.

'Although one, the Opera, is to be built at the cost of the State, and the Hôtel Dieu at that of the City of Paris and the *hospices*, both will be remarkable monuments in the capital; but as they serve two very different interests, I should not like one to appear better protected than the other.

'The cost of the Imperial Academy of Music will unfortunately exceed the estimates; and we must avoid the reproach of having spent millions on a theatre, before the first stone of the most popular hospital in Paris has been laid.

'I beg you therefore to urge the Prefect of the Seine to begin the works of the Hôtel Dieu soon, and direct those of the Opera so that both monuments shall be finished at the same time.

'I admit that this arrangement has no practical advantage; but from a moral point of view I hold it important that the edifice to be devoted to pleasure

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shall not be raised before the shelter for suffering. Receive, dear Marshal, the assurance of my sincere friendship. NAPOLEON.'

From the repose of Vichy, which gave him temporary relief, the Emperor passed to the bustle of the Camp of Châlons, where he appointed Marshal MacMahon Governor-General of Algeria, in the place of Pélissier, Duke of Malakoff, who had died in May. The year was closed with another, and, to the heart of the Emperor, a severer loss. On December 10, M. Mocquard, his faithful friend and secretary—who had been devoted to him from his early days at Arenenberg—was added to the fast increasing list of his departed adherents. In M. Mocquard the Emperor lost not only the most faithful and affectionate of servants, but a scholarly companion, a bright intelligence, and a discreet and vigorous writer.[1]

Within a few weeks of the signature of peace between Prussia and Austria and Denmark, M. de Bismarck was preparing for a war with Austria. On December 16 (1864) he gave audience to M. Jules Hansen, the Danish journalist, whom he had recently met at Biarritz, in Berlin; and discussed with him the advisability of giving back North Sleswig to Denmark, on the understanding that the Danes would then refrain from opposing the incorporation of the rest of the Duchies with Prussia, to the exclusion of Austria. M. Hansen pointed out that this course would probably obtain the hearty consent of England, France, and Russia; and that it would particularly commend itself to the Emperor Napoleon, whose policy was based on the principle of nationalities. M. de Bismarck remarked

[1] He was succeeded by M. Etienne Conti, who remained faithful to the Emperor, and served him loyally till his death on February 8, 1872.

that of course Prussia would have to reckon with Austria, and that war might break out 'in a month or in a year,'[1] and therefore that the neutrality of the Powers was worth much; but he was not prepared to say that that of Denmark would be worth North Sleswig without some compensating territory. He admitted that there were 200,000 Danes in North Sleswig, who would raise a clamour against incorporation with Prussia: but the moment had not yet come to deal with the question, and he recommended M. Hansen to wait patiently. 'I,' he added, 'have learned the art of waiting.'

M. Drouyn de Lhuys addressed a circular, on the last day of 1864, to the Emperor's representatives at the European Courts, bidding them support a solution of the Sleswig difficulty on the basis of nationalities—Danish Sleswig passing to Denmark, and German Sleswig to Germany. But M. de Bismarck still decided to wait. Events were happening quite to his satisfaction. The opposition of Prussia to the pretensions of the Prince of Augustenburg to the Duchies; the resistance of Austria to their annexation to Prussia; the disinclination of both Prussia and Austria to the Anglo-French proposal that Danish Sleswig should be retroceded; and the uneasiness of the Emperor Napoleon, who dreaded the renewal of the Holy Alliance of Russia, Prussia, and Austria against him, and who felt that he could no longer count upon the cordial alliance of England: these were the elements of gathering complications with which M. de Bismarck had to play. He still watched and waited, while diplomatists, politicians, and journalists grew angry over the two solutions which were presented to Europe. The first was the retro-

[1] *Les Coulisses de la Diplomatie.*

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cession of North Sleswig to Denmark, and the incorporation of the rest of the Elbe Duchies with Prussia; the second was their incorporation as a separate State under the Prince of Augustenburg. The first solution was that which England and France supported. The retrocession to Denmark was the indispensable condition of their acquiescence in the handing over of the German portion of the Duchies to Prussia. Austria vehemently opposed any such solution, and was becoming very angry at the ambitious designs of her ally in the plunder of Denmark.

In the spring of 1865 the Duke Charles of Glücksburg had an interview with the Emperor Napoleon in Paris to press upon him the candidature of the Prince of Augustenburg; and the Emperor replied that the will of the people should be consulted. He had always supported the principle of nationalities, and he had, therefore, always regarded the retrocession of North Sleswig to Denmark as the best solution. But he had no intention of going to war to enforce it.

Through many difficulties Prussia, under the resolute and patient guidance of M. de Bismarck, held on her way to empire. The Chambers in Berlin refused the Government the subsidies they requested; the Diet at Frankfort was turbulently hostile; Bavaria called for energetic measures against the threatened domination of the Prussian monarchy. In the summer war was imminent between Austria and Prussia; and both were ill prepared for a struggle. Hence the celebrated Convention of Gastein that was signed on the 14th of August, 1865,[1] by which Lauenburg was sold by Austria to Prussia. It was a convention against which England and France protested, but which they suffered to be carried out—

[1] For this Convention M. de Bismarck was rewarded with the title of Count.

England merely demonstrating her cordial agreement with France by a visit of her ironclads to Cherbourg. To the parties to the Convention it was but a truce. M. de Bismarck was not yet quite certain of the neutrality of France, nor was his alliance complete with Italy. From Gastein he repaired to Biarritz, to feel the pulse of the Emperor.

His Majesty was in no mood to enter upon fresh complications. The failure of his Congress, of his efforts in favour of Poland, and of his attempt to help or to save Denmark, had helped his political enemies at home to weapons of attack which they had freely used. Moreover French statesmen were on foreign affairs divided into two bitterly hostile camps. There were the supporters of the unification of Germany and Italy as the allies of France; and there were the politicians of the old school who were frankly anti-German, and hostile to the erection of a united Germany on the frontiers of France. The wise course for France would have been, in alliance with England, to oppose the *status quo* to all M. de Bismarck's designs; to have held silently aloof from his negotiations for an alliance with Italy; and to have turned a deaf ear to his territorial propositions. With France silent and on the watch, he would not have ventured to throw himself upon Austria, nor would Italy have risked an offensive alliance with him.[1]

'Remaining generally silent in the midst of these contradictory debates,' M. Julian Klaczko has remarked in his 'Two Chancellors,' 'loving moreover to soar

[1] 'Whatever may be said now, if France had appeared opposed to these steps (the treaty of Italy with Prussia), we could not have run the risk of finding ourselves face to face with an Austro-French alliance. Prussia was as anxious as we were, perhaps even more so, as to the attitude that France would adopt in the event of a war by Prussia and Italy against Austria.'— *Un Poco più di Luce*—Lamarmora.

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above the passions and contentions of his entourage, in the serenity of a calm and meditative mind, the Emperor Napoleon III. was ripening a project that appeared to him to meet two arguments of both sides, and to be in harmony with his direction to his Minister for Foreign Affairs—*inertia sapientiæ!* He had Italy more in hand than M. Drouyn de Lhuys imagined. It had been the passion—perhaps the vow—of his youth; and even the Empress Eugénie had become the ardent advocate of the liberation of Venice since the introduction of M. de la Valette to the Ministry, and perhaps since the day when the Chevalier Nigra had thrown off some graceful and pertinent couplets on the subject of a gondola, which she had launched on the lake at Fontainebleau.

The Emperor was favourable to the formation of a powerful Prussia; and to the thorough re-adjustment of the frontiers. 'The geographical situation of Prussia,' he remarked to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, 'is badly traced.'[1] Faithful to his principle of nationalities, he conceived a strong Protestant Germany, rounded to the Elbe and the Baltic, with a traditionally Catholic Austria, and a number of secondary States between. The Venetian Province was to be ceded to Victor Emmanuel, and so a free Italy was to stretch from the Alps to the Adriatic, while Austria was to be compensated with Silesia. France was to have the Catholic provinces of the Rhine—not Belgium. Again and again the Emperor said that to seize upon the kingdom of Leopold would be 'an act of brigandage.' His main object was not the enlargement of his own Empire, but the re-adjustment of Italy, Prussia, and Austria on bases that would ensure a contented

[1] Letter to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, June 11, 1866.

Europe, and for himself the glory of having been the author of a permanent settlement on the principle which had always been the keystone of his policy. Above all, he desired to finish his work as the emancipator of Italy; and it was on this desire that M. de Bismarck worked to obtain his alliance with Victor Emmanuel, and to ensure the neutrality of France, in the event of a war between Prussia and Austria. 'If Italy did not exist,' he said to the Chevalier Nigra after his return from Biarritz, 'we should have to invent her.'[1]

The famous interviews which the first Minister of Prussia had with the Emperor Napoleon at Biarritz, in October, 1865, have found many interpreters. The Emperor's enemies have declared that in the hands of the Prussian statesman he was as pliant as clay in those of the potter; while his friends and admirers have insisted that he was not led in his after policy by the persuasive tongue of his visitor. The truth is, that Napoleon remained silent, and that he was unfavourably impressed by the extravagant forms into which M. de Bismarck threw his political speculations as they walked along the beach, the Emperor leaning upon Prosper Mérimée's arm, and exchanging now and again a glance and a smile, as the boisterous German talked. 'Is he mad?' the Emperor whispered to Mérimée.[2] Mérimée's opinion was that M. de Bismarck was a

[1] 'Ce qui, pendant le séjour de Biarritz, dut le moins échapper à un observateur sagace comme M. de Bismarck, c'était la prise que donnait sur l'esprit de Louis-Napoléon son attachement profond pour la patrie de Cavour et de Manin; là était la clef de la position, le vrai mot du Sphinx, et cette certitude acquise compensait aux yeux du ministre prussien bien des doutes encore inquiétants, le faisait passer sur mainte réticence de l'auguste taciturne.'

[2] 'He is a savage of genius,' said M. Thiers, in the Place Saint-Georges.

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great man playing a game in his own original way;[1] and he was highly amused in watching the meditative and silent Sovereign, parrying the thrusts of his unwieldy antagonist, and steadily declining to give him an advantage. 'He is a big German,' Mérimée wrote to his unknown correspondent, 'very polite, and by no means naïf. He appears to be absolutely devoid of *Gemüth* (geniality), but full of wit. He has quite won me.'

Had he conquered the Emperor also? At any rate he had found his weak point, and that was his love for Italy. 'He spoke of Belgium and part of Switzerland as necessary and legitimate elements of French unity; of the common action of France and Germany for the cause of progress and humanity; of a future understanding between Paris, Berlin, and Florence, even London and Washington, to lead the destinies of Europe, to regulate the affairs of the whole world, to turn Russia to her true vocation in Asia, and Austria to her civilising mission on the Danube.'[2] Nevertheless, the Prussian Premier returned to Paris in no pleasant humour. Nor was this humour improved by his interviews with M. Drouyn de Lhuys. France had just concluded an advantageous commercial treaty with Austria, and the policy of the Government inclined towards Vienna, in spite of the faith of the Emperor in a powerful Germany under the Hohenzollerns. The activity and popularity of the Prince de Metternich in Paris thwarted for a time the adventurous schemes of the German Minister, who knew that he was playing a desperate game for his country; and he was not unaware that he might be leading her to a second Olmütz.

[1] 'Il n'y a que M. de Bismarck qui soit un vrai grand homme.'—*Lettres à une Inconnue*, vol. ii. p. 321.

[2] *Deux Chanceliers.* Par Julian Klaczko, ancien député au Parlement de Vienne. E. Plon: Paris, 1876.

The treaty of alliance between Prussia and Italy was signed on April 8, 1866. M. Bismarck had resolved upon war with Austria; and he immediately set to work to secure the 'benevolent neutrality' of the Emperor Napoleon. Promising was the very 'air o' the time,' and the adventurous statesman, who had determined to stake the fortunes of his country on the chances of war with a renowned military Power like Austria, even with the untried and not wholly organised troops of Prussia, under Generals Moltke and Roon, then inexperienced in the field, was prodigal in his offers to the French monarch, while he was allaying the fears and scruples of his own, and reconciling him to an alliance offensive and defensive with Victor Emmanuel. The records of the negotiations, official and unofficial, between Berlin and Paris, from the close of the Danish war to the victory of Sadowa, are still far from complete; but in the pages of Lamarmora, Julian Klaczko, Benedetti, Jules Hansen, Albert Sorel, and others who have already thrown considerable light on M. Bismarck's relations with Napoleon III., we find proof upon proof of the unblushing and cynical dishonesty of the former. The Emperor was sick in mind and body; and he was served by negotiators who were pigmies in the hands of the Minister of King William. He was a dreamer of benevolent intentions; and he permitted an unscrupulous rival to outwit him, to use him, to cheat him, to insult him, and at length to overcome him. The revolution in Roumania might have given Venice peaceably to Italy, whereas, through the devices of M. Bismarck, Napoleon helped to plant a Prussian Prince on the banks of the Danube. The Congress, which the Emperor proposed in order to settle peaceably the questions in dispute among the Powers, would have frustrated the designs of M. Bismarck, and, with the

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help of Prince Gortchakof, he put it aside as impracticable, at the same time whispering into diplomatic ears that he was less German than Prussian, and would not hesitate to give up all the country between the Rhine and the Moselle to France. 'Saved from the Congress,' as M. d'Usedom expressed it, M. de Bismarck laboured to draw King William off from his idea of a peaceful transaction with Austria on the subject of the Duchies, and to inflame his ambition in favour of a German nationality. He succeeded in the end; but the King gave way reluctantly, and with tears in his eyes. The venture was a most hazardous one, according to the unanimous opinion of the military authorities of Europe. The general belief was that M. de Bismarck was driving his country to utter ruin. In the course of a debate in the Legislative Body (May 3, 1866), M. Thiers characterised the conduct of Prussia as outrageous (*burlesque*), while M. Emile Olivier stigmatised it as infamous. The general belief in Paris was that Prussia would be badly beaten; and that then France, as mediator, would command the situation. This was the idea of the Emperor; and he submitted it at length to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in the following communication:—

'Palace of the Tuileries, June 11, 1866.

'Monsieur le Ministre,—At the moment when the hope of peace, which the meeting of a Conference had led us to conceive, is fading away, it is essential that we should explain in a circular, addressed to our diplomatic agents abroad, the ideas my Government intended to submit to the councils of Europe, and the line of conduct it will adopt in the course of the events which are preparing.

'This circular will place our policy in its true light. If the Conference had taken place, your language, as

you know, would have been very explicit. You would have declared in my name that I rejected any idea of territorial aggrandisement, so long as the European equilibrium was not broken. We could indeed think of the extension of our frontiers only in case the map of Europe should be modified for the benefit of a great Power, and the frontier provinces demanded, by a free vote, their annexation to France.

'These circumstances apart, I hold it to be worthier in our country to prefer, to territorial acquisitions, the precious advantage of living on good terms with our neighbours, by respecting their independence and their nationality.

'Animated by these sentiments, and having in view only the maintenance of peace, I appealed to England and Russia, to make a common effort of conciliation to the interested parties. The understanding established between the neutral Powers will remain in itself a guarantee of security for Europe. They had shown their thorough impartiality in resolving to restrict the discussions of the Conference to the questions in dispute. I believed that in order to solve them, they should be frankly stated, that they should be freed from the diplomatic veil which covered them, and that the legitimate desires of sovereigns and peoples should be taken into serious consideration.

'The conflict which has arisen has three causes.

'The badly defined (*mal délimitée*) geographical situation of Prussia.

'The desire of Germany for a political reconstitution more in conformity with her general wants (*besoins généraux*).

'The necessity under which Italy lies to secure her national independence.

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'The neutral Powers could not have desired to interfere with the internal affairs of foreign countries; nevertheless the Courts which had taken part in the constitution of the Germanic Confederation, had the right to enquire whether the contemplated changes were of a nature to compromise the order of things established in Europe. As far as we were concerned, we should have been in favour of a closer union of the secondary States of the Confederation, a more powerful organisation, a more important place, in regard to Prussia, of more homogeneity and strength in the north; and for Austria the maintenance of her great position in Germany.

'We should have favoured, moreover, the cession of Venetia by Austria to Italy, in return for an equitable compensation; for if in concert with Prussia, and putting aside the treaty of 1852, she waged war against Denmark in the name of the German nationality, it appeared to me just that she should accept the same principle in Italy, by completing the independence of the Peninsula.

'Such are the ideas, which, in the interest of the peace of Europe, we should have attempted to establish. To-day it is to be feared that the arbitrament of the sword will decide.

'In the presence of these eventualities, what should be the attitude of France? Should we manifest our displeasure because Germany finds the treaties of 1815 insufficient to satisfy her national aspirations and to maintain her tranquillity?

'In the struggle which is about to begin we have only two interests: the preservation of the European equilibrium and the maintenance of the work which we have helped to raise in Italy. But, to preserve these two interests, is not the moral strength of France

enough? In order to make her voice heard, must she draw the sword? I think not.

'If, in spite of our efforts, our hopes of peace should not be realised, we are still assured, by the declarations of the Powers engaged in the conflict, that, let the results of the war be what they may, none of the questions which affect us will be settled without the consent of France. Let us keep, then, a watchful neutrality; and, strong in our unselfishness, animated by the sincere desire to see the nations of Europe forget their quarrels, and to unite in the cause of civilisation, of liberty, and of progress, let us remain confident in our right, and calm in our strength.'

The war between Prussia and Italy and Austria was even shorter and sharper than that between Austria and France and Italy had been. M. de Bismarck, who went forth to the war at the end of June with a French romance in his pocket to distract him from the horrors of the battle-field, found himself master of Germany on the 3rd of July, when the sun went down on Sadowa, and at liberty to return to Berlin, as he had resolved, through Vienna and Munich.

On the morrow of Sadowa, the 'Moniteur' contained the following announcement:—

'An important event has happened.

'After having vindicated the honour of his arms in Italy, the Emperor of Austria, acceding to the ideas of the Emperor Napoleon, as expressed in his letter to his Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 11th of June, cedes Venetia to the Emperor of the French, and accepts his mediation to arrange a peace between the belligerents. The Emperor hastened to respond to his appeal; and immediately addressed himself to the Kings of Prussia and Italy, to arrange the terms of an armis-

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tice.'[1] While General Le Bœuf went to Venice to receive the city and the fortresses of the Quadrilateral from Austria, on August 11, these terms being arranged, he addressed the following letter to King Victor Emmanuel :—

'Saint Cloud, August 11, 1866.

'Monsieur mon Frère,—I have learned with pleasure that your Majesty has adhered to the armistice and to the preliminaries of peace signed between the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria. It is probable, therefore, that a new era of tranquillity is about to open for Europe. Your Majesty knows that I have accepted the offer of Venetia, to protect it from devastation, and to prevent a useless effusion of blood. My object has always been to deliver it up, so that Italy might be free from the Alps to the Adriatic. Being mistress of her destinies, Venetia will soon be able to express her wishes by universal suffrage.

'Your Majesty will acknowledge that in these events the action of France has been used once again in favour of humanity, and of the independence of nations.

'I renew to you the assurance of the sentiments of high esteem, and of sincere friendship, with which I remain

'Your Majesty's good brother,

'NAPOLEON.'

[1] 'Berlin, le 6 juillet, 1866.

'L'émotion qu'a produite ici la note du *Moniteur*, sur la cession de la Vénétie et la médiation de l'empereur Napoléon pour arriver à un armistice, est indescriptible. Tout le monde—bourgeois, officiers et simples soldats—est exaspéré; on ne veut pas entendre parler de "paix française" (*französischen Frieden*), de "paix pourrie" (*faulen Frieden*), ni être arrêté à mi-chemin, et autres propos semblables. . . . Je ne puis m'empêcher de croire que la France, après bien des pourparlers, réussira à faire accepter un armistice et, plus tard, la paix.'—*Les Coulisses de la Diplomatie.* Par Jules Hansen.

M. de Bismarck, in his speech in the Prussian Chambers, December 20, said French mediation was accepted only because it was offered in the form of an ultimatum.

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Between the battle of Sadowa and the signature of the preliminaries of peace on July 26, and again between July 26 and August 23, when the Peace of Prague was signed, the hesitations and discussions in the Imperial councils were of the most lamentable kind. The Emperor was very ill, and in haste to be away in search of relief, at Vichy, from sufferings becoming intolerable. He was anxious on many grounds for an amicable settlement; and he believed that a watchful neutrality would obtain conditions of peace that would satisfy the susceptibilities of his subjects. But such was not the opinion of his Foreign Minister, nor of the Duke de Grammont, then Ambassador in Vienna.

On the morrow of Sadowa, M. Drouyn de Lhuys obtained an interview with the Emperor, and said that France was face to face with events which might prove as disastrous to him as the defeats of the First Empire. He urged the Sovereign to call the Legislative Body together, and to give orders to concentrate an army of observation of 80,000 men on the eastern frontier. M. Benedetti should inform the King of Prussia that the Emperor would feel himself compelled to occupy the left bank of the Rhine, if His Majesty insisted upon acquisitions of territory that would disturb the European equilibrium. The Rhine was stripped of its troops; and Marshal Randon was ready to put 80,000 men in the field at once.

The Emperor is said to have yielded to the argument of his Foreign Minister, and to have agreed that a note convoking the Chambers should appear in the morrow's 'Moniteur.'[1] But M. Rouher, Minister of State, and M. de la Valette, Minister of the Interior, having heard of the Foreign Minister's victory, sought

[1] *Les Coulisses de la Diplomatie.*

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the Emperor, and prevailed upon him finally to remain in a strictly neutral position. He was more thoroughly committed to the alliance between Prussia and Italy, through Prince Napoleon, M. de la Valette, and M. Benedetti, than M. Drouyn de Lhuys was aware of. That conflict of separate and independent advisers, which the Prince Consort had pointed out to the Emperor as the fundamental weakness of his position as a sovereign, was seen in all its viciousness at this moment of supreme importance, and it served the turn of M. de Bismarck only too well. M. de Goltz found resolution at the Foreign Office, but hesitation and a strong disinclination to take any risk, at the Tuileries.[1] De Grammont had pointed out to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that there were not 15,000 troops between Berlin and the Rhine; but MM. de la Valette and Benedetti had reminded their Sovereign that the army was not in a state to face the Prussian needle-gun, which had mown down the Austrian battalions. The German Minister in Paris came on the scene at this juncture; and, after seeing the Emperor, informed M. Drouyn de Lhuys that he had obtained for his master more than he had hoped to get: Prussia might make her own terms

[1] M. Thiers, who was very active, diplomatically, all this time, blamed the French Government for not having supported the British Government in the Danish question. He was opposed to the principle of nationalities. He declared that the French nation detested the Italians, because they led them into political embarrassments. He was resolutely opposed to the German unity, and supported the autonomy of the small German States. He exclaimed to M. Hansen (May 28, 1866): 'Let M. de Bismarck have a care if he comes here to the Congress. The people might make a demonstration that would not be agreeable to him.' M. de Bismarck was aware of this feeling, and had arranged that, in the case of the Congress meeting, a body of French police should meet him at the frontier and escort him to Paris. In short, M. Thiers was sincerely opposed to the policy of the Emperor, and desired an active alliance with Austria. He held that all was being sacrificed to the liberation of Venetia.

with Austria. Those conditions laid the foundation of the German Empire; and Napoleon, fettered by his secret treaty (June 12, 1866) with Austria, and the dissensions of his advisers, and the unsatisfactory state of his army, was compelled to look on, while the European equilibrium was rudely broken under his eyes.

On his return from Vichy early in August, somewhat relieved by the waters, the Emperor found a bitter cup ready for his lips. His Ambassador at Berlin had returned to Paris with the point-blank refusal of M. de Bismarck even to take into consideration the subject of the claim of France to have such an accession of territory as would redress the balance of power, which Prussia's immense conquests had disturbed. France had been used by the Prussian statesman while he wanted her help; but now that victory was in his hands, he needed her no longer. He even reproached her for having interfered in the peace preliminaries in behalf of Denmark.[1] When a second negotiator was sent to him from Paris with a memorandum, in which the establishment of a neutral State on the Rhine frontier was submitted as an alternative, M. de Bismarck declined even to receive the French envoy, and referred him to an underling, who told him that Prussia would listen neither to territorial compensations, nor to the neutralisation of German lands. Even the clause which had been inserted in the peace preliminaries, at the instance of France, in favour of North Sleswig, was on the point of being omitted from the definitive treaty, so defiant had the iron Count become between Nickolsburg and Prague, under the influence of victory. He declared he owed no wages to France; he described

[1] M. Jules Hansen was sent by the Count de Chandordy (August 11, 1866) with the memorandum in question.

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her proceedings as a policy of *pour-boires*; and his countrymen, emulating his spirit, laughed at caricatures in the Berlin shop-windows which presented Napoleon in ridiculous and abject positions.

With the Treaty of Prague M. Drouyn de Lhuys disappeared from the Foreign Office; and the Marquis de Moustier was recalled from the Embassy of Constantinople to take his place. But, in the interim, M. de la Valette acted as Foreign Minister, and appended his name to the famous circular to French diplomatic agents, of September 1, 1866, which his predecessor had declined to sign, in every paragraph of which we trace the hand of the Emperor. In this remarkable State paper, the condition of Europe consequent upon the Treaty of Prague was reviewed.

The treaty was accepted as the *coup de grâce* of the Treaties of 1815. The coalition of the three Northern Courts was broken. The principle of free alliances was henceforth to govern Europe. All the great Powers had recovered their independence, and were free to pursue the regular development of their destinies.

'Prussia aggrandised, free from all solidarity, secures the independence of Germany. France should not take umbrage at this. Proud of her own admirable unity, of her indestructible nationality, she cannot oppose or regret the work of assimilation which has just been accomplished, nor subordinate to feelings of jealousy the principles of nationality which she represents and professes in regard to other nations. The national sentiment of Germany being satisfied, her cares will be dissipated, and her hostilities will die out. In imitating France, she takes a step which does not remove her farther from, but brings her nearer to us.

'In the South, Italy, whose long servitude could not extinguish her patriotism, is put in possession of all the

elements of national greatness. Her existence modifies profoundly the political condition of Europe; but in spite of thoughtless susceptibilities or passing injustices, her ideas, her principles, her interests must draw her towards the nation which has shed her blood to help her to win her independence.

'The interests of the Pontifical throne are secured by the Convention of September 15. This Convention will be loyally executed. In withdrawing his troops from Rome, the Emperor leaves there, as a guarantee of the safety of the Holy Father, the protection of France.

'In the Baltic, as in the Mediterranean, small navies are growing that will be favourable to the freedom ot the seas.

'Austria, freed from her Italian and German preoccupations, and ceasing to waste her strength in barren rivalries, but concentrating it in the East of Europe, represents still a Power of thirty-five millions of souls, which no hostility or interest separates from France.

'By what a singular reaction of the past on the future, would public opinion discover, not allies, but enemies of France in these nations, freed from the need of playing a part which was hostile to us, called to a new life, governed by principles that are our own, and animated by those sentiments of progress which form the peaceful bond of modern societies?

'A Europe more solidly constituted, made more homogeneous by better defined territorial divisions, is a guarantee for the peace of the Continent, and is neither a peril nor a harm to our nation. This nation, with Algeria, will soon include forty millions of inhabitants; Germany, thirty-seven millions, twenty-nine in the Confederation of the North, and eight in the Confederation of the South; Austria, thirty-five; Italy,

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twenty-six; Spain, eighteen. What is there in this distribution of European forces that can disturb us?

'An irresistible force—is it to be regretted?—impels nations to unite in great agglomerations, suppressing secondary States. This tendency proceeds from a desire to give to general interests more efficacious security. It is perhaps inspired by a kind of providential prevision of the destinies of the world. While the old populations of the world, in their restricted boundaries, grow slowly, Russia and the United States of America may, within a century, reckon each a hundred millions of men. Although the progress of these two great Empires is not a subject of uneasiness for us, but, on the contrary, we applaud their generous efforts in favour of oppressed races, it is prudent in the interests of the nations of Central Europe not to remain cut up in small States, without strength or public spirit.

'Policy should rise superior to the narrow and mean prejudices of a former age. The Emperor does not believe that the greatness of a country depends upon the weakness of the nations which surround it, and he sees a true equilibrium only in the satisfied aspirations of the nations of Europe. In this, he is faithful to old convictions and to the traditions of his race. Napoleon I. foresaw the changes which are now taking place on the Continent of Europe. He had sown the seeds of new nationalities: in the Peninsula, when he created the kingdom of Italy; and in Germany, when he abolished two hundred and fifty-three separate States.'

This circular, which expressed honestly the opinions of the Emperor, but not those of his friends nor of his foes, could not hide the check which France had sustained, nor allay the bitterness of the general disappointment. M. Cousin was almost alone in com-

mending the Imperial view of the situation.[1] A Prussian member of the Jockey Club angered the young men of society by laying a heavy bet that M. de Bismarck would not let France have the smallest German village. M. Doudan wrote sparkling things to his correspondents at the expense of the Government, in which he said that many perfect rifles would be wanted to repair the mischief which was then being permitted by France. He gave a sample of the address to the Emperor at the meeting of the Chambers:—'Thanks to the labours of your Majesty, a military Power, which reconstitutes the Germanic Empire with more strength than unity, is about to cover France with the shadow of its glorious neighbourhood.' M. Prévost-Paradol, in the 'Courrier du Dimanche,' had been attacking the Imperial policy without mercy, and at the close of the year put forth his letters in a volume with a preface, 'composed of vitriol and champagne,' to expose the folly of a policy that had drawn a million of fighting men along the frontiers of France, and then had summoned a Military Commission to reorganise the army. Among the hostile critics of the Imperial policy was one whose devoted friendship the Emperor could not doubt. Queen Sophia of Holland wrote to him in bitter terms, reproaching him for permitting Austria to be humbled and the Federal States to be subjugated; and warning him that he was working his own downfall.

M. Thiers, who never relaxed his activity in opposition to the Government, said that France would find herself isolated. King William might have himself

[1] 'Pour M. Cousin, il admire, dit-on, le génie de notre Empereur dans tout ceci. Selon ses fortes impressions, il s'incline devant le plus grand politique de nos jours; c'est ainsi qu'il parlait l'autre jour à M. Vuitry.'—X. Doudan: Letter to M. Picatory, July 18, 1866. Vol. iv. p. 43.

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proclaimed Emperor by a German Parliament, and it would be difficult for France to bear this. He regarded the talk about the annexation of Belgium as pure folly, and another trap laid by M. de Bismarck. France would find it difficult to secure allies. Italy was anxious to preserve her cordial friendship with Prussia; Austria was estranged by the hesitation of France in coming to her assistance after the cession of Venetia, and would probably take her revenge by remaining neutral. 'I will not allow myself,' M. Thiers added,[1] 'to be diverted from my opposition to the Empire, because I think I am fulfilling a duty to my country. For the last four centuries France has not suffered a greater misfortune than that which has just happened to her. And what is the cause of it except the personal government to which I cannot accustom myself? I cannot bear to see clerks at the head of the Government. I want Ministers responsible to the country, and not to one man.

'The public are very dissatisfied with recent events abroad; but the Opposition will take no initiative. We shall leave the responsibility to the Government. As for me, I think it necessary to stop the progress of Prussia; but I don't want a war with her at present.[2] Two years hence, when Austria will be ready, the moment will come for France to oppose the ambition of Prussia, sword in hand. But in order to do this, we must not be guilty of imprudences like that which the Government is committing with this great loan for new

[1] Conversation between M. Thiers and M. Jules Hansen, towards the end of 1866. *Les Coulisses de la Diplomatie*, p. 130.

[2] About this time M. Mérimée wrote from Saint Cloud to his friend Panizzi: 'We shall have to swallow a few vipers perhaps, and we will digest them till our needle-guns are ready. It remains to be seen what the German Parliament will do; whether they will not commit blunders and lose the advantages they have gained.'

streets, and in so-called economical experiments. I consider all this as folly at a time when France has more need than ever for her money. This is the reason why M. Fould is retiring.'[1]

Sick in mind and body, the Emperor retired first to Biarritz, and afterward to Compiègne, in quest of some rest from pain, as well as of those hours of solitary meditation and of quiet work which were the solace of his life, at every period of it.

[1] In the following year M. Fould died; to the great grief of the Emperor, whose friends had fallen so thick about him of late.

CHAPTER VII.

THE EXHIBITION OF 1867.

BOOK XII.

BEHIND the splendours and the festivities of the Great Exhibition of 1867, held on the Champ de Mars—an exhibition of the world's industry surpassing in completeness, picturesqueness, and magnificence those of 1851 in Hyde Park, and of 1855 in the Champs Elysées—lay ominous foreign and domestic questions, which darkened the horizon of the Empire all round. In the previous October (26th), the Emperor had appointed a Commission to reorganise the army,[1] that it might be able to cope with the needle-guns and the numbers of the German forces. The temper of the victorious Germans continued to show the wisdom of this precaution. The Mexican expedition was drawing to its tragic close; the Empress Charlotte had implored the Emperor Napoleon in vain not to abandon her husband.[2] The opposition, at home, was gathering strength, and becoming only more audacious and hostile to the throne under the new liberties which the Sovereign had granted. The Exhibition gaieties diverted Paris through the summer, and drew holiday hosts from the provinces to

[1] This Commission, over which the Emperor presided, included all the Marshals of France, Generals Fleury, Allard, Bourbaki, Le Bœuf, Frossard, Trochu, and Lebrun, and M. Rouher.

[2] The scene at Saint Cloud, when the Empress passionately pleaded her husband's cause, and Napoleon was prevented by his engagements with the United States Government from holding out any hope, created a profound and lasting impression on his mind.

witness the matchless fêtes of Imperial France, and the succession of crowned heads and illustrious personages who were the guests of the Sovereign. The Emperor of Russia arrived on June 1; the King of Prussia, accompanied by Moltke and Bismarck, on the 5th; and the Sultan at the end of the month. The Tuileries, the Hôtel de Ville, the Ministries, were the scenes of constant balls and concerts. The Empire, to the laughing visitors, appeared to be at the height of its glory. The humorous *gamins* laughed at the iron Count as he passed grimly along the Rue de Rivoli. King William, his First Minister, and his great General were no friendly guests at the feasts, but actors of a part, observers making notes, enemies within the hospitable gates of Napoleon and his beautiful consort. This was felt by the French people; and the feeling took some unpleasant forms.[1] The visit of the Emperor of Russia, moreover, was clouded by an attempt on his life in the Bois de Boulogne. The two Northern Sovereigns returned home, possibly dazzled by the transformation of Paris under the hands of Napoleon and Baron Haussmann, but much impressed also by the militant spirit which was abroad, and which was antagonistic to the Fatherland.

In his work-room in the Tuileries, before the many public duties of the day were begun, and in the evening, when, exhausted and in pain, he had retired betimes from the society of the Empress's *salons*, the Emperor passed many solitary hours pondering the weighty questions that encompassed his power, and that threatened to destroy it, and with it the fortunes of his House. He had freed Italy, and she was ranging herself already among his enemies, because he would not give her Rome for a capital, at the risk of mortal offence to the Church of

[1] Some St. Cyr cadets, over their wine, drank to their meeting in Berlin in the following year.

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which he was the Eldest Son. The troubles of 1867, which terminated with Mentana, and in the course of which M. Rouher uttered his famous '*Jamais!*' to Garibaldi and his volunteers as well as to the violent Opposition in the Chamber at Rome, and by which the Empire made hosts of foes and not a single friend; were a further cruel experience to the Sovereign who had recently been the dupe of Count Bismarck. His sympathies were with the Italian Liberals; but he was the chief of a great Catholic Power, and could not desert the Pope. Had he withdrawn his troops from Rome, and left the Vatican at the mercy of Menabrea and Garibaldi, he would have set up a foe to the Empire in every village pulpit of France.

Count Bismarck must have watched the Emperor's difficult predicament with satisfaction. Italy was not more grateful for Venetia. On the other hand, Austria stood aloof from France, watching in anger the fate of Maximilian in Mexico. England was cold, and leaned rather towards Prussia than towards her faithful ally of sixteen years. The Emperor's principle of nationalities as the basis of his foreign policy, albeit generous and just, and sincerely and courageously and obstinately maintained, had not prospered in his hands.

At the outbreak of the Civil War in America he was strongly inclined to intervene in favour of the South, and of the formation of a separate and kindred Republic which would be the natural ally of France. That inclination had been thwarted by the force of liberal public opinion in France in favour of the abolition of slavery, and by the attitude of the people of England. When, in 1861, however, the London Convention was signed by England, France, and Spain, by which active and energetic common action against Mexico was called for, the Emperor formed the idea

—which he called one of the great conceptions of his reign—of establishing on the American Continent a powerful Catholic monarchy, in the place of the unsettled and turbulent rule of Juarez. A Mexican empire was to put an end to the long period of political and social disorder which had afflicted the land of Montezuma, to give France an important ally beyond the Atlantic, and to curb the restless ambition of the United States. The enemies of Napoleon have endeavoured to trace the origin of the Mexican expedition to an ignoble bargain between one Jecker, a Swiss banker, and the Duke de Morny. Unfortunately the character of the Duke in his financial relations, and the subsequent pretensions of Jecker, gave colour to the slanders of an unscrupulous Opposition.[1] But the baseless fabric of the lampooners' train falls to pieces in the light of the truth now apparent to the world. The expedition was the joint action of three great Powers, whose subjects had suffered outrages at the hands of the Mexican authorities. The chastisement was to be the common act of England, France, and Spain. The expedition was in most essentials like that which Louis Philippe had sent out in 1838; but behind the terms of the common convention of the three Powers lay the French design of establishing a Catholic empire.[2]

In December, 1861, Vera Cruz was occupied by Spanish troops under the command of General Prim;

[1] This Jecker, in conjunction with the Mexican President, Miramon, and champion of the clerical party, had entered into some scandalous financial operations, to the prejudice of the Mexican Exchequer, and by which the two raised money in Paris, on bonds, called Jecker bonds. The participation of the Duke de Morny in the operation rests on a threatening letter found in the Tuileries in 1870, written after the Mexican expedition. Jecker was shot with other hostages, under the Commune, May 26, 1871.

[2] It was resolved upon by a convention of the three Powers, October 31, 1861.

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and in the following month by French and British forces. But by May both England and Spain had settled their claims and obtained guarantees from the Government of Juarez. Their mission was at end; and they retired, leaving the forces of the Emperor. Napoleon to carry out the idea which had lain behind the ostensible reason of their presence in Mexico.

Juarez had abolished the monasteries and the ecclesiastical tribunals; he had confiscated the property of the Church, which amounted to one-half of the land of the country; and he had, finally, separated Church from State. Under these blows the Mexican Church party were not likely to remain idle. They despatched Almonte and other agents to Europe; and these found a ready instrument in Napoleon III. The idea of a great Catholic empire, to hold the United States in check, and to give the Church of Rome a firm footing on the other side of the Atlantic, was to Napoleon's mind, as we have remarked, one of the greatest of his reign. The Convention of October offered him the opportunity; and, with the support of the Mexican Church party, he seized it without hesitation, to the great satisfaction of the Vatican and of the Gallican Church. It was not an idea of conquest, but one of those enterprises which commended themselves to his brooding mind. He believed that it would be for the good of the world, and that it would redound to the honour of Imperial France.

The history of the French expedition in Mexico, under Forey and Bazaine, is one of remarkable exploits, but of ever-recurring discomfiture. War was declared against Juarez in 1862 (April 16), and after a defeat at Puebla, redeemed by a series of successes, the French army entered Mexico city in the following year (June 10, 1863). A regency was formed; an assembly of notables

was convened; and on July 10 an hereditary monarchical Government, under a Roman Catholic emperor, was carried. In the following year (June 12, 1864) the Archduke Maximilian of Austria entered the Mexican capital as Emperor, and began that troubled reign which ended by his death at the hands of the Juarists, three years afterwards.[1]

The expedition had been from the beginning unpopular with the French people; and it served the enemies of the Empire as a weapon against the Government. M. Rouher called it 'the greatest enterprise of the reign;' but, in spite of the report on the splendours and national wealth of Mexico, where France was to find new sources of prosperity, by the Deputy Corta, and of Michel Chevalier's articles in the 'Revue des Deux Mondes,'[2] it never found favour, even with the majority of the Legislative Body who voted the expedition. Two sinister influences combined to damage it in public opinion. The clerical party, and the speculators for whom the Duke de Morny acted, were its active supporters; and from the time when the French expedition parted from the Spaniards and the English, and made war to establish a Catholic empire in the place of the American Republic, they alone defended it.

The Emperor Napoleon was among the first who saw that the project, which looked so prosperous when Maximilian went out to occupy the throne of Mexico in 1863, was doomed to failure, and that he must bow to the force of public opinion, vehemently expressed both in Europe and America. He loved the young Prince to whom he had given, he believed, a glorious throne in the West; and when he saw that he was in

[1] He was shot, with his two generals, Miramon and Mejia, on June 19, 1867, and a month later Juarez re-entered the capital.

[2] Afterwards published in a volume—*Mexique ancien et moderne.*

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danger upon a tottering fabric, he sent General Castellane out to him, begging him to abdicate before the French forces quitted his territory. Misguided, but heroic in his error, the young sovereign stood to the end by those who had compromised themselves in his cause, and died the death of a soldier.

The circumstances under which the Emperor withdrew his troops from Mexico are, fortunately, put on record by the chief actor in the negotiations between the Tuileries and Washington. It was said that the Emperor had recoiled before a threatening letter from Mr. Seward. General James Watson Webb, who had known the Emperor during his short exile in the United States, was the friendly agent through whom he negotiated with the American Government in 1863 the withdrawal of the French expedition from Mexico.

In 1861 General Webb, on his way to Rio (as American Minister to Brazil), had, at the request of Mr. Lincoln, seen the Emperor (at Fontainebleau, July 29th) to ascertain his views as to the American blockade of the Southern coast. These views were entirely satisfactory to the American President. This mission led to the resumption of the friendly relations between the Emperor and the General; so that when, in 1863, the Mexican expedition was assuming formidable proportions, the latter ventured to write to Napoleon, pointing out the mistake he had made in recognising the Priest party in Mexico, and putting his entire faith in it. He remarked that the United States could never assent to the project of a Roman Catholic Empire, and that a collision might occur, at any moment, between the United States and France. On March 22, the Emperor addressed the following candid reply to his friendly adviser :—

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'My dear General,—I received your letter of March 8, and the interesting note enclosed therein, which, after perusal, I burned immediately,[1] according to your wishes, and without mentioning the subject to anyone. The questions you treat of are very important and very delicate; still, I will answer them in all frankness. You are greatly mistaken if you believe that any motive of ambition or cupidity has led me to Mexico. Engaged in this enterprise by Spain, and led by the doings of Juarez, I reluctantly sent, first, two thousand men; afterwards, the national honour being compromised, my troops were increased to eight thousand; finally, the repulse at Puebla having engaged our military honour, I sent over thirty-five thousand men. It is, therefore, much against my inclination that I am compelled to wage war at such a distance from France; and it is in no way for the purpose of taking possession of the mines of the Sonora that my soldiers are fighting. But now that the French flag is in Mexico, it is difficult for me to foretell what may happen; at all events, my intention is to withdraw as soon as honour and the interests now engaged allow me. It would be wrong in the United States, therefore, to make my being there a subject of dispute; for a *menace* would then change all my plans, which now are disinterested. As regards the war which desolates your country, I profoundly regret it; for I do not see how and when it will end, and it is not the interest of France that the United States should be weakened by a struggle without any good results possible. In a country as sensible as America, it is not by arms that domestic quarrels should be settled, but

[1] This refers to a copy of an official despatch from General Webb to Mr. Seward, urging the application of the Monroe doctrine to France, and giving notice to the Emperor that his remaining in Mexico would be considered by the United States as a *casus belli*.

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by votes, meetings, and assemblies. In Europe, too, we have many causes of disturbance—many grave questions to solve. For this purpose, France needs the alliance of England ; hence my efforts have always been directed towards maintaining the ties of good understanding, often in spite of the ill-will of the English Government.

'I have now sincerely explained my position to you; and in that way, you see, I reciprocate the perfect frankness of your communication. Be always persuaded, my dear General, of my interest in your country, as well as my friendship and the high esteem which I profess for your character. With these sentiments, I remain yours, &c., NAPOLEON.'

General Webb forwarded this frank and friendly letter to President Lincoln, who received it in the spirit in which it was written, and relied on the Emperor's declaration that he should withdraw his troops at the earliest possible opportunity. But after the death of Mr. Lincoln, the continued presence of French legions on the American continent, protecting a young Catholic empire, created a very angry and threatening feeling. General Webb again tendered his good offices. On his way home, towards the close of 1865, he repaired to Paris, and had an interview with the Emperor at Saint Cloud (Nov. 10). The conference ended in an agreement, subject to the approval of the American President, that the French troops should withdraw from Mexico in twelve, eighteen, or twenty-four months.

The Emperor appears to have stipulated that the American Minister in France should know nothing of the arrangement; and, to guard against its becoming public in America, even Mr. Seward was not to know it officially. General Webb was to write to the Emperor

President Johnson's assent; and so the matter was to be kept clear of the Foreign Offices. The Emperor undertook to announce the withdrawal of his troops in the 'Moniteur,' in April, 1866; and he kept his word.

'Thus,' says the 'New York Times' (April 10, 1869), 'it will appear, that the department of State had nothing whatever to do with the settlement of the Mexican question; and it is most unjust to Napoleon III. to permit, uncontradicted, the universally received idea that the French troops were withdrawn from Mexico in consequence of the threatening letter from Mr. Seward to the Marquis of Montholon, which bears date December 6, and was sent to him on the 11th. As a matter of course, both in this country and in Europe, the public could attribute the withdrawal from Mexico to no other cause; but as it now appears that the letter referred to was written *after* Mr. Seward had been officially notified of the settlement of this all-important question, and *after* he had directed General Webb, in the name of the President, to communicate to the Emperor the President's approval and acceptance of such settlement thus agreed upon, public sentiment, both here and in France, will do justice to the Emperor and vindicate him from the reproach of having been *driven* out of Mexico by anything that could be construed into a threat.

'It seems clear, from the documentary evidence which has been submitted to us in this matter, that as early as the 22nd of May, 1863, the Emperor in his letter to General Webb declared that he desired very much to withdraw from the Mexican business, and expressed his determination to retire his troops just as soon as he could do so with honour, and without wounding the sensitive pride of the French people. From that determination he never swerved; and Mr. Lincoln died in the full faith that he would fulfil this

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understanding, and that the Mexican question would thus be settled. After Mr. Lincoln's death, the subject became one of political agitation; and we seemed to be on the eve of a rupture with France, when the personal relations which General Webb had maintained with the Emperor enabled him, in an unofficial and friendly interview, to effect an understanding which would have been found much more difficult, if not absolutely impossible, of attainment, through the ordinary channels of diplomatic intercourse. . . . . He (General Webb) has never failed to vindicate the Emperor of France from the reproach that he was induced to retire from Mexico by reason of threats, fulminated more than two years after he had voluntarily given a written pledge to retire, and after he had specifically named the manner as well as the time of his retiring. "The Emperor," says General Webb, "not only carried out the arrangement made by him in its true spirit, but when it became apparent that he must retire all his forces at once to ensure their safety, and not by detachments, instead of fixing upon eighteen months, as the average of the time agreed upon, he voluntarily named sixteen months (March, 1867) as the period for withdrawing."'

From all these troubles, deceptions and disappointments, Napoleon turned, under the burden of failing health and almost perpetual pain, to those civil and military reforms which were, according to M. Emile Olivier, to base his Empire on the rock. How patiently he laboured, and with what honest desire to leave the country he passionately loved the better for his rule, they know best who lived nearest to him. If he did not command success, he richly deserved it. This is the testimony of his honourable enemies.

BOOK XIII.

HOME AFFAIRS.

CHAPTER 1.

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS.

CHAP. I.

BEFORE passing on to the swift succession of events which led to the fall of the Second Empire, and to the wreck of the hopes and the ambition of a Sovereign who had laboured for the good of his country, and had dreamed many dreams of social improvements that were to benefit the whole family of man, we may profitably linger awhile over that part of the life of Napoleon III. which he passed with his family, and in the society of friends and visitors whom he found congenial to his sympathies and tastes. *Noscitur a Sociis.*

The *entourage* of the Emperor should be divided into two distinct sections—viz. that of his Ministers, his political partisans, his official household, civil and military; and the friends of his studious and social hours, with whom he worked, and walked, and talked. His loyalty to men who had served him—even when these compromised his Court—was so intimate a part of his being, that he could seldom be persuaded to put them aside. He suffered by their follies and their vices; but he never treated them with severity. Such men as De Persigny tried his friendship, but could not wholly destroy it. De Morny, more than all the rest of his public servants and partisans, brought discredit upon the Empire, by his immoral speculations, carried on even from the presidency of the Chambers. The Em-

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peror, when he heard of some of these things—for they were kept from him as a rule—was angry and scornful, and he remained on no intimate terms with the Duke; but the President was not easily to be put aside. He was a gambler on 'Change; at the same time he was without a rival in the difficult art of conducting the Parliamentary debates.

Again and again the Emperor rebuked the gambling spirit that flourished round about the Bourse during his reign. He was grieved and disappointed when men whom he had trusted proved to be self-seeking or disloyal. Towards the end of his life he was profoundly discouraged by his experience of men. As we have recorded, he was in the habit of saying of M. Duruy, 'C'est un honnête homme,' hereby making an invidious distinction that wounded others. But he spoke the satisfaction of his heart. He had a counsellor honest to the core, and he could not but take delight in the phenomenon. The lists of the men eminent in literature, science, art, and jurisprudence, who were invited to Compiègne, and who found there the quiet of a country life, the sports of the field, and the pleasure of a large intellectual society, are enough to confound the Legitimist and Orleanist enemies of the Empire, who have never ceased to assert that intellectual France held aloof, in a body, from Napoleon III. These invitations, drawn up carefully in series, so that the groups of guests should make a harmonious company, and that all the eminent men of the nation should have an opportunity of approaching the Sovereign on intimate terms, include the most distinguished diplomates, authors, painters, composers, men of science, politicians, professors, and inventors of the time. Each Minister furnished a list of distinguished persons in his department. These lists were submitted

by the Great Chamberlain to the Empress, who drew from them her groups of guests, each group being invited for six days.[1] Among the frequent guests were —Emile Augier, Dumas fils, Camille Doucet, Octave Feuillet, Emile de Girardin, Théophile Gautier, Paul Janet, Ernest Légouvé, Paul de Musset, Gustave Doré, Désiré Nisard, Jules Sandeau, Sainte-Beuve, De Sacy, Français, Auber, Félicien David, Berlioz, Gounod, Mermet, Ambroise Thomas, Claude Bernard, Verdi, Longet, Milne-Edwards, Nélaton, Delaunay, Leverrier, Pasteur, Ponsard, Viollet-le-Duc. These were among the guests who were invited on no official grounds, but as distinguished men, with whom both the Emperor and the Empress delighted to converse. The Empress's Mondays at the Tuileries were gay parties, at which the *verve* of Parisian society was conspicuous; but the château life of Compiègne was, as a rule, quiet. The brilliant hostess loved to assemble *savants* and wits about her tea-table, and to enjoy their conversation on a topic which she would skilfully raise. The Emperor talked apart, with a foreign prince, a diplomate, a chemist, a military authority, with the inventor of a gun, or the propounder of a new scheme for the benefit of the public.

The arrangements for the comfort and freedom of the guests were perfect. Each guest was at home in his apartments in the morning, and was served with scrupulous care and punctuality. At dinner only was there a formal appearance. Driving and hunting were at the command of those who were active; but each

[1] The lists from 1853 to 1869 have been carefully preserved, as documents that will prove the Emperor's constant connection with the most eminent of his contemporaries, French and foreign. Two students from the Polytechnic, St. Cyr, and Normal Schools, were invited with each group.

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followed his own taste. Cordiality reigned at the dinner, and throughout the cheerful evenings, which were enlivened by dramatic scenes arranged by M. Ponsard, by verses from the pen of M. Edmond About, by scientific experiments by Professor Longet and M. Pasteur, and by amateur theatricals and classic scenes, satirical or humorous reviews of the year, and charades, in which M. Viollet-le-Duc (who was of all the groups of guests) acted as stage-manager.[1]

The reviewer of Compiègne from 1865 to 1867, when, events being too sad for the comic muse, they were discontinued, was M. de Massa. Among the distinguished amateurs were the Barons de Talleyrand and Lambert, the Marquis de Cadore, the Marquis de Saulcy, the Vicomte de Marnesia, and the Countesses d'Ayguesvives, Clermont-Tonnerre, and Walewska. These, and others, as the Princess de Metternich, figured on the stage of Compiègne. The Princess was the life and soul of the little comedies, or charades, or even pantomimes, in which she figured.

The Empress was delighted when a little part was found for the young Prince. He appeared in one of M.

[1] In 1863, the words of a charade arranged by M. Viollet-le-Duc (written by M. Ponsard) was Harmonie—*arme-au-nid*. The Prince Imperial, who was in his seventh year, played Cupid. The charade was played on the eve of the departure of a group of guests. The poet turned this fact to account in his lines:—

'Entrez dans ces palais que l'Amour vous destine,
Hâtez-vous de jouir de sa grâce enfantine!
Un jour l'enfant, que l'orphelin bénit,
S'asseoira sur un trône et non plus dans un nid.
Un jour succèdera, sur son front plus sévère,
Au charme maternel la majesté du père.
Entrez, mais je vous avertis,
Nymphe qu'épouvante une ride,
Qu'on vieillit vite en ce pays,
Tant l'heure s'envole rapide;
Que le plaisir d'avoir été
Au sein d'enchantements, trop prompts à disparaître,
Demain sera bien attristé
Par le chagrin de n'y plus être.'

de Massa's Reviews of the year (1865) as a Grenadier of the Guard.[1] Madame de Metternich appeared as a *cantinière* of Turcos, her husband conducted the orchestra, the Marquis de Caux was *en cocodès*, M. A. Blount imitated Thérésa, the comic singer, while M. Viollet-le-Duc acted as prompter. At the close of 1867, the Review was 'The Sovereigns in Paris;' and Paris was played by Madame de Metternich, while the Marquis de Caux represented M. de Camors. M. de Salvandy has described these festivities as masquerades on a volcano.

At Fontainebleau, the Court spent the time quietly enough, in rides and walks in the forest, with picnics on the grass, as Mérimée[2] remarked, like plain hosiers of the Rue Saint-Denis. He mentions a Spanish dinner in which he took charge of the *gazpacho*, and amused himself by making the ladies eat his preparation of raw onions. Then from Saint Cloud he reports that (August, 1866) they are leading a quiet life, dining *en redingote*, driving, reading—and he, painting.

M. Octave Feuillet, the librarian at the Palace, was the Emperor's constant companion while the Court was at Fontainebleau. Here His Majesty would drive the

[1] See Appendix VII.

[2] M. Fagan is wrong in stating that Prosper Mérimée was not a Bonapartist. He fails to get under the surface of the character of Mérimée, in whose society both the Emperor and the Empress delighted. The *ami de la maison*, at the Tuileries, Saint Cloud, and Biarritz, was thoroughly devoted to the Empress, whom he had known from her childhood, and to the Emperor, who never failed to gain the affection of those who were admitted to frequent contact with him. Mérimée affected the coldness of an Englishman. He was an Anglomane. His persiflage was cynical; but the cynicism was adopted as a part of the character which he had assumed. His real devotion to the Emperor and the Empire is conclusively proved in his long and patient correspondence with Panizzi, in which he urged English statesmen, through the librarian of the British Museum, to put aside their ungenerous suspicions in regard to the Imperial Government, and to maintain a frank and cordial alliance.

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Empress, in a *char-à-bancs*, through the forest, enjoying keenly the beauties of nature, for which that haunt of the landscape painter is so famous; and delighting in the sallies or the recitations of Feuillet, who generally accompanied the party. The Emperor was a lover of poetry, and good recitations of fine passages, under the influence of forest scenery, wrapped him in happy reveries. Feuillet delighted in the poetry of Victor Hugo, to which the Emperor generally listened with pleasure. One day, however, when his librarian had given him some long stretches of pompous lines, he turned quietly to the reciter and said: 'Many big words; but few ideas.' Towards the end of his reign, the Emperor, during one of his *char-à-bancs* drives, complained to his companion of the gross calumnies about his family and himself that were appearing in the 'Lanterne.' The reply was that they were infamous attacks which should be treated with disdain. 'Yes,' the Emperor answered, 'they are infamous, but they are read. They are like certain women who are despised, but who are sought after.'

The conversation having fallen on the liberal institutions which the Emperor had already given, and those which he was preparing to give his people, His Majesty remarked pensively to Feuillet: 'When we are going uphill we see where we can stop: but when we are descending we can never tell.'[1] To M. Buffet (who had signed and defended the amendment of the forty-five) he expressed his doubt as to the effect of giving way to the Opposition, saying: 'I understand exactly. The object is to draw the lion's teeth, cut his claws, and leave him only his imposing and useless mane.'

At Biarritz the Emperor and Empress lived a

[1] At the beginning of his reign he said of universal suffrage: 'I go to that ocean only to baptise, and by no means to drown myself.'



SKETCHES BY THE PRINCE IMPERIAL. 1.

SKETCHES BY THE PRINCE IMPERIAL. 2.

very quiet life, with a few friends, and occasionally a visitor or two—much as the English Court lives at Osborne. CHAP. I.

'I have had an excellent time at Biarritz,'[1] writes Mérimée; 'we had a visit from the King and Queen of Portugal. The King is a very timid German student. The Queen is charming. She is like the Princess Clotilde, only prettier: she is a corrected edition of her. . . . Another personage, M. de Bismarck, pleased me more. He is a big German, very polite, and by no means *naïf*. He brought with him a wife, who has the biggest feet in Germany, and a daughter who walks in the footsteps of her mother. . . . Adieu, I am going to nurse myself until the *fêtes* of Compiègne make me ill again.' At his visit, in the following year, he found that the figs and ortolans helped him to bear the burden of life; and that it was amusing to visit a smuggler's cave in the mountains with the Empress and the young Prince, under the guidance of the king of the smugglers. He amused himself writing a little comedy for the Empress and the Grand Duchess Marie of Russia.

The stories of the popularity of the young Prince at Compiègne, Fontainebleau, and Biarritz are many. In his childhood he showed remarkable promise as an artist. When, in 1865, Carpeaux modelled his bust, he got some of the clay, and, according to Mérimée, he executed a rough head of his father that was 'atrociously like.' He also modelled two soldiers fighting, full of spirit, and a bust of his tutor, M. Monnier, which Mérimée told Panizzi he would recognise across the court of the British Museum. He was certain few sculptors could obtain a more striking likeness. In

[1] *Lettres à une Inconnue.* Letter dated October 13, 1865.

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1867, at Biarritz, on one of the Empress's adventurous sea excursions, the boat—the night being dark—struck upon a rock, and the party was in danger. When a sailor was carrying the little Louis through the surf to the rock, the Empress called to him, 'Don't be afraid, Louis;' and the little fellow turned and said, 'My name is Napoleon!' MM. Brissac and de Lavallette, who heard the dialogue, related it to Mérimée. Two years later (1869) the Prince made his appearance at the Camp of Châlons. 'He held himself so well, and was so cool and dignified, that he looked like his father become a boy again.' The young Prince's boyhood was gone! It had passed in an atmosphere of the tenderest parental affection. The Emperor and his son were much together; and the boy shared his father's tastes. A fresh invention was a toy to both. A new copying-press was submitted to the Emperor's inspection; the Emperor wrote some verses, and his son signed them,[1] and together they put the press to the test. The Prince was also acquainted with his father's severer studies; and watched him, encompassed by *savants*, working at his 'Life of Cæsar,' in hours snatched from the affairs of State.

Of the 'Life of Cæsar,' M. Renan,[2] who was much consulted in regard to it, has said that it is a good work, with a few errors in it that are blemishes to the scholar's eye, but full of real and even valuable researches. Had the Emperor finished it, as he always intended, it would

[1] See facsimile.

[2] Notes of a Conversation on the *Life of Cæsar*, between M. Ernest Renan and B. J., May 12, 1880.

M. Renan was appointed chief of the Manuscript Department of the Imperial Library. Later he was charged by the Emperor with literary missions in Italy and Syria, and was placed on the staff of the *Journal des Savants*; and finally he was appointed Professor of Hebrew in the College of France. His appointment raised a storm of clerical opposition, and was revoked.



Facsimile of lines written by Napoleon III with the signature of the Prince Imperial.

have been a notable, not a great work. The Emperor, according to this distinguished observer, although never a brilliant writer, was fond of literary composition. He was, by nature and taste, an archæologist and a philologist. He began the 'Life,' or collecting for it, about 1859; and he threw himself into it ardently, working hard, with M. Maury (the present director of the Archives—a post given to him by Napoleon), who may be said to have put together all the researches—the Emperor writing the commentaries. The preface is all the Emperor's own, and is obviously so. It is full of his ideas about providential men, fatalism, &c.

Notably the 'Life of Cæsar' may be remembered as having brought the Emperor into communication with M. Duruy, and having thus led to that liberal administration of the department of Public Instruction, with which M. Duruy's career as Minister is indissolubly linked.

The Emperor was no talker. He was a questioner, a patient listener, and an acute observer. M. Renan gave an instance. He had brought home some Roman remains, which he knew to be of the second century. The *savants* contradicted him, and maintained that they belonged to 800 years B.C. The Emperor, who knew nothing of the dispute, examined them, and pronounced them to be of the second century—and he was right.

He was fond of reading aloud pages of his 'Life of Cæsar.' He read the preface to M. Emile Augier. Madame Cornu[1] was a specially favoured listener. One

[1] In a notice which M. Renan wrote in the *Journal des Débats*, on the death of Madame Cornu, he remarked:—

'Les deux enfants grandirent ensemble et, à partir de 1815, devinrent inséparables, reçurent la même éducation. Ce qui manquait à cette éducation, ce n'était pas le savoir des maîtres: c'était la suite, la surveillance, l'attention des parents et des précepteurs. Louis-Napoléon était dès lors ce qu'il fut plus tard: nature profonde, rêveuse, sans facilité, mais

day he was reading a passage to her, in which he had remarked that a *régime* which was the result of violence always ended badly. He watched the effect of the passage on his listener. Madame Cornu highly approved the argument; and the Emperor went on with spirit, unconscious, according to the lady (who had a strong vein of malice in her composition), of its application to the *coup d'état*.[1]

The Emperor was pleased in talking about and discussing his literary labours. M. Renan contended that his speeches and proclamations were all his own; and that they bore everywhere the marks of his own hand. He loved neatness of phrase, striking ideas, and broad generalisations. He was a kind, generous, and a studious man; and full of elevated thoughts. His education was defective, for Lebas had not done his duty by him; but his self-education never ceased. He had essentially a literary mind.

The 'Life of Cæsar' brought the Emperor in close contact with Liberal scholars; and it should be specially remembered as having been the occasion of the opening of the enlightened *régime* of Public Instruction, which was planned and wrought out by M. Duruy.[2] The Minister in whose society his Sovereign took special

forte, convaincue, obstinée, incapable d'être distraite de son idée fixe. Il avait la volonté inflexible du croyant, la gaucherie de l'obsédé. Les leçons qu'il écoutait enfant furent pour lui à peu près inutiles; le maître ne croyait pas qu'il fut de son devoir de recourir aux méthodes longues et patientes pour faire pénétrer son enseignement dans un esprit qui n'était fermé qu'en apparence, mais où l'on ne pouvait entrer qu'après en avoir longtemps cherché les issues.'

[1] Here M. Renan remarked that the Emperor knew less about that event than the rest of the actors in it. He was not consulted by De Morny, St. Arnaud, and their colleagues as to details.

[2] M. Duruy, when he entered official life, was known only as the author of some small elementary Roman and other histories. He has since devoted his leisure to enduring historical work.

delight, and whose character he was never weary of praising, had, however, no hand in the writing of the 'Life.' It was the work, in all the original part, of the Emperor alone, and in the archæological of M. Maury. It was the solace of the latter part of the Emperor's reign, and occupied many solitary hours when his Court was given up to gaiety.

The reception accorded to the 'Life of Cæsar,' particularly by the scholars of Germany—as Professors Zumpt, Heller, and F. Ritschl—was not void of flattery. The latter remarked that Napoleon would be cited henceforth before Niebuhr and Mommsen.[1] The work was translated into all the European languages. A learned Rabbi applied to the author for permission to produce a Hebrew edition. Emile Augier wrote that, although the narrative was full of intense life, it was remarkable for the sobriety and the elevation of its style, as well as for the deep suggestive thoughts which it embodied. M. E. Caro found in the Imperial pages the spirit of Montesquieu; and they recalled to him conversations with the author at Compiègne. The work was to M. Camille Doucet 'a magnificent monument raised by the second Augustus to the glory of the first Cæsar.' Octave Feuillet accepted the volumes as a precious heirloom for his children. Arsène Houssaye, as 'the humblest of critics and of subjects,' begged a copy. M. F. Ponsard remarked that the Emperor's book would not only spread elevated historical and philosophical views, but exert a healthy influence on literature. 'Our literature,' M. Ponsard remarked, 'inclined to affectation, appears to be striving for effect. It seeks less precision and truth in thought, than the

[1] M. Mommsen was very grateful to the Emperor for the facilities accorded to him for his researches in the Imperial Library; but he forgot his obligations after the war.

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accumulation of images. The style of the "Life of Cæsar"—a style in which Cæsar would recognise his own neatness and precision—is well calculated to bring us back to good taste, by showing us how noble language comes with virile thought.' In a skilful passage of literary criticism, M. Saint-René Taillandier also contrasted the sobriety and elevation of the Emperor's style with that in vogue, and expressed his conviction that educated Frenchmen who were not interested in decrying the work of Napoleon III., would say that His Majesty had spoken of Cæsar in the language of Cæsar. Jules Sandeau said that the author of the 'Life of Cæsar' had taken up the pen of Montesquieu, as the Emperor Charles had picked up the pencil of Titian.

The Emperor's enemies were as severe as his friends were kind. M. Prévost-Paradol, in his reception speech as an Academician, took occasion to attack the preface of the 'Life of Cæsar.' He had a congenial audience, where MM. Guizot and Thiers were guiding spirits; and his remarks against hero-worship or providential men were received with enthusiasm. The Emperor took the onslaught in good part, and, as his custom was, received his young enemy with marked courtesy.

'I am sorry, monsieur,' said His Majesty, 'that a man of your parts should not be among my friends.' Then, in the course of a short conversation, the Emperor slyly remarked that M. Paradol had been more favourable to 'Cæsar' in his 'Histoire Universelle' than in his speech at the Academy. It was a delicate home thrust.

M. Mérimée was cautious in dealing with the subject. 'I have written an article on the "Life of Cæsar" for the "Journal des Savants,"' he said to a respondent. 'You know how I esteem the author, and even his book; but you will understand the diffi-

culty of the affair, for a man, who does not wish to pass for a courtier, not to say rude things. I hope I have got out of it pretty well. I took for my text that the Republic had had its day, and that the Roman people were going to the devil, when Cæsar saved them. As the thesis is true and easily sustained, I have written variations on the air.'

M. X. Doudan wrote to M. Piscatory that there was merit in the book, and he remarked in it a certain vigorous independence of judgment; but he begged to draw his friend's attention to M. Scherer's rough, but not disrespectful, criticism, in which the author was treated as a simple man of letters. In short, there was much courtly criticism, and much that was hostile from the Academies and the *salons*. The impartial verdict yet remains undelivered.

The desire of the Emperor to cultivate a close acquaintance with the intellectual men of his time, thwarted though it was to some extent at the Institute by the Orleanists, who carried all before them there, was not ungratified. His own literary labours brought him into contact with Renan, Duruy, Maury, and other scholars; his strong interest in every form of knowledge, and every kind of scientific and economical progress, drew to him the eminent *savants*, thinkers, and inventors of his time; while his sympathy with poets, romancists, and journalists, attracted to his Court no inconsiderable proportion of the literary power of contemporary France. Thiers, Sainte-Beuve, Emile de Girardin, Prévost-Paradol, opposed his policy; but they respected his intellectual gifts, and his liberal spirit.

In one of his messages to the Chambers, the Emperor alluded to M. Thiers as the national historian. He had written out the passage the day before its

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delivery, and had sent it to the old statesman, asking whether it would please him. Thiers was delighted. At a reception at the Place Saint-Georges, in the evening, he drew aside an old Orleanist of his acquaintance, and unlocking his desk, placed the Emperor's writing before him, saying: 'None of your D'Orléans would have done that.' The treatment which the Emperor received at the hands of M. Thiers never destroyed his profound respect for the historian of the Consulate and the Empire.

Among the unfulfilled projects of the Second Empire was that Sainte-Beuve submitted to the Emperor, by which men of letters outside the University and the Academies were to be drawn about the throne. Sainte-Beuve wrote a careful memorandum, in which he proposed that a State Institution for the Protection and Encouragement of Literature[1] should be formed under the direct patronage of the Emperor, with offices in the Louvre, and that it should be quite independent of the Ministry of Public Instruction; that a permanent Commission should give out subjects for prize essays; and that the Institution should also help necessitous men of letters. Difficulties lay thick in the way of such an institution as Sainte-Beuve designed; and the first and greatest was that of persuading those for whose benefit it was designed that the Emperor did not promote it as a political engine. In the future, when the party passions of the reign of Napoleon III. shall have died out, His Majesty's relations with the intellectual men of his time, even from his youth in Switzerland, will redeem his personal character, and that of his family, from those unfair charges of frivolity which have been preferred by po-

[1] *Papiers et Correspondance de la Famille Impériale.* Tome second, p. 257. Paris, 1871.

litical enemies. The Emperor could understand a joke; was too thorough a Frenchman not to delight in lively anecdotes, and in the *esprit gaulois* of French military life; but the companions of his lighter hours were not those whom he loved the best. Even those with whom he laughed most were of the stamp of Prosper Mérimée and Octave Feuillet.

CHAPTER II.

HOME POLICY.

BOOK XII.

In his introduction to his comprehensive work on Paris,[1] written amid the glories of the new capital raised by Napoleon III. and his great prefect Haussmann, M. Maxime du Camp expresses a wish that a fairy's wand could bring back for a moment the Paris of the time of the Revolution of February. A cry of horror would fill the air; and people would wonder how so vain a race as the Parisians could have lived in such pestilent dens. The horrible maze of loathsome alleys of the Saint Marceau quarter, the ragmen's homes about the Place Cambrai, the Rue de la Mortellerie, where the cholera of 1832 was bred, the lanes of the Butte des Moulins, the sinister Rue de la Vieille-Lanterne, the cut-throat alleys of the Cité, the black and muddy by-ways which lay between the Palais Royal and the Tuileries and the unfinished Louvre; the tattered sheds, and stalls, and showmen's encampments upon the broken ground between the two palaces; the unkempt and unlighted Champs Elysées; the dirt, and confusion, and raggedness of the central markets; the filthy and dangerous lanes of the Montagne Sainte-Geneviève; the ugly waste bordered by *guinguettes* about the Arc de Triomphe; the dusty, neglected Bois, and, at every outskirt, undrained, fever-haunted purlieus, from which the traveller shrank after

[1] *Paris, ses Organes, ses Fonctions, et sa Vie dans la Seconde Moitié du XIXme Siècle.* Par Maxime du Camp. Hachette et Cie, 1869.

nightfall—these were the excrescences and the plague-spots through which the Emperor drew his pencil; tracing in their stead broad and wholesome boulevards and streets, clean flower-bedecked squares, handsome, well ventilated and regulated markets, public baths and washhouses,[1] a vast system of underground drainage away from the Seine, a pure and abundant water-supply, *cités ouvrières*,[2] and parks and gardens in every quarter. A spacious highway was cut, to begin with, from the Tuileries to the Place de la Bastille, through one of the most tortuous, ill-built, and over-populated quarters of Paris. The Louvre was joined to the Tuileries, and the magnificent Place du Carrousel was levelled and laid out. The great boulevards were completed to the Madeleine. On the heights of Belleville a noble park was laid out for the working population of the east of Paris; and in the wood of Vincennes, cleansed and pierced with paths and roads, a vast convalescent asylum for Paris workmen was raised. In the west, the Champs Elysées were laid out with shrubs and flowers, and enlivened with fountains; the Palais de l'Industrie was raised; the Bois de Boulogne was laid out like a gentleman's park, and brightened by a broad expanse of ornamental water. The Tour du Lac became the fashionable ride of Paris. Through the unhealthy streets of the Quartier Latin boulevards and streets were driven, letting in light and pure air. A stately Palace of Justice rose on the banks

[1] In 1851, a credit of 600,000 frs. was opened in aid of public baths and washhouses.

[2] Workmen's houses and lodgings were a subject that constantly preoccupied the Emperor; and he made many experiments both with model lodging-houses and separate houses. He introduced the English building society system. In 1859, he contributed 100,000 francs towards the improvement of workmen's dwellings at Lille; he also contributed largely for the same object at Amiens, Bayonne, and elsewhere. In 1854, 60,000*l.* was advanced to build 180 blocks of workmen's houses. In 1868, the Emperor constructed 42 workmen's houses at Daumesnil.

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of the river. A boulevard stretched from the Strasbourg railway, past the Museum of Arts and Trades (before which a square was laid out), through the Cité, and so on to the Place d'Enfer; another reached from the Place du Trône to the Château d'Eau; the St. Germain boulevard pierced the dark old quarter of that name, from the Palais Bourbon to the Halle aux Vins. A straight highway was laid from Pantin to the Boulevard Haussmann, behind the Grand Opéra; and from this prodigious pile of marble, bronze, and gilding, an Imperial way was traced to the gates of the Tuileries. The Malesherbes quarter of Paris, with the Parc Monceaux and all that town of palaces around the Arc de Triomphe, and flanking the Avenue de l'Impératrice, stand on waste lands or slums of the time of the Revolution of February. Around Notre Dame there are no longer dirty alleys and tumble-down houses. The Hôtel Dieu has ceased to be shame upon the capital. The Tour Saint-Jacques is the centre of a garden in which nurses air their children, and ladies sit in the shade at work. The Place du Châtelet marks the centre of a quarter of new and handsome theatres. The old Vaudeville of the Place de la Bourse is now superbly housed at the corner of the Chaussée d'Antin. The Church of St. Augustin, where those who have remained faithful to the Napoleon dynasty congregate on the Emperor's fête day and the anniversary of his death, is approached on all sides by wide arteries of the city that were made under the Second Empire. In every quarter of the capital—even the remotest—are marks of the reforming hand that strove to make Paris the healthiest as well as the most beautiful city on the face of the earth. Victor Hugo dwells in a fashionable quarter of his beloved city which had no existence when he went into exile. He tells every foreign visitor who calls upon him that there have

been three cities of the world—Athens, Rome, Paris; but when he says 'Paris—*Urbs*,' he forgets the Sovereign who made her what she is, and laid the foundation of that matchless city of the future, which, according to him, will have the Arc de Triomphe for its centre. He spurns the genius to whose glory the Arch was raised, and the nephew of the great Captain who drew a new Paris round about it. CHAP. II.

It was not only in Paris that the Emperor's initiative as a sanitary reformer was felt. Every city in France became emulous of the example of the capital. At Marseilles, Lyons, Rouen, Amiens, and other important cities, considerable improvements were set on foot. Great efforts were made to improve the condition of the Lyons workmen. Soon the finest street in the city was the Rue de l'Impératrice, now the Rue de la République.[1] At Rouen, handsome new streets lie between the railway-station and the old town. In short, there is not a provincial town in France that cannot show marked improvements of some kind, traceable to the initiative of the Imperial Government. Sanitary science, it may be said with strict justice, was unknown in provincial France before 1851; and it is little understood in many places even now. The condition of some of the manufacturing towns as regards sewage, was such that it was a marvel to the enquiring visitors that the inhabitants were not carried off, as in the days of the plague. In 1850, a sanitary law was passed; and in 1852, 400,000*l.* were voted in aid of sanitary improvements in manufacturing towns. But the Emperor was not content with this. He never visited a town without enquiring into the condition of it, the works in progress, and the desirable improvements, nor left it without having done some-

[1] The Emperor restored the original historical names to Paris streets, and declined to have the marks of former reigns effaced.

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thing to stimulate the local sanitary reformers. In many places, the Imperial initiative, and the speculation it engendered, led to extravagant expenditure. Towns that had slumbered unimproved for many decades suddenly awoke, called in architects and builders, and begged for loans. The movement became prodigious; and the cautious began to warn the Government that the activity was feverish and dangerous. The rural population was drained from the fields to build boulevards, docks, chambers of commerce, new town halls, barracks, and churches. Paris was gorged with building operatives. The capital that was being sunk yearly in stone, cement, and iron, between 1860 and 1870, was almost more than even rich France could bear—albeit her wealth was accumulating fast.[1]

But if the tendency of the sudden and immense demand for labour in the towns was to draw the peasants from their fields; and if the speculation rife on the Bourse during many years of the Empire drained capital from the land, it was not because the Emperor was unmindful of the claims of agriculture. The agricultural population were his doughtiest supporters. He loved the country, was a keen sportsman, and, while his elder brother lived, had hoped to pass his days in the quiet happiness of rural occupations. He was a sound judge of horses and cattle. His observations of English estates, while the guest, during his exile, of some of the greatest landowners in England, enabled him to see the defects of French agriculture. He found poor breeds of cattle, slovenly cultivation, much waste land, and no drainage. One of his earliest acts (March, 1852) was to establish agricultural chambers in every *arrondissement*. He encouraged agricultural compe-

[1] The trade of France was estimated in 1848 at 1 milliard 645 millions; in 1866 it was estimated at 8 milliards 126 millions.

tition shows—dividing France into twelve regions, and favouring especially improvement in the breed of stock. Above all he introduced (June 10, 1854) a law for the facilitating the draining of lands; and caused a credit of four millions sterling to be opened, from which the farmers or proprietors could borrow capital to drain their fields, repaying their outlay by instalments reaching over twenty-five years. Improvement in the breed of horses he promoted on a large scale. In 1860 a law was passed to prevent the further destruction of forests in mountainous districts, by providing that when timber was cut down plantations should be left. In 1866 a law gave farmers indemnity for diseased cattle destroyed to prevent the spread of contagion. Among the great works of reclamation and drainage the Emperor set in motion were the planting of the downs of Gascony and the reclamation of the bogs of the Sologne. By way of example, he bought in the Sologne about three thousand hectares of marshes, drained them, and established on them three great farms. These drew small farmers about them; and now a desolate abode of malaria is a fruitful district of farm and forest, intersected with good roads.

In the Landes, at Châlons, at Vincennes, and in other places, the Emperor carried on the same work of model farms and villages, of drainage and plantation; and turned wildernesses into fruitful fields and meadows. At Pompadour he set up a vast establishment for the improvement of the breeds of oxen and sheep—introducing the Durham and Southdown. At the *bergerie* of Rambouillet, the same system of introducing the finest breeds was adopted; and the result of these efforts has long been apparent in the extraordinary improvement of meat throughout France. The farm of La Fouilleuse, designed for the trial of every kind of agri-

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cultural implement, was another Imperial creation. The model farm in the park of Saint Germain (1868) was the latest effort made by the Emperor in the direction of agricultural improvements. During his reign he personally established forty-three model farms, and sixteen old farms, reclaimed 10,000 hectares of wild land—and this at his own cost, and by way of example to French farmers and landowners.

The example had a striking effect. Between 1851 and 1862, 458,057 hectares of waste land were reclaimed; and by 1867, 645,013 hectares had been added to the corn-producing area of France. In nine years the annual corn production of the country increased by 32,998,344 hectolitres. Between 1852 and 1866 the wine yield had increased from 28 millions of hectolitres to 63 millions; the increase in heads of cattle was 1,249,141, and in horses 547,178. It is in the agricultural districts that we find the secret of that immense growth of the national wealth under the Empire which has astonished the world.

The Emperor was the enemy of that system of excessive centralisation which flourished most under the Monarchy of July, when it was remarked that a post could not be removed from a street in Boulogne-sur-Mer without the assent of the central authorities in Paris. In 1863 (June 24) His Majesty addressed a letter on the subject to the President of the Council of State, in which he pressed the Council to take up the question of decentralisation immediately, and to cause an enquiry to be made, by the various sections of the Council, into the delays and obstructions of the existing system, in their several departments. 'We have already,' the Emperor remarked, 'endeavoured to establish reforms, but much remains to be done. How can it be tolerated that an unobjectionable communal affair of minor im-

portance should entail formalities stretching over two years at least, in consequence of the routine which passes it into the hands of eleven different authorities? In certain cases, industrial enterprises suffer an equally grievous delay.' The Sovereign who had abolished passports between England and France (1861), and had led his country far on the way to free trade, was impatient at the sight of the bemummying bands of red tape that swathed provincial authorities, and impeded the free and wholesome development of local self-government and self-reliance. The liberal enlightenment which he brought to the consideration of commercial and agricultural affairs, was apparent in all his efforts for the improvement of the condition of the wage-classes. We have seen how he encouraged their provident societies; how he strove to give them healthy homes, and free parks and squares; how he instituted free law for the poor, so that no man should fail to obtain justice on account of his inability to pay fees, and instituted the priest of the poor, who should perform the last offices of religion without fee at the pauper's grave. The welfare of the labouring classes was his constant preoccupation; and his constant phrase, when the subject was under discussion, was 'Cherchez, cherchez.' He had instituted under State guarantees a *caisse* for old age, and assurance against accidents (July 1868), by which every workman might buy himself an annuity for his declining years, or secure himself against want in consequence of an accident; and when the war of 1870 came, it interrupted elaborate studies which were in progress for something like a compulsory State assurance of annuities to the working classes.[1] Co-operative

[1] The idea closely resembled that of compulsory life assurances which has been recently mooted in England by one of the thrift associations. Between 1850 and the end of 1867 the working classes paid into the

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associations had failed after the revolution of 1848, chiefly because they had mixed up extreme politics with co-operation; but the Emperor, while watching the successes of the co-operative bodies of the English manufacturing districts, had never ceased to regret their effacement from France. The war came when he was about to make an experiment, on an important scale, in co-operative mining.[1] One of the later acts of the Emperor's reign was the abolition of the workman's *livret*, a character book, which fettered his movements and kept him under the eye of the police, and to a great extent in the power of his patron. This abolition gave to the French workman a personal freedom he had never known before. It meant free labour, as a complement to free trade.[2]

Annuity Assurance Caisse 172 million francs!

[1] Madame Cornu, to whom all the preliminaries were entrusted by the Emperor, described the general plan to me.—B. J.

[2] At a meeting of the Council of State, on March 23, the Emperor said:—'Gentlemen,—I have felt anxious to preside this day over the Council of State in order to explain to you in what order of ideas I had placed myself in inviting the Ministers to submit to you a Bill for the suppression of workmen's *livrets*. Society in our time, all must admit, comprehends many elements. Do we not see, in fact, on one side certain legitimate aspirations and just desires of improvement, and on the other subversive theories and culpable cupidities? The duty of the Government is resolutely to satisfy the first, and to firmly repudiate the second. When the present state of the masses is compared with what it was in the last century, there can be only congratulation on the progress realised, the abuses suppressed, and the improvement in public manners. Nevertheless, if the social plagues of the most flourishing populations be probed, there will be discovered, under the semblance of prosperity, many undeserved grievances which should command the sympathy of all generous hearts, and many unsolved problems which attract the attention of all intelligent minds. It is with such feelings that laws have been elaborated by you and adopted by the Legislative Body—some entirely philanthropical, as those of public relief, mutual aid and assurance in case of accident or death; others, authorising the workmen to unite their savings—to oppose the solidarity of wages to that of capital, allowing them at the same time to discuss their own interests at public meetings, and, in fine, giving force

In his endeavours to improve the condition of the people, and to help them in their misfortunes, the Emperor had a worthy helpmate in the Empress. Her Majesty has been reproached with the gaieties of her Court, the frivolities of her *soirées intimes*, and the freedom of the manners prevailing in the charades, and games, and farces of the days at Compiègne. M. Prosper Mérimée's touch-and-go letters, full of cynical *persiflage*, albeit penned in no disloyal spirit, have spread abroad an exaggerated idea of the Imperial revels. These revels were of their day. In tone they were French; but they never exceeded the bounds of decorum as understood by 'our lively neighbours;' and they were merely passages of relaxation after grave and heavy labours and the strict fulfilment of pious and sometimes perilous duties.

The Empress was the Lady Bountiful of the reign; and she brought to her task, not only a gentle heart, but an elevated mind, fortified by such courage as few women possess.[1] Her Majesty was the active manager of the asylums and provident associations which were connected with her name. She attended their meetings,

to their testimony in courts of justice. The suppression of *livrets*—a measure become necessary in order to relieve workmen from vexatious formalities—will complete the series of measures which place them within the common right, and elevate them in their own esteem.

'I do not suppose that in adopting this policy I shall dissipate every prejudice and animosity, or increase my own popularity. But of one thing I am entirely convinced—that I shall derive from it a new force for resisting evil passions. When all useful reforms have been adopted, when everything that is right and just has been done, order is maintained with the authority of reason and good conscience.'

[1] In dwelling on the excessive expenditure of the Emperor, it should be borne in mind by the commentator that he gave away immense sums in charity. The calls upon him were prodigious. Thus in 1856—the year of inundations—he gave 24,000*l.* in aid of the sufferers, and the Empress opened the national subscription by a gift of 800*l.* in her own name, and of 400*l.* in that of her new-born son.

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interested herself in the minutest details, and was a strict administrator. The Loan to Labour Society, under the nominal patronage of the Prince Imperial, was governed by Her Majesty with remarkable foresight and energy. Under her guidance more than 40,000*l.* was lent to workmen for the purchase of raw material for their trade—the only security asked being the good character of the borrowers. And yet a mere trifle was lost. The Asylum for Sick Children in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, the Sailor School for Orphans, the Life Boat Society ('Société de Sauvetage des Naufragés') founded in 1865, the Society of Notre Dame de Bon Secours to provide for old sailors: these, in addition to the charities which she established with her marriage gifts, are among the institutions, and the scores of *crèches* and local charities are among the charitable institutions of France, which owe their existence to the brave lady who went through the Paris hospitals when they were filled with cholera patients (1865), and was mistaken for a sister of charity by a cholera patient at Amiens, in 1866.

'Don't correct her,' said the Empress to the superior; 'it is the noblest title she can give me.'

Before closing this brief record of notable points of the Emperor's home policy, directed always to the happiness and greatness of his country, we may refer to a work which, in the Emperor's words, was enough to make his reign illustrious.

Without going back to the project of Amrou, who wrote to the Khalif Omar, between 638 and 640, recommending the cutting of a canal between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, we may note that Captain Veitch, R.N., appears to have proposed a ship canal from Suez to Tineh, some years before M. de Lesseps conceived a definite plan for carrying out this magnificent

work. Moreover, an international scientific commission, on which Robert Stephenson represented England, had disposed of the old popular error that the Mediterranean was from twenty-five to thirty feet below the level of the Red Sea. The two seas have within an inch or two the same level. Still, the main opposition to the achievement that has given immortality to M. de Lesseps was English—the result of Robert Stephenson's obstinately held opinion that sand, silt, and mud would baffle the engineers, and of a political jealousy of which Lord Palmerston was the most conspicuous and untiring representative. It was his Lordship's opposition, however, that helped M. de Lesseps to his capital. Mr. W. S. Lindsay[1] has described the Suez Canal as the greatest and grandest work connected with maritime commerce, either in ancient or modern times. It stretches about one hundred miles nearly in a straight line, and almost due north from Suez, at the head of the Red Sea, to the shores of the Mediterranean in the Bay of Pelusium, now known as Port Said; passing through several lakes—the Bitter Lake among them—and swamps. Resolved upon by M. de Lesseps in 1840, and patiently worked upon, in the face of difficulties of all kinds—in Egypt, in France, and in England—it was not before 1857 that he issued his prospectus. And then he had to meet the opposition of scientific men, who treated him as a visionary, of capitalists who laughed at the idea of sinking money-bags in the sandy flats of Pelusium, and of statesmen who were jealous even of the sanguine Frenchman's dream. This jealousy abroad, and the cordial support of the Emperor at home, awoke in the hearts of the French people a resolve to give their countryman the money to carry out his gigantic enterprise for the glory

[1] *History of Merchant Shipping and Ancient Commerce.* By W. S. Lindsay. 1876, vol. iv. p. 367.

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of France. The animosity of Lord Palmerston and Lord Stratford drew French and other Continental capitalists to M. de Lesseps' treasury; and many subscribed who had faint hope of seeing dividends.[1]

Between the days in 1857, when the town of Port Said was raised out of the mud and fifteen thousand native fishermen began with their naked hands to throw up the first great dyke of 'black slush,' which the Egyptian sun baked into a solid wall, and the opening of the sluices by the Khedive on April 18, 1869, when the two seas first met, and that period, say, when (September 28, 1869) M. de Lesseps first steamed from sea to sea, and to that still prouder day in the following November (the 17th), when the Empress of the French formally opened the Canal—the immortal work of her kinsman—to the ships of all nations, there lies a story of courage, of patience, of skill, and of stubborn mastery of obstacles, which must for ever keep the name of De Lesseps upon the grateful lips of men.[2]

The Emperor's acknowledgment of the honour M.

[1] Mr. Ticknor describes how he met De Lesseps at a dinner. 'He is here,' he remarks, 'about the great project of the Suez Canal, and making war on all occasions—including this one—upon Lord Palmerston in the most furious manner, though making a merry affair of it all the time, with true French gaiety. *Il a beaucoup d'esprit*, and amused me much.' On the same evening he went to a party at Lady Granville's, where he met Lord Palmerston. 'I told Lord Palmerston,' he writes, 'that I had been dining where I met Lesseps, and that he was full of his canal. "He may be full of his canal," said the Premier, "but his canal will never be full of water, as the world will see." And then, having laughed heartily at his own poor joke, he went on, and abused Lesseps quite as much as, two hours before, Lesseps had abused him, though in a somewhat graver tone, explaining all the while his objections to the grand project, which it still seems to me can do England no harm, though it may much harm the stockholders, which is quite another thing.'

[2] The cordial encouragement and help given to the work by the Emperor and Empress, is put on record by M. de Lesseps in his *Lettres, Journaux et Documents pour servir à l'Histoire du Canal de Suez* (1854, 1855, 1856). Paris: Didier & Co.

de Lesseps had conferred upon France, was Imperial. On his behalf the Empress presented to the illustrious engineer, on the opening day, the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour, in a highly wrought tazza of superb design that remains one of the masterpieces of the firm of Froment-Meurice.

We now pass to the events that, in three short years, made all these labours of a patriotic sovereign weigh as nought in the balance against him. How the liberty he gave in fulfilment of the pledge with which he assumed power, was used as a weapon for his destruction and for the advancement of unscrupulous enemies, is a story that may be briefly told; for, on January 19, 1867, the power he had so wielded as to make France the arbiter of the destinies of the world, passed out of his hands; and his decline began, for he transferred his prerogative to men who were bent, not on the consolidation of the structure he had crowned with liberty, but on its overthrow, which they accomplished even while the enemy was marching upon the capital.

CHAPTER III.

THE CROWNING OF THE EDIFICE.

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THE Emperor said one day, laughing: 'How can you expect my Government to get on? The Empress is a Legitimist; Morny is an Orleanist; Prince Napoleon is a Republican; I am a Socialist. Only Persigny is an Imperialist—and he is mad.'[1] This sally expressed humorously a condition of things which hindered the quiet progress of the Imperial Government, and accounted for the strange twists and turns of the Sovereign's home policy. He had devoted adherents, but they were all of different minds. The Empress was jealous of his honour, proud of his power and renown, and given up heart and soul to his interests. Her courage rose with the dangers that beset him. No sovereign ever had a nobler consort. When the time shall come to write fully the Life of the Empress Eugénie, she will appear to the world as one of the heroines of history. It is no disparagement to her mind or her heart, therefore, to say that she often opposed the Emperor's ideas, and that she warned him against throwing himself defenceless into the arms of the Opposition.

It was in the autumn of 1866, when the aggravation of his malady warned him he had not long to live, that the Emperor endeavoured to convert M. Rouher

[1] *Berryer.* Par Madame de Janzé.

to his idea that the Empire would be safe, and would flourish, only when he had completely crowned the edifice with liberty. M. Walewski had persuaded M. Olivier to take office in the first Government responsible to the Chambers; and the Emperor favoured this combination, provided M. Rouher would assent to it. But M. Rouher firmly declined to be a party to it. The Emperor remained still inclined to pursue the liberal course on which he had entered; and the results of his solitary musings and his long conversations with M. Walewski at Compiègne were the letter and decree which appeared in the 'Moniteur' on January 19, 1867.

The letter was addressed to the Minister of State, and ran thus:—

'Monsieur le Ministre,—For some years past people have been asking themselves whether our institutions were final or whether further improvements in them should be adopted; hence a regrettable uneasiness to which an end should be put.

'Down to the present time you have courageously striven in my name to repel inopportune demands, in order to leave to me the initiation of useful reforms when the moment for realising them had come. I think that it is now possible to give to the institutions of the Empire all the development of which they are susceptible, and to public liberty a further extension, without compromising the power which the nation has entrusted to me.

'The plan I have traced consists in correcting the imperfections which time has revealed, and in conceding the progress which is compatible with our manners; for the art of governing consists in profiting by experience and foreseeing the wants of the future.

'The object of the Decree of November 24, 1860,

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was to associate the Senate and the Legislative Body more directly with the policy of the Government; but the debate on the Address has not had the effect we expected. It has agitated public opinion, given rise to barren discussions, and caused the loss of valuable time that should have been given to public business. I think we may, without lessening the prerogatives of the deliberative powers, replace the debate on the Address by a prudently regulated right to question (*droit d'interpellation*).

'Another modification in the relations of the Government with the great State Bodies has appeared necessary to me. I have thought that by delegating the Ministers to the Senate and the Legislative Body to take part in the debates, I should better utilise the forces of my Government, without breaking the terms of the Constitution, which does not admit solidarity in the Ministers, and makes them depend entirely on the Chief of the State.

'But the reforms to be adopted do not end here. A law will be proposed that will refer all press offences to the Correctional Tribunals, and suppress, therefore, the discretionary power of the Government. It is equally necessary to regulate the rights of public meeting, bearing in mind the security of the public peace.

'I said, last year, that my Government desired to move on firm ground, capable of supporting authority and liberty. In the measures I have indicated, my words are realised. I am not disturbing the ground that fifteen years of tranquillity and prosperity have consolidated: I make it stronger by making my relations with the great Public Powers more intimate, in giving by law new guarantees to the people—in completing, in short, the crowning of the edifice raised by the national will. NAPOLEON.'

The immediate result of this letter and the decree accompanying it was the modification of the Ministry. Marshal Niel became Minister of War, Admiral Rigaud de Genouilly took M. de Chasseloup-Laubat's place at the Admiralty, M. de Forcade la Roquette passed to the Ministry of Commerce, and M. Rouher remained Minister of State. M. Emile Olivier had declined to join the Administration, although offered by the Emperor, through M. Walewski, the Ministry of Public Instruction and the position of Government leader or orator in the Chamber.[1] His reasons had been stated in a letter to M. Walewski, on January 1. The first and foremost was the Military Reform Bill. He was opposed to an increase of the army, and to any reorganisation that would put a fresh burden on the tax-payer. He accepted German unity as an unfortunate *fait accompli*; but held that France should adopt a resolute peace policy, and put aside all idea of measuring her strength with Germany. The most important of M. Olivier's objections fell to the ground through the concessions spontaneously made in the Emperor's letter.

It was the preparation of the reforms of January 19, and the ministerial changes which were to accompany them, that first brought M. Olivier into direct relations with the Emperor. M. Olivier has himself described fully his first experiences at the Tuileries (January, 1867).

'People have formed an erroneous idea of the person of the Emperor.[2] He is represented as taciturn, impassible; and, in truth, he appears so on public occasions. In his cabinet he is otherwise. His face is smiling. Although he does not break through a certain

[1] *Le 19 Janvier.* Par M. Olivier. Paris, 1869. He had agreed, however, to take M. Rouher's place, if that statesman deserted the Emperor.

[2] *Le 19 Janvier.*

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reserve which looks almost like timidity, his address is cordial, of touching simplicity, and of seductive politeness. He listens like one who wishes to remember. When he has nothing decisive to answer, he lets the conversation flow. He interrupts, only to present, and this in excellent terms, a serious objection. His mind is not fettered by any mastering prejudice. You may say everything to him, even that which is contrary to his opinion, even the truth, provided you speak gently and in personal sympathy with him. His changes, which have looked like dissimulation to many, are the natural movements of an impressionable nature. One might even say that his mind is accessible only to that which is great, if he had not sometimes confounded that which is great with that which is striking. He forms his resolutions slowly, and he is not displeased when they are forced upon him by the weight of circumstances. If he were left alone, he would adapt himself to liberty.'

At the interview which provoked the above reflections, M. Olivier described the reforms he considered necessary to the consolidation of the Empire. The Emperor asked whether his adviser would not take office. M. Olivier protested that he did not care for office; that he should be more valuable as an independent supporter of the Government; and that, having a statesman of the ability of M. Rouher, the Emperor was sufficiently supported in the Chamber. The Emperor ended by admitting that M. Olivier was in the right, and by leaving him free to act independently. This generosity on the Sovereign's part confirmed and strengthened M. Olivier's regard for him.[1]

[1] 'Après avoir entendu l'Empereur, je n'avais aucun doute sur sa sincérité: m'en fût-il resté une ombre, sa réponse l'eût dissipé. Si, comme on l'a écrit, il avait eu pour dessein de se jouer de ma crédulité

Thus M. Olivier, although privy to all the ministerial movements of 1867, and in frequent consultation with the Emperor, remained an independent deputy. He gave his adhesion to the reforms submitted to the Chambers amid the hootings and plottings of his former political associates, and laboured to obtain additions to them when M. Rouher and the majority whom he commanded were doing their utmost to delay and diminish them. After the interview at the Tuileries, M. Olivier forwarded to the Emperor a categorical description of the policy and the reforms he deemed necessary in order to reconcile the dynasty with the Liberal party. The Emperor replied (January 12, 1867):—

'I thank you, sir, for your letter, which contains a concise and correct summary of our conversation. Our meeting has left a very pleasant impression in my mind; for, to me, it is a great pleasure to converse with a man whose elevated and patriotic sentiments rise superior to petty personal and party interests.

'Although resolved to follow the course the aim of which I described some months ago to Walewski, I should be glad to confer again with you and Rouher on the execution of the details. Believe me, that I am not pausing through indecision nor through a vain infatuation as to my prerogatives, but through the fear of parting, in this country agitated by so many conflicting passions, with the means of re-establishing moral order —the essential basis of liberty. My embarrassment on the subject of a press law is not where to find the power to repress, but how to define in a law the offences

et de me déconsidérer, il ne m'eût pas rendu ainsi ma liberté; il eût insisté pour me retenir; et s'il y avait réussi, il ne m'eût rejeté que quelques mois plus tard, après m'avoir discrédité et rendu impuissant.'—*Le 19 Janvier*. Par Emile Olivier. Paris, 1869.

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which deserve repression. The most dangerous articles may escape repression, while the most insignificant may provoke prosecution. This has always been the difficulty. Nevertheless, in order to strike the public mind by decisive measures, I should like to effect, at one stroke, what has been called *the crowning of the edifice.* I should like to do this, at once and for ever; for it is important to me, and it is important, above all, to the country, to be finally fixed. The end I am seeking must be resolutely traced, without appearing to be dragged year by year to successive concessions; for we always fall, as M. Guizot remarked, on the side to which we lean. I wish to advance firmly in a straight line, without oscillating to the right or left. You see that I speak to you with perfect frankness. You have inspired me with a thorough confidence; and my inspirations will appear to me always worthier, when they are in harmony with yours.

'Croyez à tous mes sentiments. NAPOLEON.'

At the next interview M. Olivier had with the Emperor, he declared that he was resolved to grant right of meeting, ministerial responsibility, and the law on the press. He said: 'I am decided, because, although the people have considerable liberty, I appear to have given none.' He added, with a smile: 'I am making a considerable concession, and if I came direct from the First Empire this would be acknowledged; but, since I succeed to parliamentary governments, so long as I do not adopt the old mould my concessions will be received as small. You will see: this will be said.'

It was said in violent language, in the Chamber and in the press.

The letter of January 19 disappointed M. Olivier. He perceived in it the effects of the pressure which had

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been put upon the Emperor by the opponents of Liberal institutions who surrounded him; but in His Majesty's speech opening the session (February 14, 1867) he recognised the sincerity of the Sovereign's convictions,[1] and in a courageous speech declared that he should vote the order of the day with the Government majority. This honest resolution raised a storm against him from the Opposition, who were hurt not on the crowning of the edifice, but on its distinction.

The session was a troubled one, in the course of which it became only too clear to M. Olivier that M. Rouher and his political creatures were bent, not on carrying in a generous spirit the reforms promised by the Emperor, but on weakening them.

The attitude of the Opposition was certainly not encouraging to the Emperor. The violence with which the Mexican and Roman questions were treated by the Opposition speakers; the brutal excesses of language, the innuendoes, the flatly treasonable charges in which the leaders of the Emperor's enemies indulged, by way of showing the uses to which they were prepared to put liberty—were cited in the Imperial *entourage*, and chiefly by the Minister of State, as arguments in arrest of all concessions. M. Picard (February 29) called the reforms of January 19 'an organised dictatorship;' M. Jules Favre declared that it would be better to shut up the Chamber once for all; M. Thiers remarked that to make and unmake constitutions was to exercise a dictatorship; and M. Favre even advised a parliamentary revolt. 'The Address was our right,' he exclaimed. 'It is for us to keep it.' Foreign affairs gave M. Thiers

[1] 'Le discours du trône, au contraire, me parut excellent; il reprenait, en l'agrandissant, la lettre du 19 Janvier; l'inspiration primitive semblait avoir de nouveau triomphé des tiraillements intérieurs.' —*Le 19 Janvier*. Par Emile Olivier. Paris, 1869.

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the opportunity of an elaborate attack upon the Government. He declared that the unity of Italy had reduced France to a second-rate, and perhaps to a third-rate, Power; and that France had no longer an ally.

'Nor an enemy,' M. Rouher replied, adding that Prussia had given every necessary guarantee of her moderation.

And yet the Government submitted an Army Reorganisation Bill, by which the effective forces of the Empire would be raised to 1,200,000 men. In May the settlement of the Luxembourg question gave rise to another violent party debate, in which M. Jules Simon exclaimed that France had liberties which could not be given piecemeal. They were indivisible, and France had had none. M. Jules Favre held that in a free country the Ministers would be impeached for the Mexican expedition.

If the speakers of the Opposition were disloyal and extravagant in their attacks even upon the reforms which the Emperor, through his Minister of State, had frankly submitted to them, M. Rouher and his colleagues were but lukewarm exponents of the Imperial reformer. The Emperor had requested M. Rouher to take counsel with M. Olivier as to the carrying out of the decree of January 19; and at the opening of the session the Minister and the deputy worked cordially together. But M. Rouher gradually drew away from M. Olivier. M. Walewski, seeing the reactionary movements of the Minister, retired from the presidency of the Chamber,[1] and was replaced by M. Schneider. A club of deputies hostile to the programme of January 19 was formed in the Rue de l'Arcade, under the auspices of M. Rouher.

[1] His withdrawal was a loss to the Liberal side; for he had helped to frame the decrees of November 24 and February 19, and his constant advice to the Emperor had been in favour of liberty.

At Court the advocates of a reactionary policy were in the ascendant. This course of events discouraged M. Olivier, and gave fresh energy to the Opposition in the Chamber and to the attacks of the press. The Liberal adviser of the Emperor was assailed not only by his former colleagues, but by the partisans of M. Rouher. The object of the Minister of State appeared to be to discredit M. Olivier in the mind of the Emperor, by demonstrating that he had influence neither with the Right nor the Left of the Chamber.

The result of the reaction which M. Rouher headed, in order to put aside the reforms of January without appearing to oppose them, was the advance of M. Olivier to a decidedly aggressive attitude against the Minister who had spurned his advice—the advice he had tendered at their Sovereign's request—and who was doing his utmost to delay and destroy the measures he had himself introduced in February. By April M. Rouher was engaged in the more congenial task of pushing a Bill to restrict the powers of the Municipal Councils. This gave M. Olivier his opportunity; and he availed himself of it, saying that for a long time nothing more adverse to the growth of public life had been proposed than this measure, which the Government affected to present as a liberal one. To M. Forcade la Roquette's assertion that the Government was marching slowly but surely towards liberty, M. Olivier replied that they were merely marking time, and not advancing at all. Eventually (July 12) he made a comprehensive survey of the political situation created by M. Rouher on the Act of January 19. 'This act, or deed,' he said, 'means that having been placed between liberal and Cesarian democracy, the Emperor has adopted liberal democracy.' As for the Minister of State, he said he was not First Minister, nor Mayor of the Palace, nor Grand Vizier—

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he was a vice-emperor, without responsibility. The title of vice-emperor clung to M. Rouher henceforth.

M. Olivier's attack was vehement, and it was eloquent. He warned the Government against wasting its strength, and irritating a submissive people until they became angry. He charged M. Rouher with having attempted to destroy the reforms he had at first opposed and then accepted. He remarked that only two courses were open—a fruitless and perhaps calamitous war, with all its horrors; or the establishment of a constitutional and free government. 'God grant,' he said, 'that our Sovereign may have the wisdom to prefer liberty to war.'

The Emperor had by this time given back all his confidence to his Minister of State. He publicly declared his sympathy with M. Rouher by sending him the grand cross of the Legion of Honour in diamonds. M. Olivier, on his side, marked his sense of the slight which had been put upon him by closing the constant personal relations with the Emperor which he had maintained during the session, and by declining all official invitations.

And yet the Emperor refused to withdraw the laws of January 19, albeit urged by his First Minister with a threat of resignation. He would not dishonour his signature. But the consequence of the divided councils by which the Emperor was embarrassed was, that these reforms were accepted by the public merely as experiments to be continued during their good conduct, and not as the bases of a new *régime* definitively entered upon. The effect of the activity of the opponents of liberal measures was not to defeat them, but to weaken and degrade them. Instead, therefore, of disarming the Opposition and the hostile press, they merely enabled the enemies of the Empire to act more efficaciously against the Throne. The session of the Chamber

which closed on July 24, albeit it had been marked by acrimonious debates, and had shown the Imperial Government to be divided against itself, had been remarkable for one liberal measure, initiated by the Emperor. It was during this session that, on the proposition of the Emperor, a national gift of 500,000 francs was voted to M. de Lamartine. It might have been a brilliant session, inaugurating a new departure in the Imperial fortunes undertaken amid the *fêtes* of the Great Exhibition in the Champ de Mars; but it closed only with ominous signs of a desperate struggle to come. It left the enemies of the Empire stronger and more vicious than they were on the 19th of January.

Nor were the foreign relations of the Empire all that could be desired. The Luxembourg difficulty had been got over by the neutralisation of the Duchy. The Emperor had paid a friendly visit to Francis Joseph at Salzburg (August 17), and on his way back had said, at Amiens, that France might rely on the maintenance of peace; but the imminence of war with Germany was the cry of the very party that declined to reorganise or increase the army, and the relations of France and Italy were not friendly. In the autumn Garibaldi's invasion of the Pontifical States took place; and the Emperor's troops, under General de Failly, sent in haste from Toulon, finally routed them at Mentana. Upon the Garibaldian battalions the new chassepots were first tried; and the General's report that they had 'done wonders' was taken up by the anti-clerical party and tossed about the boulevards, as another reason for running down the Government. A demonstration over the tomb of the Italian patriot Manin, at Montmartre, was one of the forms in which the popular anger vented itself.

In the midst of these troubles M. Achille Fould died

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(October 6), leaving another great void in the Imperial councils. M. Magne became Finance Minister in his place; while an obscure lawyer, distinguished only by his clerical ardour, M. Pinard, took office as Minister of the Interior, on the retirement of M. de Lavalette, who had opposed the Roman expedition.

The session of 1867–8 was opened on November 19, 1867. In his opening speech the Emperor announced that order was on the point of being completely re-established in the Papal States, and that it was already possible to calculate the time when the French soldiers would return home. The Opposition replied by an interpellation, in the debate on which, while M. Jules Simon declared that he saw only one solution of the difficulty, viz. the separation of Church and State, M. Rouher threw himself resolutely into the clerical camp.

'The Pope requires Rome,' he said, 'as security for his independence. Italy aspires to Rome, which she considers indispensable to her unity. Well, we affirm in the name of the French Government that Italy shall never take possession of Rome.' The majority of the Chamber vociferated 'Never!' 'No,' M. Rouher re-iterated with great force—'NEVER!'

The effect was striking, but the consequences of it were unfortunate, and reached even to the disasters of 1870. M. Rouher, who served the Emperor with extraordinary skill as an administrator and a debater during the last ten years of his reign, and stemmed the tide of revolutionary opposition with a readiness of resource and of tongue equal to that of Thiers, often compromised the Sovereign to whom he was heart and soul devoted. He was fertile in expedients, a master of sounding phrases, but he had no steady guiding principles. In this Roman debate he provoked the anger of the Opposition leaders, and gave them opportunities

of reply which they used with good effect. He talked of the revolutionary hordes that had invaded the Pontifical territory; and M. Pelletan replied that revolutionary hordes was exactly the expression used by Austria in 1831 to describe the volunteers in whose ranks two Bonaparte princes figured. The retort was modified in the official report of the sitting, and made to refer to Prince Charles Bonaparte only. This gave M. Pelletan a second opportunity. He protested against 'a suppression which had mutilated his idea.' 'I spoke,' he said, 'of two princes Bonaparte, because there were, in 1831, two precursors of Garibaldi. One is dead, the other is on the throne.' The incident served the revolutionary cause; for it was plain to the Minister of State that the end which MM. Thiers, Simon, Favre, and Pelletan were pursuing, in spite of their oath of allegiance, was the overthrow of the Empire, and not its consolidation on the rock of liberty. This conviction is the excuse for the line of policy M. Rouher adopted, in arrest of the Emperor's liberal policy; its excuse, but not the justification of it. He was the Emperor's advocate, not his adviser. It was said of him: '*Tout dossier ne lui est-il pas bon?*'

Dear bread, a rigorous winter, and a consequent lack of work, served the cause of the Opposition, on the reassembling of the Chambers, in January (1868). Seditious cries had been heard in the streets; the Marseillaise had been sung; there had been consequent arrests and short sentences of imprisonment; newspapers had been prosecuted for publishing unlawful reports. M. Magne put forth a loan of 28 millions sterling to bring the national finances into order. In the Chamber the new press law, in conformity with the Emperor's letter of January 19, was carried on March 9, and on the 25th the law on public meetings, considerably modified under

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the hand of M. Rouher, so that it was opposed by M. Olivier as insufficient, passed the Legislative Body.[1]

The law on the organisation of the army and the Garde Mobile had already been voted before the adjournment for the holidays; but it had reached the public, with the denunciations of MM. Simon, Favre, Garnier-Pagès, Pelletan, and M. Olivier, who had consistently opposed any increase of the army, and made the abandonment of the reorganisation scheme of the Commission the primary condition of his accession to office.

On the debate on the reorganisation of the army, which was opened on December 19 (1867), the supporters of the Empire, and the French Conservatives generally, rely as fixing on the Opposition under the Empire the responsibility of the military disasters of 1870.

M. Jules Simon opened it with a general attack on standing armies. He wanted 'an army that was not an army;' he demanded the suppression of the permanent army, and the arming of the entire nation, so that it might be invincible at home, and incapable of making war abroad. M. Jules Favre desired no armies, but Republican institutions everywhere, because when the nations were Republican they would have no cause for war—war being the consequence only of dynastic conflicts. M. Olivier argued that the Government should establish a Liberal Constitutional *régime*—a *régime* of peace; and thus the reorganisation and extension of the army would be unnecessary.

[1] 'L'Empire n'a jamais été plus assailli du cri de liberté que depuis qu'il a concédé quelque chose à la liberté: à entendre les réclamations qui s'élèvent de toutes parts, on dirait que les actes du 19 Janvier ont raccourci la chaîne au lieu de l'allonger; en quinze mois d'un régime adouci, le gouvernement s'est plus affaibli qu'en quinze ans d'un régime absolu. Et l'on appelle habiles, pratiques, les ministres qui ont amené une pareille situation; je les déclare les plus pitoyables des politiques.'—*Le 19 Janvier*. Par Emile Olivier, 1869.

Two years later the speaker, as the chief Minister of a Liberal Government, went to war, and to defeat, with an army the reorganisation of which he had opposed.

M. Thiers was more practical than the other Opposition speakers. His contention was that the army was strong enough; that there would always be time to organise the Garde Mobile behind the 500,000 permanent soldiers when war threatened; and that M. Rouher had exaggerated the military forces of the European Powers. He repeated that the Minister's calculations were chimerical, and that he had misled the Chamber with a phantasmagoria of figures. There would always be two or three months to call out the Mobiles! He concluded by demanding that the organisation of the Garde Nationale Mobile should be adjourned, and he was supported by M. Olivier.

The Government had asked that the army, with the reserves, should be raised to 750,000 men; and that the Garde Nationale Mobile, which would give after some years between 300 and 400 thousand, should be instituted as a second reserve. MM. Rouher and Baroche, and above all Marshal Niel, supported the Government measure. Its necessity was demonstrated by the persistence with which the deputies and writers of the Opposition described France as at the mercy of Germany, and war as inevitable; and yet it was denounced all over the country by the enemies of the Government as a new burden wantonly cast upon the people.[1]

The financial situation of the Empire afforded the

[1] 'Another thing that maddens me is the manner in which the plan for the reorganisation of the army is received. Our young gentlemen are dying with fear at the prospect of being called upon, at a given moment, to fight for their country, and say this vulgar kind of thing should be left to the Prussians. Imagine what will be left of the French nation if she loses her military courage!'—Mérimée, *Lettres à une Inconnue.*

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Opposition a more legitimate cause for attacking the Government.

M. Thiers was leader of this assault; and he had no difficult task in demonstrating that the financial position was bad. M. Magne's loan would not cover the floating debt. There had always been an excess of expenditure over income. M. Thiers estimated the floating debt at 1,356 millions of francs. M. Rouher made a forcible answer to M. Thiers, arguing that the financial condition of the country was sound, and that the public were satisfied; but the enemies of the Empire did not fail to side with the Opposition, and to rejoice in the angry recriminations which subsequently arose between MM. Jules Favre, Berryer, and Picard, and the Minister of State, over the proposed indemnity to holders of Mexican securities. Even in the Senate signs of opposition appeared.

M. Sainte-Beuve, who called himself a Senator of the Left, and had always given an independent support to the Emperor—which was not forfeited even when he was made commander of the Legion of Honour (1859), nor while he was a constant contributor to the 'Moniteur'—raised his voice in the Senate in defence of his friend, Ernest Renan, and was the advocate of unsectarian education. He said: 'Science must and will be free. The supernatural disappears before it. The desperate opposition of the clerical party to modern thought will be broken up by modern reason.'[1] The debate in

[1] Sainte-Beuve believed in the Emperor's benevolent intentions. 'Understand me thoroughly,' he said to his friend in *Lacaussade*: 'I am not a Bonapartist. It is not *fétichisme* nor enthusiasm that draws me to them; it is reason. He is the elect of universal suffrage, and we want a strong and stable Government.' Sainte-Beuve voted for the Opposition candidates in 1863 and 1869. He threw up the *Moniteur*, and went over to the *Temps* and the Opposition rather than allow one of his articles to be modified. He died on October 13, 1869.

which he made these remarks left the Government with a majority of only 14 in the Upper Chamber.

Opponents of quite another type were rising. M. Rochefort's 'Lanterne' appeared on May 1, and was followed by M. Louis Ulbach's 'Cloche;' but the most ominous events of the year were the trial of the accused in the Baudin demonstration, and the seizure of the journals that were receiving subscriptions for a monument 'to the glorious martyr of December 3, 1851.' These events created extraordinary excitement in the public mind. The speeches of MM. Emmanuel Arago and Léon Gambetta (November 13, 1868), in which the Emperor was openly attacked, and Imperial institutions were dragged through the mud, under cover of the liberties of January 19, became the texts of revolutionary fraternities throughout the country. The accused were condemned to various fines and terms of imprisonment. The action of the Government had been unfortunate, because it had been hesitating. Too much or too little liberty had been given. There was not enough to disarm the revolutionary bands in Paris, who were seeking, not the good of the nation, but their own ends; not the patriotic objects which M. Emile Olivier kept in view, but the chaos out of which the Delescluzes and Favres, the Rocheforts and Gambettas, were to pick prizes; and there was too much to leave the arm of the law strong enough against organised revolution. In the midst of the tumult of the latter half of the year 1868, M. Walewski (September 20) and M. Berryer (November 30) died. They were both honourable statesmen according to their lights and sympathies, whom France at that moment could ill spare. The year closed with the prevention of the demonstration over the tomb of Baudin, which had been prepared by the revolutionary chiefs. M. Picard's precautions were of such overwhelming

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force that their excess covered him with ridicule, under which he disappeared. He was succeeded by M. Forcade de la Roquette, M. de Moustier being replaced at the same time in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by M. de Lavalette.

On January 18, 1869, the Emperor opened the last session of the Chamber elected in 1863, with a speech in which he dwelt on the difficulties that had thickened on the path of the Empire to constitutional liberty.

'The task we have undertaken together,' he said, 'is an arduous one. It is not, in truth, without difficulty, that on a soil disturbed by so many revolutions a government can be established that shall be so penetrated with the wants of its epoch as to adopt all the benefits of liberty, and at the same time remain strong enough to withstand its excesses.

'The two laws voted in your last session, the object of which was to develope the principle of free discussion, have produced two opposite effects, which it is useful to note. On the one hand the press and public meetings have created in certain quarters an unwholesome agitation, and revealed anew ideas and passions which were believed to be dead. But, on the other hand, the nation, deaf to the most violent excitations, and relying on my resolution to maintain order, has not felt its faith in the future shaken.

'Remarkable coincidence! The more that adventurous and subversive spirits sought to disturb the public peace, the deeper became that peace. Commercial transactions resumed a fruitful activity, the public revenue increased considerably, general interests became reassured, and most of the elections gave a fresh support to my Government.'

Then the Emperor dwelt on his resolves for the future.

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'Sustained by your approbation and your help, I am thoroughly resolved to persevere in the path I have traced for myself; that is, to accept every real progress, but also to hold beyond all debate the fundamental bases of the Constitution, which the national vote has placed beyond attack.

'The tree is known by its fruit, the Evangelist has said. Well, if we look back, which is the *régime* that has given France seventeen years of quiet and of constantly increasing prosperity? Beyond doubt, every Government is liable to commit errors. Fortune does not always smile on our enterprises. But my strength consists in this, that the nation is not unaware that for twenty years I have not had a thought, I have not done a single act which was not inspired by a desire to promote the interest and the greatness of France. Neither does the nation forget that I was the first to wish for a more rigorous control of public affairs, that with this view I increased the power of the deliberative assemblies, being persuaded that the real strength of a Government lies in the independence and patriotism of the great bodies of the State.'

This liberal speech opened a short and stormy session that presaged a general election, in which the Opposition would strive, not to establish a Liberal Empire, but to lead up to a revolution.[1] The two statesmen who faced each other, bidding for the favour of the Emperor, were M. Rouher and M. Emile Olivier. The former was for a swift return to personal government; the latter laboured to convince the Sovereign that free elections, uninfluenced by prefects, and without Government candidates, would crown an edifice based upon a rock! The subject on which the adversaries tried their strength

[1] M. Rouher told the Opposition, in the course of a debate on the Mexican Expedition (July 25, 1868), that their object was the Republic.

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was the new military law. The Opposition moved an amendment, demanding a reduction of the annual military contingent by 20,000; even while they were representing the country as at the mercy of Germany. They represented to the peasants that the Government wanted to load them with more taxes, and to add to the severity of their military service; and to the artisans that France had been betrayed, and must measure swords with M. de Bismarck's legions. M. Olivier alone was just in his Liberalism. While M. de Girardin and M. Thiers were demonstrating that war with Germany was inevitable, and at the same time were opposed to the military reorganisation that alone could make such a struggle successful; M. Olivier declared he could not admit that the greatness of his country consisted in the weakness of other countries, and that to be a noble Frenchman was 'to prevent the Germans from being German, and the Italians from being Italian.' He was, with the Government, for peace; and if he declined to sanction Marshal Niel's costly military reforms, it was because he would not admit that war with Germany was unavoidable. This was M. Emile Olivier's position on the eve of the general election of 1869.

When twitted with his acceptance of a Liberal Empire, and his refusal to lend himself to its overthrow, he exclaimed: 'To whom have I given the right to believe me cut out for so despicable a part, after my oath of allegiance?' Then he added ironically: 'Who in the most advanced Opposition has acted thus? It is not M. Thiers, who on March 28, 1865, said: "As for the rights of the dynasty, they are indisputable. None of us think of discussing them, because none of us are prepared to put them in question. We are men of sense and of honour. The object we are pursuing is the re-establishment of liberty in France—it is our only object;

and we know that another revolution would be another adjournment of liberty, and a vital difficulty, for it is the many revolutions we have had that makes liberty so difficult in France."' In like manner M. Olivier quoted the speeches of MM. Jules Favre, Picard, Marie, Bethmont, Magnin, Glais-Bizoin, and others—signatories of the Amendment of the 42, in which it was declared that France united the dynasty and liberty as one attachment. He cited also M. Grévy, who had just been added to the Parliamentary Opposition, as one who refused to raise liberty on the ruins of the Empire. M. Olivier was no stranger, however, to the spirit which had been recently evoked, nor to the personal ambition which underlay the violent movements of his old party, when they approached the general election. They cast him off and denounced him as a traitor, because he was loyal to his oath, while they, sworn defenders of the dynasty, deliberately led the way to its destruction.

The following testimony to the aims and pretensions of M. Thiers at this time is conclusive. The Grotes were in Paris in the autumn of 1869.

'On one afternoon,' Mrs. Grote remarks in her Life of her husband, 'we received a visit at our hotel from two friends, both Frenchmen—the Count A. de Circourt and the Count de Belvèze. Politics of course formed the staple of our long conversation, Grote gradually becoming animated by their respective predictions about the pending changes in the course of the Government. Indeed, the malady under which the Chief of the Executive was then suffering rendered political speculation more bold and active than had been possible for a length of time. Towards the end of the visit M. de Belvèze, amused by Grote's seeming to doubt the chances of France returning to Republicanism, in spite of all that

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the two friends had been telling him of its probability, said: "Well, now, I will recount to you what befell me this very day, and you shall judge whether the incident does not confirm our opinions. I was on my way to call on my physician, when I met M. Thiers. 'Come with me,' cried he, 'and we will have a talk as we walk.' 'I cannot do so, for I *must* go and see Dr. ——.' 'Ah! never mind your doctor!'" Thus saying, Thiers tucked his arm under that of M. de Belvèze, and off they went together; naturally, since I never knew anyone to resist the fascination of M. Thiers's company if offered to him. M. de Belvèze certainly could not, anyhow.

'They plunged at once into the "situation actuelle," of course. "You know," said M. Thiers, "as well as everyone else, that *I* never was a republican; my whole life has been passed in antagonism with republican doctrines." "Certainly," rejoined M. de Belvèze, "we know it well enough." "Well," replied M. Thiers, "for all that I will frankly own to you that I have of late come to think differently. In plain terms, I am now profoundly persuaded *qu'il n'y a rien de possible que la République.*" "Now, what say you to this *confession de foi?*" said M. de Belvèze, smiling. We all held our peace. The communication seemed to take all three of us by surprise.

'When we were again alone George declared himself much impressed by the fact of so acute an interpreter of the auguries as M. Thiers adopting the Republic as the safest course to follow.'

This conversation may serve to defend M. Thiers against the accusation of having (in 1871) declared for the Republic because it would enable him to become the Chief of the State. He was ready for the Republic, and working towards it, in 1869.

CHAPTER IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.

CHAP. IV.

FIRST among the journalists who ranged themselves in opposition to the Empire was Prévost-Paradol.[1] He has been called the Rochefort of the *salons*; but he was more than this. His satire was as keen, but it was more polished. His irony was biting, and it was thrown into exquisite literary forms. His argument was conducted with vigour, but not with violence. He was a cool, methodical controversialist, whose weapons were as bright and fine as a case of surgical instruments. In the 'Débats'—which was exactly his right place in journalism—he attacked the Imperial Government, not as a skirmisher like Rochefort, but as a serious politician who desired Parliamentary government, albeit by no means the rule of the mob. When he became a contributor to the more popular 'Courrier du Dimanche' his style was more highly coloured, and he gave an extra pinch of salt to his wit; but he never derogated from his dignity as an Academician. The remark addressed to Leigh Hunt by an English wit may be applied to Paradol. He filled his sling with shining pebbles from the brook, and never condescended to bespatter his enemies with mud. He was prosecuted (1860) for his attacks upon the Imperial Government, and was condemned; but not for such slanders as made the 'Lanterne' sell. Indeed, when the press opposition to

[1] He was elected a French Academician when only 35 years of age.

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the Government became too fierce for his fine weapon to be of service, he sheathed it.[1] He had endeavoured twice to enter the Chamber, and had failed. Hating the excesses of the press, and declining to take part in them, he found his occupation as a journalist gone.

That, seeing the Emperor sincerely bent on establishing his throne upon liberal institutions, he ultimately agreed, under the guarantee of M. Emile Olivier's political honour, to rally to the Liberal Empire, needs no apology. He began by consenting to join the Decentralisation Commission, under the presidency of Odilon Barrot, which the Emperor had long wanted to form; and finally he became Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States, in June, 1870. He put an end to his life (July 11, 1870) in a fit of melancholia, produced, it is believed, by the news of the war, which broke out a few days after his departure from France, and by the German sympathies with which he found himself surrounded at Washington.

If the Empire had encountered only worthy literary enemies like Paradol, the march to complete and thorough constitutional government would have been steady; for the Opposition in the Chambers would not have counted extreme men in its ranks, because the evil passions of the half-informed multitude would not have been roused to send them there. The freedom given to the press and the right of meeting, unfortunately brought into play both licentious and blasphemous pens and slanderous tongues. The excesses of the journalists provoked reprisals that filled the prisons. The war between

[1] M. Ed. Scherer said of him: 'Entré a vingt-sept ans aux *Débats*, Paradol était devenu d'emblée le plus brillant de nos journalistes. On n'a jamais mis dans des articles tant de goût, de grâce et d'éloquence; c'était poli et acéré comme une flèche; et avec cela une si droite raison. Paradol restera le plus littéraire et le plus charmant de ceux qui ont jamais écrit dans un journal.'

the Government and the Opposition deputies and journalists became in the course of 1869 one to the knife. The Emperor and Empress were brutally assailed by M. Rochefort; the violence of the 'Lanterne' was equalled only by that of the 'Rappel,' under the patronage of Victor Hugo, and of the 'Marseillaise.'

Writing of the journalism of this year, I have remarked:[1] 'French men of letters seldom spare one another, and are pitiless towards their enemies. Poor Viennet could not be carried unmolested to his grave. We find passages as scandalous as the worst literary utterances of Scarron's time in the French journalism of the last years of the Empire. The "Rappel" draws a parallel at length between the Emperor and his ministers and Jesus of Nazareth and His disciples! I find a *très jolie satire* by Rochefort, of which one line runs—

A Jésus-Christ j'ai prêté mes vieux gants.

As we approach the present, even from only two or three years back, we find the spice becomes hotter, the hate more bitter, the disrespect profounder and more widely spread. The very roots of society are loosening. M. Rochefort, intoxicated with the noise of his street mobs, casts wildly about for stronger flavours for his poisonous dishes. His clients crave the most biting food, since he has almost paralysed their palates; not weekly, but daily; not in the "Lanterne," but in the "Marseillaise." He had a burning desire to call ministers calves with two heads, and lepers, more than a year ago; so that the lowest *argot* must seem only spoon meat to him by this time.'

The cruelty of the time was illustrated in its acutest form over the grave of Jean P. G. Viennet, the Academician, who died in the summer of 1868. He was a

[1] *The Gavroche Party*, 1869.

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satirist of the classic school, whose shafts had rotted away long before he went to his rest. He lived to be the father of the French Academy, and to know that even eighty-six summers would not shield the grey head from the ribald assaults of the new school. He said of himself, with the invincible gaiety which belonged to him, and which showed a brave spirit: 'They counted up at least 500 epigrams a year against my person, my poetry, my Parliamentary speeches—even to my green coat. Every schoolboy, on his escape from college into journalism, believed he owed me his first kick.' Yet Viennet had done good service in the cause of freedom. He was the open enemy of despotism and the denouncer of the Jesuits. He belonged to the strong and valiant Opposition that, in the end, made the restored Bourbons remember and learn; and he was among the lettered deputies who cleared the way for, and hailed, the Citizen King. Yet when he died his hearse was pelted with gibes and jests by Ferragus and the rest of the bowelless scribes who were misusing their newly-acquired liberty. The 'Figaro' remarked: 'He confessed at the last moment; it was his final irony.'

It is a swift descent from the satire of M. Viennet and brave Béranger to that of the 'Lanterne,' the 'Cloche,' the 'Marseillaise,' and the 'Rappel.' The chief of the coarse and pitiless modern school in 1869 was M. Henri Rochefort. His weapon was cold and glittering. He was heartless and plain-spoken. He conveyed to his reader his own sense of enjoyment when he was using the scalping-knife. The mocker revelled in phrases that degraded the diplomatic uniform to the footman's plush, and humbled the princess to the level of the *chiffonnière*. He delighted to pin a ridiculous something upon a man's coat, to stab with a *mot*, to strip artfully clothed deeds and things, and lay bare the

mean motive (this he usually invented) for that which the blind world had agreed to call a noble action. Rochefort mastered a distinct and separate position for himself among his literary brethren, which was creditable only to his power, and which proved that the French relish for the most spiteful writing was as keen as it had ever been.

'By the light of the "Lanterne" Imperial institutions and Imperialists looked so much moving rottenness. . . . Rochefort cut up the Empire pleasantly, as a nurse divides a holiday cake in a nursery. A man so constituted—the kernel a very Gaul, the shell a Dutchman—was a fresh presence, an original and a fascinating form of literary power. Dry wit is as engaging as dry humour. The jester who can command his own face is king of his company. Rochefort appeared to be having a light touch-and-go conversation with a gentleman of a different way of thinking; and, suddenly, he plunged a thin long knife into his bowels—that was all—and quietly turned aside to run his critical thumb along a fresh blade.' His success was extraordinary, and with his success his audacity increased until his license became such as not the very freest constitutional government would have borne. He was prosecuted, and his 'Lanterne' was suppressed. The prosecution and the suppression gave rise to excesses of the most deplorable and despicable kind. Vile imitators of Rochefort used even fouler weapons than his, and the Government was defended by agents as little worthy of respect as the Opposition lampooners. Rochefort's 'Lanterne' was answered by Marchal's 'Inflexible.'

M. About,[1] raising his voice in the 'Gaulois' in the

[1] M. Edmond About, in the *Gaulois*, remarked that the seizure of the *Lanterne* could not surprise any rational creature. He added that the *Lanterne* had produced 12,000*l.* profit. He would not imprison these traders in slander, but he would empty their pockets.

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midst of the tumult, urged the Imperial Government to leave thoughts free, and not to withdraw the liberties which had been recently given. At the same time he had the courage to denounce the party men who could even sow hatred in the breast of a boy at a distribution of school prizes, and who had encouraged him to commit a public outrage against the most liberal minister who had held a portfolio under the Second Empire. He referred to the refusal of young Cavaignac to receive a prize from the hands of the Prince Imperial, and to M. Duruy.

The result of this violence, of this blind hatred, of these false statements—all concentrated against a Government as the immediate consequence of the liberty it had granted—was a strong revulsion in favour of that Government. The misuse of satire had stirred the depths of society, and quickened the most odious forms of slander and vituperation. Silence the slanderers, punish the preachers of sedition, was the advice of About and other friends of freedom; but keep the tree of Liberty where you have planted it.

The Legislative Body was dissolved on April 27, and the general election was fixed for May 23. The month of electioneering was characterised by the most extravagant meetings and the wildest journalism. Not only full liberty but uncontrolled license was permitted. The Government, it is true, exercised its power over the electors, nominated official candidates, controlled the vast bureaucracy of the State, in order to stem the torrent of republican and demagogic opposition, which was plentifully charged with mud; but the universal electorate spoke its will fully and freely notwithstanding, under the Ministry of M. de Forcade la Roquette, a Liberal like M. Olivier. This will, amid the disaffected who were swayed by the Opposition leaders, was

declared against the moderate men, and especially against M. Emile Olivier, who had rallied to a Liberal Empire. The treatment which he received from his former colleagues, and through their influence from the electors of Paris, revealed the real nature of the issue raised between the Government and those who were led by MM. Thiers, Favre, Simon, and their political associates. M. Olivier, rejected by the Paris electors in favour of the outrageously violent M. Bancel, was provided with a seat in the Var through the influence of the Government.

The Emperor, very ill and much moved by the scenes of disorder and the unmanly attacks to which the grant of free speech and free press had immediately given rise, would not withdraw from the constitutional position he had taken up. He was magnanimous towards his enemies. M. Rochefort, who had fled to Belgium when condemned to imprisonment for the gross libels of the 'Lanterne,' was permitted by the Sovereign to return to Paris and become a candidate for the Assembly. He was returned for a Paris *arrondissement.* M. Gambetta was elected for the *First Arrondissement*, while M. Thiers and M. Simon succeeded only at the second *tour de scrutin.* In Paris the most violent candidates were the most popular.

The upshot of these tumultuous contests, however, was a Conservative Chamber, but one in which the declared enemies of the Imperial Government were a formidable force. They assembled after there had been riots not only in the provincial towns, but in the heart of Paris. These had been promptly suppressed, with the help of the shopkeepers, who had armed themselves to give a good account of the rioters. M. de Girardin had endeavoured to calm the excitement by telling the people that they had got their victory.

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Paris had spoken her will; that was enough. France was not anxious to serve another apprenticeship to liberty after another revolution. 'Let us work with the materials we have,' said the old journalist. These materials soon made their influence felt. The first work of the new Assembly was to draw up a petition to the Emperor, praying for the completion of the constitutional reforms he had already granted. It was signed by 116 deputies, including the Duke de Mouchy, a member of the Imperial family, and delivered to the Emperor at Saint Cloud.

It was opposed at the Cabinet Council by M. Rouher, and supported by the Minister of the Interior and the rest of the ministers who were in favour of constitutional government, and who looked forward with confidence to the time when M. Olivier would be at the head of an Administration responsible to the Chambers. The Minister of State pointed to the sad condition of things which had already been brought about by the loosening of the Imperial authority, and offered to attack the signatories of the petition in the Chamber, and to obtain its rejection, provided the Emperor would dissolve, and appeal boldly to the Conservative elements in the country. He was ready to retrace the steps towards Parliamentary government which the Sovereign had taken since 1860, and to assume the responsibility of a return to the terms of the Constitution of 1852. But the Emperor held his ground, and rejected the offer of his Chief Minister.

On July 12 His Majesty addressed a message to the Legislative Body, in which he declared that he granted the prayer of the petition. On August 12 the Senate was convoked to ratify the *senatus-consulte*, embodying the new reforms. On September 10 the constitutional *régime* was promulgated, and the ordinary session of

the Legislative Body was announced to open on November 29.

The new order of things was Parliamentary government—very much on the English model. The Ministers were responsible to the Chambers; they could be members of the Senate or the Legislative Body. The Legislative Body could initiate laws and elect its presidents and vice-presidents. Every member of the Senate or the Legislative Body had a right to question the Government. The expenditure was to be voted by sections of each Administration, and modifications of duties and international commercial treaties could be put in force only after adoption by Parliament. In a word, by the *senatus-consulte* of September 10, 1869, the Emperor finally and fully transferred the legislative powers which he had received from the nation to the Legislative Body.

The Cabinet had been re-formed immediately after the Emperor's message to the Legislature. M. Rouher, unable to support the Emperor's constitutional policy, withdrew from his council chamber and accepted (July 20) the Presidency of the Senate. The Ministry of State which he had held so long was suppressed. In the new Administration M. de Forcade la Roquette remained Minister of the Interior, M. Magne Minister of Finance, and Marshal Niel Minister of War. But the Marshal passed suddenly away (August 14), leaving another void in the list of the Emperor's distinguished servants, a void that was unfortunately filled up by Marshal Lebœuf.

Marshal Niel, who had been the chief author and promoter of the military reorganisation, who had supported it before the Chambers and worked hard to realise it as Minister, left his task far from complete. Indeed, the Garde Mobile was little more than a project. But he had pushed forward the manufacture of the

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chassepots that were to answer the Prussian needle-guns, and under his care the first experiments with the mitrailleuses were conducted. He was a brilliant engineer officer, who had distinguished himself in Africa, in the Baltic, and in Italy; he was popular with the people, and he enjoyed the entire confidence of his Sovereign. Had he lived only another year his zeal as a military reformer might have turned the tide of war in favour of his country; at least this was the opinion of his countrymen in the midst of their disasters.

In this year of radical changes in the Imperial Government the Emperor's life hung for many weeks in the balance. The Opposition journals did not spare him in his sickness. When, in the summer after the riots, he and the Empress had appeared on the boulevards, they had been loudly cheered;[1] but the cheers could not drown the ominous murmurs of the mobs whom the Opposition and their papers had stirred. M. Victor Hugo urged on the malcontents from Hauteville House, Jersey, in a characteristic letter to the five literary founders of the 'Rappel.'[2] 'Let not a ball fall short in the battle of principles,' he exclaimed. 'The

[1] 'I found the boulevards crowded, not with insurgents, but with well-dressed hosts; and an Imperial carriage slowly pushing its way through, amid cheers and waving of hats. "Well done! well done!" the people shouted. "This is brave! This is a happy thought!" And Cæsar, giving the silver edge of a smile to the black cloud of his thoughts, and the gentle, charitable woman beside him, who graces his life with the hundred kindnesses she scatters far and wide, bowing and repeating audibly, "Merci, messieurs," to the enthusiastic subjects at her wheels, pass on in a whirlwind, the equerry imploring the crowd to keep clear, or they will be crushed to death. This amid the broken lamps and kiosks of last night!'—June, '69, *The Gavroche Party.*

[2] '*Le Rappel.* J'aime tous les sens de ce mot: Rappel des principes, par la conscience; rappel des vérités, par la philosophie; rappel du devoir, par le droit; rappel des morts, par le respect; rappel du châtiment, par la justice; rappel du passé, par l'histoire; rappel de l'avenir, par la logique; rappel des faits, par le courage,' &c. &c.

democratic legion has two aspects—one political and one literary. The political flag bears the numbers '89 and '92; the literary standard is emblazoned 1830. These dates of double ray illumine—Right on the one hand, and Thought on the other—and they mean together: Revolution.'

It having become widely known that the Emperor was ill—stretched upon his bed at Saint Cloud, the Opposition papers attacked him in his bed. The Funds fell. Not content with the exaggeration of every unfavourable rumour, and the dismissal of the living man as something past and gone, which would be out of the way and out of men's minds in a fortnight, the lighter journals took into their service sarcastic medical writers. The doctor was called into the newspaper office to tell the French people how soon, in all reasonable probability, their Emperor would die. The inhumanity of the articles on the sick Emperor that appeared in the 'Rappel' and the 'Réveil' would not have been tolerated in England for a day. Our freedom wears well, because such license turns every honest citizen into a policeman, and every reader into an officer of public safety. In the fierce and cutting levity of the French Opposition press of 1869—the utter forgetfulness of every item of a debt to the man whom they had crowned with garlands when he swept, at the head of his victorious legions, along the Via Sacra from Vincennes to the Tuileries, home from emancipated Italy—there was a leaven inexpressibly repulsive to men of a calmer race and cooler blood. It was announced that the Emperor read the medical articles in which he was condemned to a speedy death, and which informed his subjects how the vital functions would soon fail in power to repair the waste of force caused by his ailment. The perusal did not visibly alarm him. At the same time a portrait

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of the husband and father was presented, to the minutest details—by no friendly hand moreover—and yet the picture was winning in spite of the artist.

It was grudgingly conceded that Napoleon III. had the fine old manner of the chivalrous French gentleman, and bore himself towards his wife with affectionate grace, patience, and consideration. The republican was not above a little court millinery. The public were informed that the Emperor said *tu* and *toi* at the breakfast table in the bedroom, when Her Majesty was in her *peignoir*, red or purple, and played with the dainty slippers on her feet. It was reported that the Emperor soaked his bread in his tea in the morning, and that the Imperial couple at the *déjeuner* had a preference for brisket of veal. His Majesty wore a blue dressing-gown; drank, under the doctor's orders, nothing stronger than Bordeaux wine mixed with Vichy water; and looked like a man whom his physicians had given up. Alongside the pictures of the dying Emperor, described by Rochefort as 'the lodger of the Tuileries,' were accounts of a triumphant progress of Victor Hugo on the shores of Lake Leman. Against all this the 'Petit Moniteur,' with its circulation of 7,300,000, and the 'Peuple,' directed in the interest of the Government by Clément Duvernois, could make little headway.

The Troppmann murders happened while the Emperor lay ill. The crime was treated in many comic literary forms. Aurélien Scholl, in his 'Lorgnon,' lamented that Troppmann had not strangled the ex-Carmelite Hyacinthe (who was creating some scandal just then); and another writer, in a comic dialogue, showed how the illness of the Emperor and the Pantin murder had 'clashed.' M. Louis Blanc joined the 'Rappel,' and figured henceforth in the revolutionary band, being hailed in company with Ledru, Pyat, Barbès, Rochefort,

and Crémieux. The wildest talkers and dreamers found a hearing. M. Adolphe Bertion presented himself to all the electors at all elections of the universe as 'the candidate of humanity;' M. Gagne proposed to abolish deliberative assemblies, and suggested an universal bank, the capital to be supplied by philanthropists who would require no interest. These men fell to calling one another citizens. M. Arago, charged at a popular meeting with being but a faint-hearted socialist, rebutted the charge with the remark that he *tutoyait* F. Pyat. The political charivari reached its height when Rochefort returned from Belgium, in November, and attended mob meetings, where the Emperor was insulted openly, and revolution was advocated as the duty of every citizen. The pamphleteer confessed himself the blind and humble servant of the mob, and promised to do as a deputy all it might command. He denied that he had attended the funeral of Queen Amélie, or that he had received a pencil-case from an Orleans prince; but the 'Figaro' convicted him with a quotation from his 'Grande Bohème.' He passed on, however, unabashed to the Legislative Body[1] and to the editorial chair of the 'Marseillaise'—a recent addition to what M. de Girardin called 'the abusive press.'

Félix Pyat was more methodical in his revolutionary addresses than Rochefort. At a meeting (November 18, 1869) of working men he bade them topple over everything—the work of Master-mason Rouher, of Journeyman Forcade, and of Apprentice Olivier—not forgetting the architect. Strikes of workmen and a fatal conflict with the military happened only to give fresh material to the disaffected. The wage riots of La Ricamarie and Aubin furnished fresh cries to the young Hugos, to

[1] November 22, 1869.

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Pyat, and to Rochefort. The question of the oath of allegiance had been raised on the election of MM. Bancel, Gambetta, Ernest Picard, and Jules Simon; and this was kept alive as a weapon against the Empire. In a letter, dated October 12, Victor Hugo wrote: 'The critical outcome of the situation is the abolition of the oath.' Only this was needed to open the gates wide to the Emperor's enemies. But any weapon was welcome. The Chambers had been summoned for November 29; whereas, according to the contention of the Opposition, they should have been convoked for October 24, and M. de Kératry invited his colleagues to meet on this day in spite of the Government.[1] But the project was given up, on the advice of Victor Hugo, who was dealing out counsel to the Republicans from Brussels.

That, watching from his sick chamber the base uses to which the selfish enemies of the Empire were putting the full constitutional liberties which he had freely granted them, in opposition to the advice of his tried friends, the Emperor should have doubted sometimes in the autumn months of 1869 whether he had not gone too far, cannot be wondered at. He had designed a liberal Empire, and he was met by the old Revolutionists of 1848, calling upon the French people to sweep away the dynasty. In his perplexity he sent to Cercey for his faithful servant M. Rouher, bidding him to an interview at Compiègne, where the Court was sadly sojourning—the master ill, and the mistress away in the East, travelling to the opening of the Suez canal.[2]

[1] Great military preparations were made to prevent the meeting of the Opposition members. Marshal Bazaine, who had been appointed commander of the Imperial Guard, kept the troops in barracks. Crowds filled the streets. The Emperor returned from Compiègne to Paris, where, he wrote to the Empress, his duty called him. But the day passed without a sign from the enemy.

[2] The Empress, after having made a rapid journey to Savoy and Corsica with the Prince Imperial in

M. Rouher was loth to move from his retirement. He was aware that his appearance at Compiègne would be distasteful to the Ministers who surrounded the Emperor, and who were pressing him to call M. Emile Olivier to the head of his Government. M. Olivier had even been introduced into the château, disguised, after nightfall, that he might have a secret interview with the Emperor. The men who surrounded the Emperor were partisans of M. Olivier. Every sign of wavering on the part of the Sovereign was closely watched by the supporters of personal government on the one hand and by the Parliamentarians on the other. M. Rouher, who knew the mind of the Emperor more intimately than any of his recent advisers, was persuaded that his sympathies were with the Liberals, and that if he had turned back for a moment to himself it was only because he feared that which he detested as destructive of all government, viz. such disorders as those which had followed the fall of the Monarchy of July. The Emperor revealed to his old minister all the distress the excesses of the Opposition had caused him, and proposed to him to resume the prerogatives which the Constitution of 1852 had conferred upon him, in order to save the country from anarchy. It was in the bitterness of profound disappointment, doubly trying to a sick man left solitary by the death of the councillors on whom he had been wont to rely for advice, that the Emperor submitted this course to the consideration of the President of the Senate. M. Rouher firmly declined to undertake the task of a return to personal government, albeit he saw the dangers to which the irreconcilable Opposition exposed the country and the dynasty;

August, made a state journey to Constantinople and Egypt, and was present at the ceremonies of opening the Suez Canal in November. She returned to Paris on December 5.

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and he returned to Cercey, leaving the friends of M. Olivier to work their way to power.

From the Nile the Empress wrote to her lord (October 27, 1869), begging him to continue in the Liberal path.[1]

'I was very anxious about yesterday, and thinking of you in Paris without me; but I see by your despatch that everything passed off well. When we observe other nations we can judge better of the injustice of our own. I think, however, *in spite of all*, that you must not be discouraged, but continue in the course you have inaugurated. It is right to keep faith in the concessions which have been granted. I hope that your speech will be in this spirit. The more strength may be wanted in the future, the more important is it to prove to the country that we have ideas and not only expedients. I speak thus, far away, and ignorant of what has passed since my departure; but I am thoroughly convinced that strength lies in the orderly sequence of ideas. I do not like surprises, and I am persuaded that a *coup d'état* cannot be made twice in one reign. I am talking in the dark, and to one already of my opinion, and who knows more than I can know. But I must say something, if only to prove what you know, that my heart is with you both, and that if in calm days my wandering spirit loves to roam in space it is near you both I love to be in times of care and doubt.'

But not only the Empress encouraged the Emperor to hold on in his Liberal course, in spite of the revolutionary passions which the concessions already granted had let loose. M. Ernest Renan wrote in November ('Revue des Deux Mondes') an article on the philosophy

[1] *Papiers et Correspondance de la Famille Impériale.* Tome premier. Paris: Garnier Frères, 1871.

of contemporary history, in which he remarked that egotism, scepticism, indifference towards their governors, the persuasion that no gratitude was due to them, had totally dried up the heart of France. The nation thought of its material interests. The persons who felt towards the Napoleonic dynasty the sentiments which the Royalist of the Restoration felt for his King were few indeed. 'There are no Napoleonic Legitimists,' the writer exclaimed; 'and this is a fact which the Government cannot meditate too often.'

Contemporary France was neither in a heroic nor a sentimental mood. She would vote for peace rather than for war on purely selfish grounds. The excitement which had been produced in the German people by the imprudent menaces that had been made in France (and M. Renan noted that the Government was not the principal culprit in this) would subside, and with it the cry for German unity, so soon as a thorough peace and reform programme should be adopted. Then, as to the Opposition, M. Renan held that the country had returned extreme men to chastise, but not to destroy, the Government;[1] to force forward moderate reforms, decentralisation, local self-government in the commune, the canton, and the department, the renunciation of all territorial ambition in Europe, the development of primary education and of superior education on solid philosophical foundations, an elective senate, right of meeting, the gradual separation of Church and State.

[1] 'Dix fois il m'a été donné, pendant une campagne électorale, d'entendre le dialogue que voici: "Nous ne sommes pas contents du Gouvernement; il coûte trop cher; il gouverne au profit d'idées qui ne sont pas les nôtres; nous voterons pour le candidat de l'Opposition la plus avancée." "Vous êtes donc révolutionnaires?" "Nullement; une révolution serait le dernier malheur. Il s'agit seulement de faire impression sur le Gouvernement, de le forcer à changer, de le contenir rigoureusement."'

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He protested against the violent harangues and wild schemes of the Paris deputies, and was comforted by the belief that the realisation of the aims of the Republicans was far off.[1]

This was also the belief of the Emperor and his Ministers.

The new Chambers were opened by the Emperor on November 29, when he said—

'Messieurs les Sénateurs, Messieurs les Députés,—It is not easy to establish in France the regular and peaceful exercise of liberty. Some months back we appeared to be threatened by subversive passions, and liberty to have been compromised by excesses committed at public meetings and in public journals. Everyone was asking how far the public would carry its patience. But already the good sense of the Government is reacting against culpable exaggerations. Important attacks have only had the effect of proving the solidity of the edifice based upon universal suffrage; nevertheless the uncertainty and disquietude which exist in the public mind must not continue, and the situation requires more than ever frankness and decision. We must speak without circumlocution, and proclaim loudly the will of the country. France desires liberty, but liberty united with order.

'I answer for order.'[2] (Vehement cheering.)

[1] 'Le temps des révolutions parisiennes est fini. . . . Si une telle révolution s'opérait dans Paris (chose heureusement impossible), je suis persuadé que les départements ne l'accepteraient pas, que des barricades s'élèveraient sur les chemins de fer pour arrêter la propagation de l'incendie et empêcher l'approvisionnement de la capitale, que l'émeute parisienne, vite affamée, n'aurait que quelques jours de vie.'—'Philosophie de l'Histoire Contemporaine,' par Ernest Renan, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, November 1, 1869. France stamped out the Commune in the way herein predicted by M. Renan.

[2] In 1877 (October 31) M. de Villemessant, writing to the Ismael on his acting in the Tzigane, complimented him on his manner of singing on being encored. 'Do not

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'Assist me, gentlemen, to save liberty; and with this object in view let us keep at an equal distance between reaction and revolutionary theories,—between those who pretend to preserve anything without change and those who aspire to overthrow everything there is glorious ground to occupy. When I proposed the Senatus Consultum of last September as the logical sequence of previous reforms, and of the declaration made in my name by the Minister of State on June 28, I intended resolutely to inaugurate a new era of conciliation and progress. In helping me in this path you have been unwilling to be renegades to the past, to disarm authority, or to overthrow the Empire.

'The measures which the Ministers will submit for your approbation will bear a sincerely Liberal character. If you adopt them the following improvements will be realised: Mayors will be selected from the municipal councils, excepting in special cases. At Lyons, as well as in the suburban communes of Paris, the election of these councils will be by universal suffrage. In Paris itself, where the interests of the city are linked with those of the whole of France, the municipal council will be elected by the Legislative Body, which is already invested with the right of settling the extraordinary budget of the capital. Cantonal councils will be instituted, principally with the object of uniting the communal power and of directing its employment. New prerogatives will be granted to the general councils, and even the Colonies will participate in this movement of decentralisation; and, lastly, a Bill enlarging the

be offended if I compare you with a fallen majesty. I was present at the famous sitting when the Emperor said, "L'ordre, j'en réponds." His Majesty was so enthusiastically applauded that he repeated the words. I watched him, as I watched you yesterday, and listened. He, also a great artist in his way, repeated his words without adding emphasis to them.'

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bases of universal suffrage will define the public functions compatible with a seat in the Chamber. To these administrative and political reforms will be added measures of more direct interest for the people—viz. for the more rapid development of gratuitous primary instruction; the reduction of law costs; the removal of the demi-decime war tax, which weighs upon the registration duty in matters of succession; the extension of the operation of savings banks to rural districts through Treasury agents; a more humane regulation of infant labour in manufactories; and an increase in the salaries of subordinate officials. Other important questions, not yet ripe for legislation, are under consideration. The agricultural enquiry is concluded, and useful propositions will be the outcome of its report. An enquiry into the working of the octrois has been opened. A Customs Bill will be submitted to you, with those tariffs to which no serious opposition has been offered. As regards those which have provoked complaints by certain branches of industry, they will be delayed until the Government has obtained enlightenment from all the sources of information calculated to assist your deliberations.

'The statement of the situation of the Empire is satisfactory. Commerce is not at a standstill; and the indirect revenues, the increase of which is a sign of confidence and prosperity, have produced down to the present time 30,000,000 francs more than last year. The current Budgets show notable surpluses, and the Budget for 1871 will allow of our undertaking improvements in the several branches of the public service, and of our making grants for public works. It is not enough to propose reforms, to introduce savings in the finances, and to administer public affairs in an effective manner. It is also necessary that, by a clear and firm

attitude, the public bodies, in accordance with the Government, should show that the more we widen the paths of liberty the more we are determined to preserve the interests of society and the principles of the Constitution intact and above all acts of violence. It is the duty and within the power of a Government, which is the legitimate expression of the public will, to cause that will to be respected; for it has both right and might on its side.

'Turning from home affairs, if I look beyond our frontier, I congratulate myself on seeing foreign Powers maintaining friendly relations with us. Sovereigns and nations desire peace, and they are engaged in advancing civilisation. Whatever reproaches may be made against our century, we have certainly many reasons to be proud of it. The New World suppresses slavery; Russia liberates her serfs; England does justice to Ireland; the littoral countries of the Mediterranean seem to be once more recalling their ancient splendour; and from the assembled Catholic bishops in Rome [1] we can only expect a work of wisdom and conciliation.

'The progress of science brings nations together. While America joins the Pacific with the Atlantic Ocean by a railroad 1,000 leagues in length, and in all parts capitalists and thinkers agree to unite by electric communication the most distant countries of the globe, France and Italy are about to clasp hands through the tunnel of the Alps, and the waters of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea already mingle by means of the Suez Canal. All Europe was represented in Egypt at the inauguration of this gigantic enterprise; and if the Empress is not here to-day at the opening of the Chambers, it is because I have been desirous that, by

[1] The Œcumenical Council of the Vatican, which was opened on December 8.

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her presence in a country where our arms were once rendered illustrious, she might testify to the sympathy of France towards a work due to the perseverance and genius of a Frenchman.

'You are about to resume the extraordinary session interrupted by the presentation of the Senatus Consultum. After the verification of the elections the ordinary session will immediately commence. The great bodies of the State, closely united, will come to an understanding to apply faithfully the latest modification made in the Constitution. The more direct participation of the country in its own affairs will constitute for the Empire a fresh source of strength, and the Representative Assemblies will have henceforth a larger share of responsibility. Let them use it for the promotion of the greatness and prosperity of the nation. May the various conflicts of opinion disappear when required by the general interest, and may the Chambers prove, equally by their enlightenment and their patriotism, that France, without again falling into deplorable excesses, is capable of supporting those free institutions which are the honour of civilised countries.'

On December 8 the Minister of the Interior explained and emphasised the Emperor's words. 'The Government wishes to establish liberty,' he remarked, 'if possible, with the assistance of all. It is aware of the danger by which liberty is threatened, but this danger it faces with resolution and confidence. The Government intends now to make it its glory to found liberty. In this task, though its predecessors have succumbed, the Government of the Emperor sets up a claim to be more successful, better qualified, and more resolute. It looks back with respect upon its past of eighteen years, which have given liberty to the country; but at the same time it intends to march onward and make the Empire

the definitive founder of liberty in France. This resolution is not a fresh incident: it is the result of acts which have succeeded one another during the last ten years. But to establish liberty two conditions are necessary—prudence and firmness. The country does not want a revolution: it wants a Liberal but strong Government, and this it shall have. This is the idea which the Emperor, in his speech from the Throne at the opening of this session, summed up in the words: "For order I will answer; aid me in saving liberty." '

The verification of the elections, in the course of which many of the official candidates were fiercely attacked—scandalous official interference on the part of local authorities being proved in several instances, and notably in the election of M. Clément Duvernois—was closed on December 27, and on the following day the ordinary session was opened, the 'Official Journal' announcing at the same time that the Ministry had resigned, and that M. Emile Olivier had undertaken to form a Government.

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1870.

H. Adlard Sc.

THE PRINCE IMPERIAL

AGED 21.

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CHAPTER I.

THE OLIVIER MINISTRY.

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WHEN the Emperor Napoleon III. confided the government of France to the responsible Ministry of which M. Emile Olivier was the head, he finally retired from the direction of public affairs and resolutely restricted himself to the duties of a constitutional monarch. Consequently he was not responsible for the policy of the Cabinet that in six months led to the ruin of his dynasty and to the most disastrous war of modern times. With the appointment of the Olivier Administration the *rôle* of the Emperor as active ruler ended. We shall therefore pass rapidly over the events of 1870, dwelling merely on the points in them with which Napoleon was directly connected, and showing his exact relation to the policy of his responsible ministers and his share in the diplomatic action which ended in the war with Germany.

The Olivier Ministry, the list of which appeared in the 'Moniteur' on January 2, 1870, consisted of M. Napoléon Daru (Foreign Affairs), de Valdrôme (Interior), Buffet (Finance), General Le Bœuf (War), Admiral Rigault de Genouilly (Marine), Legris (Public Instruction), De Talhouët (Public Works), Louvet (Commerce), Maurice Richard (Fine Arts). M. de Parieu was appointed President of the Council of

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State. It was called 'the Ministry of the two Centres.'[1] M. Haussmann, the great ædile of the Second Empire, was sacrificed to the Opposition, and disappeared from the Hôtel de Ville and from his gigantic labours, giving place to M. Chevreau, the Prefect of the Rhône. The sweep was a clean one. MM. Buffet and Daru were drawn from the Left Centre. As to the Liberal intentions of the Prime Minister there could be no doubt; and, indeed, he proceeded with the vigour of a statesman who was entering at length, after a protracted conflict in opposition, upon a career of radical reform. Men who had held aloof from the scene since 1851 reappeared. Personages who had been known as the enemies of the Empire figured in the *salons* of the new Ministers. MM. Guizot and Odilon Barrot not only made their bow at M. Olivier's official residence (where the ladies affected the severest simplicity in dress, as a demonstration against the splendid millinery of the Court), but accepted the direction of extra-Parliamentary commissions to enquire into the state of the national administration and the reforms to be made in the codes of law. Old Orleanist functionaries hastened into the light; and soon, at the Ministerial receptions, enemies of the Empire met, not to rally loyally to the new standard the Emperor had set up, but to plot under its folds.

In the Chamber M. Olivier found himself confronted by a passionate Opposition. His extra-Parliamentary commissions were ridiculed. He was opposed as a Republican who had ratted. His loyal endeavours to establish a Constitutional Empire were frustrated by

[1] 'C'est le ministère de la fusion des deux centres, expression vivante de l'alliance des forces libérales et modérées par laquelle s'est accomplie cette révolution qui nous ramène au régime constitutionnel.'—*Revue des Deux Mondes*, Jan. 15, 1870.

factions that could triumph only through revolution. He was disliked by many members of the Right as the tribune who had tempted the Sovereign out of the safe path of strong personal government. In short, he was an honest constitutional minister before a Parliament of Orleanists, revolutionists, and reactionaries. He would have gone to the country to obtain the direct national sanction for his policy, but the Legislative Body would not agree to the step.

A most unfortunate incident marked M. Olivier's advent to power, and brought him into collision with the most turbulent members of the constituencies of Paris. On the day when the Legislative Body met, MM. Ulric de Fonvielle and Victor Noir, carefully armed, bore a hostile message to Prince Pierre Bonaparte at Auteuil. The Prince had already challenged M. Rochefort. The conflict between this unworthy scion of the Imperial family and the violent members of the Republican party had arisen out of a paper quarrel in Corsica, in which Prince Pierre had used the lowest language of a guard-room. The Paris journalists had taken the opportunity of fastening a quarrel upon him. The 'Revanche' and the 'Marseillaise,' represented respectively by M. Grousset and M. Rochefort, were the Prince's opponents. It was a quarrel disgraceful to all parties concerned in it. Prince Pierre was a coarse, ungovernable man who had lived nearly all his life in disgrace, and his opponents were extreme men who were glad to strike at the Emperor through him. The bearers of the challenge were received as a bull receives a red flag. Violent words and blows provoked the production of pistols; and the Prince having, according to his own testimony, received a slap on the face from Noir, shot him. Then he turned upon M. de Fonvielle, who was himself armed with pistol and sword-stick.

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The result was the death of Victor Noir and a funeral at which all the revolutionary club and promoters of disorder were present. The demonstration had been prepared by M. Rochefort in the 'Marseillaise.' Albeit he knew that Prince Pierre Bonaparte was a discarded member of the Imperial family, and that the Emperor had never consented even to receive him, he wrote: 'Here are eighteen years that France has been in the blood-stained hands of these cut-throats, who, not satisfied with mowing down the Republicans with grape shot in the streets, entice them into filthy snares, to kill them within four stone walls. Frenchmen, can it be that you do not think you have had enough of them?'

This was a bad inauguration of the Constitutional Empire. The Prince was tried at Tours and acquitted. Rochefort was tried also, and was condemned for writing what in England would have put him under lock and key. Rochefort riots took place; barricades were raised; the Republic was proclaimed in permanence by M. Gustave Flourens, sword in hand, in the Salle Marseillaise at La Villette. In the Legislative Body extreme men like Jules Favre and Gambetta took side with the revolutionists. These were the troubles with which M. Olivier had to contend in the winter and spring of 1870, without support from his former colleagues. While he courageously took all needful measures to preserve order, and had the enemies of the public peace borne off to the Conciergerie, he endeavoured to remain faithful to his mission, and to continue the foundations of a Constitutional Empire. He was checked, however, at every turn, not only by the declared enemies of the Emperor, but by the moderate Liberals like M. Thiers, who would not openly side with the revolutionary party, but who based all their political hopes on its success. M. Thiers took advantage of a debate

raised against the Anglo-French commercial treaty to air his protectionist views, and to denounce this treaty as one of the Imperial Government's blunders. Two strikes of the Creuzot workmen, whose master was M. Schneider, President of the Senate, aided and envenomed by the 'Marseillaise,' tended to keep alive the turbulent spirit of the French working population. M. Olivier pushed forward his reforms, nevertheless, whenever he could obtain an interval of calm or of freedom from the active animosity of the Left. In the midst of press excesses he announced a law securing the full liberty of the press. Insult to the person of the Emperor, apologies for crimes, advocacy of breaches of the law, and attempts to draw away soldiers from their duty, were the only reserves made in this measure. M. Olivier appealed to a healthy public opinion as the future controlling power.

Such a measure looked ridiculous in the presence of the open sedition and the coarse and dangerous license with which the papers of the Opposition were daily charged, and in the face of the opposition which the Minister constantly encountered in the Legislative Body. M. Jules Favre (February 19) formulated an elaborate indictment against the Government, declaring that the reforms were shams, that the Sovereign might resume his personal authority at any moment, and that the relations of the Ministry with the representatives of the country were unsatisfactory. M. Daru replied for the Ministry that 'it was not true that France was any longer under a dictatorial rule. She is past that: she is free. It is order and liberty that France desires, not the excesses of a revolution.' The stormy debate on official candidatures that took place a few days later was opened by the same impatient deputy, who skilfully brought about a conflict between M. Olivier and

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the deputies of the Right by drawing him into a condemnation of the past of the Imperial Government. The progress of legislation under such circumstances was slow and fitful. The Ministry was encompassed with unsleeping enemies, who harassed every step with interpellations, motions, and amendments. The liberty which had been given was being turned against the giver; and it was clear that even the moderate Opposition was inclined to side with the extreme Left and the mobs of Belleville and La Villette, rather than with the constitutional Ministry who were honestly striving to reconcile order with liberty, under the Empire.

Disappointed once more by the disorders and animosities destructive of national prosperity which were appearing in and out of Parliament, the Emperor, who had stood aloof giving fair play to his Ministers in the strictest constitutional spirit, wrote to M. Olivier (March 21) from the Tuileries:—

'Monsieur le Ministre,—I think it is opportune, under the present circumstances, to adopt at once all the reforms claimed by the Constitutional Government of the Empire, in order to put an end to the immoderate desire for change which has possessed certain minds, which irritates public opinion and creates insecurity. I place in the first rank of these reforms those which affect the constitution and prerogatives of the Senate. The Constitution of 1852 was designed mainly to give the Government the means of re-establishing authority and order. It had necessarily to remain imperfect so long as the state of the country prevented the establishment of liberty upon solid foundations; but now, when successive changes have produced a constitutional system in harmony with the plebiscitum, it is important to restore to the domain of

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the law every legislative power, to give a final shape to the latest reforms, to place the Constitution out of the region of controversy, and to invite the Senate—that great institution which comprehends so much intelligence—to lend a more efficacious co-operation to the new régime I therefore beg you to confer with your colleagues for the purpose of submitting to me the draft of a senatus consultum, to fix once for all the fundamental provisions of the plebiscitum of 1852, dividing the legislative power between the two Chambers, and restoring to the nation that part of the constituent power which it had delegated to other hands. Believe, &c., 'NAPOLEON.'

This was only another attempt on the part of the Emperor to break through the impediments constantly set up by the revolutionary parties—if, indeed, the most moderate of them could be called a party.[1] Not that he feared their monotonous violence—his Ministers had shown that they could resist the turbulent mob in the street, and such inciters to revolt as M. Flourens and his associates—but because he was impatient to see the constitutional machine in regular movement. The draft commanded by the Emperor was the subject of many

[1] 'La Gauche veut-elle être un parti politique, il faut qu'elle choisisse, il faut qu'elle accepte les conditions d'une politique sérieuse en répudiant ces violences qui l'éclaboussent elle-même, ou qu'elle s'annule et qu'elle se réduise à l'impuissance en se laissant absorber par la démocratie furieuse des journaux et des réunions publiques. En effet, il n'y a que deux politiques; celle qui, se proclamant irréconciliable à tout prix, procédant de la haine et de l'esprit de vengeance, va tout droit à la préconisation de la force, et celle qui a été suivie par M. Emile Olivier depuis dix ans, qui se résume dans ce mot de Benjamin Constant: "Si incertaine que soit une chance pour la liberté d'un peuple, il n'est pas permis de la repousser." Cette chance n'est plus incertaine aujourd'hui; c'est à la Gauche de faire son choix entre les chances de la liberté et les chances de la révolution.'—Ch. de Mazade, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, January 15, 1870.

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Cabinet meetings, and of consultations with M. Rouher as to the modifications to be made in the constitution of the Senate. It was completed and introduced to the Upper Chamber by M. Olivier on March 28 in one of his most brilliant and effective speeches.[1] It was impossible, a literary contemporary remarked, to ask an assembly to execute the happy despatch in better language. It probably helped him to his chair in the Academy.

The senatus consultum was adopted by the Senate; but in the Legislative Body it gave rise to a series of interpellations, and finally to a debate, in which M. Grévy advocated the abolition of the Senate as useless and as a source of embarrassment, and maintained that the constituent power should be wholly handed over to the representatives of the people until France could establish a thoroughly democratic form of government. While Baron Jerome David was supporting the Government, and the plebiscitum to which the Emperor had resolved to submit this final settlement of the Constitution after it had been sanctioned by Parliament, M. Pelletan shouted that the Empire had given France eighteen years, not of repose, order, and security, but 'of shame and of crime.' A heated and unmannerly discussion arose, in the course of which M. Guyot Montpayroux described the course of Ministers as a piece of juggling. But the Government carried the day by 227 against 43, and the senatus consultum passed through Parliament to the direct vote of the nation. The senatus consultum and the plebiscitum cost the Cabinet the retirement of

[1] The senatus consultum deprived the Senate of their exclusive prerogatives, but left them the power of originating measures, except those dealing with finance. The Constitution could be further modified only by the nation, on the proposition of the Emperor. A schedule of thirty-six articles defined minutely the reforms in the various branches of the Administration, in conformity with the Imperial Speech at the opening of the session in November, 1869.

two valuable colleagues, MM. Buffet and Daru, who went over to the hostile force arrayed against the Liberal Empire. CHAP. I.

The day appointed for the nation to vote on the new Constitution and the transmission of the sovereign power from father to son in the Emperor's family, was May 8. The interval between the turbulent debate of the deputies and that of the national vote was turned to full account by the Republican party, and by all the minor factions that were determined to prevent, if possible, the establishment of a solid Liberal Empire. The excesses of the summer and autumn of the previous year were repeated, and yet no curb was put upon speech or printing press.

The Emperor issued the following proclamation to the nation:—

'The Constitution of 1852, drawn up by virtue of the power you confided to me, and ratified by the eight millions of votes which reconstituted the Empire, has given France eighteen years of calm and prosperity, not unaccompanied by glory. This Constitution established order, and at the same time left a way open for every needful improvement. As security has been consolidated, a larger measure of liberty has been granted. But successive changes have altered the foundation of the plebiscitum, which could not be modified without a fresh direct appeal to the nation. It became, therefore, indispensable that the new Constitution should be approved by the people, as were formerly the Constitutions of the Republic and of the Empire. It was the general belief in those two epochs, as it is now mine, that everything done without you was illegal. The Constitution of France, Imperial and democratic, when confined to a limited number of fundamental regulations which

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cannot be altered without your consent, will have the advantage of rendering definitive the progress that has been accomplished, and of shielding the form of government from political fluctuations.

'Time, too frequently wasted in passionate and barren contentions, may henceforth be more advantageously employed in seeking the means of developing the moral and material happiness of the greatest number.

'I address myself to all of you who, since December 10, 1848, have surmounted every obstacle in order to place me at your head; to you who, for twenty-three years, have constantly added to my power by your votes, supported me by your co-operation, and rewarded me by your affection. Give me yet another proof of your confidence. By voting affirmatively you will put down the threats of revolution; you will seat order and liberty upon a solid foundation; and you will render easier in the future the transmission of the crown to my son.

'Eighteen years ago you were almost unanimous in conferring the most extensive powers on me. Be now as strong in giving your adhesion to the transformation of the Imperial régime.

'A nation cannot reach its complete development without leaning for support upon institutions which are a guarantee for both stability and progress.

'To the request which I address to you to ratify the Liberal reforms that have been realised during the last ten years answer "Yes."

'For myself, faithful to my origin, I shall fill my mind with your thoughts, fortify myself in your will, and, trusting to Providence, I shall not cease to labour for the greatness and prosperity of France.

'NAPOLEON.'

The result of this appeal, albeit it showed 7,257,379

votes in his favour and but 1,530,000 against him, indicated a settled hostility of the majority in Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Nantes, and some other considerable towns. During the agitation over the plebiscitum a plot to assassinate the Emperor was discovered, in which some of the Rochefort rioters were implicated. The army recorded nearly 50,000 votes against the Sovereign. It was remarked as singular that in the towns where the Emperor's free-trade policy had been popular the votes were against him, while in the protectionist North his popularity was undiminished. The result, however, was that the Republicans, Socialists, Orleanists, and Legitimists could not muster more than one vote against seven for the Emperor; and the Government consequently were justified in holding that the plebiscitum proved the great bulk of the nation to be in favour of the Emperor and his dynasty.

The vote of the army was, however, a serious disappointment, although it could not be wondered at, seeing the close relations between the French soldier and the French citizen. All Paris had been in a state of riotous excitement, and the revolutionary parties had been vigilant and active in Lyons, Bordeaux, and Marseilles—indeed, wherever they had a hold. That the harangues and intrigues of the revolutionists should have led some thousands of the soldiers to the Opposition ballot-box was no more than a reasonable observer should have expected. The Emperor addressed a letter to Marshal Canrobert on the subject, and this was communicated to the troops of Paris. 'Rumours,' said His Majesty, 'so absurd and exaggerated have been spread on the vote of the army that I feel impelled to request you to assure the generals, officers, and soldiers under your command that my confidence in them has never been shaken. I ask you to inform General

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Lebrun particularly that I congratulate him and the troops under his command on the admirable firmness and self-command of which they have given proof during the last few days in the suppression of the riots which have disturbed the capital.'

These riots included the running up of barricades on the nights of May 9 and 10.

On the 21st the result of the plebiscitum was formally conveyed to the Emperor, with much Court pomp and ceremony, in the Salle des Etats of the Louvre. The Place du Carrousel, for the last time, was ablaze with the trappings of war, the lace and stars of Imperial dignitaries, and all the brilliant uniforms of the military and civil servants of Imperial France. Never had the Empire looked more splendid and prosperous than when Napoleon III. advanced, surrounded by his family, amid the acclamations of the two assembled Chambers, and took his place under the dais, while M. Schneider, as President of the Legislative Body, addressed the elect of the nation—now re-installed in the purple by more than seven million votes. M. Rouher, who headed the Senate, remained the silent witness of the scene—through the jealous interference of his rival, who would not permit the old chief to share in the honours of the day, and had exacted that M. Rouher's speech should be submitted to Ministers.

'In supporting the Empire by more than seven millions of suffrages,' President Schneider said at the close of his address, 'France says to you: "Sire, the country is with you; advance confidently in the path of all attainable progress, and establish liberty based on respect for the laws and the Constitution. France places the cause of liberty under the protection of your dynasty and of the great bodies of the State"'

The Emperor thanked the nation for having given

him, for the fourth time, an overwhelming proof of its confidence. He had appealed to the people to ratify his constitutional reforms, but the adversaries of Imperial institutions had made the question to be decided at the voting urns, one between revolution and the Empire. The country had declared for order and liberty. The Government, strong in the confidence of the nation, would proceed deliberately in its liberal course, bearing no malice towards those who had endeavoured to overthrow it by disturbing the public peace. They would keep one object in view.[1]

'To rally round the Constitution which has been sanctioned by the country by the honourable men of all parties; to maintain the public peace; to calm party passions; to preserve social interests from the contagion of false doctrines; to enlist the highest intellects for the promotion of the greatness and prosperity of France; to spread education; to simplify the administrative machinery; to transfer activity from the centre, where it is superabundant, to remote places, where it is deficient; to introduce into our codes of law, which are national monuments, the improvements made known to us by experience; to increase the means of production and of wealth; to promote agriculture and the development of

[1] 'Le discours impérial, c'est une justice à lui rendre, a le mérite d'être simple et sensé, et il a produit peut-être d'autant plus d'effet qu'on s'attendait à l'imprévu ou à un autre accent. Il respire sans doute la satisfaction et la confiance; au fond l'Empereur triomphe avec une habile modestie. Il ne sépare pas la liberté de l'ordre dans la victoire du 8 mai; il ne voit pour le gouvernement qu'une politique qui consiste à "montrer sa force par sa modération," à ne point "dévier de la ligne libérale qu'il s'est tracée," à rallier "autour de la constitution que le pays vient de sanctionner les honnêtes gens de tous les partis," et s'il se fait encore illusion en croyant qu'un vote puisse jamais trancher définitivement les questions politiques qui divisent les esprits, il trace un programme certainement assez vaste pour suffire provisoirement aux hommes de bonne volonté.'—*Revue des Deux Mondes*, June 1, 1870.

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public works; and finally to devote our labours to the alleviation of the burden of the tax-payer—such is our policy. In the realisation of it our nation will, by the free expansion of its powers, promote the progress of civilisation.' In conclusion the Emperor said: 'Who, indeed, can be opposed to the progressive march of a dynasty founded by a great people in the midst of political disturbance, and fortified by liberty?'

The cheering with which these brave words were received, and which was renewed as the Imperial family retired from the imposing scene, had hardly died away when it became apparent that the ratification of the Constitution by the vote of the nation would have no effect upon the conduct of the revolutionary parties in and out of the Chamber. The chiefs of the Opposition showed no respect for the will of the people, for whom they professed to be intriguing and obstructing. They evinced no disposition even to give the Constitution, which was ratified by seven millions of votes, a trial.

The plebiscitum was followed by a modification of the Ministry. The places of Count Daru, M. Buffet, and the Marquis de Talhouët, who had resigned, were filled up by the Duke de Grammont (Foreign Affairs), M. Mege (Public Instruction), and M. Plichon (Public Works), M. Olivier becoming Vice-President of the Council. The entrance of the Duke de Grammont on the political scene was an event that at once created a bad impression. He was fresh from the embassy at Vienna. He was known to be hostile not only to the Parliamentary Government, but, which was more important, to Prussia. So strongly marked were his anti-Prussian proclivities that the Prussian Government directed Baron Werther, their representative in Paris, to sound him, the result being the Duke's assurance that his sentiments were most pacific. The meeting of the Chambers after the

plebiscitum, and with a Ministry modified in a sense that made it less acceptable to the Opposition, was the signal not for a steady return to work in the direction of reform, but for renewed interpellations and scenes. The plebiscitum, albeit a hazardous experiment not to the taste of M. Buffet, or indeed, in the first instance, to the majority of the Olivier Cabinet, had been provoked by the irreconcilables of the Chamber. The Emperor had submitted the new Constitution and his dynasty *en bloc* to the judgment of the nation, and he held their vote as their answer to the revolutionary factions who were accepting parliamentary government only because they could use it as an engine of destruction against him. Although the result of the popular vote had been an immense disappointment to the Opposition, they remained undismayed, and they pursued from the middle of May until the end of their *mandat* a thoroughly unconstitutional line of action.[1]

M. C. de Mazade said of the plebiscitum: 'It is, without doubt, a victory for the Government; but beyond everything it is the repudiation of revolutionary action. It is the defeat of all who have deluded themselves with the belief that their violent polemics expressed the opinion of France, and who have been so far mistaken as not to see that, instead of preparing their own triumph, they were helping the Government. In any case the Radical party has had a wretched campaign, ending in a strange deception, and the Parliamentary Left are expiating the errors, weaknesses, and equivocal movements of what they call their policy of the last six months. The truth is that since the last elections the Left have had no policy whatever, and that, if they are now beaten, if they are placed in an incontestably false position, they deserve all that has happened to them.'

[1] *Revue des Deux Mondes*, May 15, 1870.

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This is the judgment of a writer who was no sworn friend of the Government, delivered in a periodical of Orleanist sympathies. M. de Mazade said further: 'It is nothing to be defeated in politics, but it is something to deserve defeat, and to court one of those striking repudiations which compromise a party for a long time. This is now the predicament of the Left. They are, in Parliament, a party temporarily disavowed by the mass of the country, and they have deserved their misadventure, because they could not resist the temptation of playing a heavy stake, of risking all for all.' M. Olivier was reproached, on the other hand, with wearing too defiantly the marks of victory.

On the evening of May 8 the Emperor went to bed early, while his friends were waiting anxiously for the reports of the numbers from the great towns, having been startled by the adverse votes which came, like all evil tidings, very swiftly. It was, as we have already remarked, his habit on such occasions. He could wait patiently and tranquilly for the morrow morning, when he would have full returns. But the Ministers, and particularly the chief of them, passed the early part of the night in great excitement and trepidation lest the Left and their noisy agents should triumph. The Minister was begged to remember this when he was showing himself as a victor to the defeated Republicans. His attitude provoked much of the personal antagonism he at once experienced in the Chamber, but it did not excuse the noisy obstruction with which he was met at every turn. A more skilful statesman would have turned to good account the leanings of M. Ernest Picard towards a Left constitutional party, and the admission of M. Gambetta that the plebiscitum was unanswerable as to the form under which the consolidation of a parliamentary régime must be pursued. He might have drawn out of the

Left some powerful leaders of a Liberal Empire; but he failed through vanity and inexperience in the management of men. He might have opened an epoch of reconciliation between the various Liberal sections, and drawn them away from the demagogues; but he ruffled the revolutionary party and left it to its own devices. He was soon made to see that their passions were not cooled, by the outrages to which M. Laboulaye was subjected by his pupils in the College of France, because he had voted in favour of the plebiscitum. These scandalous assaults upon a professor who had been a preacher of freedom all his life, drew not a word of remonstrance from MM. Simon, Favre, or Gambetta; for they were troubles in the path of M. Olivier and his colleagues. There was no approach to a reconciliation or to an arrangement for the benefit of the country between the Prime Minister, his former colleagues, and their noisy and uncompromising recruits.

When, at the end of June, the session approached its end, the moderate Liberals complained that Ministers, with all their show of feverish activity, had done little or nothing. Committees had been appointed to report on the newspaper stamp and the financial situation of the city of Paris. The former ended in a lame compromise, the latter in the stoppage of the immense works in progress without any plan as to the future. It was said that passions burned in the Palais Bourbon when a party question was raised, but that directly a practical question arose all was indifference or confusion. When the subject of the nomination of mayors by vote or by the Government was under discussion, it was found that the report of M. Odilon Barrot's committee on decentralisation was not printed. The Ministry, in short, was without method and without authority to lead the Chamber.

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On June 21 the Marquis de Piré proposed to the Chamber to repeal the law of exile. The princes of Orleans had addressed a letter to the Chamber (June 19) requesting the deputies to abrogate the exceptional measures levelled against them. They claimed this as a right. The subject was debated on July 2, and rejected by a majority of 143, M. Grévy having spoken against the petition and qualified its supporters as dupes or accomplices. M. Favre, who saw in the petition only another opportunity for vexing and obstructing the Government, broke away from the stern man of the Left, who stuck to his principles and disdained to use the House of Orleans to overthrow that of the Emperor. He was true to the policy of selfish ambition he had pursued throughout his career. Any means were good that carried him and his companions forward.

We now approach the war that, swift as a tropical storm, swept over the fair land of France.

The debate on the Government Bill fixing the army contingent of the year as 90,000 lasted two days (July 1 and 2). The reduction of the army was justified by the Prime Minister, who said in the course of the discussion: 'The Government has no uneasiness whatever; at no epoch was the peace of Europe more assured. Irritating questions there are none. The European Cabinets agree that treaties should be maintained. We have developed liberty in order to assure peace; and the accord between the nation and the Sovereign has produced a French Sadowa—the plebiscitum.' In the House of Lords Lord Granville about the same time described foreign affairs as in a 'dead calm.'[1] The memorable phrases uttered in the course

[1] 'It was about the same time that in England the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs had made to Lord Granville, the newly appointed

of this extraordinary debate in the French Chamber are many. M. Thiers, taunted by M. Favre as a new ally of the Government, denied that he was a Ministerialist, but admitted that some steps had been taken towards liberty. 'The two conditions of peace,' he remarked, 'are, first, to be pacific; secondly, to be strong. Prussia requires to be pacific in order to win over Southern Germany. We need to be pacific in order to prevent her.' The debate ended stormily, the storm being provoked by M. Favre, who insinuated that the will of the Emperor controlled the Ministry. No charge, even among those made by this rash and turbulent deputy, could be less deserved. The Emperor had strictly confined himself to the part of a constitutional sovereign; and to this fact his Minister emphatically bore witness.

'If all this be true, why not disarm?' The insolence of the reply created the closing tumult of the debate, after which the Government Bill was adopted by 203 votes to 31. The strict and literal truth was that there was not the smallest cloud on the political horizon on the opening day of July. Nor, indeed, was there in the heavens. The earth was parched, the cattle were without pasturage, the crops were scorched under a drought that threatened a national disaster beyond the control of man. The Emperor admitted the cattle of the farmers to the forests of the Crown. In Paris there were fears of a failure of water, and religious services were offered up for rain all over the country.

But, according to Ministers, the people were exceedingly prosperous, and could bear the heavy budget (90,439,143*l.*) If uneasiness prevailed anywhere it was

Minister for his department, a statement similar to that of M. Olivier in the French Chamber. "Never in his experience," he said, "had there been such a lull in foreign affairs." —*The Annual Register*, 1870.

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at the strikes which were going on at Mulhouse, Marseilles, and other centres of industry, and at the impending trial of offenders in connection with the recent disturbances among Schneider's Creuzot operatives.

France went to sleep one night in profound peace, and woke on the morrow to find that she was on the eve of war.

CHAPTER II.

THE DECLARATION OF WAR.

CHAP. II.

THE war of 1870 was the direct consequence of the triumph of Prussia over Germany. On the morrow of the victory of Sadowa a war party sprang up in France, and was fostered by all the enemies of the Empire, as well as by its short-sighted clerical friends. We have seen that the Emperor, faithful to his idea of nationalities, had favoured the unification of the German race. His friendliness towards Prussia was a sin in the eyes of the Chauvinists and a weapon in those of his political enemies. The day after the declaration of war between Austria and Prussia some dozen general officers who were at the Tuileries, discussed, in the Emperor's presence, the chances of Prussia. 'Look at the question as you will,' said His Majesty, 'progress lies with Prussia.' This was alleged against him by General Trochu [1] after his fall; but it was his honest opinion, and it was not an unwise one. The fault lay in the expression of it to generals who were eager for a German war, and who were not all true to the interests of their sovereign. A great Protestant military Power was being suffered to arise on the borders of France; whereas the ambition of Prussia should have been crushed, at the moment when she declared war against Austria, by the invasion and annexation of the Rhine provinces. This was the

[1] General Trochu's evidence at the enquiry into the acts of the Government of National Defence.

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fixed idea of M. Thiers and the Orleanist and Republican Opposition; and with it they proceeded to undermine the Emperor's popularity. The Liberal or Opposition creed included a belief in the inevitability of a war with Prussia; and the French politicians who dreaded the union of North with South Germany maintained that France should be prepared to act before Bismarck had forced the Southern States into a compact German Empire. The clerical party was also strongly in favour of a swift assault upon the rising German monster.

In Prussia the war party against France, if it slumbered occasionally between 1866 and 1870, as in the beginning of the latter year, never fell fairly asleep. In 1866 General Ducrot wrote to General Trochu that on the other side of the Rhine there was not a German who did not believe in an approaching war with France. The warlike spirit prevalent in Germany against France was insisted upon by General Stoffel in his military reports. In 1868 he wrote: 'France, far from commanding any sympathy at the present time in Prussia, is an object of hatred to all. The situation will infallibly bring about war: we are at the mercy of an accident.' Prévost-Paradol described the two countries as running towards each other upon the same line: there must be a collision.

And yet the Emperor had shown only pacific and friendly intentions towards Prussia from the beginning of his reign, even to that Prussia who had stigmatised the alliance between France and England as incestuous.[1] After the Crimean war it was he who insisted on inviting Prussia to the Congress. In 1858, when the Marquis Pepoli passed through Paris on his way to Berlin, charged with a mission from Count Cavour to

[1] *Histoire Diplomatique de la Guerre Franco-Allemande*, par Albert Sorel. Tome 1er. E. Plon: Paris, 1875.

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the Prussian Government relative to an alliance against Austria, he had given him an autograph note to be submitted to the Prince Regent, in which he explained how and why he shared Cavour's views in favour of an alliance between France, Italy, and Prussia.[1] He had permitted Prussia to advance towards German unity through Sadowa. Throughout his life his sympathies had inclined towards the race whom he was destined to assist to power that they might overthrow him. Prussia had always been covertly hostile to him, and she had managed first to check him in the Italian war and then grossly to deceive him after Sadowa. The Emperor was credulous; M. de Bismarck was unscrupulous. The Emperor clung sentimentally to his idea of a Europe naturally divided—that is, into nationalities—through the peaceful agencies of congresses; M. de Bismarck relied on blood and iron to conquer by force and by falsehood a German Empire, from the secure frontiers of which he might laugh at his dupes.[2] The Emperor was averse to the brutal arbitrament of war, and was for ever seeking combinations by which his dreams—and they were those of a noble and benevo-

[1] See Appendix X.

[2] 'Il pensait à reconstituer l'Europe selon ce qu'il appelait les "idées napoléoniennes." Saint-Simon et les idéologues de son école y avait sans doute plus de part que Napoléon Ier. De grands Etats industriels, unis par la communauté des intérêts, liés par des traités de commerce, se consacrant à développer la richesse publique et le bien-être des individus, se contenant les uns les autres et balançant leurs forces respectives—tel paraissait être l'idéal diplomatique de Napoléon III. Le suffrage universel, l'organisation des nationalités, la liberté commerciale, l'amélioration sociale de l'humanité, lui semblaient être des concessions suffisantes à l'esprit de la Révolution. Il se serait établi en Europe, sous le nom de congrès, de grandes assises périodiques auxquelles la France aurait présidé. Les expositions universelles eussent été, dans ce monde nouveau, la forme tangible du "progrès."'—*Histoire Diplomatique de la Guerre Franco-Allemande*, par Albert Sorel, professeur à l'Ecole libre des Sciences Politiques. Tome Ier. E. Plon: Paris, 1875, p. 16.

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lent mind—might be brought about; M. de Bismarck crushed and cheated Denmark, as the opening of his career of brutal conquest, and has wrought his ends throughout by mercilessness to his foes and by immoral arts practised with rough humour in the Cabinet. A plain record of the promises, subterfuges, deceits, reckless denials, and shameless assertions of Prince Bismarck in his diplomatic dealings with the agents of the Emperor, and with the Emperor himself, drawn from the pages of Sorel, Benedetti, Lamarmora, Massari, Julian Klaczko, Jules Hansen, De Gricourt, the Duke de Grammont, and his own Boswell, Herr Busch, would make a formidable indictment. When statements of unquestionable veracity relating to Prince Bismarck's negotiations with France for the re-settlement of their respective frontiers, and the creation of a German Confederation of the North under Prussia, are put in juxtaposition with the German Chancellor's emphatic assertion, made in the course of a debate in the Prussian Lower House (January 16, 1874), that General Govone had uttered an 'infamous lie' in reporting that he was ready on the eve of the Austrian war to give up the Rhine provinces to Napoleon, 'as a sop to Cerberus,' the character of the statesman with whom the Emperor had to deal stands out in its true light. He said in the same debate that he had learned to look down upon the calumnies of the foreigner with haughty contempt. It would have been better had he learned to be honest with him. The immorality of the German Chancellor is beyond dispute. In the debate already quoted he remarked: 'I can only repeat that I never entered into negotiations with the Emperor Napoleon for the cession of a single village. I could have easily reconciled that potentate to our politics had I made him the slightest concession of this nature. But I always abhorred any

arrangement of the kind as a stain upon our national honour, and I never would even encourage the idea for a moment.'

The negotiations that preceded the war with Austria abound in direct and unequivocal contradictions of this assertion. M. de Bismarck would rather have given Belgium and Luxembourg than Rhenish land; but that, if the sacrifice had become indispensable to the completion of his policy, he was ready to throw a Rhenish sop to Cerberus, he made known when he said significantly that he was more Prussian than German. He managed to hoodwink his rival, to destroy him, without sacrificing a single German roof-tree; but he cannot escape from the ultimate verdict of history, which will convict him as the most immoral, as well as the most powerful, statesman of his epoch.

M. de Bismarck, while his military and civil spies were overrunning France and mapping out the country for the guidance of Moltke's game of chess with living legions for pawns, let pass no opportunity of feeding the Prussian spirit of antagonism to France.[1] He had kept

[1] 'Since you can make the illustrious personages who surround you hear wholesome truths, add this: While we deliberate pompously and slowly on the best means of forming an army, Prussia intends simply and energetically to invade our territory. She will be in a position to bring 600,000 men and 1,200 guns into the field while we are considering how to organise the *cadres* of 300,000 men and 600 guns. There is not a German on the other side of the Rhine who does not believe in a war near at hand. The most peaceful among them, who by ties of family or interest are half French, look upon the struggle as inevitable, and cannot understand our inaction. As a cause must be found for all effects, they say that our Emperor has fallen into his dotage. Unless one is blind it is impossible to doubt that war will burst forth at an early date. With our mad vanity and stupid presumption we can believe that we shall be permitted to choose the day and the hour—that is to say, when the Exhibition is over and we shall have completed our organisation and armament. I am, indeed, of your opinion, and begin to believe that our Government is struck with madness. But, if Jupiter wishes us to destroy ourselves, do not let us forget that our own destinies are bound

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the fire alive since 1866, and had been pleased to see a similar fire smouldering over France, whose armies were disorganised and whose military preparations were backward. Count Moltke had made a careful inspection of the frontier in the spring of 1868, followed by a Captain Samuel, who reported to Paris that the General had visited Saarbrück and Saarlouis, and was about to descend the Moselle.[1] In the same year General Blumenthal was shooting in Norfolk with Lord Albemarle, when his Lordship remarked that he should like to go to Prussia to observe the military manœuvres. 'Do not take the trouble to see me in Prussia,' said the General; 'we will have a review for you in the Champ de Mars.' M. Jules Hansen had an interview with the King of Hanover at Gmünden (August 13, 1869), at which His Majesty said that the Emperor Napoleon would be compelled sooner or later 'to accept, and perhaps to begin,' a war with Germany, in order to get free from an insupportable position: 'Count Bismarck,' he added, 'does not know how to give quarter, and a war would

up with those of our country; and, lest we also become infected with madness, let us make every effort to stop the downhill course which ends at a precipice. Here is another matter. I call your attention to it because it is flagrant enough to open the blindest eyes. For some time back Prussian agents have infested our frontier departments, especially the country between the Moselle and the Vosges. They ascertain the opinions of the people, intrigue with the Protestants, who abound hereabouts and are less French than is generally believed. These are the sons and grandsons of the men who in 1815 sent numerous deputations to the head-quarters of the enemy, demanding that Alsace should be re-annexed to Germany. This is a fact to take heed of, for its result will be the communication of our plans and positions to the enemy. The Prussians adopted similar tactics in Bohemia and Silesia three months before the declaration of war with Austria.'—Letter from General Ducrot to General Trochu, *Papiers et Correspondance de la Famille Impériale.*

[1] April 9, 1868. Samuel, in his letter, enquired whether it was the wish of the Minister that Moltke should be followed further. '*Suivez-le*,' was the answer.—*Papiers et Correspondance de la Famille Impériale.* Paris, Imprimerie Internationale, 1870.

be a struggle unto death between the two dynasties, one of which would destroy the other.'

As the year 1869 closed, and 1870 opened, the only incident that ruffled as with a feather the general calm, was the exchange of decorations between the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia. They also exchanged compliments by telegram, in which they invoked, in almost identical terms, the memory of the great epoch when their combined armies fought for a common sacred cause. The epoch was 1813; the cause, the war against France. At a banquet given by the Prussian sovereign M. d'Oubril, the Russian Minister, said that the distinction conferred upon King William by his master was a new tie between 'the two sovereigns, the two nations, and the two armies.' The explanation invented in Paris was that Prussia had been disturbed by the reception recently given at St. Petersburg to the new French ambassador, General Fleury; but the interchange of civilities between the Russian and Prussian monarchs was, in truth, intended to reassure the German nation as to the attitude of the great Northern Power when the war with Napoleon should break out. Prussia was putting her house in thorough order. At the beginning of the year 1870 the Prussian Embassy in Paris made constant efforts to effect the dispersal of the Hanoverian Legion, which was stationed in France; and the dissensions between the chief of the Hanoverian mission and Count Platen, King George's minister, hastened the end which the German Chancellor desired. The Hanoverian officers and their soldiers might have impeded the designs of Prussia in case of war between her and France. The prudent Chancellor cleared away this possible difficulty. At the same time he provoked the susceptibilities of Frenchmen at every opportunity.

When, in May, the Reichstag of the Confederation

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was discussing a German subvention, M. de Bismarck declared that the motives of the Government in recommending this subvention were so delicate that he must beg to be excused from divulging them. 'The allied Governments should be convinced that it was advantageous to their political interests to secure a communication between Germany and Italy, not dependent on any given Power or on Switzerland. The vital interests of Prussia command her to keep herself in direct communication with Italy, which is, I believe, united to us by enduring bonds of friendship.'

The Chancellor's words were so emphatic and unmistakably directed against France that they provoked a question to the Government in the French Legislative Body (June 20),[1] to which the Duke de Grammont replied that France could not oppose the works that were in progress. He added that it was not necessary to appeal to the patriotism of French deputies, and he would not follow the example which had been given to him elsewhere. The question for France was not so 'delicate' that it could not be publicly discussed. It was not the less understood to be one of the many notes of defiance to France which the German Chancellor sounded in the spring and summer of 1870.

The candidature of a German prince for the throne of Spain was a clever stroke of policy conceived by M. de Bismarck early in the year, if not in 1869. In

[1] 'Si l'on songe aux services signalés que l'Empereur Napoléon avait rendus à l'Italie, on comprendra tout ce qu'il y avait de pénible pour lui et combien il devait se sentir blessé d'entendre le chancelier de l'Allemagne du Nord déclarer ouvertement qu'il avait pour but de détacher l'Italie de l'alliance française et de l'unir étroitement à l'Allemagne; et l'on conviendra que ces paroles contenaient, à l'adresse de la France, un défi non équivoque, auquel l'allusion du comte de Bismarck à la nature "délicate" de la question donnait un caractère encore plus offensant.'—*Les Coulisses de la Diplomatie*, p. 208. Par Jules Hansen. Paris, 1880.

the first place it would tend to cement an alliance between Spain and the German Confederation, and in the second, if it failed, it would afford fresh irritations to the relations between the Germans and the French. In either case it must serve M. de Bismarck's turn. The probability was that it would at once provoke France to violent acts.[1]

It was on July 3 that the 'Débats' and other papers published correspondence describing the steps taken by Marshal Prim to offer the throne of Spain to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern. On the morrow the French public learned that the Prince had accepted the proposal. The Ministers were taken by surprise. The French ambassador at Madrid had known nothing of it until the Prince had accepted the offer, when Marshal Prim invited him to dinner and told him the news on his taking leave. When Marshal Lebœuf entered the Legislative Body on the 4th, and found the agitated deputies crowded in the lobbies, he was informed that France had been again insulted by M. de Bismarck. The Hohenzollern candidature was, as M. Jules Hansen remarked, 'une sanglante injure pour l'Empereur Napoléon.' It was so understood by public opinion. The press, with one voice, declared that it was a challenge which the German Chancellor had been

[1] 'La candidature du prince de Hohenzollern fut une sanglante injure pour l'Empereur Napoléon, une provocation directe à l'adresse de la France. Il ne peut y avoir deux opinions sur ce sujet, et l'Europe impartiale fut unanime à reconnaître qu'un tel procédé, si l'Allemagne y persistait, justifierait la guerre contre celui qui s'en était rendu coupable. D'un autre côté l'Empereur et son Ministre des Affaires Etrangères ont été sévèrement blâmés pour avoir fait appel aux armes après le retrait de la candidature du prince de Hohenzollern. Mais ces reproches ne sont pas fondés. Lorsqu'on réfléchit bien à la conduite de la Prusse, depuis la fin de l'année 1866, on est obligé de convenir que l'abandon de la candidature Hohenzollern n'apportait aucune garantie sérieuse au maintien de la paix.'—*Les Coulisses de la Diplomatie.*

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preparing for many months.[1] According to the testimony of the Duke de Grammont, the Hohenzollern candidature was a plot hatched by Marshal Prim and M. de Bismarck; and the care with which the Marshal kept the secret from the French ambassador in Madrid, while M. Benedetti was left uninformed in Berlin, may be accepted as strong corroborative evidence. Prince Leopold had been secretly discussed in the spring of 1869, and the Emperor having summoned M. Benedetti to Paris for explanations, remarked to him: 'The candidature of the Duke de Montpensier is purely antidynastic —it strikes at me, and I may accept it—but the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern is essentially antinational. The country could not endure it—it must be prevented.' M. de Bismarck protested at that time that such a candidature would not prevail, and that the King would refuse to give his consent to it; but M. Benedetti reported that he believed the Chancellor had not frankly spoken his opinion. The truth, no doubt, is that he reserved this candidature as something which might be useful in the future, and that he kept up secret negotiations with Marshal Prim, who was privy to them, but unofficially. This was the Chancellor's explanation to the Federal Council on July 16, 1870. The course adopted was, in short, to wait the turn of events, and to spring this mine on France if it should appear at any moment to give the reason for an opportune rupture. Early in May, 1870, M. de Bismarck signified to Marshal Prim that the moment for the declaration of the Hohenzollern candidature was coming. The King would offer no objection: Prince Leopold was ready. The Marshal hoped to gain over

[1] According to a despatch from M. Benedetti (March 31, 1869), the idea of a Prussian candidate was current in Berlin in the spring of 1869.

the Emperor Napoleon to his project—the relations of Spain and France being at the time on the most cordial footing—by presenting Prince Leopold as a connexion of the Bonaparte family, and by concluding a convention then under discussion for the execution of civil judgments in the two countries.[1] M. Emile Olivier was to be comforted with the Golden Fleece. The Emperor's view was set forth in a note,[2] found in his handwriting in the Tuileries. It was in favour of a liberal regency during the minority of the Prince of the Asturias. The

[1] *L'Espagne Politique.* Cherbuliez.

[2] *Note de l'Empereur sur les Affaires d'Espagne.*

'La révolution de l'Espagne s'est faite au cri de: "A bas les Bourbons!" et cependant il y a un parti à Madrid qui, ayant reçu de fortes sommes du duc de Montpensier, travaille à le faire arriver au trône. Nous avons un profond respect pour les décisions de la volonté nationale, et si le duc de Montpensier est régulièrement élu par la nation espagnole, nous n'aurons rien à dire. Mais avant que cet événement se produise, si toutefois il doit avoir lieu, nous tenons à dire notre opinion. Si la nation espagnole ne veut plus de Bourbon, tant mieux; mais si elle revient sur sa première impression, il me semble qu'elle ne pourrait pas faire un plus mauvais choix que d'élever sur le trône un D'Orléans, répétant en Espagne l'usurpation de 1830, et donnant à l'Europe le funeste exemple d'une sœur détrônant sa sœur. D'ailleurs, la situation de l'Espagne, dans ce moment, ne nous semble pas faite pour admettre le choix d'un prince ayant déjà des antécédents accentués et des opinions faites. Si l'Espagne pouvait supporter l'état républicain sans courir le risque de voir son unité nationale compromise par la reconstitution de royaumes indépendants, c'est ce qu'elle aurait de mieux à faire; car cela donnerait le temps à la nation de faire son éducation politique et d'apprendre à se connaître elle-même; mais, puisque la république n'est pas possible, tout ce qui en rapproche le plus nous semble ce qu'il y aurait de plus profitable. Or le hasard a voulu qu'il y eût un jeune prince, le prince des Asturies, sur la tête duquel reposent tous les droits monarchiques. Il est d'un âge où ses opinions personnelles ne peuvent pas compter, et peut être élevé dans les opinions du jour, loin des flatteurs et des intrigues. Son âge permet une régence, qui serait probablement exercée par les hommes qui ont donné le plus de gages à la révolution. Et ce régime ressemblerait fort, pendant sept ou huit ans, à une république, où les agents pourraient être changés par le vote des Cortès, et le prince des Asturies ne serait que l'enfant chargé d'occuper un poste auquel aucun ambitieux ne peut prétendre.'—*Papiers et Correspondance de la Famille Impériale.* Garnier Frères: Paris, 1871, p. 37.

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effect produced in France by the sudden announcement that Prince Leopold had accepted the throne of Spain, subject to the vote of the Cortes, was exactly that which the German Chancellor had anticipated. The violence of French indignation afforded him the opportunities he had coveted for a series of diplomatic moves which would cast upon the Imperial Government the odium of declaring war, and at the same time would give to Prussia the advantage of appearing as the Power that had done its utmost, by concessions, to avoid a conflict. Had the Emperor been in the hands of competent advisers and agents they would have checkmated M. de Bismarck; but with the Duke de Grammont for Foreign Minister, with M. Benedetti in Berlin, with M. Mercier de Lostende in Madrid, and M. de Lavalette[1] in London—in short, with feeble diplomatists representing French interests in the principal capitals of Europe—the game remained throughout in the hands of Prussia. The Emperor was misinformed, or not informed at all; and the Ministers who advised him were unversed in State affairs, and swayed by every current of public opinion. The Duke de Grammont, Marshal Lebœuf, and M. Olivier were alike incompetent to deal with such a crisis. The first was rash and impetuous; the second was ignorant and incapable; the third was an orator with splendid gifts and honest and elevated aims, but he was a sentimentalist and a declaimer where calm judgment based on an extensive knowledge of contemporary European affairs was needful. The Emperor was enfeebled by the inroads of the mortal malady which had assailed him for years. He was surrounded, moreover, by influences calculated to warp his judgment. The advocates of personal government never ceased from their endeavours

[1] The Marquis de Lavalette died in Paris, May 2, 1880.

to draw him back to the Constitution of 1852. The clerical party were for war and the destruction of the powerful Protestant Empire that was growing up on the other side of the Rhine. The populace shouted for war, for no better reason than that France had the defeat of 1815 to avenge.

The Duke de Grammont was rash in his manner of conducting the negotiations regarding the Hohenzollern candidature from the beginning. On July 4 he said to the Prussian ambassador in Paris that France 'would not tolerate any Prussian prince upon the Spanish throne.'[1] On the morrow he told Lord Lyons that the candidature was an insult to France, and that the Government would not submit to it. This precipitancy was aggravated by the news that the Cortes were to be called together on the 15th to elect the King, thus leaving France only ten days to act. On the 6th he and his colleagues committed their first public blunder in reply to M. Cochery in the Chamber. The Duke read a ministerial statement, in which the Government declared that if the Hohenzollern candidature were not withdrawn they would know how to do their duty in defence of the interests and honour of France. This defiant note was received with loud applause, the echoes of which inflamed the already excited minds of the people, and was received with defiant demonstrations in Berlin. Yet while M. de Grammont was throwing down the glove in Paris the Baron de Werther was on his way to his King to lay the views of the French Government before him, and M. Benedetti was receiving from King

[1] Lord Granville, at an interview with M. de Lavalette on the 6th, remarked that he regretted the strong language the Duke de Grammont had addressed to M. de Werther on the 4th; and then, in his despatch to Lord Loftus in Berlin, he remarked that the Queen's Government were forced to admit that the secresy with which the negotiations had been conducted (by Prussia) was a just cause of offence.

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William the assurance that he would approve the withdrawal of Prince Leopold if the Prince and his father were disposed to retire. On the same day M. de Beust despatched to Berlin an energetic note in support of the withdrawal.[1] The task of M. de Bismarck was made easy, and he at once set about preparations for war by spreading troops quietly along the Rhine frontier. The King might be anxious for the continuance of peace, but his Chancellor meant to extort a declaration of war from France while she was weak and disorganised. He had taken the measure of the Cabinet of January 2.

In the midst of the agitation, confusion, and folly that preceded the war one statesman worthy of the occasion, and only one, appeared on the scene in opposition to the blood and iron policy of Prussia. The Count de Beust surveyed the diplomatic scene with the eye of a master. According to him France should have compelled the withdrawal of Prince Leopold without making it a German or a Prussian question. The pressure should have been put exclusively on Spain. M. de Bismarck would have suffered a check before Europe, and especially before the Southern States of Germany, that would have gone far towards compensating France for her disappointments of 1866. Then the French Government might have condescended to make concessions to Prussia in the shape of a more liberal interpretation of the Treaty of Prague. The Southern German States would have been drawn towards France; and, in short, the peace of Europe might have obtained a fresh lease, and a long one.

So soon as the French Government turned from Marshal Prim to M. de Bismarck, and opened a diplomatic wrangle at Berlin through M. Benedetti, the hope of peace was at an end; for the German Chancellor saw

[1] Sorel, tome i. p. 71.

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that he could play with the Emperor Napoleon's vain, excitable, and inexperienced ministers to his heart's content. They would be led by the shouting crowds around the Bourse, by the *braillards* filling the boulevards, and by the noisy war demonstrations of the Republicans and Socialists. He reckoned correctly. In all Paris only two statesmen appeared to look calmly and sadly at the excitement—the Emperor and M. Thiers. The effect of the wild war cries of Paris was the gradual estrangement of the Powers from France. As the negotiations ran their swift course the foreign Governments became convinced that France not only thirsted for war, but was wantonly provoking it. Some of M. de Bismarck's machinations were forgotten, and others remained unobserved, because he elaborated them quietly, while his dupes made scenes in the Chambers, and M. Olivier was very eloquent about the national honour when he should have been silent and at work.

On the morrow of the Duke's bellicose speech in the Chamber he addressed peremptory and precise instructions to M. Benedetti in Berlin. His Excellency was to request the King to advise Prince Leopold to withdraw. The Duke gave the following answer as the only one which would satisfy the Government: '*Le gouvernement du Roi n'approuve pas l'acceptation du prince de Hohenzollern, et lui donne l'ordre de revenir sur cette détermination, prise sans sa permission.*' The alternative was war in a fortnight. The Duke had hardly written to Berlin when he received a telegram from Marshal Prim, saying that if Prince Leopold would write to him that he found difficulties in obtaining the consent of the King, he would at once facilitate his retirement. England, Austria, and Italy had pressed the Spanish Government to take this course. Then the Duke telegraphed to M. Benedetti to see the

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King and the Prince, and to press this course upon them. The way out of the difficulty was made, and with honour and advantage to France; for public opinion in Europe was with the Imperial Government.[1] Moderation and patience would have given a signal diplomatic victory to the Imperial Government. Unfortunately the French Ministry were both impatient and immoderate in their anxiety to be beforehand with Prussia, should war come. On the 8th the Duke de Grammont told Lord Lyons that some military preparations had already been begun, and that a movement of troops would be decided at the Cabinet council on the morrow morning; but, he added, he would be content if Prince Leopold would withdraw his candidature.

In estimating the part played by the Duke in these transactions it is just to bear in mind that public feeling in France was almost beyond the control of the Government. On the morrow of the day when his Excellency had sent his instructions to M. Benedetti, M. Emile de Girardin said in the 'Liberté,' that the Germans must be driven beyond the Rhine with the butt end of French muskets. Lord Granville, on the 9th, considering the violent language of the French press, and of the French Chambers, declined to be party to a concerted action on the part of the neutral Powers, in order to put aside Prince Leopold. Still the Powers were, one and all, pressing towards a pacific solution. Even the Czar, who had not forgotten the part played by France in planting Prince Charles of Hohenzollern in Roumania, gave General Fleury to understand that he had written

[1] The *Times* of July 8 remarked of the conduct of the Prussian Government that it was grossly discourteous towards foreign Powers. 'Secresy creates suspicion. If there were nothing hostile to France in this (the Hohenzollern) negotiation, why had it been hidden? Thus millions of Frenchmen will argue; and it is not easy to combat the prejudice which has been thus created.'

to King William, urging upon him a policy 'of caution and abstention.'

On July 9, M. Benedetti requested and obtained an audience of King William at Ems. He found His Majesty in a gracious and conciliatory mood. M. de Bismarck, from his château in Pomerania, had counselled the voluntary withdrawal of the candidature of Prince Leopold, so that the dignity of the King should not be compromised. It was to be an act of the Prince's family. At the outset M. Benedetti was informed that the King, on learning that the Prince desired to accept the throne of Spain, had not opposed the step. In other words, Prince Leopold had received the King's tacit consent; but only as head of the family, not as sovereign. This was a quibble, but it served M. de Bismarck's turn, in the game of false moderation by which he was drawing his enemy into a declaration of war, in spite of the strong pacific inclinations of his sovereign. The upshot of this first interview was that the King admitted he had addressed a communication to Prince Antoine, the father of Prince Leopold, suggesting the withdrawal of his son's candidature; and that on receipt of the answer he would let M. Benedetti know it. The French ambassador remained after the audience to dine with the King. M. Benedetti could not obtain the full terms of the Duke's rash ultimatum of the 7th. The King could not declare that Prince Leopold had accepted the Spanish throne without his permission, neither would he command the Prince to withdraw. He was either bent on gaining time for military preparations, or he was anxious to extricate himself from the difficulty without compromising his dignity in the eyes of his subjects. This was M. Benedetti's judgment on his interview. That he who had conducted the diplomacy of France in Prussia in 1866 should doubt the sincerity

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of the King's professions, while M. de Bismarck was behind him, was natural enough.

'The effect of M. Benedetti's interview on the Imperial Government was not reassuring. The admission of the King that he had known and tacitly approved Prince Leopold's candidature made the insult to France Prussia's deliberate act. The Duke immediately telegraphed to M. Benedetti not to see the Prince of Hohenzollern, and that the Emperor declined to negotiate with him. On the 10th the Duke pressed M. Benedetti to obtain an answer in the course of the day; because, before night, military preparations must be begun in earnest. He requested, moreover, a reply which he might read to the Chambers, in order to appease public opinion. On the same day he told Lord Lyons that if the Prince of Hohenzollern would, on the advice of the King, withdraw his candidature, 'the affair would be at an end.' This assurance he authorised the British ambassador to announce officially to Lord Granville. But he at once wrote again to M. Benedetti, that further delay in the King's reply would not be endured, since the Prussians were calling in their soldiers, and France would not be surprised as Austria was in 1866. 'We must begin; we only wait for your despatch to call out the 300,000 men. I beg you earnestly to write or telegraph something definite to us. If the King will not counsel the Prince of Hohenzollern to renounce—well, it is war at once, and in a few days we shall be on the Rhine.' He added that an answer must be had on the morrow; later would be too late. While the Duke was forcing the situation, M. de Bismarck was telling the Federal Council that Prussia was indifferent to the affair, and that it did not concern the Confederation of the North. Prussia respected the liberty of the Spanish people and the Prince Leopold. The Chancellor was thus able to say

that he had even been disposed to offer the good services of Prussia to adjust the differences between France and Spain!

On the 10th M. Benedetti met the King, by accident, at Ems; and his Majesty said that Prince Leopold, being on a journey in Switzerland, had not yet been able to join his father; consequently he had no answer from him. He telegraphed to the Duke, that war would be inevitable if military preparations were openly begun. Whereupon, on the 11th, the Ministry decided to make a 'dilatory declaration' to the Chambers, and to brave the impatience of the deputies and the war shouts of the press. 'The Government,' said the Foreign Minister, 'understands the impatience and anxiety of the Chamber and of the country; but it is impossible to make a definite statement yet. It is waiting for an answer. All the Cabinets with which we are in communication appear to admit the justice of our complaints. I hope to be shortly in a position to satisfy the Chamber; but to-day I appeal to its patriotism and to the political sagacity of each of its members, and beg them to be content, for the moment, with this incomplete information.'

The Emperor was distressed by the contrary counsels to which he was compelled to listen. He was very ill. On the 3rd a consultation of physicians had taken place, and it had been agreed that an operation was necessary, but it was adjourned. It would have interfered with the course of public business.[1] In almost incessant pain, he had to listen to the discussions of a divided ministry; to generals who assured him that the army was in splendid condition, that the Prussians were a

[1] 'L'Empereur se sentait plus malade. Une consultation de plusieurs médecins avait eu lieu le 3 Juillet. Le docteur Sée avait conclu à la nécessité du cathétérisme de la vessie.'—*Papiers et Correspondances de la Famille Impériale.*

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fortnight behindhand, and that victory was certain; to the Court party, who were opposed to the parliamentarians; to the clericals who detested the confederation of the north; and to the sincere, if misguided, friends of his dynasty, who, believing in the reports of Marshal Lebœuf and his comrades, saw the Emperor returning after a short triumphant campaign, along the *via sacra* of his capital, at the head of his victorious legions. He was not among the enthusiasts. He had no belief in a short war, at any rate. Nor was he a man of war, but a devout lover of peace. He kept himself throughout the negotiations severely within the rôle of a constitutional monarch. He presided in the council-chamber; but his responsible Ministers acted freely, as the despatches of the Duke de Grammont prove.

When on the morning of the 11th M. Benedetti had audience of the King, his Majesty could only repeat that he expected to receive Prince Leopold's reply that evening; and the French ambassador left, understanding that the Prince would spontaneously renounce his pretensions, with the approbation of the King. This he considered a concession which should have put an end to the difficulty.[1]

At this point of the negotiations M. de Bismarck issued from his retirement, and appeared on the scene at his sovereign's elbow. The utmost had been granted to the Duke de Grammont, who had uttered the famous words of defiance on the 6th; and the Chancellor thought the moment had come to turn the Hohenzollern candidature into a German one, by a *coup de théâtre*.[2]

On the 12th Prince Leopold formally renounced his candidature; the renunciation being addressed to Marshal Prim, in Madrid. When the Duke de

[1] *Ma Mission en Prusse*, par M. Benedetti.

[2] Forel, tome i. p. 118.

Grammont received the news from M. Benedetti, he said that the ambassador had obtained—nothing. But M. Olivier, who heard the news in the shape of a telegram from Sigmaringen, where Prince Leopold was staying, went direct, in his excitement, to the Chamber, and announced the renunciation as an act of the Prussian Government; the fact being that the King was to signify his assent to Prince Leopold's retirement to the French Ambassador on the morrow—the 13th. M. Olivier, in his joy, ran to M. Thiers, when he saw him, and said: 'We have obtained what we wanted—peace.'

'Now,' said M. Thiers, after reading the despatch, 'you must keep yourselves quiet.'

'Don't be afraid,' the blundering Minister retorted, 'we hold peace in our hands and it shall not escape us.'

It escaped at that moment.

A tumult arose among the deputies. The Opposition and the Right denounced the acceptance of the Sigmaringen concession as the avoidance, by Prussia, of her responsibility. It was not the 'dépêche du père Antoine' that would satisfy the just susceptibilities of France. M. Clément Duvernois, who represented the war-party at Court, and who was credited with very much more influence than he possessed, led the discontented factions, demanding to know what guarantees Prussia was prepared to give that the Hohenzollern intrigue should not be renewed. It was the duty of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to explain, by means of the despatch he had received from Benedetti, that the spontaneous retirement of Prince Leopold would be followed by the formal approbation of the King. But the Duke was of the war-party, and he played into the hands of M. de Bismarck. Instead of calming the popular excitement by a frank explanation, he took a

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step that not only led direct to war, but compelled the Emperor to declare it. Within an hour he gave audiences to the Ministers of Spain and Prussia, drew up a letter which he submitted to M. de Werther for the signature of his sovereign, and, calling M. Olivier to his side, intimated to the representative of Prussia that the Ministers must have guarantees for the future, in order to calm the angry passions of the French people.[1]

At the end of this momentous hour, the Duke repaired to Saint-Cloud, where he found the Emperor, who blamed the interpellation of M. Clément Duvernois, the compromising precipitancy of M. Olivier, and, indeed, the blunders that were being accumulated to the sole advantage of the German Chancellor. The Duke closed his terrible day (the 12th) with a crowning blunder. At seven o'clock he telegraphed to M. Benedetti to see the King immediately, and request him not only to give his sanction to the retirement of Prince Leopold, but to assure the Government that he would not sanction the revival of the candidature. An hour later he received a telegram from M. Benedetti in which he said he had just been informed by the King that the Prince of Hohenzollern's answer would be in his hands on the morrow morning, when he would summon him to an interview.

That night Paris was wild with excitement. The violent words uttered in the Legislative Body and printed in the papers had done their work. The Boulevards were crowded with shouting and singing mobs. The Marseillaise was interlarded with cries of 'à Berlin!' The echoes of this saturnalia were carried to Berlin, and, by the Chancellor, to the ears of the King, who was presently to see the representative of

[1] *La France et la Prusse* (Sorel). M. de Werther's Report to the King.

the Emperor. The quarrel was being made German, exactly to the taste of M. de Bismarck.

At ten o'clock at night the Emperor telegraphed to the Duke to order M. Benedetti to insist with the King on an engagement that Prince Leopold should not re-enter the lists as candidate for the Spanish throne. 'So long,' said his Majesty, 'as we have not an official communication from Ems, we have not received a reply to our just demands; so long as we have not received such a reply we shall continue our armaments.' The Emperor, when he wrote this, was not aware that two hours previously his Foreign Minister had received a despatch from Ems of the most reassuring character; he was left under the irritating impression that the King had put a deliberate slight upon him. This was the impression M. de Bismarck had studied to create, while keeping up a conciliatory attitude before the world.[1]

The telegram sent at midnight to M. Benedetti, while directing him again as he had already been directed by the Duke on his own responsibility, to insist on a guarantee, a promise for the future, cautioned him to tell M. de Bismarck and the King that the French Government had no desire for war, and only wanted to find an honourable way out of a difficulty which was not of their creation.

Thus this day ended, and thus, in the words of the Duke, the Olivier Ministry fought its last diplomatic fight. When the Council met on the morning of the 13th, a letter from Lord Lyons was placed in the Emperor's hands, in which he expressed urgently the

[1] In a letter, dated from Berlin the 12th, and published in the *Gazette d'Augsbourg*, a correspondent remarked that it was generally believed there that a war with France would not be disagreeable to the Chancellor.

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hope of the British Government that France would be satisfied with the withdrawal of Prince Leopold. This communication inclined the Ministers to peace; but the war-party would not yield. According to the testimony of Marshal Lebœuf, the divided Cabinet adjourned, having decided to insist on a guarantee, and at the same time to adjourn the calling out of the reserves—a double fault. On the one hand they were precipitating the war; and on the other they were putting off the adoption of the only means to wage it with success. The Duke, on the breaking up of the Council, announced the receipt of intelligence from the Spanish Ambassador that Prince Leopold had withdrawn; but added that negotiations were pending with the Prussian Government. On the previous day M. Olivier had announced peace. Now, further negotiations were going on, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in reply to angry questions from some of the deputies, headed by M. Clément Duvernois, declined to explain. With the approbation of M. Gambetta, M. Jérôme David drew up a formal interpellation, recalling the patriotic words of the Ministry of the 6th, and condemning them as being dupes of 'the derisive delays' of Prussia.

As he left the Chamber the Foreign Minister received a telegram from Benedetti, who had seen the King that morning at nine o'clock. His Majesty had not yet an answer from Sigmaringen; but he had absolutely refused to give a guarantee for the future; he would remain free to act according to circumstances. To this the Duke replied at once to M. Benedetti to make a last effort with the King. 'Tell him,' said the Duke, 'that we only ask him to forbid the Prince of Hohenzollern to renew his candidature. Let him say, "I will forbid him," and authorise you to write this to me, or charge his ambassador to make it known to me, and it will

suffice.' The French ambassador endeavoured to see the King again in the afternoon, but his Majesty replied through his aide-de-camp, Prince Radziwill, at two o'clock, that he had just received officially the news of the withdrawal of Prince Leopold. Further pressed by the French Minister to be admitted to an audience, the King, while declining, sent the following answer: 'The King has consented to give his entire and unreserved approbation to the withdrawal of the Prince of Hohenzollern; he can do no more.'[1] He added, through his aide-de-camp, that he had said his last word in the morning as to the guarantee.

The exasperation of public opinion against Prussia had become by this time so threatening, that peace, as M. Olivier had announced it, was dubbed 'lame,' 'sinister,' 'derisive,' and as worse than ten pitched battles. The populace filled the streets with shouts for war; and the deputies and the press supported and increased the excitement every hour. The French people were not in error when they denounced the delays of Prussia in giving a plain answer to a plain question, as designed by M. de Bismarck not only to gain time, but to persuade the Southern States that France meant war against the entire fatherland, and was provoking it. The messenger from Sigmaringen to Ems was purposely delayed till the 13th, so that Prince Leopold's withdrawal should become known throughout Europe as his own act, and be communicated through the foreign representatives of Spain. King William was persuaded that he had already been too conciliatory. Articles were inserted in the German papers blaming his weakness in yielding, and declaring that the honour of the

[1] 'Le Roi a consenti à donner son approbation entière et sans réserve au désistement du Prince de Hohenzollern; il ne peut faire davantage.'

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country would not permit him to make another step towards France. The reply sent to M. Benedetti through Prince Radziwill, which his Majesty authorised the French Minister to send to his Government, might have been accepted, had not Prince Bismarck hastened to make it unacceptable by publishing an account of M. Benedetti's interview with the King, in a form humiliating to France, in a supplement of the 'Gazette de l'Allemagne du Nord,' which was distributed throughout Berlin gratuitously on the evening of the 13th. On the same day the Chancellor told Lord Loftus that Prussia, far from making concessions to France, would demand an apology from her for the violence of her press, her Chamber, and her Foreign Minister. Exaggerated and deliberately false accounts of the last interview between King William and M. Benedetti were spread by the Government all over Germany.[1] Crowds surrounded the Royal palace in Berlin, and cheered and shouted 'To the Rhine!' On the 12th General Moltke had been summoned to Berlin; and on the 13th, he, with De Roon and the Minister of War, satisfied the Chancellor that Prussia was ready for the struggle.

On the 14th King William and the French ambassador, quite unconscious that a personal offence had been given or taken, parted on the most friendly terms in the railway-station; the King leaving for Coblenz, and M. Benedetti for Paris.[2]

The resolve to go to war was not only made but declared by Prince Bismarck on the 14th, when, in a reply to a despatch from Lord Granville, advising a

[1] The *Gazette de Cologne* and other German papers, for instance, said that the French ambassador, representing the Emperor, had been turned out of the country.

[2] In the Kurgarten at Ems a stone slab let into the ground, and inscribed '13 Juli, 9 Uhr 10 Minuten Morgens 1870,' marks the spot where the famous interview between the King and M. Benedetti took place.

moderate course, he stated that France must not only withdraw her demand for a guarantee as to the future, but that she must disavow the Duke de Grammont's speech of the 6th, and blame the violence of the press. The blunders of the Olivier Cabinet had put the German Chancellor in a position to bear himself thus haughtily, and with the approbation of public opinion in Europe.

Meantime there was hesitation and indecision in the French Ministry. On the morning of the 14th, at 9 o'clock, a Cabinet council sat at the Tuileries, with the usual result. A long discussion ended only in an adjournment. The publication of the offensive Ems telegram in the 'Gazette of North Germany' had been telegraphed to the Government; and it was believed that when it became known in Paris, it would be impossible to control the indignation of the public. At a second meeting of the Ministers in the afternoon, after a protracted discussion, it was resolved that the reserves should be called out. The Emperor was sad, unwell, and had remained a silent listener, until his Foreign Minister rose and said that the question might be solved by an appeal to Europe—by a Congress.

The word Congress, according to witnesses of the scene, made an extraordinary impression on the French sovereign. He was moved, till tears filled his eyes. A Congress had been his favourite court of appeal on many occasions. Was it to solve this grave difficulty? The draft of a communication to be addressed to the Powers was at once drawn up; and it was agreed that the Government should inform the Chambers on the morrow that the Hohenzollern candidate had been withdrawn with the approbation of the King of Prussia, and that with respect to the future France referred it to the judgment of a Congress of the European Powers.

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'This,' said Albert Sorel, 'would have been a master-stroke.' It would have confounded the machinations of M. de Bismarck, and given France a strong claim upon the gratitude of all lovers of peace. But it was not to be. The Olivier Cabinet was destined to blunder to the end.

A third council was called on the 14th, to meet at ten o'clock at night at Saint-Cloud. When the Ministers parted at six o'clock peace appeared to be assured; at ten o'clock it was war. The swift change has been attributed to the communication to the French Government of M. de Bismarck's interview with Lord Loftus, in which he formulated the demands he had determined to make on France, and to the news of the movements of German troops towards the Rhine. How these reached Paris remains a diplomatic mystery; but if they were conveyed to the French Ministers through the secret agency of the German Chancellor, this was the crowning episode of his conspiracy to provoke France to war.

All the testimony which has crept or been thrust into publicity, agrees in presenting the Emperor as the first to welcome hopes of peace, and the last to consent to the arbitrament of arms. At the night council at Saint-Cloud the war-party was in force. It was in the ascendant in the palace, and among the tried friends of his dynasty. It had the sympathies of the Empress, whose impulsive nature resented vehemently the tricks and the open insults to which M. de Bismarck, their ungenerous and unchivalrous guest, had subjected her adopted country. It has been said that the Empress Eugénie urged on the war-party, and was, indeed, the chief instigator of the war, because she believed it would secure the throne to her son. Her heroic conduct after the fall of the dynasty, and when she was

asked to save it at the expense of the honour of France, should have shielded her from this charge. She approved the war because she believed that the honour of France demanded it; but none who have had the honour of approaching her Majesty or of studying the elevation and strength of her character, have for a moment believed that her share in the responsibilities which weigh upon those who governed France in July 1870, may be traced to other than patriotic motives. The French war-party wrought an evil of terrible magnitude. All who were of it must bear a share of the blame. Rashness, folly, and vanity, were uppermost when the war broke out; but all alike sought, according to their lights, the honour and the glory of France.

CHAPTER III.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

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In his proclamation to the Army of the North in the autumn of 1854 the Emperor had recalled to the troops the saying of his uncle: 'Any army, the different parts of which cannot be concentrated within twenty-four hours, is an army in a bad position.'[1] In this position stood the forces of the Empire in July 1870. When war was declared there were only four French corps between Metz and the Prussian frontier. There were two between Saargemünd and Strasburg; and one was forming at Belfort. The reserves were at Châlons. 'Without denying the faults which may have been committed, the principal reason of our reverses,' the Emperor wrote after the war,[2] 'was that on August 6, when the German troops attacked at Fröschweiler and Spickeren, the French army was not ready.' He added: 'Marshal Niel reported to the Emperor (in 1868) that he had prepared a list of orders, by which all the reserves might be called out in fifteen days at most; and when Marshal Lebœuf became Minister of War, he reaffirmed Niel's statement. Experience,' said the Emperor, writing at Chislehurst, 'has proved that this could not have been true.'[3]

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[1] 'Toute armée dont les différentes parties ne peuvent se réunir en vingt-quatre heures sur un point donné est une armée mal placée.'

[2] *Œuvres posthumes de Napoléon III.* Deuxième partie, avant-propos. Lachaud: Paris, 1873.

[3] *Œuvres posthumes.* Deuxième partie, p. 59.

On July 6, the date of the Duke de Grammont's defiant address in the Legislative Body, Marshal Lebœuf submitted a summary of the military forces to the Emperor. According to this statement there should have been 350,000 regular troops on the frontiers fifteen days after the calling out of the reserves, and 100,000 mobiles. This was the force to begin with. But within a month the Emperor might rely on having 400,000 combatants ready for action. To this force Prussia could oppose at once only 390,000—that is, reckoning without the forces of the Southern States. These were to be cut off from Prussia by the first advance of the French army. With the armies of the Southern States the German forces would amount to 420,000 men.[1] This was the calculation adopted by the Emperor on the reports of his military chiefs and the Ministry of War. How bitter then must have been the deception to the chief of this army, when, after three weeks, the eight army corps sent to the frontier comprehended only about '220,000 men.'[2]

This deception was apparent to the Emperor immediately after his arrival at Metz. He had left Saint-Cloud with sad misgivings; and three days afterwards the Empress wept on receiving a letter from him. 'He was,' she said, '*navré*;' nothing was ready, nothing was in order; the plan of the campaign must be destroyed by the delay which was inevitable.[3]

'This inconceivable difference between the number of soldiers under the colours,' the Emperor wrote in his

[1] The three German armies of invasion were, in the beginning, only 338,000 strong.

[2] *Œuvres posthumes de Napoléon III.* Deuxième partie, p. 89.

[3] In a letter to Sir John Burgoyne, dated from Wilhelmshöhe (October 29, 1870), the Emperor said: 'You, who are the Moltke of England, have understood that our disasters have arisen from this cause, that the Prussians were ready before us, and that we were taken, so to speak, *en flagrant délit de formation*.'

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history of the campaign, 'is the most striking and deplorable proof of the vice in our military organisation. In order to understand it, it should be known that, in spite of the organisation drawn up by Marshal Niel in 1868, the reserve men directed to travel to their depôts, to be thence forwarded to their regiments, were very slow in joining their corps. On the other hand, the Legislative Body having always insisted that the Minister of War should grant leave to marry to the men of the reserve, many, not being bachelors, contrived to get exempted by the generals commanding in the departments, although such exemption was in direct contravention of the orders of the Ministry.

'In spite of the order given by the Emperor several times to distribute permanently camping utensils and materials, the measure had not been taken. The baggage conveyances which should have been distributed at several military stations, carefully designated (according to orders given by the Emperor in 1868), were still stacked chiefly at Vernon and Satory.[1]

'The infantry had not, when on a peace footing, received the number of muskets that would be necessary in war time, when the entire strength of the regiments would be called out. They had had 2,000 as the peace maximum; they should have had between four and five thousand. Nor had they at hand the ninety rounds of cartridges per man which is the war supply. Considerable time, therefore, elapsed before the corps had obtained their arms, ammunition, and supplies from the central stores.

'Many more errors were committed. One of the gravest was that the contingents anterior to 1869 had not been drilled in the use of the new arms; for the men

[1] Yet the Minister of War forwarded a note to the Emperor declaring that his order had been obeyed,

of the reserve were familiar only with the old arm, and could not handle breechloaders. When they joined their corps in 1870 their military education had to be recommenced.

'The service of the mitrailleuses was also defective. The manufacture of these new weapons had been kept secret; only Marshal Lebœuf, on the advice of the Emperor, had in 1869 detached a number of artillery officers to Meudon to be instructed in the handling of them. By a culpable inadvertence, the artillery department of the Ministry of War, on the breaking out of hostilities, instead of handing over the mitrailleuses to the officers who understood them, preferred to keep to the old routine, and to appoint officers in rotation as they appeared on the lists for preferment. The result was that the mitrailleuses were injudiciously worked. Deceived by their name, the officers commanding them fired at close quarters, their range being over 1,800 mètres and their fire ineffectual at a shorter distance.

'From these causes the change from a peace to a war footing was much longer than had been anticipated; and this was the principal cause of our reverses. They were aggravated by the conduct of the Opposition in the Legislative Body, who followed up each disaster with violent Parliamentary scenes, which gave the enemy hope that civil war would soon be added to that which France was waging against Germany.'[1]

The course of Parliamentary events on the outbreak of the war must have given hope to M. de Bismarck. On July 15, when asking a vote of fifty millions,

[1] 'Fifteen days after the declaration of war 450,000 Germans, fully equipped and provisioned, were on our frontiers between the Rhine and the Moselle, facing 244,000 Frenchmen without tents or means of receiving ammunition or food, and waiting in vain for reinforcements.' —*Précis de la Guerre Franco-Allemande*, par le Colonel Fabre. Paris: E. Plon et Cie, 1875.

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M. Emile Olivier said that on that day a great responsibility began for him and his colleagues; but they accepted it with light hearts—'d'un cœur léger.' 'What! what!' M. Esquiros interrupted; 'you have light hearts when blood is about to flow in torrents?' The Minister explained: 'Yes, with light hearts; and by this I mean with hearts not borne down by remorse.' Although this explanation was given almost in the same breath with the words which it called it forth, M. Olivier's meaning was falsified to his disadvantage, was carried from mouth to mouth and bandied from journal to journal of the Opposition, until it had been made to appear a confession of reckless levity.[1] By this incident the general tone of the Opposition in the early days of the war may be judged. They meant to profit by the reverses, should they come, by fastening them upon the Emperor and his ministers; and to deprive the Empire of the glory, should success crown the arms of France, by insisting that the war was the act of the nation and not of the Government.[2] In the days of excitement immediately following on the declaration of war the enemies of the Empire denied that it was the Emperor's war or M. Olivier's war; it was the war of every Frenchman. When, on the retirement of Prince Leopold, M. Olivier

[1] The *Gaulois*, the *Figaro*, the *Soir*, the *Presse*, the *Temps*, the *Siècle*, the *Rappel*, the *Liberté*, the *Opinion Nationale*, were vehement partisans of the war. M. François Victor Hugo said in the *Rappel* that it would be an 'eternal humiliation' for France if the Hohenzollern were allowed to accept the Crown of Spain. On the dismissal of M. Benedetti by King William, and M. de Bismarck's offensive publication of the incident, the Paris press echoed the anger of the mobs in the streets.

[2] M. Guizot was the victim of a similar perversion of his meaning, when he replied, at a banquet at Lisieux, to a demand for the lowering of the suffrage qualification, 'Enrichissez vous par le travail;' meaning, 'Raise yourselves by labour to the existing qualification.' 'Enrichissez vous!' was repeated all over the country, the qualifying words and the argument being omitted.

stated that peace was secured, his declaration was greeted as the worst of humiliations, and he and his colleagues were warned to act with more boldness, 'like Frenchmen.'

So intense was the popular enthusiasm while the troops were marching through Paris on their way 'to Berlin,' and so popular had the war made the Emperor, that he avoided a public departure for the head-quarters at Metz. His reception by the people would have exceeded in warmth his entry into the capital on his return from the war of Italian liberation. He went quietly away from Saint Cloud with his son on July 28, taking leave of the Empress Regent, who was to see him next in the autumn, a prisoner at Wilhelmshöhe. On the declaration of war,[1] which was addressed to Prussia on July 19, the Emperor put forth the following proclamation to the nation :—

'Frenchmen,—There are solemn moments in the life

[1] The declaration of war was in these words: 'Le soussigné, Chargé d'Affaires de la France, en exécution des ordres qu'il a reçus de son gouvernement, a l'honneur de faire la communication suivante à S. Exc. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse.

'Le gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français n'a pu considérer le projet de placer un prince prussien sur le trône d'Espagne que comme une entreprise dirigée contre la sûreté territoriale de la France, et s'est vu dans la nécessité de demander au Roi de Prusse l'assurance que cette combinaison ne pouvait se réaliser avec son approbation. Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse s'étant refusé à donner cette assurance, et ayant, au contraire, témoigné à l'ambassadeur de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français que pour cette éventualité, comme pour toute autre, il entendait se réserver la possibilité de ne prendre conseil que des événements, le gouvernement impérial a vu dans cette déclaration une arrière-pensée menaçante aussi bien pour la France que pour l'équilibre européen. Cette déclaration a de plus été aggravée par la communication faite à différentes cabinets du refus de recevoir l'ambassadeur de Sa Majesté et d'avoir de nouveau avec lui un entretien.

'En conséquence le gouvernement français, croyant de son devoir de veiller immédiatement à la défense de son honneur et de ses intérêts lésés, a résolu de prendre toutes les mesures nécessitées par la situation qui lui est faite et se considère dès à présent en état de guerre avec la Prusse. Signé: Le Sourd.'

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of a people when the national honour, violently excited, imposes itself as an irresistible force, when it dominates every interest, and takes in hand the destinies of the country. One of these decisive hours has just struck for France.

'Prussia, to which we have shown during and since the war of 1866 the most conciliatory disposition, has given us no credit for our goodwill and forbearance. Launched on a career of invasion, she has raised suspicions on all hands, provoked extraordinary armaments, and turned Europe into a camp where uncertainty and the fear of what to-morrow may bring forth, prevail.

'A final incident has happened to demonstrate the instability of international relations, and to show all the gravity of the situation. In presence of the new pretensions of Prussia our demands have been heard. They have been eluded and followed by a disdainful attitude. Our country has been deeply irritated, and a war cry has resounded from one end of France to the other. It only remains for us to confide our destinies to the arbitrament of battle.

'We are not waging war against Germany, the independence of which we respect. We hope that the races who belong to the great German nationality may freely shape their own destinies.

'For ourselves, we claim the establishment of such a state of things as will guarantee our security and assure our future. We desire to conquer a lasting peace based on the real interests of the peoples, and to put an end to that precarious state of things which compels nations to employ their resources in arming against one another.

'The glorious flag which we now unfurl once more before those who have provoked us, is the same that carried through Europe the civilising ideas of our great

Revolution. It represents the same principles; it will inspire the same devotion.'

M. de Bismarck was swift in his movements. Already on July 16 he had exposed the situation to the Federal Council; published the document in which France had offered to recognise the incorporation of the Southern States with the Confederation of the North, in exchange for Belgium and Luxembourg, in order to damage the Imperial Government in the eyes of Europe; and had secured the co-operation of the Southern States, which Napoleon hoped to turn against Prussia by a rapid movement between North and South. On the 18th, in a circular despatch to the representatives of the Confederation, he said: 'We are already assured of the co-operation of the entire German nation; and we may rely on it that in this war, deliberately and unjustly provoked, France will not find an ally.' To the Emperor's affirmation that France was not making war against Germany, but only against Prussia, King William retorted, as he placed himself at the head of his troops, that Germany was waging war not against the French people, but against their Emperor.[1] The latter declaration was a dexterous political move; for it enabled the conspirators of the French Opposition to fasten all the responsibility of the war upon Napoleon, and to identify it with his dynasty. It was the carrying out of a threat uttered by M. de Bismarck to M. Benedetti in 1866—of a war by revolutions ('la guerre à coups de révolutions').

[1] The semi-official Prussian press, at the outset of the war, made French public opinion responsible. On July 28 L. Bamberger attributed all the fault to the French Opposition, saying: 'Thiers protests to-day, but who has shouted louder than he (against Sadowa and Prussia)? Read Jules Favre's speeches on Germany, and Jules Ferry's blind sallies about the St. Gothard Railway; read the manifesto of the Extreme Left, where Sadowa figures with Mexico as a national disgrace, and then say who bears the burden of the fault, the Emperor or public opinion.'—Sorel, tome 1, p. 208.

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As M. de Bismarck stated, France did not find an ally; albeit she had the best reason to believe that both Austria and Italy would give her their armed support. The history of the negotiations carried on between the Imperial Government and those of Vienna and Florence cannot be written yet. The 'Mémoires pour servir' are many already, but they are not complete. The main points may be stated in a few words. In 1869 the stipulations of a triple alliance, offensive and defensive, had been agreed upon, the Powers being France, Austria, and Italy. France agreed to evacuate Rome on the condition that Italy would respect the territory of the Pope and defend his Holiness against aggression from without; but that was not signed, because the Emperor Napoleon declined to withdraw his troops at once, on the ground that the King of Italy was not in a position to protect the Pope effectually. When the war broke out, it became evident that the French brigade in Rome, having no longer the French army behind it, had ceased to be an efficacious protection to the Pope; and the Emperor, in a letter to Victor Emmanuel, notified its withdrawal, confiding at the same time to the honour and loyalty of his Majesty. The negotiations ended in an agreement that the terms of the convention should remain those of September 1864 between Italy and France. The Duke de Grammont was quite justified in giving the Chamber to understand that France might reckon on powerful allies, since the treaty was ready for signature; and the modes and dates for the movements of the Italian and Austrian forces were agreed upon. Austria and Italy were to demand that Prussia should undertake to maintain the *status quo* in Germany on the basis of the Treaty of Prague. On her refusal, about which there could be no doubt, these two Powers were to declare

war against her. But as the war opened, and the position of France became apparent, her allies made fresh stipulations. On June 20 M. de Beust wrote to Paris that, on the French troops quitting Rome, the Italians must be permitted to enter the city freely and without stipulations, with the consent of Austria and France. This step was provoked by the anti-Papal party in Florence. Taken, as it was, towards 'the Eldest Son of the Church' and the chief of a great Catholic Power, it looked like a way out of their onerous engagements invented by Austrian and Italian diplomacy. Victor Emmanuel protested in a telegram to the Emperor on the proposed armed neutrality of Austria and Italy, (July 26) that he might rely on 'his remaining always his best friend.' Three days later the Italian Minister in Paris placed in the hands of the Duke de Grammont a formal undertaking on the part of Italy to execute the convention of September 15, 'relying on the just reciprocity of France in fulfilling her engagements.' This was followed by the assent of Austria, and in consequence France notified to Italy that the French troops would evacuate the Pontifical States on August 5. But at the beginning of August Austria and Italy reopened the whole question by proposing fresh stipulations and a treaty of armed neutrality between the two, France having become a belligerent Power. Austria was also to join Italy to obtain a modification of the September convention as regards Rome. The two allies wanted a month's delay to prepare for war. Count Vimercati carried these propositions to the Emperor at Metz. His Majesty replied by two requests—(1) that the armed neutrality should become armed support with the least possible delay; (2) that Austria should not combine with Italy to alter the September stipulations in regard to the Pope's dominions.

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On Count Vimercati's return to Florence the stipulation as to Rome was, according to the Duke de Grammont, given up; the French representatives had received full powers to sign the treaty, and it was on the point of being signed, when the disasters of Woerth and Forbach happened. On August 9 the Olivier Ministry retired, driven out by the fury of the implacable Republican Opposition, who were making their way to power through the disasters of their country. The Duke de Grammont had closed his mischievous public career. His was, as M. Doudan described it, the diplomacy of a hussar.[1]

That, when the war was determined upon, the Emperor was justified in regarding Austria and Italy as his allies, although the convention had not been signed, is admitted even by so grudging and unfriendly a commentator as Prince Jerome Napoleon. In his 'Alliances de l'Empire en 1869 et 1870'[2] he remarks that when, in 1869, the signing of the convention was adjourned, in order not to lose the fruit of the diplomatic labours it had cost, friendly letters were exchanged between the Emperor Napoleon and the Emperor of Austria, between the Emperor Napoleon and the King of Italy, and between the King of Italy and the Emperor of Austria. The Emperor Napoleon understood that these letters would eventually serve as basis for a treaty, which

[1] 'M. le duc de Grammont a éclaté comme une bombe à la tribune. Je n'ai pas été accoutumé dans ma jeunesse à cette diplomatie à la hussarde. Je vois d'ici Desages recevant la nouvelle que le maréchal Prim proposait le prince Léopold de Hohenzollern pour le trône de Philippe V. Il aurait mis la lettre dans sa poche et y aurait rêvé trois fois vingt-quatre heures, et regardé venir les nouvelles avant d'aller prendre la Chambre pour confidente de ses ennuis. . . . On dirait vraiment des enfants qui jouent à la diplomatie et à la guerre.'—*Letter to M. Piscatory*, July 10, 1870. Doudan, vol iv. p. 282.

[2] *Revue des Deux Mondes*, April 12, 1878. The reply of the Duke de Grammont was published in the *Revue de France*, and signed 'Andreas Memor,' April 15, 1878.

could be drawn up and signed in a few days; and his impression was confirmed by the Prince de Metternich and M. Nigra.

The year 1870, according to Prince Jerome, soon destroyed these illusions. The Archduke Albert visited Paris early in the spring, and the Emperor was drawn into a closer alliance with Austria. During the Duke's visit, military strategy rather than the Papal difficulty was dwelt upon, to the disappointment of the Italian Government, who thought that the Emperor had found it more important to support the Pope than to enter into an alliance with Victor Emmanuel. The point on which the fatal delay in the signing of the convention occurred was, that while the Emperor was ready to withdraw from Rome, and leave the Papal State to the care of Victor Emmanuel, the Italian Government, backed by M. de Beust, demanded to enter Rome with the full approbation of France and Austria. Victor Emmanuel pleaded, with force, that he would never be able to lead his people heartily into the war, unless he could tell them that it meant Rome, the capital of Italy. The scruples which made the Emperor hesitate were of the most honourable kind. General Turr[1] suggested to the Duke de Grammont that the Emperor should give such promises to Italy, but of what avail would these have been to the Power that required, in order to make war against Prussia popular, that it should mean Rome, the capital of a free and united country?

Had the terms of the treaty been agreed upon on the eve of the first disasters to the French arms, it is doubtful, as Prince Jerome remarks, whether Italy and

[1] In a despatch dated from Florence, July 27, 1870. It concludes with a suggestive phrase: 'Knowing that your Excellency is very busy, I pass over in silence the thousand intrigues got up by the Prussians.'

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Austria would have ratified it, and declared for France when she was beaten, having already admitted that they could not be ready to take the field before September 15. According to the Duke de Grammont they had been agreed upon, and were not ratified in consequence of the French defeats.

Later Prince Jerome was sent from Châlons by the Emperor on a mission to Florence. He was to request the armed intervention of Italy and Austria, on the condition that Italy should be free to act as she pleased towards Rome. 'I would not have accepted the mission on any other terms,' he says. He arrived in the Italian capital on August 20, and he was put off by temporising negotiations between Florence and Vienna, that had reached no result when the 4th of September put an end to them.

Prince Jerome attributed the failure of the negotiations of 1868–9–70 between France, Austria, and Italy to the influence exercised by the clerical party over the enfeebled mind of his sick kinsman the Emperor. He could not but grant that the Emperor wished to see a *modus vivendi* established between free Italy and the Pope; but as the Eldest Son of the Church he could not barter away the temporal power of the Pope for the military support of the Austrian and Italian monarchies without risking a revolution at home, by doing violence to the religious sentiments of the vast majority of his subjects. The Emperor was as liberal as his cousin; but, unlike his cousin, he was weighted with a sense of responsibility, and he was a sincere, albeit a liberal, Catholic.

The Emperor left behind him a short history of the war,[1] from which some passages, chiefly descriptive of

[1] *Œuvres Posthumes de Napoléon III.* Recueillis et coordonnés par le comte de la Chapelle. Lachaud: Paris, 1873.

his own part in it, are extracted. This history was written during the brief period of exile which he passed between Sedan and death. The record has no marks of hate or of passion in it. It is a plain and simple history, marked throughout by modesty and candour, by moral courage and generosity. It is an admirable sample of the illustrious author's best literary work.

On July 21 the Legislature was prorogued, and on the following day a deputation from the Legislative Body waited on the Emperor, and assured him that he might without fear leave the Empress Regent in Paris, confident in the support the liberal institutions would afford her; and, addressing the commander of the National Guard on the 26th, the Emperor said that he left the Empress under their protection, convinced that, come what might, they would maintain order in Paris. On assuming the command of the army, the Emperor issued the following proclamation to the troops from his headquarters at Metz:—

'Soldiers,—I am about to place myself at your head to defend the honour and the soil of the country. You are about to contend with one of the best armies in Europe, but others equally brave have not been able to resist your courage. The same experience will be repeated to-day. The war about to commence will be a long and a severe one, since it will be fought in a country covered with fortresses and impediments; but nothing is too difficult for the soldiers of Africa, of the Crimea, of Italy, and of Mexico. You will once more prove what the French army, animated by a feeling of duty, maintained by discipline, and inspired with love of country, can perform. Whatever road we may take beyond our frontiers, we shall find glorious traces of our fathers. We will prove ourselves

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worthy of them. All France follows you with ardent hope, and the eyes of the world are upon you. The fate of liberty and civilisation rests on our success.

'Soldiers, let each one do his duty, and the God of battles will be with us. NAPOLEON.

'The Imperial Head-quarters, Metz: July 28.'

His plan of campaign, and the considerations which determined it, are described succinctly by him:—

'Our frontiers of France, being protected on the north by the neutrality of Belgium, and on the east by the neutrality of Switzerland, the only two accessible lines of attack or defence, form a triangle, of which Lauterbourg is the apex, and the sides of which stretch, one westward towards Sierck, and one southward towards Belfort. The first side, which, for us, is the left, runs along the Rhenish-Bavarian frontier and the Sarre. It is 140 kilomètres in a direct line; the second, or right side, runs along 160 kilomètres of the Rhine bank.

'A French attacking army must necessarily, in order to enter Germany, cross one of these two sides. To the left it would march straight on Mayence to lay siege to it; to the right it must cross the Rhine to invade the Grand Duchy of Baden.

'It will be seen that the north-eastern frontiers of France are geographically bad for an attack against Germany; for, let a French army march towards the north or to the east, it is always vulnerable on its flanks, and must employ a strong force to cover and protect them.

'Germany, having the two banks of the Rhine from Cologne to Rastadt, is mistress of the river, and having many lines of railway communication also, can without difficulty convey her troops to the left bank; so that if

a French army advances on Mayence it may be attacked on the right flank at any point below Rastadt, and on the left flank by troops mustered at Treves. If, on the contrary, it marches to the east towards the Rhine, its left flank may be threatened along the entire line from Lauterbourg to Sierck, and thence along the course of the river which stretches to Basle.

'The nature of the things, therefore, clearly indicated Metz and Strasbourg as the two principal points of concentration of the two armies; for, whatever plan was adopted, the army of Alsace and the army of Metz must combine their movements so as to act in common, whether the Rhine was crossed or the advance was northward. In both cases the army of Châlons must be the reserve force, and keep open the communications of the army in the field. If circumstances compelled the French army to remain on the defensive, the army of Alsace would retire to the defiles of the Vosges, where the army of Metz would join them.

'Strasbourg did not appear to the Emperor to be a favourable place for crossing the Rhine, because it would bring the army in front of the depths of the Black Forest; and if the French forces followed the right bank of the river it would have been necessary to besiege Rastadt. Maxau, thirty kilomètres above the fortress of Germersheim and twenty kilomètres below Rastadt, appeared to be the preferable point; for it allowed the army to pass these two fortresses—one on the left and one on the right. This plan could succeed only if Maxau was seized before the enemy had assembled his troops. The passage of a great river by force is a hazardous operation which has rarely succeeded. It was not to be thought of.

'The first end to be realised consisted in assembling the army corps at the above-mentioned points,

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with all essential accessories, as conveyances, pontoons, gunboats, ammunition, and rations, &c.

'The concentration of the main body of the French forces in Alsace and at Metz did not unmask the Emperor's plan to the enemy. It permitted him, at a given moment, to unite seven army corps, and at their head to begin offensive operations resolutely. But it was necessary that all these army corps should be equally ready to open the campaign; for an army is a great body, all the parts of which must sustain each other and act together. Let one fail, and all is paralysed, and the general plan cannot be executed. Thus it was indispensable not only that the troops assembled at Metz should be complete in all things, but that the corps which was mustering at Belfort should have reached Strasbourg to reinforce that of Marshal MacMahon. It was indispensable, moreover, that Marshal Canrobert's, the reserve, which was forming at Châlons, should replace, in Lorraine, the troops who were destined to take part in the first campaign. Unhappily the hopes which had been conceived could not be realised.

'Instead of having, as was with reason expected, 385,000 men in line, to oppose to the 430,000 of Northern Germany and the Southern States, the army, when the Emperor arrived at Metz on July 25, numbered only 220,000 men, and these were not fully equipped or provisioned. The army of the Moselle had only 110,000 men instead of 220,000; that of Marshal MacMahon had only 40,000 instead of 107,000. General Douay's corps at Belfort was forming slowly and with difficulty, and Marshal Canrobert's corps was not yet complete.

'The Emperor saw that under such conditions as these the passage of the Rhine was impossible, and,

yielding to the impatience of the army and of the nation, he decided to march on the Sarre. On August 2 the armies occupied the following positions:—

'The second corps, General Frossard, at Forbach; the third corps, Marshal Bazaine, at St. Avold; the fourth corps, General Ladmirault, at Bouley; the fifth corps, General de Failly, at Sarreguemines; the Imperial Guard in the neighbourhood of Metz. The first four army corps, 80,000 strong, were within a circle of twenty kilomètres.

'General Frossard's corps easily carried the heights of Saarbrück. This affair had no great importance, seeing the small force of the enemy; however, it assured us the passage of the river, which was an advantage, and enabled us to prevent the Prussian troops who were mustering at Treves from using the railway for their transport eastward. In this engagement the Prince Imperial showed a self-possession beyond his age; but clumsy friends having exaggerated the merit of his behaviour, detractors turned to ridicule what was, in itself, worthy of praise.[1]

[1] On August 4 the following despatch appeared in the *Journal Officiel*:—

'Metz: August 2, 4.30 P.M.

'To-day, August 2, at eleven o'clock in the morning, the French troops had a severe engagement with the Prussians.

'Our army, assuming the offensive, crossed and invaded the territory of Prussia.

'In spite of the strength of the enemy's position, a few of our battalions sufficed to carry the heights which command Saarbrück, and our artillery soon drove the enemy from the town.

'The *élan* of our soldiers was so great that our losses have been slight.

'The engagement, which began at eleven o'clock, was over at one.

'The Emperor was present with the Prince Imperial, who has received upon the first battle-field of the campaign the baptism of fire.

'His presence of mind, and coolness in danger, were worthy of the name he bears. The Emperor returned to Metz at four o'clock.'

At the same time the Emperor addressed this private despatch to the Empress:—

'Louis has just received the

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'Although the affair at Saarbrück took place on August 2, the French army remained motionless on the 3rd and 4th. The Emperor waited, in order to advance, for the reserves to come up, for the completion of the army of Alsace by the junction of the seventh corps, and for the arrival of the Châlons corps at Metz. Was it possible to advance into a difficult country, offering few resources, without having combined with the other army corps? Towards Mayence the difficulty in obtaining provisions was great; for it was impossible to think of resetting the railway, the tunnel of which, it was rumoured, had been destroyed. The flanks of our army might be harassed on the left by the Prussian troops at Treves, on the right by those who were already at Kaiserslauten. The troops therefore remained inactive on the left bank of the Sarre. But when, on August 4, the check sustained at Wissembourg by General Abel Douay's division became known, the Emperor at once gave orders to concentrate the army, to recall it towards Metz, and he conferred the command of the three army corps of the Sarre on Marshal Bazaine.

'In consequence the second corps was ordered to withdraw from the heights of Saarbrück and to retire on Saint Avold; the fourth corps established its head-quarters at Boucheporn, and the second (? third) was to occupy Putelanges. As for the fifth, which was at Sarreguemines, it was sent to Bitche to be in communication with Marshal MacMahon. The Emperor's orders

baptism of fire. His coolness was admirable: he was not in the least degree excited.

'One of General Frossard's divisions carried the heights on the left bank of Saarbrück.

'The Prussians made a feeble resistance.

'We were in the front; the balls and bullets fell at our feet.

'Louis has kept a ball that fell near him.

'Some of the soldiers wept on seeing how calm he remained.

'We had only one officer and ten men killed. NAPOLEON.'

were forwarded and executed slowly. The second corps, instead of withdrawing to Saint Avold, remained at Forbach. Several divisions had been placed too far away, and it took time to draw them together.

'The Emperor generally indicated to the commanders of army corps the central position where their head-quarters should be established, but they were free to place their divisions where they chose. Some having extended their lines unreasonably, they had to wait, before they could move, to concentrate their outlying divisions. Again, in consequence of bad habits formed in Africa, the army was overloaded with baggage.[1] Waggons laden with sugar and coffee were met, when no biscuit was to be had. The men, being encumbered heavily, marched slowly, and bad weather helped to retard movements.

'The Emperor then bitterly regretted having moved the army towards the north before being thoroughly ready to take the field; for he felt after the check of Wissembourg how important it was to support the army of Alsace. The enemy having unmasked his intentions, the most rational plan was to have a strong garrison in Strasbourg and Metz, and to unite all the disposable forces behind the Vosges. But then, on the one hand, the Duke of Magenta intimated that he was in a position to take the offensive, and that he even hoped for a success; and, on the other, too much time would be required to re-conduct the army to the eastward. Nevertheless its concentration at Saint Avold was begun, and the fifth corps was sent to Bitche, in Alsace, to support the corps of the Duke of Magenta.

[1] In Paris the enemies of the Empire represented the Emperor as travelling in Imperial state, and hindering the military movements with his equipages. The falsehood of this has since been established by impartial witnesses.

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'The project of the commander-in-chief is clearly indicated in the following despatch, which was sent on the morning of the 6th by the major-general to Marshal Bazaine: "It is the Emperor's design to combine with Marshal MacMahon, and at the same time to concentrate the armies into a compact body." The rapidity of events prevented the execution of this plan.

'On August 6, while the army of the Prince Royal of Prussia was crushing by superior forces Marshal MacMahon's corps, Prussian troops were advancing from Saarbrück and Sarrelouis to attack the French army. The second corps bore alone the brunt of the battle at Spickeren. Although the French army was attacked while executing a retreating movement, the second corps was left to itself. It might easily have been sustained by three divisions which were in a position to reach the field of battle in two hours. The Montaudon division was at Sarreguemines, ten kilomètres distant; the Castagny division at Putelanges, sixteen kilomètres distant; the Mettmann division at Marienthal, fourteen kilomètres distant. On this unfortunate day, when General Frossard's corps fought heroically, a fatality prevented succour from arriving in time to turn a defeat into a victory.

'After the battle of the 6th more pressing orders were given to concentrate the army to the north of Metz. On the 10th it took up a strong position on the *Nied française*, with the intention of waiting there for the enemy; but the Emperor having reconnoitred the ground, and finding that the right might be easily turned, especially as a German corps was advancing by Sarre-Union, resolved to mass the army under the protection of the outer forts of Metz. On the 11th all the troops had taken up their positions in the entrenched camp, and on the 12th the greater part of the sixth

corps, under the command of Marshal Canrobert, arrived from the camp at Châlons.

'The hour of the cruellest trials was about to strike. Let men judge of the pain a sovereign must feel when, at the head of an army full of vigour and enthusiasm, he finds himself unable to use its ardour and devotion with advantage. His projects had been destroyed by the delay in the formation of the various corps. The vigorous initiative taken by the Prussians had compelled him to retreat, after having advanced to the frontier.

'All these movements, which appeared to be the result of hesitation, and which, in the ranks of the army as in the public mind, were severely criticised, had produced an effect unfavourable to the Emperor. Although fatigued by hard marches, and depressed by the checks suffered at Wissembourg, Frœschwiller, and Spickeren, the army had only one desire—to go forward. But he who had the responsibility of the command did not believe it to be his duty to yield to this sentiment, natural in men who have a consciousness of their strength and of their worth.

'The Emperor was, it is true, at the head of 120,000 disciplined men ready for anything; but three hostile armies, each stronger than his own, were advancing against him—from the north that of General Steinmetz and that of Prince Frederick Charles, and from the east that of the Crown Prince of Prussia. The cavalry of these three armies had already met, and had appeared in the neighbourhood of Faulquemont. If the French army accepted battle by advancing towards the Sarre, it might be cut off from Metz by the troops of the Prince Royal; if, on the contrary, it moved towards the Vosges, it might be compromised by the armies of Prince Frederick Charles and General Steinmetz.

'Indeed, now that we have seen the sad results of

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the campaign unfold themselves before us, it may be said that it would have been better to fall at the head of 120,000 men than to have led, by the force of events, to the capitulations of Metz and of Sedan; but who could then foresee the extent of our disasters?

'The events which we have recalled had diminished the confidence of the troops in the Chief of the State; for the military reputation he had acquired during the short Italian campaign was not well established enough to withstand bad fortune. These events had produced even more pernicious effects in Paris. Public opinion made Marshal Lebœuf responsible for the delays in the formation of the army, and the Opposition was demanding peremptorily that the Emperor should give up the command of the army. Under these circumstances an important success might have closed the mouths of opponents; but it was hardly permissible to hope for it. The Emperor was compelled to accept the resignation of Marshal Lebœuf; and on August 13 he placed the command of the army of the Rhine in the hands of Marshal Bazaine, who had the confidence of the troops and of the country.'

The Emperor defined his position henceforth to the end of the campaign. 'While placing all the troops around Metz under the command of Marshal Bazaine, the Emperor remained under the constitution the supreme chief of the army; and might, in an analogous position to that which the King of Prussia had assumed, direct the general defences of the country. But in Paris the Government, harassed by the attacks of the Opposition, the violence of which increased with our reverses, found itself compelled to make all kinds of concessions.[1]

[1] While the Emperor was at Metz, and after the first reverses, General Changarnier, who had remained hostile to him throughout his

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'From August 11 M. de Kératry demanded the impeachment of Marshal Lebœuf. The Legislative Body rejected his proposition. On the 12th the Count de Palikao announced that Marshal Lebœuf had resigned, and on the 13th that Marshal Bazaine was in command of the army of the Rhine. During this sitting the Opposition demanded that the war should be conducted in a republican manner (*républicainement*). To a question by M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, whether Marshal Bazaine's command comprehended the Imperial Guard, the Minister of War replied in the affirmative. M. Guyot Montpayroux wanted to know whether there were not commanders above or on an equality with Marshal Bazaine; and the Count de Palikao replied that there were none. "Then," cried M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, "Marshal Bazaine is generalissimo; that will give confidence to the country."

'It was obvious that the ministers, incessantly harassed by the perfidious attacks of the Opposition, were, in spite of their zeal and devotion, powerless to defend the Emperor. Everything then tended to decide

good fortune, hastened to him to offer his offices. The interview took place in the Emperor's bedroom. 'My heart beat as he appeared,' said the General, describing the scene to M. Adrien Marx. 'The tears came to my eyes. Unhappy sovereign! His face betrayed cruel sufferings. And he has been called "coward!"—he who before the first cannon was fired carried already in his entrails the ball which killed him later in London. When I remember that this man, tortured by a horrible disease, remained on horseback at Sedan an entire day, watching the prestige of France, his throne, his dynasty, and all the glory reaped at Sebastopol and in Lombardy disappear, I cannot control myself. But let us proceed.

'He offered me his hand. "Sire," I said, "I have come to ask your permission to let me die in the midst of your soldiers." His usually impassive countenance betrayed violent emotion. He bowed. You know the rest. He withdrew, leaving me with General Lebœuf.' The General joined Marshal Bazaine, and gallantly shared with the Marshal's forces their evil fortune, following them to Germany as prisoner of war.

Changarnier died in February, 1877, and was buried, with great pomp, at the Invalides.

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his return to Paris; but he would not execute this project before the army of the Rhine had left Metz.

'On August 13 Marshal Bazaine informed the Emperor that he should follow the plan already laid down, which consisted in making the entire force cross to the left bank of the Moselle, in order to reach Verdun, and thence to march to Châlons to join the troops already assembling there.

'On the morning of the 14th the retreat began.[1] Two army corps had already reached the left bank, and the Emperor had fixed his quarters at Longueville for the night, when the sound of cannon announced that the part of the army remaining on the right bank had been attacked. As it was under the protection of the forts, it was reasonable to hope that the retreat would not be arrested; but several divisions passed back to the right bank to take part in the struggle, so that the battle of Borny, although glorious for our arms, delayed the passage of the troops for some hours.

'Nevertheless on the morning of the 15th the march upon Verdun was resumed. In the morning the Emperor and the Prince Imperial had been compelled to evacuate their quarters precipitately; for several officers had just been killed there by the fire of the enemy. On the night of the 15th they were established with part of the army at Gravelotte.

'As the telegraph did not exist on this line, Napoleon III. could receive no news from the capital; and it was

[1] The Emperor, on leaving Metz on August 14, addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants. 'En vous quittant pour aller combattre l'invasion, je confie à votre patriotisme la défense de cette grande cité. Vous ne permettrez pas que l'étranger s'empare de ce boulevard de la France, et vous rivaliserez de dévouement et de courage avec l'armée. Je conserverai le souvenir reconnaissant de l'accueil que j'ai trouvé dans vos murs, et j'espère que dans des temps plus heureux je pourrai revenir vous remercier de votre noble conduite.'

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to put himself in communication with Paris that he decided to precede the army to Châlons. He left at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 16th with an escort of two regiments of the Guard. So little was a general engagement anticipated that it had been decided the Emperor should take the shortest road; but Marshals Bazaine and Canrobert persuaded him to pass by Conflans and Etain. On this road only a few uhlans were seen, and they quickly disappeared. The Emperor arrived at Verdun at 3 o'clock on the 16th, and on the evening of the same day he reached the camp at Châlons. There he heard of the glorious but fruitless battles of Rezonville and Saint Privat, and he felt a mortal regret that he had not been present at them.'

The Imperial quarters at Châlons, where Napoleon III. had spent many proud and happy hours, and had shown his son to his troops, were now crowded with anxious soldiers and politicians. Here were Prince Jerome Napoleon and General Trochu, MacMahon and Rouher, discussing before the advancing hosts of Germany, not only how they were to be repelled, but how the revolution which Favre, Gambetta, Rochefort, and their congeners were fomenting was to be kept down. While General de Moltke was watching Bazaine and MacMahon, M. de Bismarck was marking the good work which the irreconcilables of the French Chamber were doing for him. His threat of 1866 was being worked out; he was punishing France '*à coups de révolutions.*'

On the morrow of his arrival, the Emperor, at the suggestion of the Count de Palikao, appointed General Trochu, by decree, Governor of Paris, an appointment disastrous alike for France and for the Imperial dynasty.[1] The deliberations and resolves

[1] 'Quelle preuve plus flagrante du relâchement des mœurs politiques que l'indifférence montrée à l'égard de la trahison du général Trochu?

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of Châlons are succinctly described by the Emperor. Having remarked that the first result of the convocation of the Legislative Body was the fall of the Olivier Ministry, and that it was illegal without his consent, he dwells on the immediate evil consequences. The new (Palikao) Ministry was formed, and all kinds of important appointments were made without reference to him. On these facts His Majesty has the following commentary: 'While good fortune lasts the difficulties we have described disappear, for it is easy to agree on measures when success has increased the legitimate influence of the Chief of the State; but it is quite otherwise after misfortunes. Moral authority is no longer with the army; it returns to the public powers located in the capital. This is so true that Napoleon I. himself, although he was absolute master and encompassed with an incomparable prestige, felt that after reverses the greatest danger that menaced the established order of things was not from the enemy, but in Paris; and he hastened thither after the disasters of Moscow and of Waterloo.'

Voilà un militaire qui a prêté serment à l'Empereur, qui reçoit de lui dans un moment suprême la plus grande marque de confiance. Il est nommé commandant supérieur de toutes les forces réunies dans la capitale; il doit veiller sur les jours de l'Impératrice; et cet homme, qui, le 4 au matin, promet à la Régente qu'on passera sur son corps avant d'arriver jusqu'à elle, laisse envahir le Corps Législatif et les Tuileries; et quelques heures sont à peine écoulées depuis sa solennelle protestation qu'il usurpe le pouvoir et se déclare président du gouvernement de la Défense nationale. Jamais trahison plus noire, plus flagrante, plus impardonnable n'a été consommée, car elle s'est produite vis-à-vis d'une femme et en présence de l'invasion étrangère; et cet homme, qu'il faut appeler traître, parce que c'est son nom, semble jouir malgré cela de l'estime générale. Il est nommé dans plusieurs départements à l'Assemblée nationale par des électeurs ignorants. On ne rougit pas de lui donner la main et on le nomme président de commissions qui doivent statuer sur des points d'honneur. Ce fait ne montre-t-il pas jusqu'à l'évidence que nous avons perdu le sens moral?'—*Les Principes, par un Ancien Diplomate*—the work of Napoleon III.

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But the Empress and the ministers united in imploring the Emperor not to return under defeat to his capital, and he yielded.

Their reflections, the Emperor said, which were not without reason, resigned him to the fate of following the army of Marshal MacMahon, 'whatever its destination might be.' He remarked that his position was the most trying a sovereign had ever borne. 'Chief of the State, responsible to the French people, he was, by the force of circumstances, shorn of the rights he held from the nation, and condemned to be powerless while he saw under his eyes his army marching to an abyss.' He owed much of this sorrow to the fatuous vanity and the rashness of M. Emile Olivier; still his sympathies were with the fallen minister as an honest and a sincere friend; and before leaving Châlons he wrote to him (August 19, 1870):—

'My dear Monsieur Olivier,—I have been so engrossed with military events that I have not before been able to tell you how I regretted your withdrawal from the Ministry. You have given me so many proofs of devotion that I had become accustomed to reckon on you to smooth difficulties and to give direction, exempt from weakness, to public affairs. I hope, nevertheless, that our relations will remain as intimate as in the past. I am doing my utmost to regain our lost ground. Shall we succeed? God knows! Believe, my dear Monsieur Olivier, in my sincere friendship. NAPOLEON.'[1]

[1] 'Mon cher monsieur Olivier,—J'ai été si préoccupé des événements militaires que je n'ai pas encore pu vous dire combien j'avais regretté votre départ du ministère. Vous m'avez donné tant de preuves de dévouement que je m'étais habitué à compter sur vous pour aplanir les difficultés et imprimer aux affaires une marche ferme et exempte de faiblesse. J'espère néanmoins que nos relations continueront à être aussi intimes que par le passé.

'Je fais mes efforts pour tâche

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And with this parting shake of the hand to a well-intentioned minister, who had had his full share in precipitating the calamitous war, Napoleon followed Marshal MacMahon to the fatal field of Sedan. On the responsibilities for that immense disaster Marshal MacMahon gave conclusive testimony at the Trochu trial. He said, speaking as a witness:—

'I am bound to say—for justice must be done to everybody—that in the course of the operations the Emperor never interfered with the movements ordered by me, and that the operations were always commanded by me and not by him. At Rheims, at the Chêne-Populeux, the Emperor was of opinion that the army should retire on Paris: it is I alone who ordered the movement in the direction of Metz. I declare boldly and with all my strength, that the capitulation of Sedan may be called disastrous, but not shameful. The fact is, it was not a premeditated capitulation; it was an army that had delivered battle under bad conditions, that had been driven by superior forces to the banks of a river, to a position from which it was impossible for it to escape.'

'On the 30th, at four o'clock in the afternoon,' Napoleon wrote,[1] 'the Emperor and the Duke of Magenta were on the heights of Mouzon, where the twelfth corps was in position. They had both dismounted. In the distance they heard the artillery of General de Failly; and General Pajol, who had made a reconnaissance to judge the state of things, had brought back the news that the fifth corps was retiring on Mouzon. The Marshal then said to the Emperor that all the army would soon have crossed to the right

de regagner le terrain perdu. Le pourrons-nous? Dieu le sait!

'Croyez, mon cher monsieur Olivier, à ma sincère amitié.

'NAPOLÉON.'

[1] *Œuvres Posthumes.*

bank of the Meuse, that he would not leave Mouzon before the operation was completed, but that, since all was going well, he advised the Emperor to repair to Carignan, where the first corps must have already arrived and where the head-quarters would be established.

'Napoleon III. departed therefore full of confidence as to the result of the day; but hardly an hour had elapsed since his arrival at Carignan when General Ducrot came and gave him the most alarming news. The fifth corps had been driven back in disorder on Mouzon, with the brigade sent to support it. The Marshal begged the Emperor to retire as quickly as possible to Sedan, to which the army would withdraw. The Emperor could hardly believe that affairs had changed so thoroughly in a few hours. He at first elected to remain with the first corps, but, at the pressing solicitation of General Ducrot, he decided to depart, and arrived by railway, at eleven o'clock at night, at Sedan. He was urged to proceed to Mézières while the railway was still free. He might rally the corps of General Vinoy and establish another point of resistance in one of the strong places of the North; but he thought he would, in this case, be accused of seeking personal safety, and he preferred to share the fate of the army, whatever it might be. The equipages and escort having remained at Carignan, the Emperor entered alone on foot, followed by his aides-de-camp, in the silence of the night, the town of Sedan, which was about to become the theatre of such terrible events. . . . .'

After a description of Sedan the Emperor continued: 'General Ducrot, it must be stated, had correctly estimated the position. It was at the Calvary of Illy that he wished to establish the centre of resistance. However, on the 31st the troops were placed in position

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round the town. They described a semicircle, which, from Sedan as the centre, extended diametrically some 3,000 mètres, the extremities touching the villages of Bazeilles and Floing.

'From this semicircular position it followed that the line of retreat was by the centre, and that if the troops were driven back they would by a natural instinct precipitate themselves towards the town, which thus became an *entonnoir* to engulph them. Above and to the north of Sedan are the remains of an entrenchment called the Old Camp, which dominates the neighbouring ravines; and all the ground which stretches to the south of this camp is covered, as General Ducrot says, with garden walls, hedges, and a number of houses joined to those of Givonne, making the place a veritable maze. Held by a few stout troops, it would be very difficult to dislodge them; but, on the other hand, if a corps repulsed and in disorder came there for shelter, it would be impossible to rally and reform them. It was on this broken ground that, on the morning of September 1, the battle began. The enemy, attacking both our wings at once, endeavoured evidently to surround us and cut off our retreat.

'The Marshal Duke of Magenta having informed the Emperor of his intention, repaired at once to the outposts. The Emperor, on horseback, accompanied by his staff and a troop of guides, followed.

'It is easy to understand the state of his moral being. No longer acting as commander-in-chief, he was not sustained by the feeling of responsibility which animates the mind of him who commands; nor had he that exalting excitement of those who are acting under orders, and who know that their devotion may secure victory. The powerless witness of a hopeless struggle, convinced that on this fatal day his life and his death

were alike useless for the common safety, he advanced to the battle-field with that cool resignation which meets danger without weakness but also without enthusiasm.

'On leaving the sub-prefecture the Emperor met Marshal MacMahon, who was being brought back in an ambulance carriage. After exchanging a few words with him he advanced towards the village of Bazeilles, where the division of marines was hotly engaged.

'At Balan General Vassoigne described to him the position of the army. As every group of officers at once drew the enemy's fire upon it, the Emperor left his escort and most of his aides-de-camp with a battalion of chasseurs who were screened by a wall, and moved forward, followed by four persons, towards an open height where the greater part of the battle-field could be surveyed.

'At this moment General Ducrot, to whom Marshal MacMahon had transferred the command, was executing a retreat, which, under the present circumstances, was the best course to adopt. The Emperor sent Captain Hendecourt, one of his staff, to him, to know which direction he wished to give to the troops. This young and promising officer never reappeared. He was probably killed by an obus. All the ground on which we stood was ploughed by the enemy's projectiles, bursting around us.[1]

'After having remained several hours between the Moselle and Givonne, the Emperor desired to join the lines of infantry which were to be seen on the heights,

[1] General Pajol was with the Emperor throughout the day. In giving evidence at the trial of M. Paul de Cassagnac for libel against General Wimpffen he said: 'The conduct of the Emperor before the enemy cannot be questioned. Four officers were wounded at his side—a general (his aide-de-camp) and three staff officers.' See his pamphlet on Sedan.

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but which were separated from him by an inaccessible ravine. In order to reach them he had to make a detour, and thus found himself in the maze of Givonne already described. The roads were crowded with the wounded who were being carried to the ambulances; a park of artillery blocked the avenues, through which Goze's division had the greatest difficulty in making its way. Arrived near the old entrenched camp, it became impossible to advance further, the infantry which occupied this fort being about to retire in good order towards the town. It was already evident that every line of retreat was intercepted by the enemy, who occupied the circumference. Projectiles directed towards the centre struck the troops in front and in the rear. Many of the soldiers, pretending to be without cartridges, made for the only gate of the town which remained open.

'After having been during nearly five hours witness of a struggle the end of which was at hand, the Emperor, despairing of the possibility of gaining the heights of Illy from the position in which he was, decided to re-enter the town, to confer with the wounded Marshal, and in the hope of leaving it by the gate that opens on the departmental road to Mézières. Three wounded officers of his staff were carried by the soldiers. It was thus that he returned to the sub-prefecture, several obuses having fallen near his horse, but without harming it.[1] He caused a reconnaissance of the way by which

[1] 'L'Empereur, sorti de Sedan vers sept heures du matin, avait rencontré le maréchal blessé, n'était pas intervenu dans le débat pour le commandement entre Ducrot et De Wimpffen, et était rentré en ville vers midi, après être resté passivement sous le feu qui tua ou blessa plusieurs de ses officiers. Il était très souffrant du mal qui l'emporta en 1872. . . . L'Empereur rentra à Sedan après être resté deux heures sous les obus.' —*Précis de la Guerre Franco-Allemande*, par le colonel Fabre, pp. 143, 148. E. Plon et Cie. Paris, 1875.

he reckoned upon leaving to be made at once; and he was informed that the Mézières gate was barricaded and could not be opened, and that already the streets through which he had just passed were blocked by a pell-mell of men, horses, and waggons. There was nothing for it but to remain and wait the issue of events.

'About 3 o'clock a staff officer from General Wimpffen, who had, as senior officer, assumed the command-in-chief, made his way with great difficulty to the sub-prefecture. He came to propose to the Emperor to place himself at the head of the troops that could be got together, and to endeavour to cut a way through the enemy's lines towards Carignan. The first impulse of Napoleon III. was to accept the proposal; but he soon saw that, the difficulty of riding through the blocked streets apart, it did not become him, in order to save himself, to sacrifice the lives of many soldiers, and to escape with the commander-in-chief, deserting the rest of the army and leaving it without a directing head—to certain destruction. He refused, therefore, General de Wimpffen's offer.[1]

'During this time events had become worse and worse. The heroic but unavailing charges of the cavalry had not stopped the advance of the enemy. The brave General Margueritte, fatally wounded, had just been brought, at his request, near the Emperor. At this time, on both banks of the Meuse, the surrounding hills were crowned with several hundred pieces of artillery, which, by a convergent fire, threw their projectiles into the town. Houses were on fire; roofs were burst in. Death claimed many victims in the choked

[1] General Robert, examined by Jules Favre at the Cassagnac trial, said: 'I believe it would have been impossible for the most energetic man to pick up even a battalion to follow seriously a movement towards Carignan.'

streets, in the barracks transformed into hospitals, and in the courtyards where men of all ranks had taken refuge.

'On this the commanders of the three army corps, Generals Lebrun, Douay, and Ducrot, came in succession to report to the Emperor that further resistance was impossible; that the troops, after having fought for twelve hours without rest or food, were discouraged; that all who had not been able to gain the town were massed in the trenches and against the walls; and that it was time to come to a resolution.

'Since the departure from Châlons until this time the Emperor had held it to be his duty not to interfere in the least degree with the plans and decisions of the commander-in-chief; but at this supreme moment, when by an unheard of fatality 80,000 men appeared to be reduced to the peril of death without the means of fighting, he remembered that he was the sovereign, that he was in charge of souls, and that he ought not to allow men, who might live to serve their country at some future time, to be massacred under his eyes.

'Napoleon III. sent one of his aides-de-camp to ascend the citadel, there to assure himself of the actual state of things. The officer executed his task with the greatest difficulty. The citadel, as well as the streets, was gorged with soldiers who had taken refuge there. The report of the aide-de-camp confirmed those of the generals. Consequently the Emperor sent General Lebrun to General de Wimpffen, with the advice that he should ask for a suspension of hostilities, which would give time to collect the wounded and to take counsel.

'General Lebrun not returning, the number of victims increasing every moment, the Emperor assumed the responsibility of hoisting the flag of truce. Napo-

leon III. understood the gravity of the responsibility which he was incurring, and foresaw the accusations that would be raised against him. The situation rose before him in all its sadness, and the remembrance of a glorious past appeared in contrast to add to the bitterness of the present. How would men admit that the army of Sebastopol and of Solferino had been compelled to lay down its arms? How would it be made clear that, confined in a narrow space, the more numerous the troops the greater must be the confusion; and, therefore, that the chance of re-establishing discipline, in order to continue the fight, was diminished? The prestige of the French army was about to disappear at a blow; and in the presence of an unexampled calamity the Emperor, albeit a stranger to the resolutions which had led to it, would stand alone responsible in the sight of the world for the disasters the war was about to produce. And, as though in this supreme hour nothing should be wanting to the gravity of the situation, General de Wimpffen sent his resignation to the Emperor. Thus this routed army was about to find itself without a chief and guide, when the greatest energy was indispensable to restore a little order, and to treat, with some chance of success, with the enemy. General de Wimpffen's resignation was not accepted; and the commander-in-chief was made to understand that, having commanded during the battle, his duty obliged him not to desert his post under these critical circumstances.[1]

'While the white flag was being hoisted a Prussian officer demanded to be led to head-quarters. By him

[1] The conduct of General de Wimpffen was exposed by General Ducrot, and the rest of the generals who were at Sedan, at the De Cassagnac trial; while not a single companion in arms appeared in favour of this officer, to whose incapacity and vanity the capitulation was due. Had Ducrot remained in command the army would have effected a safe retreat. (See Appendix XI.)

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it was made known that his sovereign was at the gates of the town. On the other hand, the King of Prussia was ignorant of the fact that Napoleon III. was within the walls of Sedan. Under these circumstances the Emperor decided that the only step that remained for him to take was to address himself directly to the sovereign of North Germany. It had been so often repeated in the papers that the King of Prussia was not making war against France, but only against the Emperor, that Napoleon III. was convinced that on disappearing from the scene and placing himself in the hands of the conqueror he would obtain less disadvantageous conditions for the army, and at the same time facilitate the conclusion of a peace by the Regent. He sent, then, a letter by one of his aides-de-camp to the King of Prussia, by which he placed his sword in his hands.[1]

'The King, surrounded by his staff, received General Reille, and appeared to be astonished when he found that the letter did not announce the capitulation of the town and army; but having been informed that General de Wimpffen was the commander-in-chief, he requested his presence at the Prussian head-quarters that evening.'

The hard terms on which General Moltke first insisted were not modified in the least particular by the passion-

[1] 'Monsieur mon Frère,—N'ayant pas pu mourir au milieu de mes troupes, il ne me reste plus qu'à remettre mon épée entre les mains de vôtre Majesté. Je suis de votre Majesté le bon frère,

'NAPOLÉON.'

The King replied:—

'Monsieur mon Frère,—En regrettant les circonstances dans lesquelles nous nous rencontrons, j'accepte l'épée de votre Majesté, et je la prie de vouloir bien nommer un de vos officiers, muni de vos pleins pouvoirs, pour traiter de la capitulation de l'armée qui s'est si bravement battue sous vos ordres. De mon côté j'ai désigné le général de Moltke à cet effet. Je suis de votre Majesté le bon frère,

'GUILLAUME.'

ate pleading of the French commander; and then Napoleon, who believed in the generosity of King William, went forth, on His Majesty's invitation, to plead for his vanquished soldiers. The Emperor tells his own story:—

'On the morning of September 2 Napoleon III., attended by the Prince de la Moskowa, entered a droski drawn by two horses and drove to the Prussian lines. General Reille preceded him on horseback, in order to warn the Count de Bismarck of his arrival. Reckoning upon returning to the town, he took no leave of the troops, nor of the battalion of grenadiers, nor of the Cent Gardes who were his habitual guard. When the portcullis of the south gate of Sedan was lowered, the zouaves who were on guard there saluted him with the cry of "Vive l'Empereur!" It was the final adieu that was to fall upon his ears. Arrived within a quarter of a league of Donchéry, and not wishing to go to the Prussian head-quarters, the Emperor stopped at a little roadside house, and waited there for the Chancellor of the Confederation of the North. The Chancellor, informed by General Reille, soon arrived.

'The conversation began on the French army, which was the vitally urgent topic. The Count de Bismarck stated that General Moltke alone was empowered to discuss that question. Then the Count asked the Emperor if he was prepared to open peace negotiations. The Emperor replied that his present position prevented him from touching on the subject; that the Regent being in Paris with the Ministers and the Chambers, could, independently of him, negotiate for this object, so desirable for all.

'"But," the Chancellor of the Confederation pursued, "the French, with their character as I understand it,

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will never forgive us our successes. The peace can be only a truce."

'"If the conditions proposed by Prussia," the Emperor replied, "are marked by that generosity which the Emperor Alexander showed in 1815, the peace to be concluded may be durable."

'When M. de Moltke arrived, Napoleon III. requested that nothing might be decided before the interview he was about to have with the King, since he hoped to obtain from His Majesty some concessions in favour of the army. M. de Moltke promised nothing. He only announced that he was about to repair to Vendresse, where the King of Prussia was; and the Count de Bismarck invited the Emperor to go to the Château de Bellevue, which had been chosen as the place of meeting. It became manifest that it would be put off until after the signature of the capitulation.

'During this time General de Wimpffen had summoned a council of war, at which about thirty-two general officers were present; and these unanimously, according to General Wimpffen's official report, declared that it was impossible to continue the struggle, and that the capitulation was a hard but an absolute necessity.[1] The commander-in-chief of the French army soon arrived at Bellevue, and in a room on the ground floor discussed with Generals de Moltke, de Podbielski, and Count de Bismarck the clauses of the capitulation. When it was signed, General de Wimpffen communicated its terms to the Emperor, who was above. A few minutes later the King of Prussia arrived on horseback, accompanied by the Prince Royal and followed by a few officers.

'Three years had elapsed since the sovereigns of

[1] Two generals afterwards protested, pretending that they had opposed the capitulation.

France and Prussia had met, under very different circumstances. William III. had gone to Paris with the Emperor of Russia during the Universal Exhibition; and Napoleon III. had done the honours of the capital, brilliant with the competing industries of the universe, with the marvels which prosperity engenders, and by the presence of many of the sovereigns of Europe. To-day, betrayed by fortune, Napoleon III. had lost all, and had come to place in the conqueror's hands the only thing that was left to him—his liberty.

'The King of Prussia, as he wrote to his Consort, comparing in his mind the present position of the Emperor with that he occupied when he had last seen him, expressed to him his strong sympathy under his misfortunes, which he attributed, he said, to imprudent counsel.[1] He declared nevertheless that it was impossible to afford better conditions to the army. He informed the Emperor that he had chosen the palace of Wilhelmshöhe, near Cassel, as his residence. Then the Prince Royal advanced and shook him affectionately by the hand, and in a quarter of an hour the King retired. The Emperor was permitted to send a telegram in cypher to the Empress. In this despatch he announced the events that had happened, and advised her to negotiate a peace.'

Peace on easy terms compared with those of the following year might then have been obtained by the Empress, with the support of the Emperor of Russia; but the Opposition had won their game, and on September 4, the day of their victory and of General Trochu's shameless defection, France was embarked on a second and much more disastrous campaign than the first had been.

[1] The Prince also bore testimony to the great dignity of the Emperor during the interview.

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According to the Emperor's account, M. de Bismarck drew General Castelnau aside while the sovereigns were together, and begged him not to put faith in the reports of the newspapers that the King had said he was making war only against the Emperor. The King, he said, naturally fought against the army and its chief, while he had a weapon in his hand, but that he had never expressed his intention of upsetting a dynasty which, according to him, was the best for France and for Europe.[1] It was arranged that the Emperor should remain at Bellevue until he could be conducted to Germany through Belgium. He left on September 3, accompanied by one of the King's aides-de-camp and a squadron of hussars, passing through the Prussian lines. He arrived that night at Bouillon, where he was received with marks of sympathy, and on the morrow he slept at Verviers.

On the morning of the 5th, the Emperor relates, he heard of the revolution in Paris.

'Thus the misfortunes of the campaign of 1870 were to be centupled. No regular government to gather together the forces of the country and show the enemy an entire people united for its defence; no regular government with authority to conclude an honourable peace with the help of the neutral Powers. France is about to be given over to a fanatical demagogy, that will uselessly spill torrents of blood and waste the resources of the country, to end in a shameful peace.'

It was under the weight of these sad presentiments

[1] See General Pajol's pamphlet on Sedan; *The Germans in France*, by Sutherland Edwards; General Ducrot's *Journée de Sedan*; General de Wimpffen's pamphlet; the *French Official Enquiry into the Capitulations*; *Des Causes qui ont amené la Capitulation de Sedan*, par un officier attaché à l'Etat Major-Général; *Field Marshal Count Moltke*, by Professor W. Müller, translated by Percy E. Pinkerton, London, 1880; &c.

that the Emperor, separated from his son,[1] and doubtful as to the fate which might be awaiting the Empress, arrived, on the evening of the 5th (September 5), at his splendid prison. He was received at the station by the civil and military governors of the province, and throughout his captivity was treated with scrupulous respect.

[1] The Prince Imperial had been conducted to England *viâ* Belgium, and was safe at Hastings.

CHAPTER IV.

CHISLEHURST.

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NAPOLEON III. remained at Wilhelmshöhe from September 5, 1870, to March 19, 1871. On the eve of his arrival he had learned that a revolution had broken out in Paris; on the day of his departure the news of the triumph of the Commune reached him.

He watched the progress of the war and of the revolution in Paris with the ardour of a patriot, and not with the impatience of a dethroned sovereign anxious to regain his crown. He laid it down as a principle to guide himself, and all who remained true to him, that the Government of National Defence, since it had usurped supreme power, should be left to do its work unmolested by agitations from without. In 'Les Principes, par un ancien Diplomate,' where he cast his observations and reflections into a methodical literary form, as his wont was, he denounced the weakness and baseness of the Governments that hastened to recognise the heroes of September 4 before they had received any sanction whatever from the country. To acknowledge a revolutionary government which a nation has formally accepted was just to his mind; but to hasten to desert a faithful ally, and to sacrifice treaties won with some of its best blood, as England did, was to play a bad part.

'On September 4,' said the Emperor, 'there was in France a government chosen by the free vote of the nation, and not an insurrection. Four times the nation

had solemnly accepted it. All the Powers of Europe had not only recognised this government, but had been pleased to value their intimate relations with it. Hardly three years had elapsed since nearly all the sovereigns of Europe had journeyed to Paris to greet the chief of the nation. It was a splendid festival—an act of solemn homage accorded to the power of the heir of Napoleon I., a consecration of his dynastic rights—and yet, when a petty faction, emboldened by the treason of the principal military chiefs, upset this government, which was much more occupied with the defence of the country than with its own existence, a sad and extraordinary spectacle presented itself.

'All the Powers kept the same ambassadors and ministers in Paris, and offered the protestations of friendship to the revolution which had the day before been tendered to the legitimate government. They thus sanctioned the illegal acts of the party chiefs who had seized the reins by the favour of General Trochu's defection and that of a minority of the Chamber. They witnessed unmoved the disorganisation of the public administration, and assisted at that subversive propaganda which was to produce civil war with its worst barbarities, and the destruction of the monuments of the capital of arts and civilisation. The English Cabinet was seen, forgetting all the memories of an intimate alliance, giving orders to its representative not to follow the Empress Regent if she transferred the seat of government from Paris, and a few weeks later directing its ambassador to follow MM. Gambetta, Crémieux, and Company to Tours.'[1]

[1] This direction is given in a despatch from Lord Granville to Lord Lyons, dated September 5, 1870. 'In case Her Majesty the Empress,' said Lord Granville, 'should decide to withdraw from Paris, in order to maintain the Imperial Government even with a

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The first public act of the Emperor during his captivity was in the form of a letter to General Wimpffen in reply to his report on the battle of Sedan. It was short and sharp:—

'General,—I have read your official report on the battle of Sedan. It contains two assertions which I contradict. If I did not accede to your appeal to cut our way out towards Carignan, it was because it was impracticable, as experience proved to you; and the attempt, as I foresaw, would only sacrifice the life of many soldiers. I consented to hoist the white flag only when, in the opinion of all the commanders of army corps, further resistance had become impossible. I cannot, therefore, have impeded your means of action.

'Believe, General, in my sentiments.

'NAPOLEON.'

Later a Council of Enquiry, with Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers at its head, had been appointed in France to investigate the circumstances under which the series of capitulations of the war had been made. Its report was issued in May, 1872. Its conclusions showed the heat and prejudice of the time, under which men's minds were unhinged. Several commanders were dismissed the service. The fate of Uhrich, Bazaine, and others is only too well known. As regards Sedan the whole blame was laid upon the Emperor. He replied in the following letter, addressed to the generals who were at the capitulation:—

'General,—I am responsible to the country, and I

shadow of power, you will under no circumstances accompany Her Majesty; but you will do all that lies in your power to contribute to her safety and comfort, if you should be called upon to give your advice or help.—GRANVILLE.' His Excellency left the Austrian and Italian ambassadors to perform even these small courtesies.

can accept no judgment save that of the nation regularly consulted. Nor is it for me to pass an opinion on the report of the commission on the capitulation of Sedan. I shall only remind the principal witnesses of that catastrophe of the critical position in which we found ourselves. The army, commanded by the Duke of Magenta, nobly did its duty and fought heroically against an enemy of twice its numbers. When driven back to the walls of the town and into the town itself, 14,000 dead and wounded covered the field of battle, and I saw that to contest the position any longer was an act of desperation. The honour of the army having been saved by the bravery which had been shown, I then exercised my sovereign right and gave orders to hoist a flag of truce. I claim the entire responsibility of that act. The immolation of 60,000 men could not have saved France, and the sublime devotion of her chiefs and soldiers would have been uselessly sacrificed. We obeyed a cruel but inexorable necessity. My heart was broken, but my conscience was tranquil. NAPOLEON.

'Camden Place: May 12, 1872.'

How all the unjust and ungenerous commentaries on the great act of moral courage with which the Emperor closed his reign ate into his heart, albeit no angry complaint escaped him, from the day he left France until he died, was made known by his last words.

The life of Wilhelmshöhe was sad and silent. Its dreary monotony was broken only once, when the devoted Empress travelled thither to throw herself into the arms of her husband and comfort him.

The Emperor rose even before daylight, and the lights in his window might be often seen far into the night. How he wrote and studied, even under the calamity

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which had delivered him a prisoner into the hands of the enemy who had spread a net for him years before, his posthumous writings bear witness. His work on the military forces of France since 1852 was one that alone would have taxed all the power of a man of less mental energy than the Emperor. But he pursued also his artillery and other scientific studies, wrote on the political drama enacting in France, gave fresh forms to his old ideas on the settlement of international disputes by arbitration, and even made experiments for the economy of heat in houses.[1] It was from the palatial prison of Wilhelmshöhe that he addressed his last proclamation to the French people :—

'Frenchmen,' he said, 'betrayed by fortune, I have, since my captivity, observed the profound silence which is the mourning of misfortune. While the armies were face to face I refrained from all words or steps that might divide men's minds. I cannot now hold my peace, in the presence of the disasters of the country, without appearing insensible to its sufferings.

'At the moment when I was compelled to give myself up a prisoner I could not treat for peace. Being no longer free, my resolution would have appeared to be dictated by personal considerations. I left to the Government of the Regent, established in Paris with the Chambers, the duty of deciding whether the interests of the nation demanded the continuation of the struggle.

[1] The Empress, in the course of a conversation on the Loan to Labour Society, of which she had been the active president, remarked to me that it had often occurred to her how heat was lost in Paris houses, and that a plan might be adopted by which the wasted caloric from the lower rooms, where rich people live, might be made to warm the garrets of the poor folk of the uppermost storeys. It was an idea worthy of the august lady who sent her invalid bed (on which the Prince Imperial was born) to Béranger, to give him ease in his last illness.—B.J.

'In spite of unheard of reverses, France was not conquered. Our strong places were intact, few departments were invaded, Paris was in a state of defence, and the extent of our misfortunes could be limited.

'But while all men's eyes were turned towards the enemy, an insurrection broke out in Paris. The seat of the national representatives was violated; the safety of the Empress was menaced; a government installed itself by a surprise at the Hôtel de Ville; and the Empire, which all the nation had just acclaimed for the third time, deserted by those who were bound to defend it, was upset.

'Giving truce to my just resentment, I exclaimed, "What matters the dynasty if the country can be saved?" and, instead of protesting against the violation of the law, my prayers were given to the national defence, and I have admired the patriotic devotion which the sons of all classes and all parties have shown.

'Now that the struggle is suspended, that the capital, in spite of a heroic resistance, has fallen, and that all national hope of victory has vanished, it is time to ask for an account from those who have usurped power, of the blood spilt unnecessarily, of the ruins piled up without reason, and of the resources of the country squandered without authority.

'The destinies of France cannot be given up to an unauthorised Government, which, after disorganising the administration of the State, has not left standing a single authority emanating from universal suffrage. A nation cannot longer obey those who have no right to command. Order, confidence, a solid peace, will be re-established only after the people shall have been consulted by the Government which is best fitted to repair the misfortunes of the country.

'Under the solemn circumstances in which we find

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ourselves, in the face of the invasion and of Europe on the watch, it is important that France should be united in her aspirations, in her desires as in her resolutions. This is the end to which all the efforts of good citizens should tend.

'For myself, grievously wounded by so many injustices and bitter deceptions, I do not stand forward to-day to claim the rights which four times in twenty years you have freely conferred upon me. In the presence of the calamities that encompass us there is no room for personal ambition; but so long as the people, regularly convoked, have not manifested their will, my duty will be to address myself to the nation as its real representative, and to say to her, "All that is done without your direct authority is unlawful."

'There is only one Government, the creation of the national sovereignty, which, standing above the egotisms of party, has the strength to heal your wounds, to reopen your hearts to hope, as the profaned churches will be to our prayers, and to bring back work, and concord, and peace to the bosom of the country. NAPOLEON.

'Wilhelmshöhe: February 8, 1871.'

The Emperor believed that universal suffrage would redress his wrongs, confound his calumniators, and reerect the Empire. He was confident that the millions of the people who had responded to his appeal in the spring of 1870, were still true to him. But when the news of the elections reached him at Chislehurst he was overwhelmed with grief. He uttered not a single complaint. It is not on record that he gave way even momentarily to anger; but he was struck to the heart, for he truly loved the people from whom the blow proceeded. For some days he remained in deep melancholy; and then his patient spirit reasserted itself, and he

turned to his little study by his bedroom, where he worked, with the portraits of the Empress and Prince Imperial on the desk before him, at his dreams for the good of the many who had just spurned him.

The Emperor, grown grey and old, landed at Dover on March 20, 1871, and was enthusiastically received by an immense crowd, shouting, 'Vive l'Empereur! Vive l'Impératrice!' The Empress and the Prince Imperial were there to receive him, and they threw themselves into his arms as he landed, while many of his old friends and members of his Court pressed around him. He was cheered by the warmth of his English welcome. On April 3 the Queen paid him a friendly visit. On August 15, his birthday, Chislehurst was alive with visitors from France, and gay with floral offerings and tokens of the remembrance and loyalty of officers of the Imperial Guard from Paris. In September he went with the Prince to Torquay, while the Empress paid her mother a visit in Spain; and in his journey thither, and on his return in the following month, he was received at the stations with demonstrations of sympathy. These were renewed wherever he appeared in public, as at a review of the Woolwich garrison, or when he watched the thanksgiving progress of the Prince of Wales to St. Paul's. This warm welcome to the old land of exile soothed, but could not cure, the melancholy of the life at Chislehurst. The Emperor's comfort lay in the devotion of the Empress, and in the noble qualities he marked in his son; his strength, in the capacity to employ every hour of his day.

His disease had been aggravated by the physical exhaustion of the campaign, and especially by the hours he had spent in the saddle at Sedan, so that he moved little beyond the bounds of the park about Camden Place. He went in the summer of 1872 to the Isle of

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Wight, but the good gained was only temporary. He would walk by the hour up and down the long corridor of Camden Place with his arm on the young Prince's shoulder, while he talked with him of men and things, inculcating those kindly sentiments and generous ideas which time has already compelled his enemies to concede to him. After the midday breakfast, at which the little Court met for the first time in the day, he would sit in the morning room in his arm-chair (the arms supported by eagles) by the wood fire, and talk cheerfully with the Empress or with any visitors who had come. It was a small circle in which the Imperial couple moved, but it was one of steadfast friends. The Duke de Bassano and his son, the Clarys, Drs. de Corvisart and Conneau, Augustin Filon, the tutor and beloved friend of the Prince Imperial, and Piétri, were of the household; and many staunch adherents, the chief among them being M. Rouher, were constantly on the road between Paris and Chislehurst. The Emperor talked willingly and freely of the remote past, but was a listener when contemporary politics were brought before him. If he interfered it was to advise moderation or to protest against reprisals. When M. Guizot behaved unhandsomely in regard to the Emperor, in some letters published in the 'Times' after Sedan, the Empress, in her just indignation, telegraphed to the Emperor at Wilhelmshöhe, saying she had the correspondence between the Guizots and the Emperor, which showed them to be his 'obligés,' and proposed to publish it. The Emperor telegraphed back: 'I forbid you to mention a word of it. M. Guizot is an illustrious Frenchman. I have helped him. I do not confer favours in order that they may become arms against my enemies. Not a word.'[1]

[1] This generosity did not prevent M. Guizot from distressing the Empress after the Emperor's death with threats of a lawsuit to compel her

CHAP. IV.

Sometimes the afternoon would be occupied going over family papers, the Emperor sitting quietly by while his consort or one of the gentlemen in attendance read them, and now and then interrupting with some anecdote the readings recalled or some reflection they suggested. One afternoon the letters of Queen Hortense were examined, M. Filon assisting and the Emperor reading passages here and there. Of the Queen's description of his uncle's manners and sharp words the Emperor remarked that nobody had succeeded in describing Napoleon I. like his mother. He went on to say that the best portraits of Napoleon were by women. Thiers had failed to present an image of the living man. Sometimes the conversation fell on a passing event in Paris that had particularly moved the Emperor. The re-naming the Rue du 10 Décembre the Rue du 4 Septembre struck him as monstrous, inasmuch as

to receive back the money His Majesty had given to the younger Guizot. He also let it be known that he would have to sell a valuable picture to be rid of the obligation. In any case he considered himself free to lead a bitter opposition to the reading of M. Olivier's reception speech at the Academy, because it comprehended a manly vindication of the Emperor's character. In M. Olivier's address the following passage occurred: 'S'il l'avait approché davantage, s'il avait éprouvé son grand cœur, son esprit formé de charme et de justesse, la douceur de sa Majesté paisible; s'il était devenu le confident de ses pensées uniquement tournées au bien public et au soulagement de ceux qui souffrent; s'il avait été témoin de la lovauté avec laquelle il a fondé et mis en pratique les institutions les plus libres que notre pays ait encore connues; s'il l'avait contemplé modeste pendant la prospérité, auguste pendant l'infortune—il aurait fait mieux que lui rendre justice: il l'eût aimé.'—*M. Emile Olivier's Speech, prepared for his reception as a member of the Académie Française*, March, 1874.

When the Empress went to the Institute to hear Father Lacordaire's reception speech, she was received officially by M. Guizot, and she was charmed by his grave courtesy. On the other hand she was angry with her favourite preacher, Lacordaire, for his attack on the Empire. As she retired she said to Count Bacciocchi, who was in attendance: 'Aujourd'hui j'ai perdu un préjugé et une illusion.' The prejudice M. Guizot certainly did his utmost to revive.

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December 10 was the date when the nation had elected their President, whereas September 4 was the date of an unlawful usurpation. On this he made a note, to the effect that he had left the historical monuments untouched, with the emblems and names of the Bourbons upon them.[1] Even the Pont Louis-Philippe, which he had rebuilt, he left with the name of the Citizen King upon it.

The most notable, however, of the afternoon conversations at Chislehurst was that in which the Emperor renewed his discussion with the late Mr. Thornton Hunt on the idea of an International Arbitration Congress, that had formed the subject of an interview at the Tuileries in March, 1865. Mr. Hunt has described how, on being introduced to the Emperor at the Tuileries, he was struck with his quiet dignity and the affability of his address in conversation. 'Seated near Napoleon III., and exactly opposite him,' Mr. Hunt remarked, 'I listened attentively to his observations, and willingly answered his questions. Many subjects were touched upon, but throughout I remarked the Emperor's fixed resolve to remain in perfect harmony with England. We soon turned, however, to our most important subject—the question of periodical congresses of the Powers, a system which the Emperor had been the first to propose in his letter to the Queen of England, dated November 4, 1863. In this letter he emitted the idea of an Inter-

[1] 'Camden Place, Chislehurst.

'L'Empereur a laissé aux monuments historiques, comme à Versailles par exemple, les armes et les emblèmes de la maison de Bourbon. Les places publiques ont conservé les statues de Louis XIV et Henri IV. Les rues rappelant les règnes précédents n'ont pas été changées.

'Bien plus, il existait un pont suspendu en fer dans la cité à Paris qui se nommait Pont Louis-Philippe. L'Empereur l'a remplacé par un superbe pont en pierre. Il était juste de lui donner un nouveau nom. Eh bien, l'Empereur a voulu que ce nouveau pont conservât le nom de Pont Louis-Philippe.'—Manuscript note of the Emperor, *Œuvres Posthumes.*

national Council, the duty of which would be to watch over the affairs of Europe, to follow and study the various phases which the relations of State to State might assume, and to interpret and explain treaties.' CHAP. IV.

The plan, it was remarked by the English Government, had been suggested by Lord Clarendon at the Congress of Paris, in the event of any difference occurring between the Ottoman Porte and one of the signatory Powers. The Emperor enlarged it and made it of general application, recommending the meeting of his International Council at fixed dates—say, every ten years—and the gradual formation of a code of international law. He even dreamed of an eventual international parliament, charged with the formation of general laws for the government of the relations of States.

When Mr. Hunt returned to London he found that the idea was coldly received in official circles. Lord Palmerston tossed it aside as impracticable, or as full of risks and dangers. But afterwards Mr. Hunt persuaded several English statesmen to give serious attention to the Emperor's 'great idea.' So encouraging, indeed, were they that he obtained an interview with the Emperor at Chislehurst, to beg him to write a work on the subject.

'I was struck,' Mr. Hunt said, 'with the change in him. He was grave and more reserved, but he listened to me with attention, appearing to weigh each word that I uttered, and following the details as I unfolded them. I concluded from our interview that the Emperor would write the book if he found it possible, which he appeared to doubt.' He attributed the Emperor's hesitation to his disinclination to touch on many questions which such a work must involve, but in not many weeks afterwards he knew that it was the shadow

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of death which had prevented His Majesty from seeing his way.

'In any case,' Mr. Hunt concludes, 'as I have often remarked,[1] the day will come when the world will rejoice in the inauguration of this institution, which is wanting to our civilisation—"the International Council"—and then, if gratitude still exists in men, humanity will remember that the exile of Chislehurst, Napoleon III., was the founder of this court of legislation and of legal appeal of the nations.'

At the close of 1872 the Emperor's medical advisers agreed that an operation had become necessary, and it was fixed for January 2. Two operations were successfully carried out, but the state of the patient gave rise to serious doubts as to the ultimate results.

On the evening of January 8 the Emperor's case appeared more hopeful than on any previous day since the operations began. He slept peacefully through the night, watched by turns by MM. Conneau, Filon, Clary, and the doctors. He was able to rise from his bed in the morning, and felt relieved. Another, and it was hoped a final, operation was to take place at noon. The Empress had visited him as usual. At half-past ten Sir Henry Thompson approached him. A sudden change became apparent. The strong regular pulse fell rapidly; the action of the heart failed. The doctors were alarmed, and in a few moments the Empress was at her husband's bedside, but he did not recognise her. Some stimulants were administered, and the patient rallied for a moment. And then the Abbé Goddard administered the last sacraments of the Church, amid the weeping of the kneeling gentlemen and ladies of the household, who had gathered about the death-bed. When the Empress leant over

[1] *Œuvres Posthumes*, letter from Thornton Hunt to the Count de la Chapelle, p. 138.

him and embraced him the Emperor's eyes fell upon his wife; he could not speak audibly, but he raised his lips to kiss the devoted and heroic companion he had taken to his heart at the height of his glory, and who had comforted his exile; and then he passed into his long sleep. He had breathed his last when his son arrived from Woolwich. It was a quarter past eleven on the 9th day of January, 1873.[1]

The Emperor's last words, faintly addressed to Dr. Conneau, were: 'Etiez-vous à Sedan?'

The poor young Prince arrived from Woolwich only half an hour after his father had passed away. The Empress met him at the door of the death chamber, and taking him in her arms, cried: 'I have only you, Louis, left.'

On the 10th a post-mortem examination was made, and on the following day the body of the Emperor was embalmed, and on the 13th it was enclosed in three coffins and removed to the hall of Camden Place, transformed into a *chapelle ardente* (see Appendix XII.) The Empress and the Prince Imperial were visited by the Prince of Wales and other members of the Royal Family, and received the most affectionate condolences from the Queen. It was estimated that nearly 30,000 persons passed before the coffin at the lying in state.

On the 15th the funeral in St. Mary's Church, Chislehurst, took place.[2]

The obsequies were simple, imposing by the extraordinary throng of princes, dignitaries of the Empire,

[1] The emotion with which the Emperor's death was received in Italy was universal. Italian cities sent messages of condolence to the Empress; the Royal Family went into mourning; at Spoleto, where the Emperor had first fought in the Italian cause, they voted a monument to him. In Paris crowds attended the funeral mass said in many of the churches.

[2] For the Emperor's will and that of the Prince Imperial, see Appendix XIII.

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of humble representative bodies of Frenchmen, of representatives of the Queen, and of foreign countries, of marshals, prefects, and working men, who walked bareheaded behind the coffin to the Roman Catholic village church of Chislehurst—the gallant young Prince, who was destined six years later to be carried along the same line of funeral march, leading the mourners.

The body of the Emperor was afterwards deposited in a sarcophagus, the gift of Queen Victoria; and it lies at Chislehurst, surmounted by the banner which floated at Windsor over His Majesty's stall as Knight of the Garter. Opposite the tomb of the father lie, still unburied, the remains of the son whom he loved so well, and who was so entirely worthy of his love.

For her beloved husband and son the grief-stricken widow and mother is raising a mausoleum that shall be worthy of their fame, and which will also commemorate her heroism under the heaviest blows that have fallen upon one human heart in modern times.

THE END



JANUARY 1873.

(Engraved from a Photograph by permission of Messrs. W. & D. Downey.)

APPENDICES.

I.

Mr. Kinglake's Fourteenth Chapter.

MR. KINGLAKE has printed his chapter on Napoleon III. and the *coup d'état*, in the sixth edition of his 'Invasion of the Crimea,' with the following prefatory note:—'Not a word of this chapter has been changed since the day of its original publication in January, 1863, when the French Emperor was at the height of his power.'

When we have considered the number of misstatements, inventions, calumnies, and false conclusions which Mr. Kinglake's famous Fourteenth Chapter comprehends, we must remain astonished at the audacity of this defiant statement.

'C'est ignoble!' cried the Emperor, when he had read Mr. Kinglake's laboured lampoon. It was ignoble to collect the mendacious statements of a man's avowed enemies, to affect to derive the most damning facts against him from anonymous friends, to suppress every anecdote or event in his favour, and at the same time to use, as fact, every malevolent rumour or item of the scandalous gossip of the scattered Burgraves. Mr. Kinglake was sharply taken to task in 1863 for his studied libel on the character of a Sovereign who had remained loyal in his alliance with England, whose English friends were men not in the habit of tolerating such a mean and dismal creature as he had painted, and of whom he proved himself, in every graphic page of his commentary, to be ignorant. Since 1863 proofs of Mr. Kinglake's blunders have accumulated on his head; and yet he has not the candour to note them, much less the fairness to obliterate them. It is with evident reluctance that he even qualifies them, as in the following instance:—

In his original text Mr. Kinglake remarks: 'Partly upon grounds of this sort, but more perhaps by the teaching of universal fame, Paris came to believe—and, rightly or wrongly, Paris still believes—that during the night of the 4th, and

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again during the night of the 5th, prisoners were shot in batches and thrown into pits.' In a note to his fifth edition there is the following reluctant qualification of the above:—

'I now have the name of a man—a man widely known and forming part of Louis Napoleon's military *entourage*—who entered the Union Club of Paris in a state of joyous excitement, saying, with exultation, that he had just been "assisting" at the shooting of 165 insurgents in the Champ de Mars. *It is right to say* that some time afterwards, when the fashion of this boasting had a little declined, the man said he might have "*un peu exagéré.*"'

It is a pity that Mr. Kinglake has not followed even the mild example of the 'man widely known,' and confessed to a little exaggeration at any rate. Why does the advocate of Lord Raglan as the hero of the Crimean War withhold the name of his authority; why, indeed, does he keep back the names of all, or nearly all, his informants, and particularly that of the informant who is generally credited with having supplied him with the bulk of his brief against Prince Louis Napoleon—a brief which he has thrust into that which he holds from Lady Raglan, in defiance of overwhelming testimony against the nefarious part in the Crimean War, or in the provocation of the war, which he has thrust upon Napoleon III.?

A writer in 'Fraser's Magazine,'[1] in the autumn of the year when the first instalment of the 'Invasion of the Crimea' appeared, put the case between Mr. Kinglake, his critics, and the public, with method and fairness. 'We presume,' said the writer, 'Mr. Kinglake's ambition was to write a philosophical history, a defence of Lord Raglan, and a true military chronicle. His philosophical history is too biographical, his biography too imaginative, and his military history too diffuse.' The writer then dissects some of the more important parts of Mr. Kinglake's Fourteenth Chapter. He says, with justice: 'The chapter taken by itself, written by the Duke d'Aumale or Victor Hugo, would have astonished no one by its extravagance, and interested most people by its power. But in a history of the Crimean War and defence of Lord Raglan, who was not a states-

[1] July, 1863.

man, written by an English gentleman, not an exile, it is totally deficient in all that we should expect from a Christian, a philosopher, or a man of earnest and truthful research. It is, moreover, wholly impertinent to the story. It occupies one hundred and eleven pages, and goes into all those details which malice, rage, or disappointment, male or female, political, military, or financial, could invent. We cannot help thinking that a ruined speculator, a literary Orleanist, a broken soldier in Brussels, and a faded beauty, must have sat in committee to accumulate facts for this wonderful chapter.'

If this committee had collected facts only, and had carefully authenticated each before putting it in its place in the chapter, we could have quarrelled with the indictment only as out of place, and as an unwarrantable break in the story of the Crimean War; but when we find them gloating over dirty shreds and patches picked up anywhere, and presenting in the bulk a *ramassis* as incongruous and unsavoury as the contents of a *chiffonnier's hotte*, and presently bedizening the figure of an honourable and illustrious man with the *loques*, we cry shame! and it becomes a duty to warn the public against a deliberate falsification of history.

'The excuse for the performance,' the 'Fraser' writer remarks, 'is that the moment after the *coup d'état* the policy of the French Government changed, in consequence of that necessity under which an usurper lies to do something before the world; and that, in order to show who and what that usurper was, it behoved our author to write upon the *coup d'état*. We deny that there was any necessity to do this; but if we are wrong, we think that Mr. Kinglake should have begun from 1848, which really was the source from which all these evolutions sprung. Again, was Louis Napoleon the only man who had made a *coup d'état* or crushed Constitutional Government? or was it, in fact, that in 1851 every monarch in Europe, either by himself or by the aid of his neighbours, had trodden out the hopes, the follies, and the crimes of 1848? Were Mr. Kinglake's friends in Austria guilty of no crimes in Hungary and Italy which should call for a sensation chapter? And were panic and alarm, prompting to cruelty, experienced in Paris alone?'

APP. II.

These are very inconvenient questions, when addressed to the zealous friend of Austria. Our concern, however, is with the particular counter-revolution it has pleased Mr. Kinglake to thrust into his 'Invasion of the Crimea.'

II.

'SIRE,—Le différend qui s'est élevé entre Votre Majesté et la Porte Ottomane en est venu à un tel point de gravité, que je crois devoir expliquer moi-même directement à Votre Majesté la part que la France a prise dans cette question et les moyens que j'entrevois d'écarter les dangers que menacent le repos de l'Europe.

'La note que Votre Majesté vient de faire remettre à mon Gouvernement et à celui de la Reine Victoria tend à établir que le système de pression adopté dès le début par les deux Puissances maritimes a seul envenimé la question. Elle aurait, au contraire, ce me semble, continué à demeurer une question de cabinet, si l'occupation des Principautés ne l'avait transportée tout à coup du domaine de la discussion dans celui des faits. Cependant les troupes de Votre Majesté une fois entrées en Valachie, nous n'en avons pas moins engagé la Porte à ne pas considérer cette occupation comme un cas de guerre, témoignant ainsi notre extrême désir de conciliation. Après m'être concerté avec l'Angleterre, l'Autriche, et la Prusse, j'ai proposé à Votre Majesté une note destinée à donner une satisfaction commune. Votre Majesté l'a acceptée. Mais à peine étions-nous avertis de cette bonne nouvelle, que son ministre, par des commentaires explicatifs, en détruisait tout l'effet conciliant et nous empêchait par là d'insister à Constantinople sur son adoption pure et simple. De son côté la Porte avait proposé à projet de note des modifications que les quatre Puissances représentées à Vienne ne trouvèrent pas inacceptables. Elles n'ont pas eu l'agrément de Votre Majesté. Alors la Porte, blessée dans sa dignité, menacée dans son indépendance, obérée par les efforts déjà faits pour opposer une

armée à celle de Votre Majesté, a mieux aimé déclarer la guerre que de rester dans cet état d'incertitude et d'abaissement. Elle avait réclamé notre appui; sa cause nous paraissait juste; les escadres anglaise et française reçurent l'ordre de mouiller dans le Bosphore. APP. II.

'Notre attitude vis-à-vis de la Turquie était protectrice, mais passive. Nous ne l'encouragions pas à la guerre. Nous faisions sans cesse parvenir aux oreilles du Sultan des conseils de paix et de modération, persuadés que c'était le moyen d'arriver à un accord; et les quatre Puissances s'entendirent de nouveau pour soumettre à Votre Majesté d'autres propositions. Votre Majesté, de son côté, montrant le calme qui nait de la conscience de sa force, s'était bornée à repousser, sur la rive gauche du Danube comme en Asie, les attaques des Turcs; et avec la modération digne du chef d'un grand empire, Elle avait déclaré qu'Elle se tiendrait sur la défensive.

'Jusque-là nous étions donc, je dois le dire, spectateurs intéressés, mais simples spectateurs de la lutte, lorsque l'affaire de Sinope vint nous forcer à prendre une position plus tranchée. La France et l'Angleterre n'avaient pas cru utile d'envoyer des troupes de débarquement au secours de la Turquie. Leur drapeau n'était donc pas engagé dans les conflits qui avaient lieu sur la terre. Mais sur mer, c'était bien différent.

'Il y avait à l'entrée du Bosphore trois mille bouches à feu dont la présence disait assez haut à la Turquie que les deux premières Puissances maritimes ne permettraient pas de l'attaquer sur mer. L'événement de Sinope fut pour nous aussi blessant qu'inattendu, car peu importe que les Turcs aient voulu ou non faire passer des munitions de guerre sur le territoire russe. En fait, des vaisseaux russes sont venus attaquer des bâtiments turcs dans les eaux de la Turquie et mouillés tranquillement dans un port turc; ils les ont détruits, malgré l'assurance de ne pas faire une guerre agressive, malgré le voisinage de nos escadres. Ce n'était plus notre politique qui recevait là un échec, c'était notre honneur militaire. Les coups de canon de Sinope ont retenti douloureusement dans le cœur de tous ceux qui en Angleterre et en France ont un vif sentiment de la dignité nationale. On s'est écrié d'un commun accord: Partout où nos canons peuvent atteindre, nos alliés

APP. II.

doivent être respectés. De là l'ordre donnée à nos escadres d'entrer dans la mer Noire et d'empêcher par la force, s'il le fallait, le retour d'un semblable événement. De là la notification collective envoyée au cabinet de Saint-Pétersbourg pour lui annoncer que, si nous empêchions les Turcs de porter une guerre agressive sur les côtes appartenant à la Russie, nous protégerions le ravitaillement de leurs troupes sur leur propre territoire. Quant à la flotte russe, en lui interdisant la navigation de la mer Noire, nous la placions dans des conditions différentes, parce qu'il importait, pendant la durée de la guerre, de conserver un gage qui pût être l'équivalent des parties occupées du territoire turc et faciliter la conclusion de la paix en devenant le titre d'un échange désirable.

'Voilà, Sire, la suite réelle et l'enchaînement des faits. Il est clair qu'arrivés à ce point, ils doivent amener promptement ou une entente définitive ou une rupture décidée.

'Votre Majesté a donné tant de preuves de sa sollicitude pour le repos de l'Europe, Elle y a contribué si puissamment par son influence bienfaisante contre l'esprit de désordre, que je ne saurais douter de sa résolution dans l'alternative qui se présente à son choix. Si Votre Majesté désire autant que moi une conclusion pacifique, quoi de plus simple que de déclarer qu'un armistice sera signé aujourd'hui, que les choses reprendront leur cours diplomatique, que toute hostilité cessera et que toutes les forces belligérantes se retireront des lieux où des motifs de guerre les ont appelées?

'Ainsi les troupes russes abandonneraient les Principautés, et nos escadres la mer Noire. Votre Majesté préférant traiter directement avec la Turquie, Elle nommerait un ambassadeur qui négocierait avec un plénipotentiaire du Sultan un convention qui serait soumise à la conférence des quatre Puissances. Que Votre Majesté adopte ce plan, sur lequel la Reine d'Angleterre et moi sommes parfaitement d'accord; la tranquillité est rétablie et le monde satisfait. Rien, en effet, dans ce plan qui ne soit digne de Votre Majesté, rien qui puisse blesser son honneur. Mais si, par un motif difficile à comprendre, Votre Majesté opposait un refus, alors la France, comme l'Angleterre, serait obligée de laisser au sort des armes et aux hasards de la guerre ce qui pourrait être décidé aujourd'hui par la raison et la justice.

APP. III.

'Que Votre Majesté ne pense pas que la moindre animosité puisse entrer dans mon cœur; il n'éprouve d'autres sentiments que ceux exprimés par Votre Majesté Elle-même dans sa lettre du 17 Janvier 1853, lorsqu'Elle m'écrivait: Nos relations doivent être sincèrement amicales, reposer sur les mêmes intentions: maintien de l'ordre, amour de la paix, respect aux traités et bienveillance réciproque. Ce programme est digne du souverain qui le traçait, et je n'hésite pas à l'affirmer, j'y suis resté fidèle.

'Je prie Votre Majesté de croire à la sincérité de mes sentiments, et c'est dans ces sentiments que je suis, Sire,

'De Votre Majesté le bon ami,

'NAPOLÉON.'

III.

'MESSIEURS LES SÉNATEURS, MESSIEURS LES DÉPUTÉS,—Depuis votre dernière session, deux questions, vous le savez, ont préoccupé le pays: l'insuffisance de la dernière récolte et les difficultés extérieures; mais ces deux questions, je me hâte de le dire, inspirent déjà bien moins de craintes, parce que, malgré leur gravité, on peut en mesurer et limiter l'étendue.

'L'insuffisance de la récolte a été estimée à environ dix millions d'hectolitres de froment, représentant une valeur de près de 300 millions de francs et le chargement de quatre mille navires. Le gouvernement pouvait-il entreprendre l'achat de ces dix millions d'hectolitres sur tous les points du globe, pour venir ensuite les vendre sur tous les marchés de France? L'expérience et la sagesse disaient assez haut que cette mesure eût été environnée d'embarras presque insurmontables, d'inconvénients et de dangers sans nombre. Le commerce seul possédait les moyens financiers et matériels d'une aussi grande opération. Le gouvernement a donc fait la seul chose praticable: il a encouragé la liberté des transactions en délivrant le commerce des grains de toute entrave. Le prix élevé d'une denrée si nécessaire à l'alimentation générale est une calamité sans doute, mais il n'était ni possible, ni désirable même de s'y

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soustraire, tant que le déficit n'était pas comblé; car, si le prix du blé eût été inférieur en France à celui des pays circonvoisins, les marchés étrangers eussent été approvisionnés aux dépens des nôtres. Cet état de choses devait produire néanmoins un malaise qu'on ne pouvait combattre que par l'activité du travail ou par la charité publique. Le gouvernement s'est donc efforcé d'ouvrir, dès le commencement de l'année, des crédits qui, dépassant de quelques millions seulement les ressources du budget, amèneront, avec les concours des communes et des compagnies, une masse de travaux évalués à près de 400 millions, sans compter 2 millions affectés par le Ministre de l'Intérieur aux établissments de bienfaisance. En même temps, les conseils généraux et municipaux, la charité privée faisaient les plus louables sacrifices pour soulager les souffrances des classes pauvres.

'Je recommande surtout à votre attention le système adopté par la ville de Paris, car, s'il se répand, comme je l'espère, par toute la France, il préviendra désormais, pour la valeur des céréales, ces variations extrêmes qui, dans l'abondance, font languir l'agriculture par le vil prix du blé, et, dans la disette, font souffrir les classes nécessiteuses par sa cherté excessive.

'Ce système consiste à créer dans tous les grands centres de population une institution de crédit appelée Caisse de boulangerie, qui puisse donner, durant les mois d'une mauvaise année, le pain à un taux beaucoup moins élevé que la Mercuriale, sauf à le faire payer un peu plus cher dans les années de fertilité. Celles-ci étant en général plus nombreuses, on conçoit que la compensation s'opère facilement. On obtient aussi cet immense avantage de fonder des sociétés de crédit, qui, au lieu de gagner d'autant plus que le pain est plus cher, sont intéressées, comme tout le monde, à ce qu'il devienne à bon marché, car, contrairement à ce qui a existé jusqu'à ce moment, elles font des bénéfices aux jours de fertilité et des pertes aux jours de disette.

'Je suis heureux de vous annoncer maintenant que sept millions d'hectolitres de froment étranger sont déjà livrés à la consommation, indépendamment des quantités en route et en entrepôt; qu'ainsi les moments les plus difficiles de la crise sont passés.

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'Il est un fait remarquable qui m'a profondément touché. Pendant cet hiver rigoureux, pas une accusation n'a été dirigée contre le gouvernement, et le peuple a subi avec résignation une souffrance qu'il était assez juste pour imputer aux circonstances seules: preuve nouvelle de sa confiance en moi, et de sa conviction que son bien-être est avant tout l'objet de mes préoccupations constantes. Mais la disette à peine finie, la guerre commence.

'L'année dernière, dans mon discours d'ouverture, je promettais de faire tous mes efforts pour maintenir la paix et rassurer l'Europe. J'ai tenu parole. Au fin d'éviter une lutte, j'ai été aussi loin que me le permettait l'honneur. L'Europe sait maintenant, à n'en plus douter, que si la France tire l'épée, c'est qu'elle y aura été contrainte. Elle sait que la France n'a aucune idée d'agrandissement: elle veut uniquement résister à des empiètements dangereux; aussi, j'aime à le proclamer hautement, le temps des conquêtes est passé sans retour, car ce n'est pas en reculant les limites de son territoire qu'une nation peut désormais être honorée et puissante; c'est en se mettant à la tête des idées généreuses, en faisant prévaloir partout l'empire du droit et de la justice. Aussi voyez les résultats d'une politique sans égoïsme et sans arrière-pensée. Voici l'Angleterre, cette ancienne rivale, qui resserre avec nous les liens d'une alliance de jour en jour plus intime, parce que les idées que nous défendons sont en même temps celles du peuple anglais.

'L'Allemagne, que le souvenir des anciennes guerres rendait encore défiante, et qui par cette raison donnait depuis quarante ans peut-être trop de preuves de déférence à la politique du cabinet de Saint-Pétersbourg, a déjà recouvré l'indépendance de ses allures et regarde librement de quel côté se trouvent ses intérêts. L'Autriche surtout, qui ne peut pas voir avec indifférence les événements qui se préparent, entrera dans notre alliance, et viendra ainsi confirmer le caractère de moralité et de justice de la guerre que nous entreprenons.

'Voici, en effet, la question telle qu'elle s'engage. L'Europe préoccupée de luttes intestines depuis quarante ans, rassurée d'ailleurs par la modération de l'Empereur Alexandre en 1815, comme par celle de son successeur jusqu'à ce jour, semblait

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méconnaître le danger dont pouvait la menacer la Puissance colossale qui, par ses envahissements successifs, embrasse le Nord et le Midi, qui possède presque exclusivement deux mers intérieurs, d'où il est facile à ses armées et à ses flottes de s'élancer sur notre civilisation. Il a suffi d'une prétention mal fondée à Constantinople pour réveiller l'Europe endormie.

'Nous avons vu, en effet, en Orient, au milieu d'une paix profonde, un souverain exiger tout à coup, de son voisin plus faible, des avantages nouveaux, et, parce qu'il ne les obtenait pas, envahir deux de ses provinces. Seul, ce fait devait mettre les armes aux mains de ceux que l'iniquité révolte; mais nous avions aussi d'autres raisons d'appuyer la Turquie. La France a autant et peut-être plus d'intérêts que l'Angleterre à ce que l'influence de la Russie ne s'étende pas indéfiniment sur Constantinople, car régner sur Constantinople, c'est régner sur la Méditerranée, et personne de vous, Messieurs, je le pense, ne dira que l'Angleterre seule a de grands intérêts dans cette mer, qui baigne trois cents lieues de nos côtes. D'ailleurs, cette politique ne date pas d'hier; depuis des siècles, tout gouvernement national en France l'a soutenue ; je ne la déserterai pas.

'Qu'on ne vienne donc plus nous dire, Qu'allez-vous faire à Constantinople? Nous y allons avec l'Angleterre pour défendre la cause du Sultan, et néanmoins pour protéger les droits des chrétiens; nous y allons pour défendre la liberté des mers et notre juste influence dans la Méditerranée. Nous y allons avec l'Allemagne pour l'aider à conserver le rang dont on semble vouloir la faire descendre, pour assurer ses frontières contre la prépondérance d'un voisin trop puissant. Nous y allons enfin avec tous ceux qui veulent le triomphe du bon droit, de la justice et de la civilisation.

'Dans cette circonstance, Messieurs, comme dans toutes celles où je serai obligé de faire appel au pays, je suis sûr de votre appui, car j'ai toujours trouvé en vous les sentiments généreux qui animent la nation. Aussi, fort de cet appui de la noblesse de la cause, de la sincérité de nos alliances, et confiant surtout dans la protection de Dieu, j'espère arriver bientôt à une paix qu'il ne dépendra plus de personne de troubler impunément.'

IV.

Letter from Napoleon to Queen Victoria.[1]

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'MADAM AND VERY DEAR SISTER,—Your Majesty was right in thinking that the Empress and myself would feel a deep interest in the happy event which has recently filled your mother's heart with joy. It was only later that we learned the danger run by the Princess Frederick William, and with Your Majesty we rejoice that you are now fully reassured as to the health of the Princess and her son.

'It is always with gratitude that I receive the counsels which Your Majesty is pleased to give me, for I appreciate the noble and friendly sentiments from which they spring, but I would at the same time ask permission to tell you frankly what the state of matters is. The story of what has been going on for the last six or eight months is not a little curious.

'In the course of last summer I received from Italy, and particularly from Sardinia, confidential communications, which told me that the disquietude of Italy was such as could not fail ere long to lead to insurrections. These were only prevented from breaking out by the counsels of Piedmont; nevertheless the Sardinian Government intimated to me that it would be difficult long to maintain this state of things, without holding out to the just complaints which reached it a hope of early redress; that the position was one of so much tension, that Piedmont would not draw back, even if it saw the way to do so, from a war with Austria. I replied that I had always felt warmly for Italy, but that my first duty was to my country and to its interests; that the traditional policy of France had always been opposed to the exclusive influence of Austria in Italy; that, nevertheless, my Government could not encourage an aggressive line of conduct on the part of Piedmont, nor support her in a struggle in which right would not be upon her side; but that, on the other hand, she might rely upon being

[1] Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iv. p. 368.

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vigorously backed, either if attacked by Austria, or if she became involved with this Power in a just and lawful war.

'These *pourparlers* came to nothing (*n'eurent pas d'autres suites*); but, towards November last, either because the unpopular measures taken by Austria in Italy had roused men's minds, or because indiscreet language had been held at Turin, or, finally, because a certain party had found its interest in disquieting public opinion, certain it is that all at once rumours of war were spread on every side, founded both upon the condition of peoples' minds in Italy and upon the state of our relations with Austria. In the hope of calming these apprehensions, I caused it to be announced in the 'Moniteur' that there was nothing in our relations with foreign Powers to justify such fears. Notwithstanding this, as if under the influence of a real panic, everything continued to be construed in a warlike sense. The conciliatory words to M. Hübner, the despatch to Marseilles of six batteries (without men or horses) destined for Algeria, the construction, as an experiment, of ten gunboats, carrying each one gun, the armament of two troop-ships for the Algerine service, the purchase of some thousands of artillery horses to bring their number up to the peace footing, finally, the progress made with the reconstruction of our artillery equipment begun two years before—these were what were taken as so many warlike symptoms; and, *although there was in fact nothing more*, the persuasion to the contrary is so general, that it would be difficult for me to persuade the public in France and abroad that I am not even now making immense preparations for war. And yet at this very time simple prudence seems to me to enjoin that I should do much more; for, on the one side, I cannot blind myself to the ill-will that surrounds me, and, on the other, for the last month I have been urgently appealed to by the King of Sardinia to mass 20,000 men upon the Alps, ready to come to his assistance, in case of his being attacked by the Austrians.

'I am, therefore, in no way responsible either for the apprehensions or for the agitation now on foot, and I can regard them with indifference. But what wounds me deeply as a man and as a sovereign is to see that a mere rumour of war, vague and undefined, is sufficient to raise doubts of my moderation,

and to draw upon me the charge of ambition; and, consequently, that with complications beyond the Alps staring us in the face, people seem to deny to France, by anticipation, the influence to which she is entitled by her rank among nations, as well as by her history. In presence of an imaginary intervention in the affairs of a country which touches our frontiers, all Germany seems of a mind to enter into a league against France, and to dispute even her most legitimate action. Did Germany intervene in our embroilment with Russia? Or did Europe intervene when Germany upheld the cause of Holstein against Denmark?

'I admit to Your Majesty that this attitude of Germany sets me thinking deeply, and that I see in it great danger to the future, for I shall always respect the Treaties. I know that they cannot be changed except by general assent; but respect for treaties does not run counter to my duty, which is to follow always the policy that is most in harmony with the honour and the interests of my country.

'Nevertheless, I hope that the alliance with Your Majesty will always be maintained. Two great countries may remain friends, although their interests in all questions may not be identical, provided the action of each shall have been settled by a preliminary understanding in accordance with the dictates of its political interests.

'Your Majesty will, I hope, forgive me this long letter. But I felt bound to lay my thoughts before you, and you will see in it a fresh proof of my desire to find myself in accord with Your Majesty, and of the great value I attach to your opinion and advice.

'I beg you to recall me to the remembrance of the Prince, and to believe in the sentiments of high esteem and sincere friendship with which I am

'Your Majesty's good brother and friend,

'NAPOLEON.

'Palace of the Tuileries, February 14, 1859.'

V.

Conversation between the Emperor Napoleon and Louis Kossuth at the Tuileries, May 5, 1859.

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AT eleven at night Prince Jerome called for Kossuth and drove him to the Tuileries. The Emperor met him at the door of his private study, and shook hands with him heartily. Writing to his wife next morning, Kossuth narrates the interview that then took place, lasting two hours.

'The Emperor ordered the chamberlain in waiting not to allow us to be disturbed, and we sate down all three (His Majesty, Prince Jerome, and I), and conversed as follows:—

The Emperor: 'The Prince has reported your views to me. I sincerely desire that your patriotic wishes may be fulfilled. I apprehend that you attach two conditions to Hungary's participation in the war: one that I should extend the scene of action from the banks of the Po to those of the Danube and Theiss; the other, that I should accompany the appearance of my troops upon Hungarian soil with a proclamation in which I should make appeal to Hungary's decisions of 1849, and call upon your nation, as its friend and ally, to realise its Declaration of Independence, and to take up arms for the conquest of our common foe. Have I accurately comprehended your views?'

Kossuth: 'Admirably, Sire.'

The Emperor: 'I have thought over the matter. As far as the proclamation is concerned, I see no obstacle to that, if the other condition, that of sending the troops, be fulfilled. The proceeding is not unprecedented in the history of my House. Here is the original draft of the proclamation which my uncle addressed to the Hungarian nation in 1809. Are you acquainted with it?'

Kossuth: 'L'Empereur d'Autriche, infidèle à ses traités, méconnaissant la générosité . . . .'

The Emperor: 'So it runs. You have a good memory. I possess, therefore, a precedent, and it matters not to me that that proclamation then led to no result. This point might be considered as settled, therefore, were it not for the question of

a military expedition, in which I am encountered by serious difficulties. England constitutes my chief obstacle. The Tory Cabinet at present in power manifests a hostile attitude towards all my undertakings, even in the Italian business. It sticks closely to the Convention of 1815, which others besides myself have long since torn to tatters. That Convention proscribed the Napoleons. Nevertheless, I am here. But any Convention will serve as a cloak under which to conceal evil intentions. If the English Government assumes this attitude towards me even with respect to my Italian enterprise, what would it do were I to extend the war to the Danube region? That would be held equivalent to a resolve on my part to erase the House of Austria from the list of Great Powers. But the English Government adheres firmly to that particular Power; generally speaking, one of the traditional axioms of British policy is the principle that the maintenance of Austria's position as a Great Power is necessary to the preservation of the balance of power in Europe. I have reason to believe that England would be capable of actually intervening against me. I cannot risk that. Pray take this into consideration.'

The Prince: 'Could we not gain over England, Sire, by holding out to her the prospect of Constantinople?'

The Emperor (lighting a cigarette over the lamp): 'One must never desire impossibilities.' ('Il ne faut jamais vouloir l'impossible.')

Kossuth: 'Does your Majesty wish that England should become your ally, as in the Crimea, and take part in the war?'

The Emperor: 'Oh, no. I do not think of such a thing. I only wish that her neutrality should be secured. It is scarcely likely that England would make war out of pure friendship for Austria. Nevertheless I am by no means at ease so long as England's policy remains under its present guidance.'

Kossuth: 'The thing would be, then, to upset Lord Derby's Government, and to upset it just upon its foreign policy, so that the Whigs might come into office upon the basis of foregone engagements, fully assuring England's neutrality. And, as your Majesty wishes for nothing more than this, permit me to declare that I will take upon myself the carrying out of this enterprise.'

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The Emperor: 'What do you mean? Do you really believe you can bring it to pass?'

Kossuth: 'Yes, Sire, I hope so. Do not interpret my words as the outcome of extravagant boastfulness. I take the liberty to observe to you that the feelings of the English people towards my native land are extremely favourable.' (The Emperor, interrupting: 'That is true—I know they are.') 'Your Majesty knows that public opinion in England is a great power. Not that the persons who direct Great Britain's policy would refrain from disregarding public opinion, if it lay in their interest so to do, but it is a power chiefly because it ever proves a mighty support to them, when it suits them to appeal to it. I should, therefore, commence operations by persuading the Lord Mayor of London to preside in person over a meeting to which I would summon the people to pronounce itself in favour of neutrality. Further, I would fan popular excitement in other large cities, and preach my doctrine to monster meetings. There is no doubt that resolutions corresponding to my wishes would be adopted everywhere, which would find their echoes in the press as well as in all parts of the country. Thus could the foundation be laid for the overthrow of the Tory Cabinet through the utilisation by the Whigs of public opinion on this particular question. What we have to do is to furnish the Whigs with a majority.

'The two great parties almost balance one another in the House of Commons—there is but a slight preponderance in favour of the Tories. The turn of the scale depends on the independent members, the nucleus of which congeries is the so-called "Manchester School," headed by Cobden and Bright. At a general election the Tories—judging by foregone circumstances—will possibly gain twenty more votes. But, even with that reinforcement, they cannot hold their own against the Whigs, if these latter be supported by the independent members, some ninety in number, who cannot themselves form an Administration, but are, nevertheless, masters of the situation. One of this party's fundamental axioms is total abstinence from all Continental wars. Lord Palmerston knows this perfectly well, and will, if he desire to take office, declare for neutrality. He will be obliged to come to terms beforehand

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with the independent members, who, as he is aware, dislike him, especially Cobden, the great popular leader. That is the situation.

'Now, I stand in the most intimate relations of friendship with the leaders of the Cobden faction, and I venture to assert that they will gladly carry out any of my wishes which may not absolutely collide with their principles. Happily our interests coincide entirely with their principles, wherefore I can reckon with certainty upon their support. If I should be so fortunate as to secure your Majesty's authorisation thereto, I would at once communicate the affair to some of my friends and entreat them to wait upon Lord Palmerston, as soon as I should have sufficiently stirred up public feeling by meetings, &c., and promise him their support upon two conditions—firstly, that he and his Ministerial colleagues should engage themselves in writing to preserve English neutrality even if your Majesty should extend the war to Hungary with the object of achieving the restoration of Hungarian independence; and secondly, that some of the members of the independent party should enter the Government, so that, in case his Lordship should find himself unable to maintain the promised neutrality, they should be in a position to break up the Cabinet altogether by quitting it in a body.

'The Whigs will come into power shortly after the meeting of Parliament, in the first week of June; and I shall then have the pleasure of laying before your Majesty the English Ministry's written guarantee of neutrality.'

The Emperor: 'What you tell me is extremely interesting and important. I beg you to proceed forthwith with this undertaking; and be assured that by making certain of England's neutrality you will sweep away the chief obstacle to the realisation of your patriotic wishes.'

In subsequent conversations the question of German Unity cropped up, whereupon the Emperor observed, with a smile, 'That would not suit me at all. Two Germanies do not so much matter; but an United Germany would really be more than I could put up with.' To which Kossuth, quoting the Emperor's own words, replied, 'One must never desire impossibilities!'

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With respect to foreign intervention, the Emperor remarked, 'Not only will Russia not interfere with you again, but she will now regard the emancipation of Hungary with satisfaction, requiring, of course, that the Hungarian question be not mixed up with that of Poland. The Prussian Cabinet has hitherto made no sign of an intention to back up Austria. Besides, were Prussia to meddle, Hungary would certainly not become the seat of war. But she will not interfere. Go back to England and work there on behalf of British neutrality. I empower you to come to a discreet understanding with your friends upon the whole affair. Meanwhile, till you have settled everything in England, let the Hungarian refugees keep their eyes upon Italy. You shall be provided with money and arms. Senator Piétri will arrange all these details.' (To the Prince:) 'Bring these gentlemen and Piétri together, so that the business may be attended to without delay.' (To Kossuth:) 'You will, of course, prepare the necessary popular feeling in your country; perhaps it would be as well to send confidential emissaries to Belgrade and Bucharest. As soon as you shall have fulfilled your important mission in England, I beg you to come to Italy. *Au revoir en Italie!*'

Walking homewards with Prince Jerome, the latter observed *inter alia*, 'A propos of Republicans, what will your friends Ledru and Mazzini say to all this?'

Kossuth: 'They will certainly not be delighted. But for us the question now is, "To be, or not to be?" I have often told Ledru and Mazzini that, to gain my end, I would contract alliances with emperors and kings, sultans, or any other description of despot—aye, with the very devil himself—only I would take good care that he should not carry me away!'

Next morning the Prince and Piétri met Kossuth, Teleki, and Klapka by appointment; the latter constituted themselves into a 'Hungarian National Directory,' after which Teleki and Klapka left Paris for Italy, and Kossuth went to London, where he succeeded triumphantly in performing the engagements he had entered into with Napoleon III. Having done so he set off with a joyful heart for Milan, where, on July 3, he was admitted to a second and last interview with the Emperor, which will best be described in his own words:—

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'He received me at eight o'clock in the morning, and kept me with him a whole hour, so that the King of Sardinia himself had to wait half an hour before he could gain admission. Piétri was present at our interview. First of all, I made a full report of the results of my efforts in England; at first only in words, not to appear in the light of a braggart. But Piétri interposed, saying, "The most astounding circumstance is, Sire, that M. Kossuth has in his pocket letters by which the English Ministers pledge themselves to preserve England's neutrality even if we should march to Hungary." "Is that so?" asked the Emperor; "may I see the letters?" I handed them to him. They seemed to interest him deeply; he read one after the other, smiling from time to time and shaking his head, as though he found much that surprised him in the letters.

'"Then," I said, "your Majesty will have gathered from those documents that I have not only fulfilled my undertaking according to our programme, but have obtained a far greater success than I was enabled to promise to you in Paris. Now that the obstacles which your Majesty feared on the part of England exist no longer, I feel myself called upon to ask, What decision has your Majesty come to with respect to Hungary?"'

The Emperor: 'There is still a difficulty—Prussia. In consequence of your journey hither (for European diplomacy attaches great importance to your movements) I have received a despatch from Lord John Russell, in which he, officially I may say, emphasises the assurance of England's neutrality; but he also expresses the opinion that by taking up the Hungarian cause I should provoke Prussia.'

Kossuth: 'As England's neutrality is secured, that is by no means probable. But, even admitting that Germany were angered, is your Majesty disposed to accept a peace which leaves the Italian question unsolved?'

The Emperor: 'I shall accept no such peace, unless I should be beaten in the field, or compelled to do so by an European army of mediation.'

Kossuth: 'Then I ask your Majesty if it be possible—leaving Hungary out of the question—to avoid provoking

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Germany? Let us suppose that you drive the Austrians out of Verona: they will cross the Isonzo to German soil, and your Majesty will not be able to follow them. But it is an absurdity to concede neutrality to an enemy upon his own territory.' 'So it is,' interposed the Emperor; 'it is simply ridiculous—one could never finish with him!' 'Therefore, Sire, you will assuredly pursue the conquered army across the Isonzo, and there is your provocation to Germany! But if you will come to Hungary, the possibility of a German war will be sensibly diminished, and, moreover, your Majesty will secure to yourself the alliance of a nation which can supply you with 200,000 warriors, who will fight like lions. The Prussians will think twice before they draw the sword when they may be sure of being attacked by the Duc de Malakhoff with 180,000 men on the Rhine, and of finding 40,000 Frenchmen and 200,000 Hungarians in their rear.'

Emperor: 'That is true; and I tell you frankly, loyally, that I am firmly resolved to make Hungary independent, if no unforeseen event accrue to prevent me from so doing. I *will* do it. Let us discuss how it is to be done. Are you still determined not to summon your countrymen to arms until I send them a French army?'

Kossuth: 'More steadfastly than ever; and this is my reason. Of two things one: either the uprising would not, by reason of defective military organisation, be powerful enough to knock the Austrians on the head before your Majesty could send us aid, even if you intended to help us, in which case Hungary would be crushed for another fifty years; or the uprising would assume vast dimensions and achieve great successes, in which case the terrified Austrians would abandon Italy and throw themselves upon us with their whole might. Prussia, too, would offer them assistance, as she would only have to do with us, and not with your Majesty.'

The Emperor: 'You act like a patriot. I accept this basis; either I will send an army to Hungary, or I will not require Hungary to rise. But I will send her an army if within the range of possibility; only I must first carry out certain further military operations here. Should, however, Europe force me by an armed mediation to make peace, the Hungarian expedi-

tion must be foregone; but in no other case. Meanwhile, do all you can to form an army in Hungary. I will give you money and every other facility. It lies in your own interest to have an army of your own acting with the French troops.'

Kossuth: 'Doubtless; but only in co-operation with the French troops!'

Emperor: 'That is understood. *Au revoir!*'[1]

VI.

The Emperor to Prince Napoleon.

'Paris, March 29, 1863.

'MY DEAR COUSIN,—I have delayed answering your letter, for it pains me to enter on a discussion which can only lead to recriminations on the past. I have, I confess, been surprised to see how little justice you render to my conduct towards you for twelve years, and how mistaken you are as to your own. The recollections of our childhood are as dear to me as to you, but they have nothing to do with the questions now before us. Since the morrow of the day when I was elected President of the Republic, you have never ceased by your words and actions to be hostile to my policy, whether during the Presidency on December 2, or since the Empire. How have I avenged myself for this conduct? By seeking every opportunity of putting you forward, of making you a position worthy your rank, and of opening an arena for your brilliant qualities. Your Crimean command, your marriage, your dotation, your Ministry of Algeria, your *corps d'armée* in Italy, your admission into the Senate and Council are manifest proofs of my friendship for you. Need I recall how you have responded to them? In the East your discouragement made you lose the fruit of a well-opened campaign. People have a right to be surprised that

[1] *Memoirs of My Exile.* By Louis Kossuth. Translated from the Original Hungarian by Ferencz Jausz. Cassell & Co., 1880.

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you never hold Receptions, and that your name never appears in any charitable effort. Your Algerian portfolio you sent me back one fine day on account of an article in the 'Moniteur.' As for your speeches in the Senate, they have never been otherwise than a serious embarrassment for my Government. And yet you complain of my conduct towards you. People are astonished rather that I have so long tolerated in a member of my family an opposition which alarms and casts hesitation among the partisans of our cause. The 'Times' not long ago, speaking of you, said that if an English Prince followed in England the same line of conduct as you, he would be disavowed by public opinion. Be assured that it is the same in France, and that, except a few flatterers of no account, people disapprove an attitude which has all the appearance of rivalry. Do I claim, however, that your words should be the faithful echo of my intentions and thoughts? No; but what I have a right to require of a Prince of my family is that, in speaking before the first body of the State, he shall at least disguise divergencies of opinion, when they exist, under proprieties of form. I will never admit it to be of advantage to anybody to speak in the Senate as in a club, launching insults at everybody's head, and expressing oneself without reserve, as if your past were irreproachable, and as if your future required no care. In your last speech you violated all propriety. By quoting my writings you had the appearance of wishing to put my acts in contradiction to my words. By attacking the Emperor of Russia even for his kind attentions to me, you have put me in such a position that if to-morrow the Russian Ambassador were rude to you, I should have no right to complain of it to his Government. Lastly, by attacking my Minister you showed a want of tact and an animosity which it is difficult to excuse. And, after this, you consider my letter to Billault was an affront to you. It was, however, the mildest and most honest reply that could be chosen. Now that I have told you all I thought, there are only two lines of conduct for you to follow. Either be what you ought to be, a support and prop for my Government, and then I shall be happy to continue to give you proofs of my former friendship; or else go your own way, giving free course to the violence of your own opinions, and then it will be neces-

sary that my conduct towards you testify publicly my displeasure, for it is impossible for people to understand my receiving as a friend in the evening him who attacks me in the morning. It is for you to choose. I should be very sorry if your good sense and heart did not get the better of the impetuosity of your disposition.

'Receive the assurance of my sincere friendship.

'NAPOLEON.'

VII.

Universal Exhibition of 1867 and the Evangelical Alliance.

AT the commencement of the year 1867, when preparations on a grand scale were being made for holding the Universal Exhibition in Paris during that year, the Imperial Commission, through their President, M. Le Play, communicated to the Council of the Evangelical Alliance their readiness to grant them a piece of land within the Champ de Mars, with permission to erect a building and to use it for international réunions and other purposes in harmony with the philanthropic and Christian objects of that important society. The offer was gratefully accepted, and the Salle Evangélique was erected and opened on April 15 in that year, by a public meeting over which the Earl of Shaftesbury and General the Baron Chabaud la Tour jointly presided. Various gentlemen of different nationalities took part in the meeting. During the whole time of the Exhibition, services, arranged by British and French Committees, were held, dealing with questions of great social and national importance in the interest of religion, the greatest care being taken against the intrusion of controversial or sectarian topics.

The Imperial Government, by conceding this permission to a religious society, one of an international and unsectarian character, and whose motto is 'Unum corpus sumus in Christo,' set an example of liberality worthy the imitation of other nations. It strengthened the cordial and friendly relations already existing between the British and French nations, closely allied by their geographical position, and closer still by

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their friendship and their commercial and political interests. At the close of the Exhibition, and on December 13, the Emperor received at St. Cloud a deputation from the London and Paris Committees, for the purpose of presenting the following address :—

'*To His Imperial Majesty Napoleon III., Emperor of the French.*

'SIRE,—We approach your Majesty in the name and on behalf of various Noblemen, Gentlemen, and Christian Ministers of Great Britain, acting in concert with their Christian friends and co-religionists in Paris.

'We offer your Majesty our respectful and cordial salutations, and desire especially on this occasion to express our grateful thanks for the opportunity so graciously accorded by the President of the Imperial Commission, with your Majesty's consent, of holding conferences with our Christian brethren of various nations, and of preaching the Gospel in different languages within the Salle Evangélique.

'This concession, communicated to the Council of the Evangelical Alliance, was entrusted by them to a special committee, under whose direction, and acting in consultation with M. Theodore Vernes, the hall was constructed and opened by an inaugural service in April last, under the joint presidency of the Right Honourable the Earl of Shaftesbury and General the Baron Chabaud la Tour.

'Deeply sensible of the importance of these Universal Exhibitions in the interest of science and art, and we trust also of international amity and peace, we rejoice that France, by her vast resources and powerful influence, has twice carried to a triumphant completion this achievement of modern thought and wisdom. But, Sire, as the servants and followers of our Divine Redeemer, we have felt that there were higher and more sacred interests to regard, and that the marvels of skill and beauty accumulated on the Champ de Mars would neither be diminished in lustre nor appear less glorious to the world, if presented in association with an edifice wherein God's most precious truth was taught, and the eternal welfare of man sought to be promoted.

'Happily, in accordance with that religious liberty which it

has been the enlightened policy of your Majesty's Government to concede, we have been able to carry out our object, and with a success that has filled our hearts with gratitude and praise.

'We have the sincere gratification of assuring your Majesty that, in using the Salle Evangélique for the purposes already indicated, fervent prayer has been daily offered for your Majesty, for the Empress, and for the Prince Imperial. Supplication has also been made for the members of your Majesty's Government, and for the prosperity, peace, and progress of this great nation.

'With the desire to manifest and strengthen, by useful co-operation, the real and essential union existing among true Christians, notwithstanding diversities of sentiment on minor points of belief, and differences of nation and language, we have carefully observed, both in speech and action, that true charity which the Gospel enjoins. We rejoice to know that the privilege granted to us in this city and on this memorable occasion has been used with moderation and with prudence; that in all cases the conscientious convictions of others have been respected, and the truth spoken in love and in dependence on the guidance and illumination of God's Holy Spirit.

'We humbly offer to your Majesty our warmest congratulations for the example you have set before all nations. We trust and pray that it may be extensively followed, and lead to the wider circulation of the Holy Scriptures, a respect for which, we believe, tends to the stability of empires, and promotes that righteousness which we are taught "exalteth a nation."

'We pray that your Majesty's life may be long spared to rule over this people, and that your Imperial name, descending to your successors, may ever be associated with the happiness and prosperity of a loyal and grateful people.'

The Emperor replied that he was deeply touched with the cordiality that had been shown, and for the efforts which had been made, with a view to enlighten and benefit the masses of the people—efforts which he had been glad to hear had been conducted with much prudence as well as wisdom. His Majesty having made enquiry into the various conferences that had been held, and the subjects which had been treated, expressed his entire satisfaction.

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In the month of June, 1867, the Emperor was informed that an English lady, a member of the Society of Friends, desired to be received by him, and to be allowed to present him with an address, dictated both by her respect for His Majesty and by her interest in the moral and religious welfare of the nation under his rule. Mrs. Fowler had been in the habit of contributing of her wealth to benevolent and Christian objects in France, and her frequent visits to the capital and different parts of the country had afforded her the opportunity of remarking the progress which had been made under the enlightened institutions introduced during the reign of Napoleon III. The desire for the interview, on being communicated to the Emperor by the Duc de Bassano, was acceded to, and on the 14th of the same month Mrs. Fowler, accompanied by an English gentleman, was received at the Tuileries. In the course of the interview, an address, expressing her desire that His Majesty's Government should be distinguished unceasingly by the circulation of the Bible, the national observance of Sunday as a day of rest, and by those objects generally for the advancement of which the Society of Friends had so long devoted their efforts, was presented. The address, clothed in language of affection and respect, concluded with a wish that all suitable blessings might be conferred on the Emperor, on the Empress, on the Prince Imperial, and on the French nation. Mrs. Fowler then asked His Majesty's acceptance of a copy of the Holy Scriptures, which was graciously accepted; and the Emperor, who evidently appreciated the motive of this excellent lady, expressed to her how much he was touched by this proof of her interest in his welfare and that of the French people. A copy of the 'Life and Philanthropic Labours of Elizabeth Fry' was subsequently presented to the Empress and was acknowledged by Her Majesty.

The Emperor had repeatedly expressed his sympathy with the principles of religious liberty and his determination to repress intolerance wherever it existed within his dominions. On several occasions his sincerity was tested by prompt interference in cases of oppression which were brought to his knowledge, occurring either in the departments of France or in remote possessions of his Empire.

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In the month of April, 1878, he received at the Tuileries the Rev. James Davis, the official representative of the Evangelical Alliance, a Protestant Society composed of members of different Churches in various countries, united for common action, especially the protection of persons, of whatever creed, whose religious liberty had been interfered with. Protestant missionaries complained that the French authorities in New Caledonia had refused to allow them to enter and hold religious services in that island. His Majesty having received a memorial embodying the alleged facts, assured the secretary that any opposition which had been made to the Christian teaching of Protestant missionaries in New Caledonia was opposed to his instructions. He added that it was his desire and purpose to extend the religious liberty which was enjoyed in France to all his dependencies, and that he would give immediate directions to the Minister of Marine to enquire into the matter, and would see that Protestant missionaries enjoyed the same religious freedom as the Catholics in New Caledonia. These directions were carried out.

VIII.

'De 1865 à 1867, M. de Massa fut, comme on le disait du brave et bon Guénée, l'homme-revue de la cour impériale. A partir de 1868, les événements devenant plus sombres, les revues restèrent inédites. On n'eût pu les appeler, dès lors, que les points noirs. Mais, jusqu'à Sadowa, et même au lendemain de Sadowa, les couplets, les chansons et les rondeaux, fort bien tournés souvent, de M. de Massa, allèrent leur train fort gaiement.

'Que de souvenirs dans un seul nom! C'est bien le cas de rééditer le vieux mot—solennel comme "Alonzo"—de M. de Salvandy:—On jouait des vaudevilles, on se maquillait et on se costumait sur un volcan—ou sur un canon Krupp.

'M. de Massa, en grande faveur, était le faiseur de revues attitré de ce théâtre de Compiègne où le Baron de Talleyrand,

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le Marquis de Cadore et Mme. la Comtesse d'Ayguesvives jouaient "l'Affaire de la rue de Lourcine," et le Vicomte de Marnésia, le Marquis de Saulcy et la Comtesse Walewska improvisaient des charades politiques sur l'an 1859.

'On aimait beaucoup, à Compiègne, dans l'intimité, les charades et les revues. On y donnait même des pantomimes. Un collectionneur a conservé les programmes de ces fêtes où, comme en Décembre 1862, on représentait "Casia, ou la Couronne enchantée," le Baron Lambert jouant le rôle du fermier Jean; la Comtesse de Clermont-Tonnerre et la Princesse de Metternich les personnages de Basia et de Casia, ses deux filles; la Baronne de Vatry la fée Cassilda, la bonne fée; et la Comtesse Stéphanie Tascher la fée Maladetta, le mauvais génie de la pantomime. Je ne sais de qui était cette "Casia," mais les revues de M. de Massa, du moins, étaient signées.

'L'auteur de "l'Honneur" en écrivit deux pour le moins, mais je crois bien qu'il n'y en eut qu'une seule de représentée: les "Commentaires de César," revue de l'année 1865, jouée les 26 et 27 Novembre et publiée peu après dans le "Nain Jaune," que dirigeait alors M. Aurélien Scholl. M. de Massa aimait les revues de fin d'année, et la cour les adorait. Je ne sais où j'ai lu que l'auteur des "Commentaires de César" voulait faire représenter, à Mexico, durant l'occupation française, une revue parisienne dont une grande dame de l'empire eût été la principale interprète, comme, à Paris, la plus applaudie et la plus alerte était Mme. de Metternich.

'Ces "Commentaires de César" ont été imprimés, chez Vallée, rue Bréda, à quelques exemplaires, et les curieux, les bibliophiles ont mis ces raretés dans un coin de leur bibliothèque. En fait de documents, il n'en est pas de plus caractéristiques. Marie-Antoinette, à Trianon, jouait à la laitière et faisait, comme à Rambouillet, de petits fromages dans sa laiterie de marbre. A Compiègne, l'impératrice s'amusait à voir le prince impérial représenter un grenadier dans les revues de M. le Marquis de Massa.

'Dans une des dernières scènes de la revue, l'Industrie (c'était Mme. la Marquise de Galliffet qui représentait le personnage) levait sa baguette et montrait la France et l'Angle-

terre se donnant la main et chantant sur l'air jadis belliqueux de "Charles VI.": "Jamais l'Anglais ne règnera . . ."

'Vivent toujours la France et l'Angleterre !
Et le progrès les unira !

'"Plus de passeport!" disait l'*Angleterre* (Mme. Bartholony). "Nous jetons un pont sur la Manche !"

'"Et," répondait *la France* (Mme. de Pourtalès), "le boulevard Haussmann est prolongé jusqu'à Piccadilly."

'*La France*, avec émotion.—"Ma sœur !"

'*L'Angleterre*, de même.—"Ma sœur !"

'(Elles s'embrassent.)

'"Les deux sœurs !" disait alors le compère, M. Prudhomme (M. le Baron Lambert), songeant au drame de M. de Girardin. "C'est égal," ajoutait-il . . .

'*L'Industrie*.—"Quoi donc ?"

'*Prudhomme*:—

'"Lorsque je vois la France et l'Angleterre
A qui mieux mieux se cuirasser,
Je me demande et je ne comprends guère
A quoi ça sert, si c'est pour s'embrasser.
Je ne veux pas leur faire de reproches,
Mais la raison ?"

'*L'Industrie*:—

'"Est facile à trouver:
Ayez toujours du canon dans vos poches,
On ne sait pas ce qui peut arriver."

'Et tous les personnages en chœur:

'"Ayons toujours du canon dans nos poches,
On ne sait pas ce qui peut arriver !"

'Le conseil était cependant bon à suivre, même donné sur l'air: "Amis, voici la riante semaine." Il vint un jour, pourtant, où les canons manquèrent. Mais, en 1865, on en était aux illusions de gloire.

'*L'Angleterre* montrait fièrement à *la France* un matelot, représenté par le Vicomte de Fitz-James, et un volontaire, un rifleman, figuré par le Comte de Pourtalès, et la France répliquait en désignant un invalide, joué par le général Mellinet et un fantassin, rôle distribué à M. de Galliffet, alors lieutenant-colonel.

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'Et *la France* chantait cette fois sur l'air "Pomare Maria":—

'"Mais je n'ai nul souci,
Mon ciel s'est éclairci,
Mon prestige grandit.
Ces deux guerriers ne vous l'ont-ils pas dit?
(*Montrant l'invalide.*)
De ce vieillard l'allure est martiale,
Et, quand je songe au sang qu'il a versé,
J'ai bien le droit, moi, France impériale,
De me montrer fière de mon passé!
(*Montrant le fantassin.*)
Mon présent le voici:
Ce visage noirci,
C'est mon fidèle appui.
C'est mon enfant, mon soldat d'aujourd'hui!
Au bout du monde, aux bords les plus arides,
Il a porté mes aigles et mes lois . . .
(*Se tournant vers l'invalide*)
Et le canon de mes vieux invalides
N'a pas fini d'annoncer ses exploits!
Je vous ai retracé
Le présent, le passé;
Mais, avant de finir,
Je veux encore vous montrer l'avenir!"

'"Et l'avenir?" demandait *M. Prudhomme.*

'Mme. la Marquise de Galliffet étendait la jolie main de *l'Industrie*, la commère de la revue, et répondait:—

'"Il est à ce jeune grenadier!"

'Et, bien habillé, bien serré dans son uniforme de grenadier de la garde, le Prince Impérial, présentant les armes, venait réciter ce couplet sur un air de pont-neuf:—

'"Un grenadier, c'est une rose
Qui brille de mille couleurs;
Mais le seul but qu'il se propose
C'est de rallier tous les cœurs . . .
Relevant sa moustache fière,
La France est sa particulière!
Le Dieu d'amour le guide auprès,
Voilà, voilà, voilà,
Voilà le grenadier français!"

'*Tous:*—

'"Voilà, voilà voilà,
Voilà le grenadier français!"

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'Roulement de tambour. On passait au vaudeville final, et Mme. de Metternich, en cantinière de turcos, Mme. de Poilly en Africaine, le Comte de Solms en marchand de coco, le Marquis de Caux en cocodès, M. A. Blount en diva, imitant Thérésa et chantant la "Vénus aux carottes," le jeune Conneau en marchande de plaisirs, entonnaient, après le couplet au public, dit par Mme. de Metternich, le dernier refrain :—

'"Dérider les fronts
C'était son privilège.
Que César la protège
Et nous la reverrons!"

'L'orchestre était tenu, dit la brochure, par S. A. le Prince de Metternich. Le souffleur était M. Viollet-le-Duc.

'Il y a une ironie singulière dans ces ressouvenirs auxquels les faits accomplis donnent une mélancolie si profonde. Le grenadier de l'avenir, dont la France était la particulière, est allé mourir, au bout du monde, dans l'uniforme rouge de ces Anglais qu'on embrassait en "gardant toujours un canon dans sa poche."

'"On ne sait pas ce qui peut arriver!"

'Et qui eût prévu ce qui est arrivé, parmi tous ces spectateurs de Compiègne applaudissant les couplets où l'on comparait l'Empereur au cocher modèle assis par le peuple sur un siège auguste :—

'"Son char enfin est celui de la France
Et son chemin s'appelle le Progrès!"

'et les rondeaux sur Jules César, qui se terminaient par ce madrigal :—

'"Loin des partis qui ne sont plus
Le temps a dégagé l'histoire,
Et *César renait dans sa gloire*
Après deux mille ans révolus!"'—

Le Temps (*Chronique*),
January 16, 1881.

IX.

Text of the Sénatus-Consulte of September 10, 1869.

APP. IX.

ART. 1er.—L'Empereur et le Corps Législatif ont l'initiative des lois.

ART. 2.—Les Ministres ne dépendent que de l'Empereur. Ils délibèrent en conseil, sous sa présidence.

Ils sont responsables.

Ils ne peuvent être mis en accusation que par le Sénat.

ART. 3.—Les Ministres peuvent être membres du Sénat ou du Corps Législatif.

Ils ont entrée dans l'une ou dans l'autre assemblée, et doivent être entendus toutes les fois qu'ils le demandent.

ART. 4.—Les séances du Sénat sont publiques. La demande de cinq membres suffit pour qu'il se forme en comité secret.

ART. 5.—Le Sénat peut, en indiquant les modifications dont une loi lui paraît susceptible, décider qu'elle sera renvoyée à une nouvelle délibération du Corps Législatif.

Il peut, dans tous les cas, s'opposer à la promulgation de la loi.

La loi à la promulgation de laquelle la Sénat s'est opposé ne peut être présentée de nouveau au Corps Législatif dans la même session.

ART. 6.—A l'ouverture de chaque session, le Corps Législatif nomme son président, ses vice-présidents et ses secrétaires.

Il nomme ses questeurs.

ART. 7.—Tout membre du Sénat ou du Corps Législatif a le droit d'adresser une interpellation au Gouvernement.

Des ordres du jour motivés peuvent être adoptés. Le renvoi aux bureaux de l'ordre du jour motivé est de droit, quand il est demandé par le Gouvernement.

Les bureaux nomment une Commission, sur le rapport sommaire de laquelle l'Assemblée prononce.

ART. 8.—Aucun amendement ne peut être mis en délibération, s'il n'a été envoyé à la Commission chargée d'examiner le projet de loi, et communiqué au Gouvernement.

Lorsque le Gouvernement et la Commission ne sont pas d'accord, le Conseil d'Etat donne son avis, et le Corps Législatif prononce.

ART. 9.—Le budget des dépenses est présenté au Corps Législatif par chapitres et articles.

Le budget de chaque ministère est voté par chapitre, conformément à la nomenclature annexée au présent sénatus-consulte.

ART. 10.—Les modifications apportées à l'avenir à des tarifs de douanes ou de postes par des traités internationaux ne seront obligatoires qu'en vertu d'une loi.

ART. 11.—Les rapports constitutionnels actuellement établis entre le Gouvernement de l'Empereur, le Sénat et le Corps Législatif, ne peuvent être modifiés que par un sénatus-consulte.

X.

The Emperor's Note on an Alliance between France, Italy, and Prussia, 1858.

THIS Note, which was to be placed before the President of the Prussian Cabinet by the Marquis Pepoli, was submitted to the Prince Regent.

Tuileries, Décembre 1858.

'Il y a deux grandes puissances allemandes, la Prusse et l'Autriche. La Prusse représente l'avenir—l'Autriche le passé. La France depuis dix ans a toujours montré une préférence marquée pour la Prusse ; cela lui profitera-t-il ? C'est à l'avenir à décider.

'Examinons de quel côté sont les intérêts bien entendus de la Prusse. Ce pays, comme tout ce qui grandit, ne peut rester stationnaire, et, cependant, s'il s'allie intimement avec l'Autriche, il est obligé de rester stationnaire et même de rétrograder.

'Ce qui peut lui arriver de plus heureux, c'est de contre-balancer en Allemagne l'influence autrichienne. Mais est-ce là la seule gloire qui convienne à un nouveau règne et avec les instincts élevés et chevaleresques de la Prusse ?

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'Je ne le crois pas, et cependant, si la Prusse suit les conseils intéressés qui lui sont donnés de divers côtés, son rôle en Europe doit se borner à faire équilibre à sa rivale. Mais dans cette politique il y a un danger: si, entraînée parde funestes influences, la Prusse, faisant cause commune avec l'Autriche, garantissait les provinces italiennes de la maison de Habsbourg, alors l'équilibre européen serait rompu, les traités de 1815 seraient abolis et alors la France serait forcée, en faisant appel à la Russie, de jeter le gant à l'Allemagne. J'espère que cette extrémité n'arrivera pas; si, au contraire, la Prusse, en se détachant sans bruit de l'Autriche, se montre bienveillante pour la France, de grandes destinées l'attendent sans dangers ni convulsions pour elle. Car si, par suite de la lutte entre la France et l'Autriche, cette dernière puissance perdît de son influence en Allemagne, c'est la Prusse qui en hériterait.

'Ainsi donc, si la Prusse se lie avec l'Autriche, tout progrès lui est impossible, et elle risque de réunir la Russie et la France contre l'Allemagne. Si, au contraire, elle s'allie avec la France, toute diminution de l'influence autrichienne lui profite, et, soutenue par la France, elle peut poursuivre en Allemagne les hautes destinées qui l'attendent et que le peuple allemand attend d'elle. NAPOLÉON.'

How the proposals of the Emperor Napoleon were received, and what impressions they made on the mind of Prince Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, is fully related by Pepoli in the following Report:—

'SIRE,—Selon le désir que V. M. a eu la bonté de m'exprimer, j'ai dit à mon beau-frère, le Prince Charles, que V. M., sachant que je venais passer les jours de fête de Noël avec lui, m'avait chargé de lui communiquer tout l'intérêt que la France portait à la Prusse, et le désir qu'elle avait de renouer avec elle des relations intimes. J'ai même ajouté que Vous m'avez remis une Note dans laquelle étaient tracées les expressions, dont j'étais autorisé à me servir, et je lui en ai donné lecture.

'Elle a vivement impressionné le Prince, et, selon les ordres de V. M., je lui ai remis la Note, pour qu'il puisse la communiquer au Prince Régent, et je lui ai même fait connaître que

j'étais disposé à attendre des nouvelles de Berlin sur cette question. Le Prince m'a dit, qu'il allait expédier la Note de suite au Prince Régent. Cette Note avait, selon lui, un grand mérite—celui d'être nette et franche.

'Je me suis empressé d'ajouter, que je m'étais d'autant plus volontiers chargé de cette communication, que je me rappelais que, dans le temps, il m'avait écrit, qu'une alliance entre la France, la Prusse, le Piémont, était dans l'intérêt de l'Europe civilisée.

'Il m'a répondu que son opinion personnelle était toujours la même, mais que les circonstances de 1852 étaient bien différentes de celles d'aujourd'hui. Qu'alors l'opinion publique en Allemagne était contraire à l'Autriche, tandis qu'à présent elle lui était très-favorable, surtout dans les questions religieuses, puisque le gouvernement passé s'était aliéné, avec sa politique intolérante, les catholiques du Royaume. Il a même fait observer que le gouvernement du Prince Régent était placé dans une position difficile, puisque le Roi n'était pas mort, et qu'il pouvait d'un moment à l'autre redemander sa couronne: il était, donc, très compromettant de s'engager dans une question aussi grave que celle que la Note venait de relever. C'était dans cette perspective que le Prince Régent s'était réservé son commandement à Coblence. J'ai cru alors devoir lui demander, jusqu'où l'esprit public, favorable à l'Autriche, engagerait la Prusse, et si c'était vrai que le Prince Régent allait garantir les possessions italiennes à l'Autriche. Il m'a répondu nettement: "Non." Alors je lui ai rappelé que, dans le temps, il m'avait écrit qu'une couvention avait été signée avec l'Autriche par le Roi: il m'a tout de suite répondu qu'il l'avait cru, mais qu'il croyait s'être trompé, et qu'il aurait là-dessus des renseignements précis. Alors il m'a demandé, si on croyait à la guerre en France: j'ai répondu que j'y croyais, mais que V. M. ne m'avait pas autorisé d'ajouter mot aux termes de la Note, et que ma mission était tout à fait personnelle; que cependant la position de l'Italie était très grave, et que j'étais tout-à-fait de l'avis qu'il m'avait fait connaître autrefois, qu'on ne parviendrait jamais à rétablir une véritable paix en Europe qu'avec une bonne guerre.

'Il m'a répondu, que c'était toujours son opinion, mais que

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cette opinion lui était aussi personnelle. Je saisis cette occasion pour lui exprimer au nom du Comte Cavour, que j'avais vu à Gênes toute la sympathie qu'on éprouvait en Italie pour le nouveau gouvernement prussien; et qu'on espérait qu'il serait favorable aux idées italiennes. Je lui ai fait observer que le Piémont était le véritable allié de la Prusse, puisque leur avenir repose sur l'abaissement de l'Autriche, et que les Italiens ne demandent pas mieux que d'aimer les Allemands. Je ne lui ai pas même caché mon opinion personnelle, qu'un conflit finirait par éclater en Italie, puisque les gouvernements poussent à la révolte par leur mauvaise administration, et que l'esprit de nationalité s'était réveillé avec telle force, qu'on ne parviendra jamais à le comprimer. Il m'a répondu qu'il comprend ce sentiment, mais qu'il y avait là une question à ménager, l'amour-propre de l'Allemagne, et que c'était une question très grave, mais que, selon lui, et il a rappelé que cette opinion lui était personnelle, le plus sage parti pour la Prusse serait, peut-être, la neutralité. Il m'a demandé quelle était l'opinion de V. M. dans la question italienne; je me suis empressé de répondre que je ne connaissais de V. M. que les intentions qui étaient formulées dans la Note. Je croyais cependant que V. M. soutiendrait la cause de la justice, et que dans ce moment la France, poussée à l'extérieur avec une armée puissante, avec les finances admirablement en règle, saurait toujours faire respecter sa politique. Il m'a ajouté qu'une chose qui tenait toujours en alarme l'Allemagne, c'était le véritable but de la politique de l'Empereur. Je me suis empressé de répondre, qu'il me semblait que dans la guerre d'Orient la France Impériale avait bien prouvé quel noble but elle poursuivait, et que, relativement à l'Allemagne, tandis qu'elle regarderait come un *casus belli* tout agrandissement de l'Autriche, si minime qu'il fût, elle aimerait à voir grandir la puissance et l'influence prussiennes. Le Prince me fit observer que V. M. lui avait déjà tenu ce langage lors de sa mission à Paris.

'Voilà, Sire, le résumé du premier entretien que j'ai eu avec mon beau-frère. Depuis ce jour, nous avons encore eu plusieurs entretiens, mais sans une grande importance; c'étaient des discours confidentiels, où nous exprimions notre manière

personnelle de voir. Je lui ai parlé de mes brochures, du gouvernement de Rome, de la double occupation étrangère des états du Pape ; il m'a dit que sur cette question il croyait que la Prusse serait toujours pour l'évacuation complète, parce que la situation actuelle était anormale et ne pouvait durer.

'Enfin, après m'avoir annoncé qu'une dépêche de Berlin lui avait appris que le Prince Régent avait reçu la Note de l'Empereur, il me pria, le mardi, de passer chez lui, pour me communiquer l'impression produite à Berlin par la Note de V. M. Il m'a traduit d'abord une lettre du Baron de Schleinitz, et puis une lettre du Prince Régent et un Mémoire dicté par le même.

'Alors j'ai prié le Prince de me dicter lui-même le résumé de cette réponse. J'ai l'honneur de transmettre à V. M. une copie exacte à celle que le Prince a gardée pour lui-même.

'Je me suis cependant permis d'ajouter, que je ne croyais pas que ce fut une réponse bien catégorique à la Note de V. M., puisqu'en définitive elle laissait la question intacte, et ne laissait pas juger si la Prusse s'éloignerait ou se rapprocherait de la France dans les grandes questions du jour. Je me suis donc cru autorisé à demander au Prince, si le nouveau ministère serait plus favorable à l'Autriche que l'ancien. Il m'a répondu que, dans les questions intérieures de l'Allemagne, il était certainement plus disposé à la conciliation que le cabinet précédent, mais que dans les questions étrangères, il ne le croyait pas: qu'on pouvait être d'accord dans la vie intérieure, et ne pas l'être dans les rapports extérieurs: qu'on savait très bien à Berlin qu'on voulait persuader à la France, que le Prince Régent et le nouveau ministère ne lui étaient pas favorables, mais que c'était complètement faux. Que quant à lui, il restait toujours le même, et que lui et M. de Schleinitz étaient d'accord, qu'il n'y avait en Prusse que deux politiques possibles, celles que V. M. avait si bien tracées dans Sa Note : que lui, il serait toujours pour la politique de Frédéric le Grand, qui consistait à profiter de tous les événements pour agrandir la Prusse, mais qu'il fallait tenir compte au Prince de Prusse de l'incertitude de sa position et de la pression de l'opinion publique et de la plupart des gouvernements en faveur de l'Autriche. Comme je désirais que les conversations que j'ai

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eues avec le Prince fussent tout-à-fait exactes, j'ai cru lui devoir lire ce rapport, pour qu'il puisse en constater lui-même l'exactitude.

'Il l'a complètement approuvé, et je lui en ai même laissé une copie, mais comme il contient les idées personnelles du Prince, et qu'il a parlé avec la plus grande franchise, il se confie au haut savoir-faire de l'Empereur, en le priant de lui faire ses communications toujours d'une manière confidentielle et réservée. 'PEPOLI.

'26 Décembre, 1858.'

These documents were printed in a Roman magazine, 'Minerva' (December, 1880), which has ceased to appear.

XI.

The Command at Sedan. Described by General Ducrot in his evidence at the libel trial, Wimpffen v. de Cassagnac.

'M. LE GÉNÉRAL DUCROT: Il était à peu près de six à sept heures du soir, lorsque l'Empereur m'a fait appeler et m'a dit: "Le général de Wimpffen m'a envoyé sa démission; il faut que vous preniez le commandement de l'armée pour aller traiter de la capitulation." "Sire, je ne peux pas accepter ce rôle-là, ce n'est pas le moment de prendre le commandement de l'armée maintenant. Le général de Wimpffen n'a pas le droit de donner sa démission dans ce moment-ci. Insistez, Sire, insistez pour qu'il vienne prendre vos ordres."

'Alors l'Empereur écrivit de nouveau au général de Wimpffen, qui vint. J'étais dans le cabinet de l'Empereur, assis derrière son fauteuil, quelques personnes causaient, lorsque le général de Wimpffen entra, marchant à grands pas, ouvrant les bras, et son premier mot fut celui-ci: "Sire, si j'ai perdu la bataille, si j'ai été vaincu, c'est la faute de vos généraux, qui n'ont pas exécuté mes ordres, qui ont refusé de m'obéir." En entendant cela, je me levai subitement, je me mis en face du général de Wimpffen

et lui dis: "A qui faites-vous allusion? Est-ce à moi par hasard? Je ne les ai que trop bien exécutés, vos ordres, nous ne les avons que trop bien exécutés, car si nous sommes dans la plus affreuse situation qu'on puisse voir pour une armée, c'est à vous que nous le devons, c'est à votre folle présomption; et, si vous aviez voulu suivre mon conseil, nous serions en sûreté à Mézières." Le général de Wimpffen me répondit: "Eh bien, raison de plus, si je suis incapable, qu'on donne le commandement de l'armée à un autre." "Non, non, vous avez envié le commandant de l'armée quand il y avait honneur et profit; c'est vous qui devez porter la responsabilité et la honte, s'il y en a, de la capitulation." Là-dessus l'Empereur et ceux qui m'entouraient me calmèrent: je m'en allai; le général de Wimpffen resta avec Sa Majesté et je n'ai pas su ce qui s'est passé.

. . . . . .

'Maintenant, il y a une chose qu'il faut dire. . . . On nous a reproché de n'avoir pas exécuté les ordres qui nous ont été donnés: ce reproche est tout-à-fait injuste; car nous les avons exécutés avec une obéissance complète, avec un dévouement absolu et, je dois le dire, avec une abnégation entière, car à partir du moment où nous nous sommes reportés de l'ouest à l'est, nous ne pouvions plus nous faire d'illusion.

'Nous savions très bien qu'à partir de cet instant c'était uniquement pour l'honneur des armes que nous combattions, et quand je dis nous, je ne parle pas de moi personnellement, mais de tous les braves enfants qui étaient sous mes ordres; j'avais l'honneur de commander le premier corps d'armée, dont une division, à Wissembourg, a lutté toute la journée, 4,000 hommes contre 40,000; ce premier corps d'armée, qui à Frœschwiller a lutté toute une journée, 35,000 hommes contre 120,000, et, je vous l'affirme, à Sedan comme à Frœschwiller, comme à Wissembourg, nous avons fait notre devoir jusqu'au bout: la division Lartigue a défendu pied à pied les hauteurs de la Moncelle et le village de Daigny; elle a été écrasée par des forces sans cesse renouvelées.

'Quand l'ennemi est entré, toutes les rues étaient pleines de morts et de blessés; le général Lartigue était blessé cruellement, un autre général également blessé grièvement, le colonel d'Andigné était laissé pour mort sur le champ de bataille, tous

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les officiers supérieurs étaient tués ou blessés. Il n'y avait plus rien ; à gauche, le général Wolff a lutté sur les hauteurs jusqu'à deux heures et demie ou trois heures ; il n'a quitté cette position que quand il a été débordé, et il est rentré dans Sedan grièvement blessé. La brigade Carteret a également combattu jusqu'à la fin de la journée ; son général a été blessé.

'Quant à nos batteries, que nous avons portées du côté de l'ouest, sur cette crête, elles ont lutté contre des forces dix fois supérieures comme nombre, et bien inférieures comme portée, comme justesse ; ces batteries se sont fait écraser, broyer : il y en a dans lesquelles il n'est resté ni un servant, ni un cheval ; les caissons sautaient comme un feu d'artifice ; la cavalerie de Margueritte, ces vieux chasseurs d'Afrique à moustache grise, ces braves gens ont chargé trois fois, et trois fois il se sont brisés. Ils ont fait leur devoir ; mais la force humaine a des limites, et, quand nous sommes entrés dans Sedan, nous n'avions plus rien (Applaudissements), ils n'étaient plus capables de rien. (Applaudissements.)'

General Ducrot ended with the following declaration:—'Si on m'avait laissé accomplir ma retraite, nous pouvions perdre des bagages, des canons, peut-être beaucoup de monde, mais il est certain que la masse de cavalerie et d'infanterie aurait passé et que nous n'aurions pas eu sur notre honneur militaire cette sombre tache de la capitulation de Sedan.'

XII.

The Remains of Napoleon III.

'L'AN mil huit cent soixante-treize, le quatorze Janvier, à neuf heures et demie du soir.

'Nous, Hugues Joseph Napoléon Maret, Duc de Bassano, Grand Chambellan de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon III, avons procédé, en vertu de la mission à nous confiée, à la description de l'état du corps de l'Empereur dans sa bière, et avons constaté tous les faits relatifs à la fermeture du cercueil.

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'La bière est en bois d'orme, recouvert de plomb à l'extérieur. L'intérieur est tapissé en étoffe blanche. Le pourtour intérieur est garni d'une ruche de même étoffe et de même couleur.

'Le corps est étendu horizontalement sur le dos. La tête est découverte et repose sur un coussin d'étoffe blanche. Les cheveux de la partie postérieure de la tête ont été coupés pour être gardés en souvenirs par la famille. La barbe a été conservée telle que Sa Majesté la portait de son vivant (moustaches et impériale).

'L'Empereur est revêtu de l'uniforme de général de division, petite tenue, avec le ceinturon et l'épée au côté. Le képi est placé aux pieds de Sa Majesté.

'L'Empereur a sur la poitrine :—

'1° Un crucifix en nacre ; de chaque côté de ce crucifix ont été placées, par les soins de Sa Majesté l'Impératrice, une fleur naturelle et une fleur artificielle.

'2° Le grand cordon et la plaque de l'ordre de la Légion d'Honneur.

'3° La croix de chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur.

'4° La médaille militaire.

'5° La médaille française d'Italie.

'6° La médaille, en or, de la valeur militaire d'Italie.

'7° Le glaive de Suède.

'Les deux mains sont croisées sur la partie inférieure de la poitrine. La gauche est posée sur la droite et tient une paire de gants blancs.

'L'Empereur porte à l'annulaire de la main gauche l'anneau de son mariage, et au petit doigt de la même main l'anneau de Napoléon Ier. Au côté gauche du corps ont été déposées des photographies de Sa Majesté l'Impératrice et de Son Altesse Impériale Monseigneur le Prince Impérial. Aux pieds ont été mis des bouquets et des couronnes d'immortelles qui ont été déposés autour du cercueil pendant l'exposition du corps.

'Après que ces constatations ont été faites, des bandes doubles d'ouate sont étendues sur le visage et sur la poitrine. Un drap de batiste, marqué d'un N couronné, est placé sur les jambes et sur les pieds.

'Le couvercle en orme, revêtu de plomb à l'extérieur, et

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doublé à l'intérieur d'étoffe blanche, est apposé à dix heures vingt minutes, et on procède aussitôt à la soudure de ce couvercle. Cette opération dure une heure. Sur le couvercle est soudée une plaque en plomb portant l'inscription suivante:—

NAPOLÉON III,
EMPEREUR DES FRANÇAIS,
NÉ À PARIS
LE 20 AVRIL 1808,
MORT À CAMDEN PLACE,
CHISLEHURST,
LE 9 JANVIER 1873.
R. I. P.

'Le cercueil en plomb est ensuite déposé dans un autre cercueil en acajou recouvert de velours violet, garni de clous dorés et de huit poignées en cuivre doré.

'Ce cercueil est, à l'intérieur, doublé d'étoffe blanche et bordé de ruches de même étoffe et de même couleur. Le couvercle du second cercueil est recouvert de velours violet et bordé de clous en cuivre doré.

'Au milieu de la surface extérieure de ce couvercle est fixée une plaque en cuivre doré, sur laquelle est gravée la même inscription que celle placée sur le couvercle du cercueil en plomb.

'Au-dessus de l'inscription est une couronne Impériale, au-dessous une croix dorée.

'Le couvercle est fixé au cercueil par des vis à tête carrée et dorée.

'La cérémonie est terminée à onze heures et demie du soir.

'ETAIENT PRÉSENTS:

'Son Altesse Impériale.

'Monseigneur le Prince Napoléon Jérôme.

'Son Altesse le Prince Louis Lucien Bonaparte.

'Son Altesse le Prince Joachim Napoléon Murat.

'Son Altesse le Prince Napoléon Charles Jacques Philippe Grégoire Bonaparte.

'Son Altesse le Prince Achille Charles Louis Napoléon Murat.

'Rouher, ancien Ministre d'Etat,

'Le Général Comte Fleury, Grand Ecuyer de l'Empereur.

'Le Général Prince de la Moskowa, Grand Veneur de l'Empereur.

'Le Duc de Cambacérès, Grand Maître des Cérémonies de l'Empereur.

'Le Docteur Conneau, Premier Médecin de l'Empereur.

'Davillier Comte Regnaud de St.-Jean d'Angély, Premier Ecuyer de l'Empereur.

'Le Comte Clary, Aide-de-Camp de Son Altesse Impériale Monseigneur le Prince Impérial.

'Le Baron Corvisart, Médecin Ordinaire de l'Empereur, adjoint au Premier Médecin de l'Empereur.

'L'Abbé Laine, Chapelain de l'Empereur.

'L'Abbé Cadoret, Chanoine de Saint-Denis.

'Franceschini Piétri, Secrétaire particulier de l'Empereur.

'Filon, Précepteur de Son Altesse Impériale Monseigneur le Prince Impérial.

'Le présent procès-verbal a été rédigé en quatre originaux, qui ont été signés par toutes les personnes présentes à la cérémonie. L'un des originaux est destiné à Sa Majesté l'Impératrice; l'autre à Son Altesse Impériale Monseigneur le Prince Impérial; le troisième à Son Altesse Impériale Monseigneur le Prince Napoléon. Le quatrième sera par nous adressé à M. le Directeur Général des Archives nationales de France, pour être conservé dans le dépôt public.

'Ampliation du présent procès-verbal sera par nous délivrée à chacun des signataires.

'Fait, clos et scellé des armes de l'Empereur et de nos armes à Camden Place, Chislehurst, Kent, Angleterre, à l'heure de minuit moins un quart, le quatorze Janvier, mil huit cent soixante-treize.

'Ont signé:—

'S. A. I. Mgr. le Prince Napoléon Jérôme.

'S. A. le Prince Louis Lucien Bonaparte.

'S. A. le Prince Joachim Napoléon Murat.

'S. A. le Prince Napoléon Charles Jacques Philippe Grégoire Bonaparte.

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'S. A. LE PRINCE ACHILLE CHARLES LOUIS NAPOLÉON MURAT.

'MM. ROUHER.

'LE GÉNÉRAL COMTE FLEURY.

'LE GÉNÉRAL PRINCE DE LA MOSKOWA.

'LE DUC DE CAMBACÉRÈS.

'LE DOCTEUR CONNEAU.

'DAVILLIER COMTE REGNAUD DE ST.-JEAN D'ANGÉLY.

'LE COMTE CLARY.

'LE BARON CORVISART.

'L'ABBÉ LAINE.

'L'ABBÉ CADORET.

'FRANCESCHINI PIÉTRI.

'FILON.

SEAL

'Pour Ampliation,

'DUC DE BASSANO.'

XIII.

The Wills of Napoleon III. and his Son, the Prince Imperial.

'CECI EST MON TESTAMENT.

'Je recommande mon fils et ma femme aux grands Corps de l'Etat, au peuple et à l'armée. L'Impératrice Eugénie a toutes les qualités nécessaires pour bien conduire la Régence, et mon fils montre des dispositions et un jugement qui le rendront digne de ses hautes destinées.

'Qu'il n'oublie jamais la devise du Chef de notre famille, "*Tout pour le Peuple français*;" qu'il se pénètre des écrits du prisonnier de Ste.-Hélène, qu'il étudie les actes et la correspondance de l'Empereur, afin qu'il se souvienne quand les circonstances le permettront que la cause des peuples est la cause de la France.

'Le pouvoir est un lourd fardeau, parce qu'on ne peut pas toujours faire tout le bien qu'on voudrait, et que vos contemporains vous rendent rarement justice; aussi faut-il, pour accomplir

sa mission, avoir en soi la foi et la conscience de son devoir. Il faut penser que du haut des cieux ceux que vous avez aimés vous regardent et vous protègent. C'est l'âme de mon grand oncle qui m'a toujours inspiré et soutenu. Il en sera de même pour mon fils, car il sera toujours digne de son nom.

'Je laisse à l'Impératrice Eugénie tout mon domaine privé. Je désire qu'à la majorité de mon fils elle habite l'Elysée et Biarritz.

'J'espère que mon souvenir lui sera cher, et qu'après ma mort elle oubliera les chagrins que j'ai pu lui causer.

'Quant à mon fils, qu'il garde comme talisman le cachet que je portais à ma montre et qui vient de ma mère; qu'il conserve avec soin tout ce qui me vient de l'Empereur, mon oncle, et qu'il soit persuadé que mon cœur et mon âme restent avec lui.

'Je ne parle pas de mes fidèles serviteurs. Je suis convaincu que l'Impératrice et mon fils ne les abandonneront jamais.

'Je mourrai dans la religion Catholique, Apostolique et Romaine, que mon fils honorera toujours par sa piété.

'(Signé) NAPOLÉON.

'Fait, écrit et signé de ma main, au Palais des Tuileries, le 24 Avril 1865. (Signé) NAPOLÉON.'

'April 24, 1865.

'THIS IS MY WILL.

'I commend my son and my wife to the high constituted authorities of the State (aux grands corps de l'Etat), to the people, and the army. The Empress Eugénie possesses all the qualities requisite for conducting the Regency well, and my son displays a disposition and judgment which will render him worthy of his high destinies. Let him never forget the motto of the head of our family, "Everything for the French people." Let him fix in his mind the writings of the prisoner of St. Helena; let him study the Emperor's deeds and correspondence; finally, let him remember, when circumstances so permit, that the cause of the peoples is the cause of France.

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'Power is a heavy burden, because one cannot always do all the good one could wish, and because your contemporaries seldom render you justice; so that, in order to fulfil one's mission, one must have faith in, and consciousness of, one's duty. It is necessary to consider that from Heaven on high those whom you have loved regard and protect you; it is the soul of my illustrious uncle that has always inspired and sustained me. The like will apply to my son, for he will always be worthy of his name.

'I leave to the Empress Eugénie all my private property. It is my desire that on the majority of my son she shall inhabit the Elysée and Biarritz.

'I trust that my memory will be dear to her, and that after my death she will forget the griefs I may have caused her.

'With regard to my son, let him keep as a talisman the seal I used to wear attached to my watch, and which comes from my mother; let him carefully preserve everything that comes to me from the Emperor, my uncle, and let him be convinced that my heart and my soul remain with him.

'I make no mention of my faithful servants. I am convinced that the Empress and my son will never abandon them.

'I shall die in the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion, which my son will always honour by his piety.

'(Signed) NAPOLEON.

'Done, written, and signed with my hand at the Palace of the Tuileries, April 24, 1865. (Signed) NAPOLEON.'

This will was published in the English papers with the following explanatory letter from the solicitors of the Empress:—

'SIR,—Incorrect statements having repeatedly appeared in both English and foreign newspapers regarding the will of the late Emperor Napoleon, we think it right, as solicitors for the Administratrix, to state that all such rumours as have hitherto been published are without authority and inaccurate. Unavoidable circumstances have occasioned some delay in the publication of the will, but letters of administration *cum testamento annexo* have now been applied for, and, in order to

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avoid the possibility of further misrepresentations, we are authorised to transmit to you a copy of the will for publication.

'The estate has been sworn under 120,000*l.*, but it is right to state that this sum is subject to claims which will reduce the amount actually received by the administratrix to about one-half of the sum named.

'We are, Sir, your obedient servants,

'MARKBY, TARRY, AND STEWART.

'57 COLEMAN STREET, E.C.

'*April* 29.'

The following is the original text of the will of the Prince Imperial:—

'Fait à Camden-place, Chislehurst,
le 26 Février 1879.

'Ceci est mon testament.

'1. Je meurs dans la religion Catholique, Apostolique et Romaine, dans laquelle je suis né.

'2. Je désire que mon corps soit déposé auprès de celui de mon père, en attendant qu'on les transporte, tous deux, là où repose le fondateur de notre maison, au milieu de ce peuple français que nous avons, comme lui, bien aimé.

'3. Ma dernière pensée sera pour ma patrie—c'est pour elle que je voudrais mourir.

'4. J'espère que ma mère me gardera, lorsque je ne serai plus, l'affectueux souvenir que je lui conserverai jusqu'à mon dernier moment.

'5. Que mes amis particuliers, que mes serviteurs, que les partisans de la cause que je représente, soient convaincus que ma reconnaissance envers eux ne cessera qu'avec ma vie.

'6. Je mourrai avec un sentiment de profonde gratitude pour Sa Majesté la Reine d'Angleterre, pour toute la famille royale, et pour le pays où j'ai reçu pendant huit ans une si cordiale hospitalité.

'Je constitue ma mère bien-aimée, l'Impératrice Eugénie, ma légataire universelle, à charge pour elle de supporter les legs suivants.

'Je lègue 200,000 francs à mon cousin le Prince J. N.

APP. XIII.

Murat. Je lègue 100,000 francs à M. F. Piétri, en reconnaissance de ses bons services. Je lègue 100,000 à M. le Baron Corvisart, en reconnaissance de son dévouement. Je lègue 100,000 francs à Mdlle. de Larminat, qui s'est toujours montrée si attachée à ma mère. Je lègue 100,000 à M. A. Filon, mon ancien précepteur. Je lègue 100,000 francs à M. L. N. Conneau; je lègue 100,000 francs à M. N. Espinasse; je lègue 100,000 francs au Captaine A. Bizot—tous trois mes plus anciens amis. Je désire que ma chère mère constitue une pension viagère de 10,000 francs au Prince L. L. Bonaparte. Une pension viagère de 5,000 francs à M. Bâchon, mon ancien écuyer; de 2,500 francs chacune à Mme. Thierry et à Uhlmann. Je désire que tous mes autres serviteurs ne soient jamais privés de leurs appointements. Je désire laisser au Prince N. Charles Bonaparte, au Duc de Bassano, et à M. Rouher, trois des plus beaux souvenirs que mes exécuteurs testamentaires pourront désigner. Je désire laisser aussi au Général Simmons, à Monsieur Strode, et à Monsignor Goddard trois souvenirs que mes exécuteurs testamentaires désigneront parmi les objets de valeur qui m'appartiennent. Je lègue à Monsieur F. Piétri mon épingle surmontée d'une pierre (œil de chat); à Monsieur Corvisart mon épingle (perle rose); à Mademoiselle de Larminat un médaillon contenant les portraits de mon père et de ma mère; à Madame Lebreton ma montre en émail, ornée de mon chiffre en diamants; à MM. Conneau, Espinasse, Bizot, J. N. Murat, A. Fleury, P. de Bourgoing, S. Corvisart, mes armes et uniformes, si ce n'est toutefois le dernier que j'aurai porté et que je laisse à ma mère. Je laisse à M. d'Entraigues une épingle, surmontée d'une perle fine ronde de forme, qui m'a été donnée par l'Impératrice. Je prie ma mère de vouloir bien distribuer aux personnes qui m'ont témoigné de mon vivant quelque attachement les bijoux ou objets de moindre valeur qui pourraient me rappeler à leur souvenir. Je lègue à Madame la Comtesse Clary mon épingle surmontée d'une belle perle fine (a); au Duc de Huescar, mon cousin, mes épées espagnoles.

'NAPOLÉON.

'Le tout écrit de ma propre main.

'Je n'ai pas besoin de recommander à ma mère de ne rien

négliger pour défendre la mémoire de mon grand oncle et de mon père. Je la prie de se souvenir que tant qu'il y aura des Bonapartes la cause impériale aura des représentants. Les devoirs de notre maison envers le pays ne s'éteignent pas avec ma vie ; moi mort, la tâche de continuer l'œuvre de Napoléon Ier et de Napoléon III incombe au fils aîné du Prince Napoléon, et j'espère que ma mère bien-aimée, en le secondant de tout son pouvoir, nous donnera à nous autres qui ne seront plus cette dernière et suprême preuve d'affection. NAPOLÉON. APP. XIII.

'Le 26 Fév. 1879, à Chislehurst.

'Je nomme MM. Rouher et F. Piétri mes exécuteurs testamentaires. (Je dis par F. Piétri, Franceschino Piétri.) N.'

The envelope containing the will was opened and the will read at Camden Place on Friday, June 29, and the following signatures are among those appended to the *procès-verbal* which was drawn up on that occasion:—L. L. Bonaparte, Napoleon Charles Bonaparte, J. N. Murat, Noailles Duc de Mouchy, Duc de Huescar, Duc de Bassano, E. Rouher.

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